


- A O. 



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EECENT DISCISSIONS 



IN 




SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY, AND MORALS. 



BY 



HERBERT SPENCER, 

AUTHOR OP "FIRST PRINCIPLES," "THE PRINCIPLES OF BIOLOGY, 1 ' "THE 
PRINCIPLES OP PSYCHOLOGY, 15 ETC. 



NEW AND ENLARGED EDITION*. 



NEW YORK : 
D. APPLETON AND COMPANY, 

549 & 551 BEOADWAY. 

1879. 



-& 



I.** 



^v 



Ekteeed, according to Act of Congress, in the year 1871, 

By D. APPLETON & COMPANY, 

In the Office of the Librarian of Congress, at "Washington. 



PREFACE 



The present volume consists mainly of matter that is 
new to the American public. Three of the essays have 
not before appeared in this country, and two of the others, 
issued as a pamphlet, have had so small a circulation as 
to have been seen by but few readers. These several 
discussions have been drawn from Mr. Spencer at various 
times to correct misapprehensions and misrepresentations 
that have been made regarding the doctrines of his system 
of Philosophy. Some of them form valuable extensions 
of these doctrines, and all will be useful in promoting their 
right interpretation. Why the sixth article has been 
taken from another volume and included in this collec- 
tion, requires a few words of explanation. 

Seventeen years ago, Mr. Spencer published an elabo- 
rate Keview article entitled " The Genesis of Science," in 
which he objected to Comte's views of the classification 
of the Sciences. Although Mr. Spencer's criticisms in- 
volved a radical dissent from the peculiar views of M. 
Comte, and what was held as fundamental in his philoso- 
phy, yet upon the publication of his own philosophical 



4 PREFACE. 

system Mr. Spencer found himself ranked as a positivist 
and a follower of Comte. Against this he repeatedly pro- 
tested in public letters ; but the charge was so continually 
reiterated that at length he found himself compelled to 
make a more formal statement of the differences between 
himself and the French philosopher. The result of this 
was a pamphlet published in 1864, in which he followed 
the rejection of Comte's classification by the promulgation 
of his own view, and appended a detailed statement of 
the differences between his doctrine and the doctrines of 
M. Comte. Some of his views of classification having 
been adversely criticised by Mr. Bain and Mr. Mill, he 
has replied to their strictures in a new article in the pres- 
ent volume. The general question is one of great interest 
to scientific students ; and, for the convenience of those 
who desire to form an intelligent judgment of Mr. Spen- 
cer's case, both as contrasted with that of Comte, and on 
its own independent merits, it has been thought desirable 
to incorporate the original article on " The Genesis of 
Science " in this collection. Though placed last, it should 
be read first by those not already familiar with the dis- 
cussion. 



The present revised edition of " Recent Discussions " 
contains six additional articles, and completes the first 
collection yet made of Mr. Spencer's miscellaneous essays. 

Kew Yoke:, Septondcr, 1S72. 



CONTENTS. 



PA03 

I. — MOEALS AND MOEAL SENTIMENTS, 7 

II. OEIGIN OF ANIMAL- WOESHIP, 31 

III. — THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES, . . . .57 

IT. POSTSCEIPT — EEPLYING TO CELTICISMS, .... 87 

V. — SEASONS FOE DISSENTING FEOM THE PHILOSOPHY OF COMTE, 113 
VI. — OF LAWS IN GENEEAL, AND THE OEDEE OF THEIE DISCOYEET, 137 

VII. — THE GENESIS OF SCIENCE, 155 

£TIII. SPECIALIZED ADMINISTEATION, 235 

IX. — WHAT IS ELECTEICITY? 281 

X. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SUN, 297 

L> XI. THE COLLECTIYE WISDOM, 311 

XII. POLITICAL FETICHISM, .♦..»«• 319 

XIII. — ME. MAETINEAU ON EVOLUTION, 329 



MORALS AND MORAL SENTIMENTS. 

[FROM THE FORTNIGHTLY REVIEW, APRIL, 1871.] 



MOKALS AND MOEAL SENTIMENTS. 



If a writer who discusses unsettled questions takes up 
every gauntlet thrown down to him, polemical writing 
will absorb much of his energy. Having a power of 
work which unfortunately does not suffice for executing 
with any thing like due rapidity the task I have under- 
taken, I have made it a policy to avoid controversy as 
much as possible, even at the cost of being seriously mis- 
understood. Hence it happened that, when, in Macmil 
larCs Magazine for July, 1869, Mr. Richard Hutton pub- 
lished, under the title of " A Questionable Parentage for 
Morals," a criticism upon a doctrine of mine, I decided 
to let his misrepresentations remain unnoticed until, in 
the course of my work, I arrived at the stage where, by a 
full exposition of this doctrine, they would be set aside. 
It did not occur to me that, in the mean time, these erro- 
neous statements, accepted as true statements, would be 
repeated by other writers, and my views commented upon 
as untenable. This, however, has happened. In more 
periodicals than one, I have seen it asserted that Mr. 
Hutton has effectually disposed of my hypothesis. Sup- 
posing that this hypothesis has been rightly expressed by 
Mr. Hutton, Sir John Lubbock, in his " Origin of Civili- 
zation," etc., has been led to express a partial dissent ; 
which I think he would not have expressed had my own 
exposition been before him. Mr. Mivart, too, in his 



10 MORALS AND MORAL SENTIMENTS. 

recent " Genesis of Spscies," has been similarly betrayed 
into misapprehensions. And now Sir Alexander Grant, 
following the same lead, has conveyed to the readers of 
the Fortnightly Review another of these conceptions, 
which is but very partially true. Thus I find myself 
compelled to say as much as will serve to prevent further 
spread of the mischief. 

If a general doctrine concerning a highly- involved 
class of phenomena could be adequately presented in a 
single paragraph of a letter, the writing of books would 
be superfluous. In the brief exposition of certain ethical 
doctrines held by me, which is given in Prof. Bain's 
" Mental and Moral Science," it is stated that they are — 

" as yet nowhere fully expressed. They form part of the more gen- 
eral doctrine of Evolution which he is engaged in working out ; and 
they are at present to be gathered only from scattered passages. It 
is true that, in his first work, ' Social Statics,' he presented what he 
then regarded as a tolerably complete view of one division of Morals. 
But, without abandoning this view, he now regards it as inadequate 
— more especially in respect of its basis." 

Mr. Hutton, however, taking the bare enunciation of 
one part of this basis, deals with it critically ; and, in the 
absence of any exposition of it by me, sets forth what he 
supposes to be my grounds for it, and proceeds to show 
that they are unsatisfactory. 

If, in his anxiety to suppress what he doubtless re- 
gards as a pernicious doctrine, Mr. Hutton could not wait 
until I had explained myself, it might have been expected 
that he would use whatever information was to be had 
for rightly construing it. So far from seeking out such 
information, however, he has, in a way for which I can- 
not account, ignored the information immediately before 
him. 



PRIMARY BASIS OF MORALS. 11 

The title which Mr. Hutton has chosen for his 
criticism is, "A Questionable Parentage for Morals." 
Now, he has ample means of knowing that I allege a pri- 
mary basis of Morals, quite independent of that which he 
describes and rejects. I do not refer merely to the fact 
that, having, when he reviewed " Social Statics," x ex- 
pressed his very decided dissent from this primary basis, 
he must have been aware that I allege it ; for he may say 
that in the long interval which has elapsed he had for- 
gotten all abDut it. But I refer to the distinct enuncia- 
tion of this primary basis in that letter to Mr. Mill from 
which he quotes. In a preceding paragraph of the letter, 
I have explained that, while I accept utilitarianism in the 
abstract, I do not accept that current utilitarianism which 
recognizes for the guidance of conduct nothing beyond 
empirical generalizations ; and I have contended that — 

" Morality, properly so called — the science of right conduct — has 
for its object to determine how and why certain modes of conduct 
are detrimental, and certain other modes beneficial. These good and 
bad results cannot be accidental, but must be necessary consequences 
of the constitution of things ; and I conceive it to be the business of 
Moral Science to deduce, from the laws of life and the conditions of 
existence, what kinds of action necessarily tend to produce happi- 
ness, and what kinds to produce unhappiness. Having done this, its 
deductions are to be recognized as laws of conduct; and are to be 
conformed to irrespective of a direct estimation of happiness or 
misery." 

Nor is this the only enunciation of what I conceive to 
be the primary basis of morals, contained in this same 
letter. A subsequent paragraph, separated by four lines 
only from that which Mr. Hutton extracts, commences 
thus : 

" Progressing civilization, which is of necessity a succession of 
compromises between old and new, requires a perpetual readjust- 

1 See Prospective fieview for January, 1852. 



L2 MOEALS AJSTD MOEAL SEXTIMENTS. 

inent of the compromise between the ideal and the practicable in 
social arrangements : to which end, both elements of the compro- 
mise must be kept in view. If it is true that pure rectitude pre- 
scribes a system of things far too good for men as they are, it is not 
less true that mere expediency does not of itself tend to establish a 
system of things any better than that which exists. "While absolute 
morality owes to expediency the checks which prevent it from rush- 
ing into Utopian absurdities, expediency is indebted to absolute mo- 
rality for all stimulus to improvement. Granted that we are chiefly 
interested in ascertaining what is relatively right, it still follows that 
we must first consider what is absolutely right ; since the one con- 
ception presupposes the other." 

I do not see Low there could well be a more em- 
phatic assertion that there exists a primary basis of mor- 
als independent of, and in a sense antecedent to, that 
which is furnished by experiences of utility ; and, conse- 
quently, independent of, and in a sense antecedent to, 
those moral sentiments which I conceive to be generated 
by such experiences. Yet no one could gather from Mr. 
Hutton's article that I assert this ; or would even find 
reasons for a faint suspicion that I do so. From the 
reference made to my further views, he would infer my 
acceptance of that empirical utilitarianism which I have 
expressly repudiated. And the title which Mr. Ilutton 
gives to his paper clearly asserts, by implication, that I 
recognize no " parentage for morals ? ' beyond that of the 
accumulation and organization of the effects of experi- 
ence. I cannot believe that Mr. Ilutton intended to con- 
vey this erroneous impression. lie was, I suppose, too 
much absorbed in contemplating the proposition he com- 
bats to observe, or, at least, to attach any weight to, the 
propositions which accompany it. But I regret that he 
did not perceive the mischief he was likely to do me by 
spreading this one-sided statement. 

I pass now to the particular question at issue — not 



GENESIS OF MOKAL SENTIMENTS. 16 

the " parentage for morals," but the parentage of moral 
sentiments. In his version of my view on this more spe- 
cial doctrine, Mr. Hutton has similarly, I regret to say, 
neglected the data which would have helped him to draw 
an approximately true outline of it. It cannot well be 
that the existence of such data was unknown to him. 
They are contained in the u Principles of Psychology ; " 
and Mr. Hutton reviewed that work when it was first 
published. 1 In the chapter on The Feelings, which occurs 
near the end of that work, there is sketched out a pro- 
cess of genesis by no means like that which Mr. Hutton 
indicates ; and had he turned to that chapter he would 
have seen that his description of the genesis of the moral 
sentiments out of organized experiences is not such a one 
as I should have given. Let me quote a passage from 
that chapter : 

" Not only are those emotions which form the immediate stimuli 
to actions thus explicable, but the like explanation applies to the 
emotions that leave the subject of them comparatively passive : as, 
for instance, the emotion produced by beautiful scenery. The grad- 
ually increasing complexity in the groups of sensations and ideas co- 
ordinated, ends in the coordination of those vast aggregations of 
them which a grand landscape excites and suggests. The infant 
taken into the midst of mountains is totally unaffected by them ; 
but is delighted with the small group of attributes and relations pre- 
sented in a toy. The child can appreciate, and be pleased with, the 
more complicated relations of household* objects and localities, the 
garden, the field, and the street. But it is only in youth and mature 
age, when individual things and small assemblages of them have 
become familiar and automatically cognizable, that those immense 
assemblages which landscapes present can be adequately grasped, 
and the highly aggregated states of consciousness produced by them, 
experienced. Then, however, the various minor groups of states, 
that have been in earlier days severally produced by trees, by fields, 

1 His criticism will be found in the National Review for January, 1856, 
under the title " Atheism." 



14: MORALS AND MORAL SENTIMENTS. 

by streams, by cascades, by rocks, by precipices, by mountains, by 
clouds, are aroused together. Along with the sensations immediate- 
ly received, there are partially excited the myriads of sensations that 
have been in times past received from objects such as those pre- 
sented ; further, there are partially excited the various incidental 
feelings that were experienced on all these countless past occasions; 
and there are probably also excited certain deeper, but now vague, 
combinations of states, that were organized in the race during bar- 
barous times, when its pleasurable activities were chiefly among the 
woods and waters. And out of all these excitations, some of them 
actual, but most of them nascent, is composed the emotion which a 
fine landscape produces in us." 

It is, I think, amply manifest that the processes here 
indicated are not to be taken as intellectual processes — 
not as processes in which recognized relations between 
pleasures and their antecedents, or intelligent adaptations 
of means to ends, form the dominant elements. The state 
of mind produced by an aggregate of picturesque objects 
is not one resolvable into propositions. The sentiment 
does not contain within itself any consciousness of causes 
and consequences of happiness. The vague recollections 
of other beautiful scenes and other delightful days which 
it dimly rouses, are not aroused because of any rational 
coordinations of ideas that haYe been formed in by -gone 
clays. Mr. Hutton, however, has assumed that in the 
genesis of moral feelings as due to inherited experiences 
of the pleasures and pains arising from certain modes of 
conduct, I am speaking of reasoned-out experiences — 
experiences consciously accumulated and generalized. He 
altogether overlooks the fact that the genesis of emotions 
is distinguished from the genesis of ideas in this : that 
whereas the ideas are composed of elements that are 
simple, definitely related, and (in the case of general 
ideas) constantly related, emotions are composed of enor- 
mously complex aggregates of elements which are never 



GENESIS OF EMOTIONS. 13 

twice alike, and that stand in relations which are never 
twice alike. The difference in the resulting modes of 
consciousness is this : In the genesis of an idea the suc- 
cessive experiences, be they of sounds, colors, touches, 
tastes, or be thej of the special objects that combine many 
of these into groups, have so much in common that each, 
when it occurs, can be definitely thought of as like those 
which preceded it. But in the genesis of an emotion the 
successive experiences so far differ that each of them, 
when it occurs, suggests past experiences which are not 
specifically similar, but have only a general similarity ; 
and, at the same time, it suggests benefits or evils in past 
experience which likewise are various in their special 
natures, though they have a certain community of general 
nature. Hence it results that the consciousness aroused 
is a multitudinous, confused consciousness, in which, along 
with a certain kind of combination among the impressions 
received from without, there is a vague cloud of ideal 
combinations akin to them, and a vague mass of ideal 
feelings of pleasure or pain that were associated with 
these. We have abundant proof that feelings grow up 
without reference to recognized causes and consequences, 
and without the possessor of them being able to say why 
they have grown up ; though analysis, nevertheless, shows 
that they have been formed out of connected experiences. 
The familiar fact to which, I suppose, almost every one 
can testify, that a kind of jam which was, during child- 
hood, repeatedly taken after medicine, may become by 
simple association of sensations so nauseous that it cannot 
be tolerated in after-life, illustrates clearly enough the 
way in which repugnances may be established by habitual 
association of feelings, without any idea of causal connec- 
tion ; or rather, in spite of the knowledge that there is no 
causal connection. Similarly with pleasurable emotions. 



16 MOEALS AND MORAL SEOTIMENTS. 

The cawing of a rook is not in itself an agreeable sound 
— musically considered, it is very much the contrary. 
Yet the cawing of rooks usually produces in people very 
pleasurable feelings — feelings which most of them suppose 
to result from the quality of the sound itself. Only the 
few who are given to self- analysis are aware that the 
cawing of rooks is agreeable to them because it has been 
connected with countless of their greatest gratifications — 
with the gathering of wild-flowers in childhood ; with 
Saturday-afternoon excursions in school-boy days ; with 
midsummer holidays in the country, when books were 
thrown aside, and lessons were replaced by games and 
adventures in the fields ; with fresh, sunny mornings in 
after-years, when a walking-excursion was an immense 
relief from toil. As it is, this sound, though not causally 
related to all these multitudinous and varied past delights, 
but only often associated with them, can no more be 
heard without rousing a dim consciousness of these de- 
lights, than the voice of an old friend unexpectedly coming 
into the house can be heard without suddenly raising a 
wave of that feeling that has resulted from the pleasures 
of past companionship. If we are to understand the 
genesis of emotions, either in the individual or in the 
race, we must take account of this all-important process. 
Mr. Hutton, however, apparently overlooking it, and not 
having reminded himself, by referring to the " Principles 
of Psychology," that I insist upon it, represents my hy- 
pothesis to be that a certain sentiment results from the 
consolidation of intellectual conclusions ! He speaks of 
me as believing that " what seems to us now the ' neces- 
sary' intuitions and a priori assumptions of human 
nature, are likely to prove, when scientifically analyzed, 
nothing but a similar conglomeration of our ancestors' 
oest observations and most useful empirical rules." He 



EXPERIENCES OF UTILITY. 17 

supposes me to think that men having, in past times, come 
to see that truthfulness was useful, " the habit of approving 
truth-speaking and fidelity to engagements, which was 
first based on this ground of utility, became so rooted, 
that the utilitarian ground of it was forgotten, and we find 
ourselves springing to the belief in truth-speaking and 
fidelity to engagements from an inherited tendency." 
Similarly throughout, Mr. Hutton has so used the word 
"utility," and so interpreted it on my behalf, as to make 
me appear to mean that moral sentiment is formed out 
of conscious generalizations respecting what is beneficial 
and what detrimental. "Were such my hypothesis, his 
criticisms would be very much to the point ; but as such 
is not my hypothesis, they fall to the ground. The ex- 
periences of utility I refer to are those which become 
registered, not as distinctly-recognized connections be- 
tween certain kinds of acts and certain kinds of remote 
results, but those which become registered in the shape 
of associations between groups of feelings that have often 
recurred together, though the relation between them has 
not been consciously generalized — associations the origin 
of which may be as little perceived as is the origin 
of the pleasure given by the sounds of a rookery; but 
which, nevertheless, have arisen in the course of daily 
converse with things, and serve as incentives or de- 
terrents. 

In the paragraph which Mr. Hutton has extracted 
from my letter to Mr. Mill, I have indicated an analogy 
between those effects of emotional experiences out of 
which I believe moral sentiments have been developed, 
and those effects of intellectual experiences out of which 
I believe space-intuitions have been developed. Bightly 
considering that the first of these hypotheses cannot stand 
if the last is disproved, Mr. Hutton has directed part of 



18 MOBALS AXD MOEAL SENTIMENTS. 

his attack against this last. But would it not have been 
well if he had referred to the " Principles of Psychology," 
where this last hypothesis is set forth at length, before 
criticising it? Would it not have been well to have 
given an abstract of my own description of the process, 
instead of substituting what he supposes my description 
must be ? Any one who turns to the " Principles of Psy- 
chology" (first edition, pp. 218-245), and reads the two 
chapters, The Perception of Body as presenting Statical 
Attributes, and The Perception of Space, will £nd that 
Mr. Hutton's account of my view on this matter has 
given him no notion of the view as it is expressed by me ; 
and will, perhaps, be less inclined to smile than he was 
when he read Mr. Hutton's account. I cannot here do 
more than thus imply the invalidity of such part of Mr. 
Hutton's argument as proceeds upon this incorrect repre- 
sentation. The pages that would be required for properly 
explaining the doctrine that space-intuitions result from 
organized experiences may be better used for explaining 
this analogous doctrine at present before us. This I will 
now endeavor to do ; not indirectly by correcting misap- 
prehensions, but directly by an exposition which shall be 
as brief as the extremely involved nature of the process 
allows. 

An infant in arms, that is old enough to gaze at 
objects around with some vague recognition, smiles in 
response to the laughing face and soft, caressing voice of 
its mother. Let there come some one who, with an angry 
face, speaks to it in lond, harsh tones. The smile dis- 
appears, the features contract into an expression of pain, 
and, beginning to cry, it turns away its head and makes 
such movements of escape as are possible. What is the 
meaning of these facts? Why does not the frown make 
it smile, and the mother's laugh make it weep ? There 



INFANT EMOTION AND EXPRESSION. 19 

is but one answer. Already in its developing brain there 
is coming into play the structure through which one 
cluster of visual and auditory impressions excites pleasur- 
able feelings, and the structure through which another 
cluster of visual and auditory impressions excites painful 
feelings. The infant knows no more about the relation 
existing between a ferocious expression of face, and the 
evils that may follow the perception of it, than the young 
bird just out of its nest knows of the possible pain and 
death which may be inflicted by a man coming toward 
it ; and as certainly in the one case as in the other, the 
alarm felt is due to a partially-established nervous struct- 
ure. "Why does this partially-established nervous struct- 
ure betray its presence thus early in the human being ? 
Simply because, in the past experiences of the human 
race, smiles and gentle tones in those around have been 
the habitual accompaniments of pleasurable feelings; 
while pains of many kinds, immediate and more or less 
remote, have been continually associated with the im- 
pressions received from knit brows and set teeth and 
grating voice. Much deeper down than the history of 
the human race must we go to find the beginnings of 
these connections. The appearances and sounds which 
excite in the infant a vague dread, indicate danger ; and 
do so because they are the physiological accompaniments 
of destructive action — some of them common to man and 
inferior mammals, and consequently understood by inferior 
mammals, as every puppy shows us. What we call the 
natural language of anger, is due to a partial contraction 
of those muscles which actual combat would call into 
play ; and all marks of irritation, down to that passing 
shade over the brow which accompanies slight annoyance, 
are incipient stages of these same contractions. Conversely 
with the natural language of pleasure, and of that state 



20 MOEALS AND MOEAL SENTIMENTS. 

of mind which we call amicable feeling : this, too, has a 
physiological interpretation. 1 

Let us pass now from the infant in arms to the chil- 
dren in the nursery. What have the experiences of each 
one of these been doing in aid of the emotional develop- 
ment we are considering % "While its limbs have been 
growing more agile by exercise, its manipulative skill 
increasing by practice, its perceptions of objects growing 
by use quicker, more accurate, more comprehensive ; the 
associations between these two sets of impressions received 
from those around, and the pleasures and pains received 
along with them, or after them, have been by frequent 
repetition made stronger, and their adjustments better. 
The dim sense of pain and the vague glow of delight 
which the infant felt, have, in the urchin, severally taken 
shapes that are more definite. The angry voice of a 
nurse-maid no longer arouses only a formless feeling of 
dread, but also a specific idea of the slap that may follow. 
The frown on the face of a bigger brother, along with the 
primitive, indefinable sense of ill, brings the sense of ills 
that are definable in thought as kicks, and cuffs, and 
pullings of hair, and losses of toys. The faces of parents, 
looking now sunny, now gloomy, have grown to be re- 
spectively associated with multitudinous forms of gratifi- 
cation and multitudinous forms of discomfort or privation. 
Hence these appearances and sounds, which imply amity 
or enmity in those around, become symbolic of happiness 
and misery ; so that eventually perception of the one set 
or the other can scarcely occur without raising a wave of 
pleasurable feeling or of painful feeling. The body of 
this wave is still substantially of the same nature as it was 

1 Hereafter I hope to elucidate at length these phenomena of expression. 
For the present, I can refer only to such further indications as are contained 
in two essays on The Physiology of Laughter and the Origin and Function of 
Music. 



EMOTIONS OF CHILDREN AND SAVAGES. 21 

at first; for though in each of these multitudinous ex- 
periences a special set of facial and vocal signs has been 
connected with a special set of pleasures or pains, yet 
since these pleasures or pains have been immensely varied 
in their kinds and combinations, and since the signs that 
preceded them were in no two cases quite alike, it results 
that to the last the consciousness produced remains as 
vague as it is voluminous. The myriads of partially- 
aroused ideas resulting from past experiences are massed 
together and superposed, so as to form an aggregate in 
which nothing is distinct, but which has the character of 
being pleasurable or painful according to the nature of 
its original components ; the chief difference between this 
developed feeling and the feeling aroused in the infant 
being, that on bright or dark background forming the 
body of it, may now be sketched out in thought the par- 
ticular pleasures or pains which the particular circum- 
stances suggest as likely, 

What must be the working of this process under the 
conditions of aboriginal life ? The emotions given to the 
young savage by the natural language of love and hate in 
the members of his tribe, gain first a partial definiteness 
in respect to his intercourse with his family and play- 
mates ; and he learns by experience the utility, in so far 
as his own ends are concerned, of avoiding courses which 
call from others manifestations of anger, and taking courses 
which call from them manifestations of pleasure. ]STot 
that he consciously generalizes. He does not at that age, 
probably not at any age, formulate his experiences in the 
general principle that it is well for him to do things which 
bring smiles from others, and to avoid doing things which 
bring frowns. What happens is, that having, in the way 
shown, inherited this connection between the perception 
of anger in others and the feeling of dread, and having 



22 MORALS AND MORAL SENTIMENTS. 

discovered that particular acts of his bring on this anger, 
he cannot subsequently think of committing one of these 
acts without thinking of the resulting anger, and feeling 
more or less of the resulting dread. He has no thought 
of the utility or inutility of the act itself; the deterrent is 
the mainly vague, but partially definite, fear of evil that 
may follow. So understood, the deterring emotion is 
one that has grown out of experiences of utility, using that 
word in its ethical sense ; and if we ask why this dreaded 
anger is called forth from others, we shall habitually find 
that it is because the forbidden act entails pain some- 
where — is negatived by utility. On passing from the 
domestic injunctions to the injunctions current in the 
tribe, we see no less clearly how these emotions produced 
by approbation and reprobation come to be connected in 
experience with actions that are beneficial to the tribe, 
and actions that are detrimental to the tribe ; and how 
there consequently grow up incentives to the one class of 
actions and prejudices against the other class. From early 
boyhood the young savage hears recounted the daring 
deeds of his chief — hears them in words of praise, and sees 
all faces glowing with admiration. From time to time 
also he listens while some one's cowardice is described 
in tones of scorn, and with contemptuous metaphors, and 
sees him meet with derision and insult whenever he 
appears. That is to say, one of the things that comes to 
be strongly associated in his mind with smiling faces, 
which are symbolical of pleasures in general, is courage ; 
and one of the things that comes to be associated in his 
mind with frowns and other marks of enmity, which form 
his symbol of unhappiness, is cowardice. These feelings 
are not formed in him because he has reasoned his way 
to the truth that courage is useful to the tribe, and, by 
implication, to himself, or to the truth that cowcTrdice is a 



OTHEE FOEMS OF EESTEAINT. 23 

cause of evil. In adult life lie may, perhaps, see this ; but 
lie certainly does not see it at the time when bravery is 
thus associated in his consciousness with all that is good, 
and cowardice with all that is bad. Similarly there are 
produced in him feelings of inclination or repugnance 
toward other lines of conduct that have become estab- 
lished or interdicted, because they are beneficial or inju- 
rious to the tribe; though neither the young nor the 
adults know why they have become established or 
interdicted. Instance the praiseworthiness of wife-steal- 
ing, and the viciousness of marrying within the tribe. 

"We may now ascend a stage to an order of incentives 
and restraints derived from these. The primitive belief 
is that every dead man becomes a demon, who remains 
somewhere at hand, may at any moment return, may give 
aid or do mischief, and is continually propitiated. Hence, 
among other agents whose approbation or reprobation is 
contemplated by the savage as a consequence of his con- 
duct, are the spirits of his ancestors. "When a child he is 
told of their deeds, now in triumphant tones, now in whis- 
pers of horror ; and the instilled belief that they may inflict 
some vaguely-imagined but fearful evil, or give some great 
help, becomes a powerful incentive or deterrent. Espe- 
cially does this happen when the narrative is of a chief, 
distinguished for his strength, his ferocity, his persistence 
in that revenge which the experiences of the savage make 
him regard as beneficial and virtuous. The conscious- 
ness that such a chief, dreaded by neighboring tribes, and 
dreaded, too, by members of his own tribe, may reappear 
and punish those who have disregarded his injunctions, 
becomes a powerful motive. But it is clear, in the first 
place, that the imagined anger and the imagined satisfac- 
tion of this deified chief are simply transfigured forms of 
the anger and satisfaction displayed by those around ; and 



24: MORALS AND MORAL SENTIMENTS. 

that the feelings accompanying such imaginations have the 
same original root in the experiences which have associated 
an average of painful results with the manifestation of 
another's anger, and an average of pleasurable results with 
the manifestation of another's satisfaction. And it is 
clear, in the second place, that the actions thus forbidden 
and encouraged must be mostly actions that are respec- 
tively detrimental and beneficial to the tribe ; since the 
successful chief is usually a better judge than the rest, 
and has the preservation of the tribe at heart. Hence 
experiences of utility, consciously or unconsciously organ- 
ized, underlie his injunctions ; and the sentiments which 
prompt obedience are, though very indirectly and without 
the knowledge of those who feel them, referable to expe- 
riences of utility. 

This transfigured form of restraint, differing at first 
but little from the original form, admits of immense 
development. Accumulating traditions, growing in 
grandeur as they are repeated from generation to genera- 
tion, make more and more superhuman the early-recorded 
hero of the race. His powers of inflicting punishment 
and giving happiness become ever greater, more multi- 
tudinous and varied; so that the dread of divine dis- 
pleasure, and the desire to obtain divine approbation, 
acquire a certain largeness and generality. Stiil the con- 
ceptions remain anthropomorphic. The revengeful deity 
continues to be thought of in terms of human emotions, 
and continues to be represented as displaying these emo- 
tions in human ways. Moreover, the sentiments of right 
and duty, so far as they have become developed, refer 
mainly to divine commands and interdicts ; and have 
little reference to the natures of the acts commanded or 
interdicted. In the intended offering up of Isaac, in the 
sacrifice of Jephthah's daughter, and in the hewing to 



EARLY MEANING OF EIGHT AND WRONG. 25 

pieces of Agag, as much as in the countless atrocities com- 
mitted from religious motives by other early historic 
races, we see that the morality and immorality of actions, 
as we understand them, are at first little recognized ; and 
that the feelings, chiefly of dread, which serve in place of 
them, are feelings felt toward the unseen beings supposed 
to issue the commands and interdicts. 

Here it will be said that, as just admitted, these are 
not the moral sentiments properly so called. This is true. 
They are simply sentiments that precede and make 
possible those highest sentiments which do not refer either 
to personal benefits or evils to be expected from men, or 
to more remote rewards and punishments. Several com- 
ments are, however, called forth by this criticism. One 
is, that if we glance back at past beliefs and their correla- 
tive feelings, as shown in Dante's poem, in the mystery- 
plays of the middle ages, in St. Bartholomew massacres, 
in burnings for heresy, we get proof that in comparatively 
modern times right and wrong meant little else than sub- 
ordination or insubordination — to a divine ruler primarily 
and under him to a human ruler. Another is, that down 
to our own day this conception largely prevails, and is 
even embodied in elaborate ethical works — instance the 
"Essays on the Principles of Morality," by Jonathan 
Dymond, which recognizes no ground of moral obligation, 
save the will of God as expressed in the current creed. 
And yet a further is, that while in sermons the torments 
of the damned and the joys of the blessed are set forth as 
the dominant deterrents and incentives, and while we 
have prepared for us printed instructions " how to make 
the best of both worlds," it cannot be denied that the 
feelings which impel and restrain men are still largely 
composed of elements like those operative on the savage — 
the dread, partly vague, partly specific, associated with 
2 



26 MORALS AND MORAL SENTIMENTS. 

the idea of reprobation, human and divine, and the sense 
of satisfaction, partly vague, partly specific, associated 
with the idea of approbation, human and divine. 

But during the growth of that civilization which has 
been made possible by these ego-altruistic sentiments, 
there have been slowly evolving the altruistic sentiments. 
Development of these has gone on only as fast as society 
has advanced to a state in which the activities are mainly 
peaceful. The root of all the altruistic sentiments is 
sympathy ; and sympathy could become dominant only 
when the mode of life, instead of being one that habitually 
inflicted direct pain, became one which conferred direct 
and indirect benefits; the pains inflicted being mainly 
incidental and indirect. Adam Smith made a large step 
toward this truth when he recognized sympathy as giving 
rise to these superior controlling emotions. His " Theory 
of Moral Sentiments," however, requires to be supple- 
mented in two ways. The natural process by which 
sympathy becomes developed into a more and more im- 
portant element of human nature, has to be explained ; 
and there has also to be explained the process by which 
sympathy produces the highest and most complex of the 
altruistic sentiments — that of justice. Respecting the 
first process, I can here do no more than say that sym- 
pathy may be proved, both inductively and deductively, 
to be the concomitant of gregariousness ; the two having 
all along increased by reciprocal aid. Multiplication has 
ever tended to force into an association, more or less close, 
all creatures having kinds of food and supplies of food 
that permit association; and established psychological 
laws warrant the inference that some sympathy will 
inevitably result from habitual manifestations of feelings 
in presence of one another, and that the gregarionsness 
being augmented by the increase of sympathy, further 



DEVELOPMENT OF SYMPATHY. 27 

facilitates the development of sympathy. But there are 
negative and positive checks upon this development — 
negative, because sympathy cannot advance faster than 
intelligence advances, since it presupposes the power of 
interpreting the natural language of the various feelings, 
and of mentally representing those feelings ; positive, 
because the immediate needs of self-preservation are often 
at variance with its promptings, as, for example, during 
the predatory stages of human progress. For explanations 
of the second process, I must refer to " The Principles of 
Psychology " (§ 202, first edition, and § 215, second edition) 
and to " Social Statics," Part II., Chapter Y. 1 Asking that 
in default of space these explanations may be taken for 
granted, let me here point out in what sense even sym- 
pathy, and the sentiments that result from it, are due 
to experiences of utility. If we suppose all thought of 
rewards or punishments, immediate or remote, to be left 
out of consideration, it is clear that any one who hesitates 
to inflict a pain because of the vivid representation of that 
pain which rises in his consciousness, is restrained, not by 
any sense of obligation or by any formulated doctrine of 
utility, but by the painful association established in him. 
And it is clear that if, after repeated experiences of the 
moral discomfort he has felt from witnessing the unhappi- 
ness indirectly caused by some of his acts, he is led to check 
himself when again tempted to those acts, the restraint is 
of like nature. Conversely with the pleasure-giving acts : 
repetitions of kind deeds, and experiences of the sympa- 
thetic gratifications that follow, tend continually to make 
stronger the association between such deeds and feelings 
of happiness. 

1 1. may add that in " Social Statics," Chapter XXX., 1 have indicated, in 
a general way, the causes of the development of sympathy and the restraints 
upon its development — confining the discussion, however, to the case of the 
human race, my suhject limiting me to that. The accompanying teleology I 
now disclaim. 



28 MORALS AND MOEAL SENTIMENTS. 

Eventually these experiences may be consciously gen- 
eralized, and there may result a deliberate pursuit of the 
sympathetic gratifications. There may also come to be 
distinctly recognized the truths that the remoter results 
are respectively detrimental and beneficial — that due 
regard for others is conducive to ultimate personal welfare 
and disregard of others to ultimate personal disaster ; and 
then there may become current such summations of expe- 
rience as " honesty is the best policy." But so far from 
regarding these intellectual recognitions of utility as 
preceding and causing the moral sentiment, I regard the 
moral sentiment as preceding such recognitions of utility, 
and making them possible. The plsasures and pains 
directly resulting in experience from sympathetic and 
unsympathetic actions, had first to be slowly associated 
with such actions, and the resulting incentives and de- 
terrents frequently obeyed, before there could arise the 
perceptions that sympathetic and unsympathetic ac- 
tions are remotely beneficial or detrimental to the actor ; 
and they had to be obeyed still longer and more gen- 
erally before there could arise the perceptions that they 
are socially beneficial or detrimental. When, however, 
the remote effects, personal and social, have gained 
general recognition, are expressed in current maxims, 
and lead to injunctions having the religious sanction, 
the sentiments that prompt sympathetic actions and 
check unsympathetic ones are immensely strengthened 
by their alliances. Approbation and reprobation, divine 
and human, come to be associated in thought with 
the sympathetic and unsympathetic actions respectively. 
The commands of the creed, the legal penalties, and 
the code of social conduct, unitedly enforce them ; 
and every child as it grows up, daily has impressed 
on it, by the words and faces and voices of those around, 



FURTHER EVOLUTION OF SYMPATHY. 29 

tlie authority of these highest principles of conduct. And 
now we may see why there arises a belief in the special 
sacredness of these highest principles, and a sense of the 
supreme authority of the altruistic sentiments answering 
to them. Many of the actions which, in early social 
states, received the religious sanction and gained public 
approbation, had the drawback that such sympathies as 
existed were outraged, and there was hence an imperfect 
satisfaction. "Whereas these altruistic actions, while simi- 
larly having the religious sanction and gaining public 
approbation, bring a sympathetic consciousness of pleas- 
ure given or of pain prevented*; and beyond this, bring 
a sympathetic consciousness of human welfare at large, as 
being furthered by making altruistic actions habitual. 
Both this special and this general sympathetic conscious- 
ness become stronger and wider in proportion as the 
power of mental representation increases, and the imagi- 
nation of consequences, immediate and remote, grows 
more vivid and comprehensive. Until at length these 
altruistic sentiments begin to call in question the au- 
thority of those ego-altruistic sentiments which once ruled 
unchallenged. They prompt resistance to laws that do 
not fulfil the conception of justice, encourage men to 
brave the frowns of their fellows by pursuing a course at 
variance with customs that are perceived to be socially 
injurious, and even cause dissent from the current re- 
ligion ; either to the extent of disbelief in those alleged 
divine attributes and acts not appioved by this supreme 
moral arbiter, or to the extent of entire rejection of a 
creed which ascribes such attributes and acts. 

Much that is required to make this hypothesis com- 
plete must stand over until, at the close of the second 
volume of " The Principles of Psychology," I have space 
for a full exposition. What I have said will make it 



30 



MORALS AXD MORAL SENTLMEXTS. 



sufficiently clear that two fundamental errors have been 
made in the interpretation put upon it. Both Utility and 
Experience have been construed in senses much too nar- 
row. Utility, convenient a word as it is from its com- 
prehensiveness, has very inconvenient and misleading 
implications. It vividly suggests uses and means and 
proximate ends, but very faintly suggests the pleasures, 
positive or negative, which are the ultimate ends, and 
which, in the ethical meaning of the word, are alone con- 
sidered ; and, further, it implies conscious recognition of 
means and ends — implies the deliberate taking of some 
course to gain a perceived benefit. Experience, too, in its 
ordinary acceptation, connotes definite perceptions of 
causes and consequences, as standing in observed relations, 
and is not taken to include the connections formed in 
consciousness between states that recur together, when 
the relation between them, causal or other, is not per- 
ceived. It is in their widest senses, however, that I 
habitually use these words, as will be manifest to every 
one who reads the " Principles of Psychology ; " and it is 
in these widest senses that I have used them in the letter 
to Mr. Mill. I think I have shown above that, when they 
are so understood, the hypothesis briefly set forth in that 
letter is by no means so indefensible as is supposed. At 
any rate, I have shown — what seemed for the present 
needful to show — that Mr. Hutton's versions of my views 
must not be accepted as correct. 



II. 

THE ORIGIN OF ANIMAI-WOESIIIP. 

[FROM THE FORTNIGHTLY REVIEW, MAY, 1870.] 



THE ORIGIN OF ANIMAL-WORSHIP. 



Mr. McLennan's recent essays on the Worship of 
Animals and Plants have done much to elucidate a very 
obscure subject. By pursuing in this case, as before in 
another case, the truly scientific method of comparing the 
phenomena presented by existing uncivilized races with 
those which the early traditions of civilized races present, 
he has rendered both more comprehensible than they were 
before. 

It seems to me, however, that Mr. McLennan gives 
but an indefinite answer to the essential question — How 
did the worship of animals and plants arise ? Indeed, in 
his concluding paper, he expressly leaves this problem 
without a solution ; saying that his " is not an hypothesis 
explanatory of the origin of Totemdsm, be it remembered, 
but an hypothesis explanatory of the animal and plant 
worship of the ancient nations." So that we have still to 
ash — Why have savage tribes so generally taken animals 
and plants and other things as their totems ? What can 
have induced this tribe to ascribe special sacredness to one 
creature, and that tribe to another ? And if to these ques- 
tions the general reply is, that each tribe considers itself 
to be descended from the object of its reverence, then 
there presses for answer the further question — How came 
so strange a notion into existence ? If this notion occurred 



34 THE ORIGIN" OF ANIMAL-WORSHIP. 

in one case only, we might set it down to some whim of 
thought or some illusive occurrence. But appearing as it 
does with multitudinous variations among so many un- 
civilized races in different parts of the world, and having 
left equally numerous traces in the superstitions of the 
extinct civilized races, we cannot assume any special or 
exceptional cause. Moreover, the general cause, whatever 
it may be, must be such as does not negative an aboriginal 
intelligence essentially like our own. After studying the 
grotesque beliefs of savages, we are apt to suppose that 
their reason is not as our reason. But this supposition is 
inadmissible. Given the amount of knowledge which 
primitive men possess, and given the imperfect verbal 
symbols used by them in speech and thought, and the con- 
clusions they habitually reach will be those that are rela- 
tively the most rational. This must be our postulate ; 
and, setting out with this postulate, we have to ask how 
primitive men came so generally, if not universally, to be- 
lieve themselves the progeny of animals or plants or inani- 
mate bodies. There is, I believe, a satisfactory answer. 

The proposition with which Mr. McLennan sets out, 
that totem-worship preceded the worship of anthropomor- 
phic gods, is one to which I can yield but a qualified as- 
sent. It is true in a sense, but not wholly true. If the 
words "gods" and "worship" carry with them their or- 
dinary definite meanings, the statement is true; but if 
their meanings are widened so as to comprehend those 
earliest vague notions out of which the definite ideas of 
gods and worship are evolved, I think it is not true. The 
rudimentary form of all religion is the propitiation of dead 
ancestors, who are supposed to be still existing, and to be 
capable of working good or evil to their descendants. As 
a preparation for dealing hereafter with the principles of 



RUDIMENTARY FORM OF RELIGION. 35 

sociology, I have, for some years past, directed much at- 
tention to the modes of thought current in the simpler 
human societies ; and evidence of many kinds, furnished 
by all varieties of uncivilized men, has forced on me a 
conclusion harmonizing with that lately expressed in this 
Review by Prof. Huxley — namely, that the savage, con- 
ceiving a corpse to be deserted by the active personality 
who dwelt in it, conceives this active personality to be 
still existing, and that his feelings and ideas concerning 
it form the basis of his superstitions. Everywhere we find 
expressed or implied the belief that each person is double ; 
and that when he dies, his other self, whether remaining 
near at hand or gone far away, may return, and continues 
capable of injuring his enemies and aiding his friends. 1 

1 A critical reader may raise an objection. If animal-worship is to be ra- 
tionally interpreted, bow can the interpretation set out by assuming a belief 
in the spirits of dead ancestors — a belief which just as much requires explana- 
tion ? Doubtless there is here a wide gap in the argument. I hope eventually 
to fill it up. Here, out of many experiences which conspire to generate this 
belief, I can but briefly indicate the leading ones : 1. It is not impossible that 
his shadow, following him everywhere, and moving as he moves, may have 
some small share in giving to the savage a vague idea of his duality. It needs 
but to watch a child's interest in the movements of its shadow, and to remem- 
ber that at first a shadow cannot be interpreted as a negation of light, but is 
looked upon as an entity, to perceive that the savage may very possibly con- 
sider it as a specific something which forms part of him. 2. A much more 
decided suggestion of the same kind is likely to result from the reflection of 
his face and figure in water: imitating him as it does in his form, colors, mo- 
tions, grimaces. When we remember that not unfrequently a savage objects 
to have his portrait taken, because he thinks whoever carries away a represen- 
tation of him carries away some part of his being, will see how probable it is 
that he thinks his double in the water is a reality in some way belonging to 
him. 3. Echoes must greatly tend to confirm the idea of duality otherwise 
arrived at. Incapable as he is of understanding their natural origin, the 
primitive man necessarily ascribes them to living beings — beings who mock 
him and elude his search. 4. The suggestions resulting from these and other 
physical phenomena are, however, secondary in importance. The root of this 
belief in another self lies in the experience of dreams. The distinction so 
easily made by us between our life in dreams and our real life, is one which 
the savage recognizes in but a vague way ; and he cannot express even that 
distinction which he perceives. When he awakes, and to those who have seen 



36 THE ORIGIN OF ANIMAL- WORSHIP. 

But how out of the desire to propitiate this second per- 
sonality of a deceased man (the words " ghost " or " spirit " 
are somewhat misleading, since the savage believes that 
the second personality reappears in a form equally tan- 
gible with the first) does there grow up the worship of 

him lying quietly asleep, describes where he has been, and what he has done, 
his rude language fails to state the difference between seeing and dreaming 
that he saw, doing and dreaming that he did. From this inadequacy of his 
language it not only results that he cannot truly represent this difference to 
others, but also that he cannot truly represent it to himself. Hence, in the 
absence of an alternative interpretation, his belief, and that of those to whom 
he tells his adventures, is that his other self has been away and came back 
when he awoke. And this belief, which we find among various existing sav- 
age tribes, we equally find in the traditions of tbe early civilized races. 
5. The conception of another self capable of going away and returning, re- 
ceives what to the savage must seem conclusive verifications from the abnor- 
mal suspensions of consciousness, and derangements of consciousness, that 
occasionally occur in members of his tribe. One who has fainted, and cannot 
be immediately brought back to himself (note the significance of our own 
phrases "returning to himself," etc.) as a sleeper can, shows him a state in 
which the other self has been away for a time beyond recall. Still more is 
this prolonged absence of the other self shown him in cases of apoplexy, cata- 
lepsy, and other forms of suspended animation. Here for hours the other 
self persists in remaining away, and on returning refuses to say where he has 
been. Further verification is afforded by every epileptic subject, into whose 
body, during the absence of the other self, some enemy has entered ; for how 
else does it happen that the other self on returning denies all knowledge of 
what his body has been doing? And this supposition that the body has been 
"possessed" by some other being, is confirmed by the phenomena of som- 
nambulism and insanity. 6. What, then, is the interpretation inevitably put 
upon death ? The other self has habitually returned after sleep, which simu- 
lates death. It has returned, too, after fainting, which simulates death much 
more. It has even returned after the rigid state of catalepsy, which simulates 
death very greatly. Will it not return also after this still more prolonged 
quiescence and rigidity ? Clearly it is quite possible — quite probable even. 
The dead man's other self is gone away for a long time, but it still exists some- 
where, far or near, and may at any moment como back to do all he said he 
would do. Hence the various burial-rites — the placing of weapons and valu- 
ables along with the body, the daily bringing of food to it, etc. I hope here- 
after to show that, with such knowledge of the facts as he has, this interpreta- 
tion is the most reasonable the savage can arrive at. Let me here, however, 
by way of showing how clearly the facts boar out this view, give one illustra- 
tion out of many. " The ceremonies with which they [the Veddahs] invoke 
them [the shades of the dead] are few as they are simple. The most common 



INFLUENCE OF NICKNAMES. 37 

animals, plants, and inanimate objects? Very simply. 
Savages habitually distinguish individuals by names that 
are either directly suggestive of some personal trait or fact 
of personal, history, or else express an observed community 
of character with some well-known object. Such a gene- 
sis of individual names, before surnames have arisen, is 
inevitable ; and how easily it arises we shall see on re- 
membering that it still goes on in its original form, even 
when no longer needful. I do not refer only to the sig- 
nificant fact that in some parts of England, as in the nail- 
making districts, nicknames are universal, and surnames 
scarcely recognized; but I refer to the general usage 
among both children and adults. The rude man is apt to 
be known as " a bear ; " a sly fellow, as an " old fox ; " a 
hypocrite, as " the crocodile." Names of plants, too, are 
used ; as when the red-haired boy is called " carrots " by 
his school-fellows. Nor do we lack nicknames derived 
from inorganic objects and agents : instance that given by 
Mr. Carlyle to the elder Sterling — " Captain "Whirlwind." 
Now, in the earliest savage state, this metaphorical nam- 

is the following : An arrow is fixed -upright in the ground, and the Veddah 
dances slowly round it, chanting this invocation, which is almost musical in 
its rhythm : 

" Ma miya, ma miy, ma deya, 
Topang Koyichetti mittigan yandah ? " 

" My departed one, my departed one, my God ! 
Where art thou wandering ? " 

" This invocation appears to he used on all occasions when the intervention 
of the guardian spirits is required in sickness, preparatory to hunting, etc. 
Sometimes in the latter case, a portion of the flesh of the game is promised as 
a votive offering, in the event of the chase "being successful ; and they "believe 
that the spirits will appear to them in dreams and tell them where to hunt. 
Sometimes they cook food and place it in the dry "bed of a river, or some other 
secluded spot, and then call on their deceased ancestors "by name, ' Come and 
partake of this ! Give us maintenance as you did when living ! Come, where- 
soever you may he, on a tree, on a rock, in the forest, come ! ' And dance 
round the food, half chanting half shouting the invocation." — Bailey, Trans. 
Eth. Soe. t London, N. S., ii., p. SOI. 



58 THE OEIGIK OF AOTMAL-WOKSHIP. 

ing will in most cases commence afresh in each generation 
— must do so, indeed, until surnames of some kind have 
been established. I say in most cases, because there will 
occur exceptions in the cases of men who have distin- 
guished themselves. If " the Wolf," proving famous in 
fight, becomes a terror to neighboring tribes, and a domi- 
nant man in his own, his sons, proud of their parentage, 
will not let fall the fact that they descended from the 
Wolf; nor will this fact be forgotten by the rest of the 
tribe who held " the Wolf" in awe, and see some reason 
to dread his sons. In proportion to the power and celeb- 
rity of the Wolf will this pride and this fear conspire. to 
maintain among his grandchildren and great-grandchil- 
dren, as well as among those over whom they dominate, 
the remembrance of the fact that their ancestor was the 
Wolf. And if, as will occasionally happen, this dominant 
family becomes the root of a new tribe, the members of 
this tribe will become known to themselves and others as 
the Wolves. 

We need not rest satisfied with the inference that this 
inheritance of nicknames will take place : there is proof 
that it does take place. As nicknaming after animals, 
plants, and other objects, still goes on among ourselves, so 
among ourselves does there go on the descent of nicknames. 
An instance has come under my own notice on an estate 
in the West Highlands, belonging to some friends with 
whom I frequently have the pleasure of spending a few 
weeks in the autumn. ' ; Take a young Croskeky * lias 
more than once been the reply of my host to the inquiry, 
who should go with me when I was setting out salmon- 
lishing. The elder Croshek I knew well ; and supposed 
that this name, borne bv him and bv all belon^in^ to him, 
was the family surname. Some years passed before I 
learned that the real surname was Cameron ; that the 



OEIGIN OF TRIBAL NAMES. 39 

father was called Croshek, after the name of his cottage, 
to distinguish him from other Camerons employed about 
the premises ; and that his children had come to be simi- 
larly distinguished. Though here, as very generally in 
Scotland, the nickname was derived from the place of 
residence, yet had it been derived from an animal, the 
process would have been the same — inheritance of it would 
have occurred just as naturally. ISTot even for this small 
link in the argument, however, need we depend on infer- 
ence : there is fact to bear us out. Mr. Bates, in his " Nat- 
uralist on the Eiver Amazon " (2d ed., p. 376), describ- 
ing three half-castes who accompanied him on a hunting 
trip, says : " Two of them were brothers — namely, Joao 
(John) and Zephyrino Jabuti ; Jabuti, or tortoise, being a 
nickname which their father had earned for his slow gait, 
and which, as is usual in this country, had descended as 
the surname of the family." Let me add the statement 
made by Mr. Wallace respecting this same region, that 
" one of the tribes on the river Isanna is called ' Jurupari ' 
(Devils). Another is called ' Ducks ; ' a third, ' Stars ; ' 
a fourth, l Mandiocca.' " Putting these two statements 
together, can there be any doubt about the genesis of these 
tribal names ? Let the tortoise become sufficiently distin- 
guished (not necessarily by superiority — great inferiority 
may occasionally suffice) and the tradition of descent from 
him, preserved by his descendants themselves if he was 
superior, and by their contemptuous neighbors if he was 
inferior, may become a tribal name. 1 

1 Since the foregoing pages were written, my attention has heen drawn hy 
Sir John Lubbock to a passage in the appendix to the second edition of " Pre- 
historic Times," in which he has indicated this derivation of tribal names. He 
says : " In endeavoring to account for the worship of animals, we must remem- 
ber that names are very frequently taken from them. The children and fol- 
lowers of a man called the Bear or the Lion would make that a tribal name. 
Hence the animal itself would be first respected, at last worshipped." Of the 
genesis of this worship, however, Sir John Luhbock does not give any specific 



10 THE ORIGIN OF ANBIAL-WOESHIP. 

" But this," it will "be said, " does not amount to an 
explanation of animal- worship." True : a third factor 
remains to be specified. Given a belief in the still-exist- 
ing other self of the deceased ancestor, who must be pro- 
pitiated ; given this survival of his metaphorical name 
among his grandchildren, great-grandchildren, etc. ; and 
the further requisite is that the distinction between meta- 
phor and reality shall be forgotten. Let the tradition of 
the ancestor fail to keep clearly in view the fact that he 
was a man called the Wolf — let him be habitually spoken 
of as the Wolf, just as when alive ; and the natural mis- 
take of taking the name literally will bring with it, firstly, 
a belief in descent from the actual wolf, and, secondly, a 
treatment of the wolf in a manner likely to propitiate 
him — a manner appropriate to one who may be the other 
self of the dead ancestor, or one of the kindred, and there- 
fore a friend. 

That a misunderstanding of this kind will naturally 
grow up, becomes obvious when we bear in mind the great 
indefiniteness of primitive language. As Prof. Max Mul- 
ler says, respecting certain misinterpretations of an oppo- 
site kind : " These metaphors .... would become mere 
names handed down in the conversation of a family, un- 
derstood perhaps by the grandfather, familiar to the father, 
but strange to the son, and misunderstood by the grand- 
son." We have ample reason, . then, for thinking that 
such misinterpretations are likely to occur, ^ay, we may 
go further. We are justified in saying that they are cer- 
tain to occur. For undeveloped languages contain no 
words capable of indicating the distinction to be kept in 
view. In the tongues of existing inferior races, only con- 

explanatiou. Apparently he inclines to the belief, tacitly adopted also by 
Mr. McLennan, that animal-worship is derived from an original Fetichism, 
of which it is a more developed form. As will shortly be seen, I take a differ- 
ent view of its orisin. 



INDEFINITENESS OF PRIMITIVE LANGUAGE. 41 

crete objects and acts are expressible. The Australians 
have a name for each kind of tree, but no name for tree 
irrespective of kind. And though some witnesses allege 
that their vocabulary is not absolutely destitute of generic 
names, its extreme poverty in such is unquestionable. 
Similarly with the Tasmanians. Dr. Milligan says they 
" had acquired very limited powers of abstraction or gen- 
eralization. They possessed no words representing ab- 
stract ideas ; for each variety of gum-tree and wattle-tree, 
etc., etc., they had a name, but they had no equivalent for 
the expression, ' a tree ; ' neither could they express ab- 
stract qualities, such as hard, soft, warm, cold, long, short, 
round, etc. ; for ' hard,' they would say ' like a stone,' for 
' tall,' they would say c long legs,' etc., and for ' round,' 
they said i like a ball,' ' like the moon,' and so on, usually 
suiting the action to the word, and confirming, by some 
sign, the meaning to be understood." * Now, even mak- 
ing allowance for over-statement here (which seems need- 
ful, since the word " long," said to be inexpressible in the 
abstract, subsequently occurs as qualifying a concrete in 
the expression, "long legs"), it is sufficiently manifest 
that so imperfect a language must fail to convey the idea 
of a name, as something separate from a thing ; ana that 
still less can it be capable of indicating the act of naming. 
Familiar use of such partially abstract words as are appli- 
cable to all objects of a class, is needful before there can 
be reached the conception of a name — a word symbolizing 
the symbolic character of other words ; and the conception 
of a name, with its answering abstract term, must be long 
current before the verb to name can arise. Hence, among 
tribes with speech so rude, it will be impossible to trans- 
mit the tradition of an ancestor named the "Wolf, as dis- 
tinguished from the actual wolf. The children and grand- 

» Proc. Eoyal Soc. Tasmania, iii., p. 280. 



£2 THE OEIGIN OF ANIMAL-WOESHTP. 

children who saw him will not be led into error ; but in 
later generations, descent from the Wolf will inevitably 
come to mean descent from the animal known by that 
name. And the ideas and sentiments which, as above 
shown, naturally grow np around the belief that the dead 
parents and grandparents are still alive, and ready, if pro- 
pitiated, to befriend their descendants, will be extended 
to the wolf species. 

Before passing to other developments of this general 
view, let me point out how not simply animal-worship is 
thus accounted for, but also the conception, so variously 
illustrated in ancient legends, that animals are capable 
of displaying human powers of speech and thought and 
action. Mythologies are fall of stories of beasts and birds 
and fishes that have played intelligent parts in human 
affairs — creatures that have befriended particular persons 
by giving them information, by guiding them, by yielding 
them help ; or else that have deceived them, verbally or 
otherwise. Evidently all these traditions, as well as those 
about abductions of women by animals and fostering of 
children by them, fall naturally into their places as re- 
sults of the habitual misinterpretation I have described. 

The probability of the hypothesis will appear still 
greater when we observe how readily it applies to the 
worship of other orders of objects. Belief in actual de- 
scent from an animal, strange as we may think it, is one 
by no means incongruous with the unanalyzed experiences 
of the savage ; for there come under his notice many 
metamorphoses, vegetal and animal, which are apparently 
of like character. But how could he possibly arrive at so 
grotesque a conception as that the progenitor of his tribe 
was the sun, or the moon, or a particular star I Xo ob- 
servation of surrounding phenomena affords the slightest 



CONFUSION OF METAPHOR WITH FACT. 43 

suggestion of any such possibility. But by the inheritance 
of nicknames that are eventually mistaken for the names 
of the objects from which they were derived, the belief 
readily arises — is sure to arise. That the names of heav- 
enly bodies will furnish metaphorical names to the un- 
civilized, is manifest. Do we not ourselves call a distin- 
guished singer or actor a star ? And have we not in poems 
numerous comparisons of men and women to the sun and 
moon ; as in " Love's Labour's Lost," where the princess 
is called "a gracious moon," and as in "Henry YIIL," 
where we read — " Those suns of glory, those two lights 
of men ? " Clearly, primitive men will be not unlikely 
thus to speak of the chief hero of a successful battle. 
When we remember how the arrival of a triumphant war- 
rior must affect the feelings of his tribe, dissipating clouds 
of anxiety and irradiating all faces with joy, we shall see 
that the comparison of him to the sun is extremely natural ; 
and in early speech this comparison can be made only by 
calling him the sun. As before, then, it will happen that, 
through a confounding of the metaphorical name with the 
actual name, his progeny, after a few generations, will be 
regarded by themselves and others as descendants of the 
sun. And, as a consequence, partly of actual inheritance 
of the ancestral character, and partly of maintenance of 
the traditions respecting the ancestor's achievements, it 
will also naturally happen that the solar race will be con- 
sidered a superior race, as we find it habitually is. 

The origin of other totems, equally strange if not even 
stranger, is similarly accounted for, though otherwise un- 
accountable. One of the New-Zealand chiefs claimed as 
his progenitor the neighboring great mountain, Tongariro. 
This seemingly-whimsical belief becomes intelligible when 
we observe how easily it may have arisen from a nick- 
name. Do we not ourselves sometimes speak figuratively 



44: THE ORIGIN" OF ANIMAL-WORSHIP. 

of a tall, fat man as a mountain of flesh ? And, among a 
people prone to speak in still more concrete terms, would 
it not happen that a chief, remarkable for his great bulk, 
would be nicknamed after the highest mountain within 
sight, because he towered above other men as this did 
above surrounding hills ? Such an occurrence is not sim- 
ply possible, but probable. And, if so, the confusion of 
metaphor with fact would originate this surprising gene- 
alogy. A notion perhaps yet more grotesque, thus re- 
ceives a satisfactory interpretation. What could have put 
it into the imagination of any one that he was descended 
from the dawn ? Given the extremest credulity, joined 
with the wildest fancy, it would still seem requisite that 
the ancestor should be conceived as an entity ; and the 
dawn is entirely without that definiteness and compara- 
tive constancy which enter into the conception of an 
entity. But when we remember that " the Dawn " is a 
natural complimentary name for a beautiful girl opening 
into womanhood, the genesis of the idea becomes, on the 
above hypothesis, quite obvious. 

Another indirect verification is that we thus get a 
clear conception of Fetichism in general. Under the feti- 
chistic mode of thought, surrounding objects and agents 
are regarded as having powers more or less definitely per- 
sonal in their natures. And the current interpretation is, 
that human intelligence, in its early stages, is obliged to 
conceive of their powers under this form. I have myself 
hitherto accepted this interpretation ; though always with 
a sense of dissatisfaction. This dissatisfaction was, I 
think, well grounded. The theory is scarcely a theory 
properly so called; but rather, a restatement in other 
words. Uncivilized men do habitually form anthropo- 
morphic conceptions of surrounding things ; and this ol> 



ORIGIN OF FETICIIISM. 45 

served general fact is transformed into the theory that at 
first they must so conceive them — a theory for which the 
psychological justification attempted, seems to me inade- 
quate. From our present stand-point, it becomes mani- 
fest that Fetichism is not primary but secondary. "What 
has been said above almost of itself shows this. Let us, 
however, follow out the steps of its genesis. Respecting 
the Tasmanians, Dr. Milligan says : " The names of men 
and women were taken frorii natural objects and occur- 
rences around, as, for instance, a kangaroo, a gum-tree, 
snow, hail, thunder, the wind, flowers in blossom, etc." 
Surrounding objects, then, giving origin to names of per- 
sons, and being, in the way shown, eventually mistaken 
for the actual progenitors of those who descend from per- 
sons nicknamed after them, it results that these surround- 
ing objects come to be regarded as in some manner pos- 
sessed of personalities like the human. He whose family 
tradition is that his ancestor was " the Crab," will conceive 
the crab as having a disguised inner power like his own ; 
and alleged descent from " the palm-tree " will entail be- 
lief in some kind of consciousness dwelling in the palm- 
tree. Hence, in proportion as the animals, plants, and 
inanimate objects or agents that originate names of per- 
sons, become numerous (which they will do in proportion 
as a tribe becomes large and the number of persons to be 
distinguished from one another increases), multitudinous 
things around will acquire imaginary personalities. And 
so it will happen that, as Mr. McLennan says of the Fee- 
jeeans : " Vegetables and stones, nay, even tools and weap- 
ons, pots and canoes, have souls that are immortal, and 
that, like the souls of men, pass on at last to Mbulu, the 
abode of departed spirits." Setting out, then, with a be- 
lief in the still-living other self of the dead ancestor, the 
alleged general cause of misapprehension affords us an 



46 THE ORIGIN" OF ANTlVf AL-WORSHIP. 

intelligible origin of the fetichistic conception; and we 
are enabled to see how it tends to become a genera], if 
not a universal, conception. 

Other apparently inexplicable phenomena are at the 
same time divested of their strangeness. I refer to the 
beliefs in, and worship of, compound monsters — impossible 
hybrid animals, and forms that are half human, half brutal. 
The theory of a primordial Fetichism, supposing it other- 
wise adequate, yields no feasible solution of these. Grant 
the alleged original tendency to think of all natural agen- 
cies as in some way personal. Grant, too, that hence may 
arise a worship of animals, plants, and even inanimate 
bodies. Still the obvious implication is that the worship 
so derived will be limited to things that are, or have been, 
perceived. Why should this mode of thought lead the 
savage to imagine a combination of bird and mammal : 
and not only to imagine it, but worship it as a god ? If 
even we admit that some illusion may have suggested the 
belief in a creature half man, half h'sh, we cannot thus 
explain the prevalence among Eastern races of idols repre- 
senting bird-headed men, men having their legs replaced 
by the legs of a cock, and men with the heads of elephants. 

Carrying with us the inferences above drawn, how- 
ever, it is a manifest corollary that ideas and practices of 
these kinds will arise. When tradition preserves both 
lines of ancestry — when a chief, nicknamed the Wolf, car- 
ries away from an adjacent tribe a wife who is remem- 
bered either under the animal name of her tribe, or as a 
woman ; it will happen that if a son distinguishes him- 
self, the remembrance of him among his descendants will 
be that he was born of a wolf and some other animal, or 
of a wolf and a woman. Misinterpretation, arising in the 
way described from defects of language, will entail belief 



MEANINGS OF ANCIENT MYTHS. 47 

in a creature uniting the attributes of the two ; and if the 
tribe grows into a society, representations of such a crea- 
ture will become objects of worship. One of the cases 
cited by Mr. McLennan may here be repeated in illustra- 
tion. " The story of the origin of the Dikokamenni Kir- 
gheez," they say, " from a red greyhound and a certain 
queen with her forty handmaidens, is of ancient date." 
Now, if " the red greyhound " was the nickname of a man 
extremely swift of foot (celebrated runners have been 
similarly nicknamed among ourselves), a story of this 
kind would naturally arise ; and if the metaphorical name 
was mistaken for the actual name, there might result, as 
the idol of the race, a compound form appropriate to the 
story. We need not be surprised, then, at finding among 
the Egyptians the goddess Pasht represented as a woman 
with a lion's head, and the god Month as a man with the 
head of a hawk. The Babylonian gods — one having the 
form of a man with an eagle's tail, and another uniting a 
human bust to a fish's body — no longer appear such un- 
accountable conceptions. We get feasible explanations, 
too, of sculptures representing sphinxes, winged human- 
headed bulls, etc. ; as well as of the stories about centaurs, 
satyrs, and the rest. 

Ancient myths in general thus acquire meanings con- 
siderably different from those ascribed to them by com- 
parative mythologists. Though these last may be in part 
correct, yet if the foregoing argument is valid, they can 
scarcely be correct in their main outlines. Indeed, if we 
read the facts the other way upward, regarding as sec- 
ondary or additional the elements that are said to be pri- 
mary, while we regard as primary certain elements which 
are considered as accretions of later times, we shall, I 
think, be nearer the truth. 



48 THE ORIGIN OF ANTM A L-WORSHIP. 

Tlie current theory of the myth is that it has grown 
out of the habit of symbolizing natural agents and pro- 
cesses, in terms of human personalities and actions. lsow : 
it may in the first place be remarked that, though syrn- 
bolization of this kind is common enough among civilized 
races, it is not common among races that are the most 
uncivilized. By existing savages, surrounding objects, 
motions, and changes, are habitually used to convey ideas 
respecting human transactions. It is by no means so 
much the habit to express by the doings of men the course 
of natural phenomena. It needs but to read the speech 
of an Indian chief to see that just as primitive men name 
one another metaphorically after surrounding objects, so 
do they metaphorically describe one another's doings as 
though they were the doings of natural objects. Bat as- 
suming a contrary habit of thought to be the dominant 
one, ancient myths are explained as results of the primi- 
tive tendency to symbolize inanimate things and their 
changes, by human beings and their doings. 

A kindred difficulty must be added. The change of 
verbal meaning from which the myth is said to arise, is a 
change opposite in kind to that which prevails in the 
earlier stages of linguistic development. It implies a 
derivation of the concrete from the abstract ; whereas at 
first abstracts are derived only from concretes : the con- 
creting of abstracts being a subsequent process. In the 
words of Prof. ATax Miiller, there are " dialects spoken at 
the present day which have no abstract nouns, and the 
more we go back in the history of languages, the smaller 
we find the number of these useful expressions " (" Chip-." 
vol. ii., p. 54); or, as he says more recently: "Ancient 
words and ancient thoughts, for both go together, have 
not yet arrived at that stage of abstraction in which, for 
instance, active powers, whether natural or supernatural, 



COJSTEADICTIOKS OF THE CTJEBENT HYPOTHESIS. 49 

can be represented in any but a personal and more or less 
human form.' , (Fraser's Magazine, April, 1870.) Here 
the concrete is represented as original, and the abstract 
as derivative. Immediately afterward, however, Prof. 
Max Muller, having given as examples of abstract nouns, 
" day and night, spring and winter, dawn and twilight, 
storm and thunder," goes on to argue that, " as long as 
people thought in language, it was simply impossible to 
speak of morning or evening, of spring and winter, with- 
out giving to these conceptions something of an indi- 
vidual, active, sexual, and at last personal character." 
(" Chips," etc., vol. ii., p. 55.) Here the concrete is de- 
rived from the abstract — the personal conception is repre- 
sented as coming after the impersonal conception ; and 
through such transformation of the impersonal into the 
personal, Prof. Max Muller considers ancient myths to 
have arisen. How are these propositions reconcilable? 
One of two things must be said : If originally there were 
none of these abstract nouns, then the earliest statements 
respecting the daily course of Nature were made in con- 
crete terms — the personal elements of the myth were the 
primitive elements, and the impersonal expressions which 
are their equivalents came later. If this is not admitted, 
then it must be held that, until after there arose these ab- 
stract nouns, there were no current statements at all 
respecting these most conspicuous objects and changes 
which the heavens and the earth present ; and that the 
abstract nouns having been somehow formed, and rightly 
formed, and used without personal meanings, afterward 
became personalized— a process the reverse of that which 
characterizes early linguistic progress. 

No such contradictions occur if we interpret myths 
after the manner that has been indicated. Nay, besides 
escaping contradictions, we meet with unexpected solu- 

3 



50 THE OEIGIX OF ANIMAL- WOESHTP. 

tions. The moment we try it, the key unlocks for us with 
ease what seems a quite inexplicable fact, which the cur- 
rent hypothesis takes as one of its postulates. Speaking 
of such words as sky and earth, dew and rain, rivers and 
mountains, as well as of the abstract nouns above named, 
Prof. Max Miiller says : " Now, in ancient languages every 
one of these words had necessarily a termination expres- 
sive of gender, and this naturally produced in the mind 
the corresponding idea of sex, so that these names received 
not only an individual but a sexual character. There 
was no substantive which was not either masculine or 
feminine; neuters being of later growth, and distinguish- 
able chiefly in the nominative." (" Chips," etc., vol. ii., 
p. 55.) And this alleged necessity for a masculine or 
feminine implication is assigned as a part of the reason 
why these abstract nouns and collective nouns became 
personalized. But should not a true theory of these first 
steps in the evolution of thought and language show us 
how it happened that men acquired the seemingly-strange 
habit of so framing their words for sky, earth, dew, rain, 
etc., as to make them indicative of sex % Or, at any rate, 
must it not be admitted that an interpretation which, in- 
stead of assuming this habit to be " necessary," shows us 
how it results, thereby acquires an additional claim to 
acceptance? The interpretation I have indicated does 
this. If men and womqn are habitually nicknamed, and 
if defects of language lead their descendants to regard 
themselves as descendants of the things from which the 
names were taken, then masculine or feminine gender- 
will be ascribed to these things according as the ancestors 
named after them were men or women. If a beautiful 
maiden known metaphorically as " the Dawn," afterward 
becomes the mother of some distinguished chief called 
" the North Wind," it will result that when, in course of 



HUMAN PARENTAGE AND NON-HTJMAN ATTRIBUTES. 51 

time, the two have been mistaken for the actual dawn and 
the actual north wind, these will, by implication, be re- 
spectively considered as male and female. 

Looking, now, at the ancient myths in general, their 
seemingly most inexplicable trait is the habitual combi- 
nation of alleged human ancestry and adventures, with 
the possession of personalities otherwise figuring in the 
heavens and on the earth, with totally non-human attri- 
butes. This enormous incongruity, not the exception but 
the rule, the current theory fails to explain. Suppose it 
to be granted that the great terrestrial and celestial ob- 
jects and agents naturally become personalized ; it does 
not follow that each of them shall have a specific human 
biography. To say of some star that he was the son of 
this king or that hero, was born in a particular place, and 
when grown up carried off the wife of a neighboring chief, 
is a gratuitous multiplication of incongruities already 
sufficiently great ; and is not accounted for by the alleged 
necessary personalization of abstract and collective nouns. 
As looked at from our present stand-point, however, such 
traditions become quite natural — nay, it is clear that they 
will necessarily arise. When a nickname has become a 
tribal name, it thereby ceases to be individually distinc- 
tive ; and, as already said, the process of nicknaming 
inevitably continues. It commences afresh with each 
child ; and the nickname of each child is both an individ- 
ual name and a potential tribal name, which may become 
an actual tribal name if the individual is sufficiently cele- 
brated. Usually, then, there is a double system of distin- 
guishing the individual ; under one of which he is known 
by his ancestral name, and under the other of which he is 
known by a name suggestive of something peculiar to 
himself : just as we have seen happens among the Scotch 
clans. Consider, now, what will result when language 



52 THE ORIGIN OF ANIMAL WORSHIP. 

has reached a stage of development such that it can con- 
vey the notion of naming, and is able, therefore, to pre- 
serve traditions of human ancestry : the preservation of 
such traditions being furthered by these corruptions of 
tribal names which render them no longer suggestive of 
the things they were derived from. It will result that the 
individual will be known both as the son of such and 
such a man by a mother whose name was so-and-so, and 
also as the Crab, or the Bear, or the Whirlwind — suppos- 
ing one of these to be bis nickname. Such joint use of 
nicknames and proper names occurs in every school. Xow, 
clearly, in advancing from the early state in which ances- 
tors become identified with the objects they are nick- 
named after, to the state in which there are proper names 
that have lost their metaphorical meanings, there must be 
passed through a state in which proper names, partially 
settled only, may or may not be preserved, and in which 
the new nicknames are still liable to be mistaken for act- 
ual names. Under such conditions there will arise (es- 
pecially in the case of a distinguished man) this seeming- 
ly-impossible combination of human parentage with the 
possession of the non-human, or superhuman, attributes 
of the thing which gave the nickname. Another anomaly 
simultaneously disappears. The warrior may have, and 
often will have, a variety of complimentary nicknames — 
" the powerful one," " the destroyer," etc. Supposing 
his leading nickname has been the Sun, then when he 
comes to be identified by tradition with the sun, it will 
happen that the sun will acquire his alternative descrip- 
tive titles — the swift one, the lion, the wolf — titles not 
obviously appropriate to the sun, but quite appropriate to 
the warrior. Then there comes, too, an explanation of 
the remaining trait of such myths. When this identifica- 
tion of conspicuous persons, male and female, with con- 



ANTHROPOMORPHIC INTERPRETATIONS. 53 

spicuous natural agents, has become settled, there will in 
due course arise interpretations of the actions of these 
agents in anthropomorphic terms. Suppose, for instance, 
that Endjmion and Selene, metaphorically named, the 
one after the setting sun, the other after the moon, have 
had their human individualities merged in those of the 
sun and moon, through misinterpretation of metaphors ; 
what will happen ? The legend of their loves having to 
be reconciled with their celestial appearances and motions, 
these will be spoken of as results of feeling and will ; so 
that when the sun is going down in the west, while the 
moon in mid-heaven is following him, the fact will be ex- 
pressed by saying : " Selene loves and watches Endym- 
ion." Thus we obtain a consistent explanation of the 
myth without distorting it ; and without assuming that 
it contains gratuitous fictions. We are enabled to accept 
the biographical part of it, if not as literal fact, still as 
having had fact for its root. We are helped to see how, 
by an inevitable misinterpretation, there grew out of a 
more or less true tradition, this strange identification of 
its personages, with objects and powers totally non-human 
in their aspects. And then we are shown how, from the 
attempt to reconcile in thought these contradictory ele- 
ments of the myth, there arose the habit of ascribing the 
actions of these non-human things to human motives. 

One further verification may be drawn from facts 
which are obstacles to the converse hypothesis. These 
objects and powers, celestial and terrestrial, which force 
themselves most on men's attention, have some of them 
several proper names, identified with those of different 
individuals, born at different places, and having different 
sets of adventures. Thus we have the sun variously 
known as Apollo, Endymion, Helios, Tithonos, etc. — per- 
sonages having irreconcilable genealogies. Such anoma- 



54: THE ORIGIN OF ANIMAL-WORSHIP. 

lies Prof. Max Miiller apparently ascribes to the untrust- 
worthiness of traditions, which are " careless about con- 
tradictions, or ready to solve them sometimes by the most 
atrocious expedients." (" Chips," etc., vol. ii., p. 84.) But 
if the evolution of the myth has been that above indicated, 
there exist no anomalies to be got rid of: these diverse 
genealogies become parts of the evidence. For we have 
abundant proof that the same objects furnish metaphori- 
cal names of men in different tribes. There are Duck 
tribes in Australia, in South America, in Xorth America. 
The eagle is still a totem among the JSorth Americans, as 
Mr. McLennan shows reason to conclude that it was 
among the Egyptians, among the Jews, and among the 
Romans. Obviously, for reasons that have been assigned, 
it naturally happened in the early stages of the ancient 
races, that complimentary comparisons of their heroes to 
the sun were frequently made. "What resulted ? The 
sun having furnished names for sundry chiefs and early 
founders of tribes, and local traditions having severally 
identified them with the sun, these tribes, when they grew, 
spread, conquered, or came otherwise into partial union, 
originated a combined mythology, which necessarily con- 
tained conflicting stories about the sun-god, as about its 
other leading personages. If the North-American tribes, 
among several of which there are traditions of a sun-god, 
had developed a combined civilization, there would simi- 
larly have arisen among them a mythology which ascribed 
to the sun several different proper names and genealogies. 

Let me briefly set down the leading characters of this 
hypothesis which give it probability. 

True interpretations of all the natural processes, or- 
ganic and inorganic, that have gone on in past times, 
habitually trace them to causes still in action. It is thus 



REASONS FOE ADOPTING THIS VIEW. 55 

in Geology ; it is thus in Biology ; it is thus in Philology. 
Here we find this characteristic repeated. Nicknaming, 
the inheritance of nicknames, and, to some extent, the 
misinterpretation of nicknames, go among us still ; and 
were surnames absent, language imperfect, and knowledge 
as rudimentary as of old, it is tolerably manifest that re- 
sults would arise like those we have contemplated. 

A further characteristic of a true cause is that it ac- 
counts not only for the particular group of phenomena to 
be interpreted, but also for other groups. The cause here 
alleged does this. It equally well explains the worship 
of animals, of plants, of mountains, of winds, of celestial 
bodies, and even of appearances too vague to be consid- 
ered entities. It gives us an intelligible genesis of feti- 
chistic conceptions in general. It furnishes us with a 
reason for the practice, otherwise so unaccountable, of 
moulding the words applied to inanimate objects in such 
ways as to imply masculine and feminine genders. It 
shows us how there naturally arose the worship of com- 
pound animals, and of monsters half man half brute. And 
it shows us why the worship of purely anthropomorphic 
deities came later, when language had so far developed 
that it could preserve in tradition the distinction between 
proper names and nicknames. 

A further verification of this view is, that it conforms 
to the general law of evolution : showing us how, out of 
one simple, vague, aboriginal form of belief, there have 
arisen, by continuous differentiations, the many hetero- 
geneous forms of belief which have existed and do exist. 
The desire to propitiate the other self of the dead ances- 
tor, displayed among savage tribes, dominantly manifested 
by the early historic races, by the Peruvians and Mexi- 
cans, by the Chinese at the present time, and to a consid- 
erable degree by ourselves (for what else is the wish to do 



56 THE ORIGIN OF ANIMAL- WORSHIP. 

that which a lately-deceased parent was known to have 
desired ?), has been the universal first form of religious be- 
lief ; and from, it have grown up the many divergent be- 
liefs that have been referred to. 

Let me add, as a further reason for adopting this view, 
that it immensely diminishes the apparently-great con- 
trast between early modes of thought and our own mode 
of thought. Doubtless the aboriginal man differs con- 
siderably from us, both in intellect and feeling. But such 
an interpretation of the facts as helps us to bridge over the 
gap, derives additional likelihood from doing this. The 
hypothesis I have sketched out enables us to see that 
primitive ideas are not so gratuitously absurd as we sup- 
pose, and also enables us to rehabilitate the ancient myth 
with far less distortion than at first sight appears possible. 

These views I hope to develop in the first part of 
" The Principles of Sociology." The large mass of evi- 
dence which I shall be able to give in support of the hypoth- 
esis, joined with the solutions it will be shown to yield 
of many minor problems which I have passed over, will, 
I think, then give to it a still greater probability than it 
seems now to have. 



III. 

THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES. 



PEEFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. 



The first edition of this Essay is not yet out of 
print. But a proposal to translate it into French 
having been made by Professor Bethore, I have 
decided to prepare a new edition free from the im- 
perfections which criticism and further thought have 
disclosed, rather than allow these imperfections to be 
reproduced. 

The occasion has almost tempted me into some 
amplification. Further arguments against the classi- 
fication of M. Comte, and further arguments in sup- 
port of the classification here set forth, have pleaded 
for utterance. But reconsideration has convinced 
me that it is both needless and useless to say more 
— needless because those who are not committed will 
think the case sufficiently strong as it stands, and 
useless because to those who are committed additional 
reasons will seem as inadequate as the original ones. 

This last conclusion is thrust on me by seeing how 
little M. Littre, the leading expositor of M. Comte, 
is influenced by fundamental objections the force of 
which he admits. After quoting one of these, he 



60 PREFACE. 

'saygj with a candour equally rare and admirable, that 
he has vainly searched M. Comte's works and his 
own mind for an answer. Nevertheless, he adds — 
"j'ai reussi, je crois, a ecarter Fattaque de M. Her- 
bert Spencer, et a sauver le fond par des sacrifices 
indispensables mais accessoires." The sacrifices are 
these. He abandons M. Comte's division of In- 
organic Science into Celestial Physics and Ter- 
restrial Physics — a division which, in M. Comte's 
scheme, takes precedence of all the rest ; and he 
admits that neither logically nor historically docs 
Astronomy come before Physics, as M. Comte alleges. 
After making these sacrifices, which most will think 
too lightly described as " sacrifices indispensables 
mais accessoires," M. Littre proceeds to rehabilitate 
the Comtean classification in a way which he con- 
siders satisfactory, but which I do not understand. 
In short, the proof of these incongruities affects his 
faith in the Positivist theory of the sciences, no 
more than the faith of a Christian is affected by 
proof that the Gospels contradict one another. 

Here in England I have seen no attempt to meet 
the criticisms with which M. Littre thus deals. 
There has been no reply to the allegation, based on 
examples, that the several sciences do not develop 
in the order of their decreasing generality ; nor to 
the allegation, based on M. Comte's own admissions, 
that within each science the progress is not, as he 
says it is, from the general to the special ; nor to 



PREFACE. 61 

the allegation that the seeming historical precedence 
of Astronomy over Physics in M. Comte's pages, is 
based on a verbal ambiguity — a mere sleight of 
words; nor to the allegation, abundantly illustrated, 
that a progression in an order the reverse of that 
asserted by M. Comte may be as well substantiated ; 
nor to various minor allegations equally irreconcile- 
able with his scheme. I have met with nothing 
more than iteration of the statement that the sciences 
do conform, logically and historically, to the order in 
which M. Comte places them ; regardless of the as- 
signed evidence that they do not. 

Under these circumstances it is unnecessary for me 
to say more ; and I think I am warranted in con- 
tinuing to hold that the Comtean classification of the 
sciences is demonstrably untenable. 

"While, however, I have not entered further into the 
controversy, as I thought of doing, I have added at 
the close an already-published discussion, no longer 
easily accessible, which indirectly enforces the general 
argument. 

Lokdon, 23ed Athil, 1869. 



PKEFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION. 



In the preface to the second edition, I have de- 
scribed myself as resisting the temptation to amplify, 
which the occasion raised. Reasons have since arisen 
for yielding to the desire which I then felt to add 
justifications of the scheme set forth. 

The immediate cause for this change of resolve, has 
been the publication of several objections by Prof. 
Bain in his Logic. Permanently embodied, as these 
objections are, in a work intended for the use of 
students, they demand more attention than such as 
have been made in the course of ordinary criticism; 
since, if they remain unanswered, their prejudicial 
effects will be more continuous. 

While to dispose of these I seize the opportunity 
afforded by a break in my ordinary work, I have 
thought it well at the same time to strengthen my 
own argument, by a re-statement from a changed 
point of view. 

Feb., 1871. 



THE 

CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES. 



In an essay on " The Genesis of Science," originally 
published in 1854,* I endeavoured to show that the 
Sciences cannot be rationally arranged in serial order. 
Proof was given that neither the succession in which 
the Sciences are placed by M. Comte (to a criticism of 
whose scheme the essay was in part devoted), nor any 
other succession in which the Sciences can be placed, 
represents either their logical dependence or their his- 
torical dependence. To the question — How may their 
relations be rightly expressed ? I did not then attempt 
any answer. This question I propose now to con- 
sider. 

A true classification includes in each class, those 
objects which have more characteristics in common 
with one another, than any of them have in common 
with any objects excluded from the class. Further, 
the characteristics possessed in common by the colli- 
gated objects, and not possessed by other objects, are 
more radical than any characteristics possessed in 
common with other objects — involve more numerous 

* Contained in the " Illustrations of Universal Progress." 



61 CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES. 

dependent characteristics. These are two sides of the 
same definition. For things possessing the greatest 
number of attributes in common, are things that pos- 
sess in common those essential attributes on which the 
rest depend; and, conversely, the possession in com- 
mon of the essential attributes, implies the possession 
in common of the greatest number of attributes. Hence, 
either test may be used as convenience dictates. 

If, then, the Sciences admit of classification at all, it 
must be by grouping together the like and separating 
the unlike, as thus defined. Let us proceed to do this. 

The broadest natural division among the Sciences, 
is the division between those which deal with the ab- 
stract relations under which phenomena are presented 
to us, and those which deal with the phenomena them- 
selves. Eelations of whatever orders, are nearer akin 
to one another than they are to any objects. Objects 
of whatever orders, are nearer akin to one another 
than they are to any relations. Whether, as some 
hold, Space and Time are forms of Thought ; or 
whether, as I hold myself, they are forms of Things, 
that have become forms of Thought through organ- 
ized and inherited experience of Things ; it is equally 
true that Space and Time are contrasted absolutely 
with the existences disclosed to us in Space and Time 
and that the Sciences which deal exclusively with 
Space and Time, are separated by the profoundest of 
all distinctions from the Sciences which deal with the 



ALL PHENOMENA COMPOSITE. 65 

existences that Space and Time contain. Space is the 
abstract of all relations of co-existence. Time is the 
abstract of all relations of sequence. And dealing as 
they do entirely with relations of co-existence and 
sequence, in their general or special forms, Logic and 
Mathematics form a class of the Sciences more widely 
unlike the rest, than any of the rest can be from one 
another. 

The Sciences which deal with existences themselves, 
instead of the blank forms in which existences are pre- 
sented to us, admit of a sub-division less profound than 
the division above made, but more profound than any 
of the divisions among the Sciences individually con- 
sidered. They fall into two classes, having quite dif- 
ferent aspects, aims, and methods. Every phenomenon 
is more or less composite — is a manifestation of force 
under several distinct modes. Hence result two ob- 
jects of inquiry. We may study the component modes 
of force separately ; or we may study them in their 
relations, as co-operative factors in this composite phe- 
nomenon. On the one hand, neglecting all the inci- 
dents of particular cases, we may aim to educe the 
laws of each mode of force, when it is uninterfered 
with. On the other hand, the incidents of the parti- 
cular case being given, we may seek to interpret the 
entire phenomenon, as a product of the several forces 
simultaneously in action. The truths reached through 
the first kind of inquiry, though concrete inasmuch as 
they have actual existences for their subject-matters, 



(jQ 



CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES. 



are abstract inasmuch as they refer to the modes of 
existence apart from one another; while the truths 
reached by the second kind of inquiry arc properly 
concrete, inasmuch as they formulate the facts in their 
combined order, as they occur in Kature. 

The Sciences, then, in their main divisions, stand 
thus : — 



'that which treats of the forms in ) Abstract / Logic and \ 
which phenomena are known to us J Science V Mathematics. / 



SCIENCE is < 



that which treats of the 
phenomena themselves < 



in their 
elements 



Abstract- /Mechanics, < 
Concrete i Physics, 
Science \ Chemistry, etc. 



/Astronomy, 

L totalities ) Science ! Psych 

XSociolojrv 



tronomy, \ 
ology,BiologyA 
ycboiogy, I 
ciology/etc. / 



It is needful to define the words abstract and con- 
crete as thus used ; since they are sometimes used 
with other meanings. M. Comte divides Science into 
abstract and concrete; but the divisions which he 
distinguishes by these names are quite unlike those 
above made. Instead of regarding some Sciences 
as wholly abstract, and others as wholly concrete, he 
regards each Science as having an abstract part, and 
a concrete part. There is, according to him, an 
abstract mathematics and a concrete mathematics — an 



THE ABSTRACT AND THE GENERAL. 67 

abstract biology and concrete biology. He says: — 
"II faut distinguer, par rapport a tous les ordres de 
phenomenes, deux genres de sciences naturelles: les 
unes abstraites, generales, ont pour objet la decouverte 
dcs lois qui regissent les diverses classes de pheno- 
menes, en considerant tous" les cas qu'on peut con- 
cevior j les autres concretes, particulieres, descriptives, 
et qu'on designe quelquefois sous le nom de sciences 
naturelles proprement dites, consistent dans Tapplica- 
tion de ces lois a Fhistoire effective de differens etres 
existans*" And to illustrate the distinction, he names 
general physiology as abstract, and zoology and botany 
as concrete. Here it is manifest that the words 
abstract and general are used as synonymous. They 
have, however, different meanings ; and confusion 
results from not distinguishing their meanings. Ab- 
stractness means detachment from the incidents of parti- 
cular cases. Generality means manifestation in numerous 
cases. On the one hand, the essential nature of some 
phenomenon is considered, apart from disguising phe- 
nomena. On the other hand, the frequency of the 
phenomenon, with or without disguising phenomena, 
is the thing considered. Among the ideal relations of 
numbers the two coincide ; but excluding these, an 
abstract truth is not realizable to perception in any 
case in which it is asserted, whereas a general truth is 
realizable to perception in every case of which it is 
asserted. Some illustrations will make the distinction 
clear. Thus it is an abstract truth that the angle contained 



GS 



CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES. 



in a semi-circle is a right angle — abstract in the sense 
that though it does not hold in actually-constructed 
semi-circles and angles, which are always inexact, it 
holds in the ideal semi-circles and angles abstracted 
from real ones ; but this is not a general truth, either 
in the sense that it is commonly manifested in Nature, 
or in the sense that it is a space-relation that compre- 
hends many minor space-relations : it is a quite 
special space-relation. Again, that the momentum 
of a body causes it to move in a straight line at a 
uniform velocity, is an abstract-concrete truth — a 
truth abstracted from certain experiences of concrete 
phenomena ; but it is by no means a general truth : 
so little generality has it, that no one fact in Xature 
displays it. Conversely, surrounding things supply 
us with hosts of general truths that are not in the 
least abstract. It is a general truth that the planets 
go round the Sun from West to East — a truth which 
holds good in something like a hundred cases (includ- 
ing the cases of the planetoids) ; but this truth 
is not at all abstract, since it is perfectly realized 
as a concrete fact in every one of these cases. Every 
vertebrate animal whatever, has a double nervous 
system ; all birds and all mammals are warm- 
blooded — these are general truths, but they are 
concrete truths : that is to say, every vertebrate 
animal individually presents an entire and unqualified 
manifestation of this duality of the nervous system ; 
every living bird exemplifies absolutely or completely 



WHAT IS A GENERAL TRUTH. 69 

the warm-bloodedncss of birds. "What we here call, 
and rightly call, a general truth, is simply a pro- 
position which sums tip a number of our actual expe- 
riences ; and not the expression of a truth drawn 
from our actual experiences, but never presented to 
us in any of them. In other words, a general truth 
colligates a number of particular truths,; while an 
abstract truth colligates no particular truths, but 
formulates a truth which certain phenomena all in- 
volve, though it is actually seen in none of them. 

Limiting the words to their proper meanings as 
thus defined, it becomes manifest that the three classes 
of Sciences above separated, are not distinguishable 
at all by differences in their degrees of generality. 
They are all equally general ; or rather they are 
all, considered as groups, universal. Every object 
whatever presents at once the subject-matter for each 
of them. In the smallest particle of substance we 
have simultaneously illustrated the abstract truths 
of relation in Time and Space ; the abstract-concrete 
truths in conformity with which the particle mani- 
fests its several modes of force ; and the concrete 
truths which are the laws or the joint manifestation 
of these modes of force. Thus these three classes of 
Sciences severally formulate different, but co-extensive, 
classes of facts. Within each group there are truths of 
greater and less generality : there are general abstract 
truths, and special abstract truths J general abstract- 
concrete truths, and special abstract-concrete truths ■ 



70 CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES. 

general concrete truths, and special concrete truths. 
But while within each class there are groups and 
sub-groups and sub-sub-groups which differ in their 
degrees of generality, the classes themselves differ 
only in their degrees of abstractness.* 

* Some propositions laid down by M. Littre, in his lately-published book — 
Aticjuste Comte et la Pkilosophie Positive, may fitly be dealt with here. In the 
candid and courteous reply he makes to my strictures on the Comtean classifica- 
tion in " The Genesis of Science," he endeavours to clear up some of the incon- 
sistencies I pointed out; and he does this by drawing a distinction between 
objective generality and subjective generality. He says — " qu'il existe deux 
ordres de generalite, l'une objective et dans les choses, 1' autre subjective, abstraite 
et dans 1' esprit." This sentence, in which M. Littre makes subjective generality 
synonymous with abstractness, led me at first to conclude that he had in view the 
same distinction as that which I have above explained between generality and 
abstractness. On re-reading the paragraph, however, I found this was not the 
case. In a previous sentence he says — " La biologie a passe de la consideration 
des organes a cellcs des tissus, plus generaux que les organes, et de la consideration 
des tissus a celle des elements anatomiques, plus generaux que les tissus. Mais 
cette generalite croissante est subjective non objective, abstraite non concrete." 
Here it is manifest that abstract and concrete, are used in senses analogous to 
those in which they are used by M. Comte ; who, as we have seen, regards 
general physiology as abstract and zoology and botany as concrete. And it is 
further manifest that the word abstract, as thus used, is not used in its proper 
sense. For, as above shown, no such facts as those of anatomical structure can 
be abstract facts , but can only be more or less general facts Xor do I under- 
stand M. Littre's point of view when he regards these more general facts of 
anatomical structure, as subjectively general and not objectively general. The 
structural phenomena presented by any tissue, such as mucous membrane, are 
more general than the phenomena presented by any of the organs which mucous 
membrane goes to form, simply in the sense that the phenomena peculiar to the 
membrane are repeated in a greater number of instances than the phenomena 
peculiar to any organ into the composition of which the membrane enters. And, 
similarly, such facts as have been established respecting the anatomical elements 
of tissues, are more general than the facts established respecting any particular 
tissue, in the sense that they are facts which organic bodies exhibit in a g 
number of cases— they are objectively more general; and they can be called 
subjectively more general only in the sense that the conception corresponds with 
the phenomena. 

Let me endeavour to clear up this point : — There is, as If. Littre truly says, 
a decreasing generality that is objective. If we omit the phenomena of Dissolu- 
tion, which are changes from the special to the general, all changes which nutter 
nndergoes are from the general to the special — are changes involving a decreasing 



ABSTRACT SCIENCE. 71 

Passing to the sub-divisions of these classes, we find 
that the first class is separable into two parts— the 
one containing universal truths, the other non-uni* 
versal truths. Dealing wholly with relations apart 
from related things, Abstract Science considers first, 
that which is common to all relations whatever ; and 
second, that which is common to each order of rela- 
tions. Besides the indefinite and variable connexions 
which exist among phenomena, as occurring together 
in Space and Time, we find that there are also definite 

generality in the united groups of attributes. This is the progress of things. 
The progress of thought, is not only in the same direction, but also in the oppo- 
site direction. The investigation of Nature discloses an increasing number of 
specialities ; but it simultaneously discloses more and more the generalities within 
which these specialities fall. Take a case. Zoology, while it goes on multiply- 
ing the number of its species, and getting a more complete knowledge of each 
species (decreasing generality) ; also goes on discovering the common characters by 
which species are united into larger groups (increasing generality). Both these 
are subjective processes ; and in this case, both orders of truths reached are con- 
crete—formulate the phenomena as actually manifested. 

M. Littre, recognizing the necessity for some modification of the hierarchy of 
the Sciences, as enunciated by M. Comte, still regards it as substantially true ; 
and for proof of its validity, he appeals mainly to the essential constitutions of the 
Sciences. It is unnecessary for me here to meet, in detail, the arguments by 
which he supports the proposition, that the essential constitutions of the Sciences, 
justify the order in which M. Comte places them. It will suffice to refer to the 
foregoing pages, and to the pages which are to follow, as containing the defini- 
tions of those fundamental characteristics which demand the grouping of the 
Sciences in the way pointed out. As already shown, and as will be shown still 
more clearly by and bye, the radical differences of constitution among the 
Sciences, necessitate the colligation of them into the three classes — Abstract, 
Abstract- Concrete, and Concrete. IIow irreconcilable is M. Comte's classification 
with these groups, will be at once apparent on inspection. It stands thus : — 

Mathematics (including rational Mechanics), partly Abstract, partly 

Abstract-Concrete. 

Astronomy Concrete. 

Physics Abstract- Concrete. 

Chemistry Abstract- Concrete. 

Biology Concrete. 

Sociology Concrete. 



72 CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES. 

and invariable connexions — that between each kind of 
phenomenon and certain other kinds of phenomena, 
there exist uniform relations. This is a universal 
abstract truth — that there is an unchanging order 
among things in Space and Time. We come next 
to the several kinds of unchanging order, which, 
taken together, form the subjects of the second 
division of Abstract Science. Of this second divi- 
sion, the most general sub-division is that which 
deals with the natures of the connexions in Space 
and Time, irrespective of the terms connected. The 
conditions under which we may predicate a rela- 
tion of coincidence or proximity in Space and 
Time (or of non-coincidence or non-proximity) form 
the subject-matter of Logic. Here the natures and 
amounts of the terms between which the relations arc 
asserted (or denied) are of no moment : the proposi- 
tions of Logic are independent of any qualitative 
or quantitative specification of the related things. 
The other sub-division has for its subject-matter, the 
relations between terms which are specified quanti- 
tatively but not qualitatively. The amounts of the 
related terms, irrespective of their natures, are here- 
dealt with; and Mathematics is a statement of the 
laws of quantity considered apart from reality. Quan- 
tity considered apart from reality, is occupancy of 
Space or Time ; and occupancy of Space or Time 
is measured by the number of coexistent or sequent 
positions occupied. That is to say, quantities can be 






MATHEMATICAL IDEAS. 73 

compared and the relations between them established, 
only by some direct or indirect enumeration of their 
component units; and the ultimate units into which 
all others are decomposable, are such occupied posi- 
tions in Space as can, by making impressions on 
consciousness, produce occupied positions in Time. 
Among units that are unspecified in their natures 
(extensive, protensive, or intensive), but are ideally 
endowed with existence considered apart from attri- 
butes, the quantitative relations that arise, are those 
most general relations expressed by numbers. Such 
relations fall into either of two orders, according as 
the units are considered simply as capable of filling 
separate places in consciousness, or according as they 
are considered as filling places that are not only sepa- 
rate, but equal. In the one case, we have that inde- 
finite calculus by which numbers of abstract existences, 
but not sums of abstract existence, are predicable. In 
the other case, we have that definite calculus by which 
both numbers of abstract existences and sums of 
abstract existence are predicable. Next comes that 
division of Mathematics which deals with the quanti- 
tative relations of magnitudes (or aggregates of units) 
considered as coexistent, or as occupying Space — the 
division called Geometry. And. then we arrive at 
relations, the terms of which include both quantities 
of Time and quantities of Space — those in which 
times are estimated by the units of space traversed 
at a uniform velocity, and those in which equal 

4 



u 



CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCTEXCE: 



units of time being given, the spaces traversed with 
uniform or variable velocities are estimated. These 
Abstract Sciences, which are concerned exclusively 
with relations and with the relations of relations, may 
be grouped as shown in Table I. 

Passing from the Sciences that treat of the ideal or 
unoccupied forms of relations, and turning to the 
Sciences that treat of real relations, or the relations 
among realities, we come first to those Sciences which 
deal with realities, not as they arc habitually mani- 
fested to us, but with realities as manifested in their 
different modes, when these are artificially separated 
from one another. In the same way that the Abstract 
Sciences are ideal, relatively to the Abstract-Concrete 
and Concrete Sciences ; so the Abstract- Concrete 
Sciences are ideal, relatively to the Concrete Sciences. 
Just as Logic and Mathematics have for their object 
to generalize the laws of relation, qualitative and 
quantitative, apart from related things; so, Mecha- 
nics, Physics, Chemistry, etc., have for their object 
to generalize the laws of relation which different 
modes of Matter and Motion conform to, when seve- 
rally disentangled from those actual phenomena in 
which they are mutually modified. Just as the 
geometrician formulates the properties of lines and 
surfaces, independently of the irregularities and thick- 
nesses of lines and surfaces as they really exist ; so, 
the physicist and the chemist formulate the mani- 



. f Unis of Being, irrespective of any specification of tho 



proximity in Time and Space, but not necessarily in 



(_ Laws of positions in space ; and the facts predicated being 



+ Lest tli 
name, in ill 
lation, crim 
in respect o 

t Perhap: 
ception of ] 
Motion maj 
of Matter ml 



TABLE .jpendent existences. 



when their numbers are completely specified 
* This d( {Arithmetic.) 

lations cal 
relations c 
which the 

nexion varil f m tneir relations. 

c nnexion When their numbers | {Algebra.) 

rightly deaj^ spec i ned on l y </ 

**Here,l 
will suffice (. 

in a point, j 
absence of a 
the ass er tic 
line, is neg; 

implies the flered in their relations of coexistence. 
{Geometry.) 

f that is wholly indefinite. 
j {Kinematics.) 

lered as traversed in Time <^ 

| that is divided into equal 
^ units. 

{Geometry of Motion. %) 



in the relations of their relations. 
{Calculus of Operations.) 



'Universal law of relation— an expression of the truth that uniformities of connexion obtain anions modes of Reing, irrespective of any specification of tho 
lKiiuRi ot the ■uniformities of connexion. • 



(_ Laws of relati( 



• Till* (lelim!:...|L iinlllrlC; 
Kliilh.il'- f.llk'tl timlili^l-lll 
in.-v.on vane- Willi tlie 1MIIII 

nulitly <ii ,ilt with mathenii 

'» Here, by wayol explain 

will MiHi'-o lo in, inner the ] 

H 1 !— [['■" r,| .Ml-, I [ n ■ I 1 1 1 i i \ nV - 

ini|itii.^ tli-.' ni- : j..ilnui of any 



that are qualitative; or that are specified in their natures as relations of coincidence or proximity in Time and Space, but not necessarily in 
their terms: the natures and amount of which are indifferent. (Logic.)* 



negatively : the terms of the relations being definitely-related sets of positions in space ; and tho facts predicated being 
the absences of certain quantities. {Geometry of Position.* •) 



positively : the 
terms being magni- 
tudes composed of« 



■ ■it- iiitci--icumi--. Siinilinly, 
■<>rk('|iun:) of a straight line 



when their numbers are completely specified 
the equality of which is I {Arithmetic.) 

defined 



[ in the relations of their relatk 
{Cahulm of Operations) 



f considered in their relations of coexistence. 
! equality of which | {Geometry.) 

that of extension ^ ["that U wholly imVt'uiitr. 

| {Kinematic*.) 

considered as traversed in Time < 

1 that is divided into equal 

{Geometry of Motion. X) 



THE LAWS OF MOTION. 75 

festations of each mode of force, independently of 
the disturbances in its manifestations which other 
modes of force cause in every actual case. In works 
on Mechanics, the laws of motion are expressed with- 
out reference to friction and resistance of the medium. 
Not what motion ever really is, but what it would 
be if retarding forces were absent, is asserted. If any 
retarding force is taken into account, then the effect 
of this retarding force is alone contemplated : neglect- 
ing the other retarding forces. Consider, again, the 
generalizations of the physicist respecting molecular 
motion. The law that light varies inversely as the 
square of the distance, is absolutely true only 
when the radiation goes on from a point without 
dimensions, which it never does; and it also assumes 
that the rays are perfectly straight, which they cannot 
be unless the medium differs from all actual media in 
being perfectly homogeneous. If the disturbing 
effects of changes of media are investigated, the 
formulae expressing the refractions take for granted 
that the new media entered are homogeneous ; which 
they never really are. Even when a compound 
disturbance is allowed for, as when the refraction 
undergone by light in traversing a medium of in- 
creasing density, like the atmosphere, is calculated, 
the calculation still supposes conditions that are un- 
naturally simple — it supposes that the atmosphere 
is not pervaded by heterogeneous currents, which 
it always is. Similarly with the inquiries of the 



76 CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES. 

chemist. He does not take his substances as Nature 
supplies them. Before he proceeds to specify their 
respective properties, he purifies them — separates from 
each all trace of every other. Before ascertaining the 
specific gravity of a gas, he has to free this gas from 
the vapour of water, usually mixed with it. Before 
describing the properties of a salt, he guards against 
any error that may arise from the presence of an 
uncombined portion of the acid or base. And when 
he alleges of any element that it has a certain atomic 
weight, and unites with such and such equivalents 
of other elements, he does not mean that the results 
thus expressed are exactly the results of any on? 
experiment ; but that they are the results which, 
after averaging nany trials, he concludes would be 
realized if absolute purity could be obtained, and 
if the experiments could be conducted without 
loss. His problem is to ascertain the laws of 
combination of molecules, not as they are actually 
displayed, but as they would be displayed in the 
absence of those minute interferences which cannot 
be altogether avoided. Thus all these Abstract-Con- 
crete Sciences have for their object, analytical inter- 
pretation. In every case it is the aim to decompose 
the phenomenon, and formulate its components apart 
from one another ; or some two or three apart from 
the rest. Wherever, throughout these Sciences, syn- 
thesis is employed, it is for the verification of analysis.* 

* I am indebted to Prof, Fr tnkland for reminding me of an objection \\\ it may ba 



THE ABSTRACT-CONCRETE SCIENCES. 77 

The truths elaborated are severally asserted, not as 
truths exhibited by this or that particular object ; but 
as truths universally holding of Matter and Motion in 
their more general or more special forms, considered 
apart from particular objects, and particular places in 
space. 

The sub-divisions of this group of Sciences, may be 
drawn on the same principle as that on which the 
sub-divisions of the preceding group were drawn. 
Phenomena, considered as more or less involved 
manifestations of force, yield on analysis, certain 
laws of manifestation that are universal, and" other 
laws of manifestation, which, being dependent on 
conditions, are not universal. ITence the Abstract- 
Concrete Sciences are primarily divisible into — the 
laws of force considered apart from its separate modes, 
and laws of force considered under each of its sepa- 
rate modes. And this second division of the Abstract- 
Concrete group, is sub-divisible after a manner essen- 
tially analogous. It is needless to occupy space by 



made to this statement. The production of new compounds by synthesis, has of 
late become an important branch of chemistry. According to certain known laws 
of composition, complex substances, which never before existed, are formed, and 
fulfil anticipations both as to their general properties and as to the proportions of 
their constituents — as proved by analysis. Here it may be said with truth, that 
analysis is used to verify synthesis. Nevertheless, the exception to the above 
statement is apparent only — not real. In so far as the production of new com- 
pounds is carried on merely for the obtainment of such new compounds, it is not 
Science but Art— the application of pre-established knowledge to the achievement 
of ends. The proceeding is a part of Science, only in so far as it is a means to 
the better interpretation of the order of Nature. And how does it aid the inter- 
pretation ? It does it only by verifying the pre-established conclusions respecting 
the laws of molecular combination ; or by serving further to explain them. That 
is to say, these syntheses, considered on their scientific side, have simply the pur- 
pose of forwarding the analysis af the laws of chemical combination. 



78 CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES. 

defining these several orders and genera of Sciences. 
Table II. will sufficiently explain their relations. 

We come now to the third great group. "We have 
done with the Sciences which are concerned only with 
the blank forms of relations under which Being is 
manifested to us. We have left behind the Sciences 
which, dealing with Being under its universal mode, 
and its several non-universal modes regarded as inde- 
pendent, treats the terms of its relations as simple and 
homogeneous, which they never are in Nature. There 
remain the Sciences which, taking these modes of 
Being as they are connected with one another, have for 
the terms of their relations, those heterogeneous combi- 
nations of forces that constitute actual phenomena. 
The subject-matter of these Concrete-Sciences is the 
real, as contrasted with the wholly or partially ideal. 
It is their aim, not to separate and generalize apart 
the components of all phenomena ; but to explain each 
phenomenon as a product of these components. Their 
relations are not, like those of the simplest Abstract- 
Concrete Sciences, relations between one antecedent 
and one consequent, nor are they, like those of the 
more involved Abstract-Concrete Sciences, relations 
between some few antecedents cut off in imagination 
from all others, and some few consequents similarly 
cut off; but they are relations each of which has for 
its terms a complete plexus of antecedents and a com- 
plete plexus of consequents. This is manifest in the 



resolution and composition of forces. 



{Statics.) 
(Hydrostatics) 
(Dynamics) 
(Hydrodynamics) 

., as impenetrability or space-occupancy. 

(^ as the forms resulting from molecular equilibrium. 

/ when solid, 
cohesion, elasticity, etc.) < when liquid. 
I when gaseous. 



" causing increase of volume 
relative (expansion, liquefaction, evaporation), 
teneously ^ 
TAlM causing decrease of volume 

^ (condensation, solidification, contraction). 

f producing new relations of molecules 
relative | (new compounds), 

eneously ^ 
) | producing new relations of forces 

^ (new affinities). 



y integration, generates sensible motion. 

y disintegration, generates ( tw/ 
e motion, under the forms of &£&+ 
\ Magnetism. 



yorsal laws of forces (tensions and pressures), as cbiusible fro 



the t!io>r:-:iis of res:>lutu 



equilibrium relatively to other 



B that are not in equilibrium relatively to other masses 



' ana* are solid. {Stalks.) 
and are fluid. (Hydrostatics.) 



( and are solid. {Dyn 



in molecules 
(Molecular 
Mechanics) 



( and are fluid. {Hydrodynamics.) 

giving statical properties of matter J 

( special, as the forms resulting from molecular equilibrium, 

/ when solid, 
giving statico -dynamical properties of matter (cohesion, elasticity, etc.) ! when liquid. 

'when gaseous. 



which alters their relative 

positions hctcrogcncously 

{Chemistry) 



\ producing new relations of forces 
^ (new affinities). 



f which, by integration, generates sensible motion. 



• insensible motion, under the forms 



/ mat. 

5 2ft* 



THE PEOBLEMS OF ASTRONOMY. 79 

least involved Concrete Sciences. The astronomer 
seeks to explain the Solar System. He does not stop 
Bhort after generalizing the laws of planetary move- 
ment, such as planetary movement would be did only 
a single planet exist ; but he solves this abstract-con- 
crete problem, as a step towards solving the concrete 
problem of the planetary movements as affecting one 
another. In astronomical language, "the theory of 
the Moon'' means an interpretation of the Moon's 
motions, not as determined simply by centripetal and 
centrifugal forces, but as perpetually modified by 
gravitation towards the Earth's equatorial protuber- 
ance, towards the Sun, and even towards Venus — 
forces daily varying in their amounts and combina- 
tions. 'Nov docs the astronomer leave off when he has 
calculated what will be the position of a given body 
at a given time, allowing for all perturbing influences ; 
but he goes on to consider the effects produced by re- 
actions on the perturbing masses. And he further 
goes on to consider how these mutual perturbations 
of the planets cause, during a long period, increasing 
deviations from a mean state; and then how compen- 
sating perturbations cause continuous decrease in the 
deviations. That is, the goal towards which he ever 
strives, is a complete explanation of these complex 
planetary motions in their totality. Similarly with 
the geologist. Ho does not take for his problem only 
those irregularities of the Earth's crust that are 
worked by denudation ; or only those which igneous 



80 CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES. 

action causes. He does not seek simply to understand 
how sedimentary strata were formed; or how faults 
were produced; or how moraines originated, or how 
the beds of Alpine lakes were scooped out. But taking 
into account all agencies co-operating in endless and 
ever-varying combinations, he aims to interpret the 
entire structure of the Earth's crust. If he studies 
separately the actions of rain, rivers, glaciers, icebergs, 
tides, waves, volcanoes, earthquakes, etc. ; he does so 
that he may be better able to comprehend their joint 
actions as factors in geological phenomena: the object 
of his science being to generalize these phenomena in 
all their involved connections, as parts of one whole. 
In like manner Biology is the elaboration of a com- 
plete theory of Life, in each and all of its involved 
manifestations. If different aspects of its phenomena 
are investigated apart — if one observer busies himself 
in classing organisms, another in dissecting them, 
another in ascertaining their chemical compositions, 
another in studying functions, another in tracing laws 
of modification; they are all, consciously or uncon- 
sciousty, helping to work out a solution of vital 
phenomena in their entirety, both as displayed by 
individual organisms and by organisms at large. 
Thus, in these Concrete Sciences, the object is the 
converse of that which the Abstract-Concrete Sciences 
propose to themselves. In the one case we have 
analytical interpretation ; while in the other case we 
have synthetical interpretation. Instead of synthesis 



MATTEE AND MOTION. 81 

being used merely to verify analysis ; analysis is here 
used only to aid synthesis. Not to formulate the 
factors of phenomena is now the object ; but to formu- 
late the phenomena resulting from these factors, under 
the various conditions which the Universe presents. 

This third class of Sciences, like the other classes, is 
divisible into the universal and the non-universal. As 
there are truths which hold of all phenomena in their 
elements ; so there are truths which hold of all pheno- 
mena in their totalities. As force has certain ultimate 
laws common to its separate modes of manifestation, 
so in those combinations of its modes which constitute 
actual phenomena, "we find certain ultimate laws that 
are conformed to in every case. These are the laws 
of the re-distribution of force. Since we can become 
conscious of a phenomenon only by some change 
wrought in us, every phenomenon necessarily implies 
re-distribution of force — change in the arrangements 
of matter and motion. Alike in molecular movements 
and the movements of masses, one great uniformity 
may be traced. A decreasing quantity of motion, 
sensible or insensible, always has for its concomitant 
an increasing aggregation of matter ; and, conversely, 
an increasing quantity of motion, sensible or insensible, 
has for its concomitant a decreasing aggregation of 
matter. Give to the molecules of any mass, more 
of that insensible motion which we call heat, and the 
parts of the mass become somewhat less closely aggre- 
gated. Add a further quantity of insensible motion, 



S2 CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES. 

and the mass so far disintegrates as tobe come liquid. 
Add still more insensible motion, and the mass dis- 
integrates so completely as to become gas ; which 
occupies a greater space with every extra quantity 
of insensible motion given to it. On the other hand, 
every loss of insensible motion by a mass, gaseous, 
liquid, or solid, is accompanied by a progressing 
integration of the mass. Similarly with sensible 
motions, be the bodies moved large or smalh Aug- 
ment the velocities of the planets, and their orbits 
will enlarge — the Solar System would occupy a wider 
space. Diminish their velocities, and their orbits will 
lessen — the Solar System will contract, or become 
more integrated. And in like manner we see that 
every sensible motion on the Earth's surface involves 
a partial disintegration of the moving body from 
the Earth; while the loss of its motion is accom- 
panied by the body's re-integration with the Earth. 
In all phenomena we have either an integration of 
matter and concomitant dissipation of motion ; or 
an absorption of motion and concomitant disintegra- 
tion of matter. And where, as in living bodies, 
these processes are going on simultaneously, there 
is an integration of matter proportioned to the dis- 
sipation of motion, and an absorption of motion 
proportioned to the disintegration of matter. Such, 
then, are the universal laws of that re-distribution 
of matter and motion everywhere going on — a re- 
distribution which results in Evolution so long as 



RE-DISTRIBUTIONS OF MATTER AND MOTION. 83 

the aggregation of matter and dispersion of motion 
predominate ; but which results in Dissolution where 
there is a predominant aggregation of motion and 
dispersion of matter. Hence we have a division 
of Concrete Science which bears towards the other 
Concrete Sciences, a relation like that which Universal 
Law of Kelation bears to Mathematics, and like that 
which Universal Mechanics (composition and resolu- 
tion of forces) bears to Physics. We have a division of 
Concrete Science which generalizes those concomitants 
of this re-distribution that hold good among all orders 
of concrete objects — a division which explains why, 
along with a predominating integration of matter and 
dissipation of motion, there goes a change from 
an indefinite, incoherent -homogeneity, to a definite, 
coherent heterogeneity ; and why a reverse re-dis- 
tribution of matter and motion, is accompanied by 
a reverse structural change. Passing from this uni- 
versal Concrete Science, to the non-universal Concrete 
Sciences; we find that these are primarily divisible 
into the science which deals with the re-distributions 
of matter and motion among the masses in space, con- 
sequent on their mutual actions as w T holes ; and the 
science which deals with the re-distributions of matter 
and motion consequent on the mutual actions of the 
molecules in each mass. And of these equally general 
Sciences, this last is re-divisible into the Science which 
is limited to the concomitants of re-distribution among 
the molecules of each mass when regarded as inde- 



t CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES. 

pendent, and the Science which takes into account the 
molecular motion received by radiation from other 
masses. But these sub -divisions, and their sub-sub- 
divisions, will be best seen in the annexed Table III. 

That these great groups of Sciences and their re- 
spective sub-groups, fulfil the definition of a true 
classification given at the outset, is, I think, tolerably 
manifest. The subjects of inquiry included in each 
primary division, have essential attributes in common 
with one another, which they have not in common 
with any of the subjects contained in the other pri- 
mary divisions; and they have, by consequence, a 
greater number of common attributes in which they 
severally agree with the colligated subjects, and dis- 
agree with the subjects otherwise colligated. Between 
Sciences which deal with relations apart from realities, 
and Sciences which deal with realities, the distinc- 
tion is the widest possible; since Being, in some or 
all of its attributes, is common to all Sciences of the 
second class, and excluded from all Sciences of the first 
class. The distinction between the empty forms of 
things and the things themselves, is a distinction 
which cannot be exceeded in degree. And when 
we divide the Sciences which treat of realities, into 
those which deal with their separate components and 
those which deal with their components as united, 
we make a profounder distinction than can exist be- 
tween the Sciences which deal with one or other order 



Univers 
of Met 



predominant integration of Matter and dissipation 
f Matter. 



Laws c 

tions of 

^ tion ac 



fe. [Sidereal Astronomy.) 
(Planetary Astronomy.) 



TABLE III. 



molecules. (Solar Mineralogy!) 
3sis of radiant forces.* 
aids. (Solar Meteorology, f) 



and decomposition of inorganic matters. (Mineralogy.) 
ons of gases and liquids. (Meteorology.) 
ions of solids. (Geology.) 

[ general. 



r those of structure < 

(Morphology) ( special. 



:e < 



* This must X\ 
here referred to 
the integration c 

t Embracing 
coronal flames. 

t Want of spa 



! general, 
special, 
function <{ 

| in their exter- I general 
^ nal relations < ( separate. 

(Psychology) [ special < 

( comhined. 
(Sociology. I) 



i of Mattor and dissipation 



i of tlie rcdistribu- 
of Matter and Mo- 
actually going on 



the celestial bodies 
(AstronomtI 



the molecules 
my celestial 
as caused by 



rela- I the dvi- 
iding 

( the dyn 



r stellar universe. {Sidereal Astronomy.) 
c solar system. (Planetary Astronomy.) 



f resulting in the formation of compound molendrs. [Solar Miueraht/y.) 
softhesemole- | 

one another { resulting in molecuhir motions ami evm-is of reliant, forces.* 



and liquids. [Solar Ueteoroloyy.f) 



the actions of these mole- 
cules on one another, joined 
with the actions on them 
of forces radiated by the 
i molecules of other masses : 

(GsUGEHY) 



■ exiiiM'vl in tlic pl;un-N -'rUiTnlly. 



ausing composition and dm>inp'vitimi nf iiMnrinu' miffnr*. hrLr-rulngy.) 
ausing re-distributions of gases and liquids. {Meteorology.) 
■nuking rc-di.-tiilmtknii of solids. {Geology.) 

I general. 



causing organic plic- 
{Biology) 



' This must not he -nppr^cil t 



! general, 
special. 



?rc loft-m-il to u* dis.-i]j.itctl in railiatii 
t Kmiii-.K-in- the iiiR-ipretatiim of -\ 


ns, is the equivalent 
consequent on their 
ch phenomena as th 


nutual gravitation. 
solar spots, the faculoo and fho 


t Want of space p 


'.■v. ,u ■- .m> ;.;.i!,_: i.L-y>>;iO i'o.o briefest indication of 


hesesubdivis 





( Sprl'i.d 



( combined. 

(.Sotiuhji/.i,) 



THE THREE GROUPS OF SCIENCES. 85 

of the components, or than can exist between the 
Sciences which deal with one or other order of the 
things composed. The three gronps of Sciences may 
be briefly defined as — laws of the forms; laws of 
the factors ; laws of the products. And when thus 
defined, it becomes manifest that the groups are 
so radically unlike in their natures, that there can 
be no transitions between them ; and that any 
Science belonging to one of the groups must be 
quite incongruous with the Sciences belonging to 
either of the other groups, if transferred. How 
fundamental are the differences between them, will be 
further seen on considering their functions. The first, 
or abstract group, is instrumental with respect to both 
the others ; and the second, or abstract-concrete group, 
is instrumental with respect to the third or concrete 
group. An endeavour to invert these functions will 
at once show how essential is the difference of 
character. The second and third groups supply 
subject-matter to the first, and the third supplies 
subject-matter to the second; but none of the truths 
which constitute the third group are of any use as 
solvents of the problems presented by the second 
group ; and none of the truths which the second 
group formulates can act as solvents of problems 
contained in the first group. Concerning the sub- 
divisions of these great groups, little remains to be 
added. That each of the groups, being co-extensive 
with all phenomena, contains truths that are universal 



S3 CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES. 

and others that are not universal, and that these must 
be classed apart, is obvious. And that the sub- 
divisions of the non-universal truths, are to be made in 
something like the manner shown in the tables, is 
proved by the fact that when the descriptive words 
are read from the root to the extremity of any branch, 
they form a definition of the Science constituting that 
branch. That the minor divisions might be other- 
wise arranged, and that better definitions of them 
might be given, is highly probable. They are here 
set down merely for the purpose of showing how this 
method of classification works out. 

I will only further remark, that the relations of the 
Sciences as thus represented, are still but imperfectly 
represented : their relations cannot be truly shown 
on a plane, but only in space of three dimensions. 
The three groups cannot rightly be put in linear 
order as they have here been. Since the first stands 
related to the third, not only indirectly through the 
second, but also directly — it is directly instrumental 
with respect to the third, and the third supplies it 
directly with subject-matter. Their relations can 
thus only be truly shown by a divergence from a 
common root on different sides, in such a way that 
each stands in juxta-position to the other two. And 
only by the like mode of arrangement, can the relations 
among the sub-divisions of each group be correctly 
represented. 



IV. 

POSTSCRIPT— REPLYING TO CRITICISMS. 



POSTSCRIPT, REPLYING TO CRITICISMS. 



Among objections made to any doctrine, those which come 
from avowed supporters of an adverse doctrine must be con- 
sidered, other things equal, as of less weight than those 
which come from men uncommitted to an adverse doctrine, 
or but partially committed to it. The element of preposses- 
sion, distinctly present in the one case and in the other case 
mainly or quite absent, is a well- recognized cause of differ- 
ence in the values of the judgments : supposing the judg- 
ments to be otherwise fairly comparable. Hence, when it is 
needful to bring the replies within a restricted space, a fit 
course is that of dealing rather with independent criticisms 
than with criticisms which are really indirect arguments for 
an opposite view, previously espoused. 

For this reason I propose here to confine myself substanti- 
ally, though not absolutely, to the demurrers entered against 
the foregoing classification by Prof. Bain, in his recent work 
on Logic. Before dealing with the more important of these, 
let me clear the ground by disposing of the less important. 

Incidentally, while commenting on the view I take re- 
specting the position of Logic, Prof. Bain points out that 
this, which is the most abstract of the sciences, owes much 
to Psychology, which I place among the Concrete Sciences; 
and he alleges an incongruity between this fact and my 
statement that the Cor/crete Sciences are not instrumental 



90 



EEPLLES TO CRITICISMS. 



in disclosing the trutns of the Abstract Sciences. Subse- 
quently he re-raises this apparent anomaly when saying — 

"Nor is it possible to justify the placing of Psychology wholly 
among Concrete Sciences. It is a highly analytic science, as !Mr. 
Spencer thoroughly knows." 

For a full reply, given by implication, I must refer Prof. 
Bain to § 56 of The Principles of Psychology, where I 
have contended that " while, under its objective aspect, 
Psychology is to be classed as one of the Concrete Sciences 
which successively decrease in scope as they increase in 
speciality; under its subjective aspect, Psychology is a 
totally unique science, independent of, and antithetically 
opposed to, all other sciences whatever." A pure idealist 
will not, I suppose, recognize this distinction ; but to every 
one else it must, I should think, be obvious that the science 
of subjective existences is the correlative of all the sciences 
of objective existences; and is as absolutely marked off from 
them as subject is from object. Objective Psychology, which 
I class among the Concrete Sciences, is purely synthetic, so 
long as it is limited, like the other sciences, to objective 
data ; though great aid in the interpretation of these data 
is derived from the observed correspondence between the 
phenomena of Objective Psychology as presented in other 
beings and the phenomena of Subjective Psychology as pre- 
sented in one's own consciousness. Xow it is Subjective 
Psychology only which is analytic, and which affords aid 
in the development of Logic. This being explained, the 
apparent incongruity disappears. 

A difficulty raised respecting the manner in which I have 
expressed the nature of Mathematics, may next be dealt 
with. Prof. Pain writes : — 

"In the first place, objection maybe taken to his language, in 
discussing the extreme Abstract Sciences, when he speaks of the 
empty forms therein considered. To call Space and Time empty 



conceptions of space and time. 91 

forms, must mean that they can he thought of without any concrete 
embodiment whatsoever; that one can think of Time, as a pure 
abstraction, without having in one's mind any concrete succession. 
Now, this doctrine is in the last degree questionable." 

I quite agree with Prof. Bain that "this doctrine is in 
the last degree questionable ; " but I do not admit that this 
doctrine is implied by the definition of Abstract Science 
which I have given. I speak of Space and Time as they 
are dealt with by mathematicians, and as it is alone possible 
for pure Mathematics to deal with them. While Mathe- 
matics habitually uses in its points, lines, and surfaces, 
certain existences, it habitually deals with these as repre- 
senting points, lines, and surfaces that are ideal; and its 
conclusions are true only on condition that it does this. Points 
having dimensions, lines having breadths, planes having 
thicknesses, are negatived by its definitions. Using, though 
it does, material representatives of extension, linear, super- 
ficial, or solid, Geometry deliberately ignores their material- 
ity ; and attends only to the truths of relation they present. 
Holding with Prof. Bain, as I do, that our consciousness 
of Space is disclosed by our experiences of Matter — argu- 
ing, as I have done in The Principles of Psychology, that it 
is a consolidated aggregate of all relations of co-existence 
that have been severally presented by Matter ; I never- 
theless contend that it is possible to dissociate these re- 
lations from Matter to the extent required for formulating 
them as abstract truths. I contend, too, that this separa- 
tion is of the kind habitually made in other cases ; as, for 
instance, when the general laws of motion are formulated 
(as M. Comte's system, among others, formulates them) in 
such way as to ignore all properties of the bodies dealt with 
save their powers of taking up, and retaining, and giving 
out, quantities of motion; though these powers are incon- 
ceivable apart from the attribute of extension, which is 
intentionally disregarded. 



yii REPLIES TO CRITICISMS. 

Taking other of Prof. Bain's objections, not in the order 
in which they stand but in the order in which they may be 
most conveniently dealt with, I quote as follows: — 

"The law of the radiation of light (the inverse square of the 
distance) is said by Mr. Spencer to be Abstract-Concrete, while the 
disturbing changes in the medium are not to be mentioned except 
in a Concrete Science of Optics. We need not remark that such 
a separate handling is unknown to science." 

It is perfectly true that " such a separate handling is un- 
known to science." But, unfortunately for the objection, it 
is also perfectly true that no such separate handling is pro- 
posed by me, or is implied by my classification. How Prof. 
Bain can have so missed the meaning of the word "concrete," 
as I have used it, I do not understand. After pointing out 
that "no one ever drew the line," between the Abstract- 
Concrete and the Concrete Sciences, "as I have done it," 
he alleges an anomaly which exists only supposing that 
I have drawn it where it is ordinarily drawn. lie appears 
inadvertently to have carried with him M. Cointe's concep- 
tion of Optics as a Concrete Science, and, importing it into 
my classification, debits me with the incongruity. If he 
will re-read the definition of the Abstract-Concrete Sciences, 
or study their sub-divisions as shown in Table IL, he will, 
I think, see that the most special laws of the redistribution 
of light, equally with its most general laws, are included. 
And if he will pass to the definition and the tabulation of 
the Concrete Sciences, he will, I think, see no less clearlv 
that Optics cannot be included among them. 

Prof. Bain considers that I am not justified in classing 
Chemistry as an Abstract-Concrete Science, and excluding 
from it all consideration of the crude forms of the various 
substances dealt with ; and he enforces his dissent by saying 
that chemists habitually describe the ores and impure mix- 
tures in which the elements, etc., are naturally found. Un- 
doubtedly chemists do this. But do they therefore intend 



JIMITS OF CHEMICAL SCIENCE. 93 

to include an account of the ores of a substance, as a part of 
the science which formulates its molecular constitution and 
the constitutions of all the definite compounds it enters 
into? I shall be very much surprised if I find that they 
do. Chemists habitually prefix to their works a division 
treating of Molecular Physics ; but they do not therefore 
claim Molecular Physics as a part of Chemistry. If they 
similarly prefix to the chemistry of each substance an out- 
line of its mineralogy, I do not think they therefore mean to 
assert that the last belongs to the first. Chemistry proper, 
embraces nothing beyond an account of the constitutions 
and modes of action and combining proportions of substances 
that are taken as absolutely pure ; and its truths no more 
recognize impure substances than the truths of Geometry 
recognize crooked lines. 

Immediately after, in criticizing the fundamental dis- 
tinction I have made between Chemistry and Biology, as 
Abstract- Concrete and Concrete respectively, Prof. Bain 
says : — 

"But the objects of Chemistry and the objects of Biology are 
equally concrete, so far as they go ; the simple bodies of chemistry, 
and their several compounds, are viewed by the Chemist as concrete 
wholes, and are described by him, not with reference to one factor, 
but to all their factors." 

Issue is here raised in a form convenient for elucidation 
of the general question. It is true that, for purposes oj 
identification y a chemist gives an account of all the sensible 
characters of a substance. He sets down its crystalline 
form, its specific gravity, its power of refracting light, its 
behaviour as magnetic or diamagnetic. But does he there- 
by include these phenomena as part of the Science of 
Chemistry ? It seems to me that the relation between the 
weight of any portion of matter and its bulk, which is 
ascertained on measuring its specific gravity, is a physical 
and not a chemical fact. I think, too, that the physicist 



94: REPLIES TO CPJTICISMS. 

will claim, as part of liis science, all investigations touching 
the refraction of light : be the substance producing this 
refraction what it may. And the circumstance that the 
chemist may test the magnetic or diamagnetic property 
of a body, as a means of ascertaining what it is, or as a 
means of helping other chemists to determine whether they 
have got before them the same body, will neither be held 
by the chemist, nor allowed by the physicist, to imply a 
transfer of magnetic phenomena from the domain of the 
one to that of the other. In brief, though the chemist, in 
his account of an element or a compound, may refer to 
certain physical traits associated with its molecular consti- 
tution and affinities, he does not by so doing change these 
into chemical traits. "Whatever chemists may put into 
their books, Chemistry, considered as a science, includes 
only the phenomena of molecular structures and changes — 
of compositions and decompositions.* I contend, then, 
that Chemistry does not give an account of anything 
as a concrete whole, in the same way that Biology gives 
an account of an organism as a concrete whole. This 
will become even more manifest on observing the character 
of the biological account. All the attributes of an organism 
are comprehended, from the most general to the most special 
— from its conspicuous structural traits to its hidden and faint 
ones; from its outer actions that thrust themselves on the 
attention, to the minutest sub-divisions of its multitudinous 

* Perhaps some will say that such incidental phenomena as those of the heat 
and light evolved during "chemical changes, are to be included among chemical 
phenomena. I think, however, the physicist will hold that all phenomena of 
re-distributed molecular motion, no matter bow arising, come within the range 
of Physics. Put whatever difficulty there may be in drawing the line betweou 
Physics and Chemistry (and, as I have incidentally pointed out in The Pri 
of 'Psychology, § 55, the two are closely linked by the phenomena of aUotropy 
and isomerism), applies equally to the Comtean classification, or to any other. 
And I may further point out that no obstacle hence arises to the classification I 
am defending. Physics and Chemistry being both grouped by me as Ab- 
Concrete Sciences, no difficulty in satisfactorily dividing them in the least afrecta 
the satisfactoriness of the division ot' the great group to which they both belong, 
from the other two great groups. 



ELEMENTS OF BIOLOGICAL SCIENCE. 95 

internal functions ; from its character as a germ, through the 
many changes of size, form, organization, and habit, it goes 
through until death ; from the physical characters of it as 
a whole, to the physical characters of its microscopic cells, 
and vessels, and fibres ; from the chemical characters of 
its substance in general to the chemical characters of each 
tissue and each secretion — all these, with many others. 
And not only so, but there is comprehended as the ideal 
goal of the science, the consensus of all these phenomena 
in their co-existences and successions, as constituting a 
coherent individualized group definitely combined in space 
and in time. It is this recognition of individuality in its 
subject-matter, that gives its concreteness to Biology, as 
to every other Concrete Science. As Astronomy deals 
with bodies that have their several proper names, or (as 
with the smaller stars) are registered by their positions, 
and considers each of them as a distinct individual — as 
Geology, while dimly perceiving in the Moon and nearest 
planets other groups of geological phenomena (which it would 
deal with as independent wholes, did not distance forbid), 
occupies itself with that individualized group presented by 
the Earth ; so Biology treats either of an individual dis- 
tinguished from all others, or of parts or products belonging 
to such an individual, or of structural or functional traits 
common to many such individuals that have been observed, 
and supposed to be common to others that are like them 
in most or all of their attributes. Every biological truth 
connotes a specifically individualized object, or a number 
of specifically individualized objects of the same kind, or 
numbers of different kinds that are severally specific. See, 
then, the contrast. The truths of the Abstract- Concrete 
Sciences do not imply specific individuality. Neither Molar 
Physics, nor Molecular Physics, nor Chemistry, concerns it- 
self with this. The laws of motion are expressed without 
any reference whatever to the sizes or shapes of the moving 



90 REPLIES TO CRITICISMS. 

masses ; which may be taken indifferently to be suns or 
atoms. The relations between contraction and the escape 
of molecular motion, and between expansion and the ab- 
sorption of molecular motion, are expressed in their general 
forms without reference to the kind of matter ; and, if 
the degree of either that occurs in a particular kind of 
matter is formulated, no note is taken of the quantity of 
that matter, much less of its individuality. Similarly with 
Chemistry. When it inquires into the atomic weight, the 
molecular structure, the atomicity, the combining propor- 
tions, etc., of a substance, it is indifferent whether a grain 
or a ton be thought of — the conception of amount is abso- 
lutely irrelevant. And so with more special attributes. 
Sulphur, considered chemically, is not sulphur under its 
crystalline form, or under its allot ropic viscid form, or as 
a liquid, or as a gas ; but it is sulphur considered apart 
from those attributes of quantity, and shape, and state, that 
give individuality. 

Prof. Bain objects to the division I have drawn between the 
Concrete Science of Astronomy and that Abstract-Concrete 
Science which deals with the mutually-modified motions of 
hypothetical masses in space, as "not a little arbitrary." 
He says : — 

"We can suppose a science to confine itself soldi/ to the 'factors,' 
or the separated elements, and never, on any occasion, to combine two 
into a composite third. This position is intelligible, and possibly 
defensible. For example, in Astronomy, the Law of Persistence of 
Motion in a straight line might be discussed in pure ideal separation ; 
and so, the Law of Gravity might be discussed in equally pure - 
ration — both under the Abstract-Concrete department of Mechanics. 
It might then be reserved to a concrete department to unite these in 
the explanation of a projectile or of a planet. Such, however, is 
not Mr. Spencer's boundary Hue. He allows Theoretical Mechanics 
to make this particular combination, and to arrive at the lav 
planetary movement, in the case of a single planet. What he 
not allow is, to proceed to the case of two planets, mutually 
turbing one another, or a planet and a satellite, commonly l 
the 'problem of the Three Bodies.' M 



ABSTEACT-CONCEETE PEOBLEMS. 97 

If I lield what Prof. Bain supposes me to hold, my position 
would be an absurd one ; but he misapprehends me. The 
misapprehension results in part from his having here, as 
before, used the word " concrete " with the Comtean mean- 
ing, as though it were my meaning ; and in part from the 
inadequacy of my explanation. I did not in the least mean 
to imply that the Abstract- Concrete Science of Mechanics, 
when dealing with the motions of bodies in space, is limited 
to the interpretation of planetary movement such as it would 
be did only a single planet exist. It never occurred to me 
that my words (see p. 19) might be so construed. Abstract- 
Concrete problems admit, in fact, of being complicated in- 
definitely, without going in the least beyond the definition. 
I do not draw the line, as Prof. Bain alleges, between the 
combination of two factors and the combination of three, or 
between the combination of any number and any greater 
number. I draw the line between the science which deals 
with the theory of the factors, taken singly and in combina- 
tions of two, three, four, or more, and the science which, 
giving to these factors the values derived from observations of 
actual objects, uses the theory to explain actual phenomena. 

It is true that, in these departments of science, no radical 
distinction is consistently recognized between theory and the 
applications of theory. As Prof. Bain says : — 

" Newton, in the First Book of the Principia, took up the 
i problem of the Three Bodies, as applied to the Moon, and worked 
it to exhaustion. So writers on Theoretical Mechanics continue to 
include the Three Bodies, Precession, and the Tides." 

But, supreme though the authority of Newton may be as a 
mathematician and astronomer, and weighty as are the names 
of Laplace and Herschel, who in their works have similarly 
mingled theorems and the explanations yielded by them, it 
does not seem to me that these facts go for much ; unless it 
can be shown that these writers intended thus to enunciate 
the views at which they had arrived respecting the- .classifi- 



98 REPLIES TO CRITICISMS. 

cation of the sciences. Such a union as that presented in 
their works, adopted merely for the sake of convenience, is, 
in fact, the indication of incomplete development; and has 
been paralleled in simpler sciences which have afterwards 
outgrown it. Two conclusive illustrations are at hand. The 
name Geometry, utterly inapplicable by its meaning to the 
science as it now exists, was applicable in that first stage 
when its few truths were taught in preparation for land- 
measuring and the setting-out of buildings; but, at a com- 
paratively early date, these comparatively simple truths 
became separated from their applications, and were embodied 
by the Greek geometers into systems of theory.* A like puri- 
fication is now taking place in another division of the science. 
In the Geometric Descriptive of Monge, theorems were mixed 
with their applications to projection and plan-drawing. But, 
since his time, the science and the art have been segregating; 
and Descriptive Geometry, or, as it may be better termed, 
the Geometry of Position, is now recognized by mathemati- 
cians as a far-reaching system of truths, parts of which are 
already embodied in books that make no reference to derived 
methods available by the architect or the engineer. To meet 
a counter-illustration that will be cited, I may remark that 
though, in works on Algebra intended for beginners, the 
theories of quantitative relations, as treated algebraically, 
are accompanied by groups of problems to be solved, the 
subject-matters of these problems are not thereby made 
parts of the Science of Algebra. To say that they are, is 
to say that Algebra includes the conceptions of distances 
and relative speeds and times, or of weights and bulks 
and specific gravities, or of areas ploughed and days and 
wages; since these, and endless others, may be the terms of 

* It may bo said that the mingling of problems and theorems in Euclid is not 
quite consistent with this statement ; and it is true that we have, in this mil 
a trace of the earlier form of the science. But it is to be remarked thai 
problems are all purely abstract, and, further, I 
expressed as a theorem. 



its equations. And just in the same way that these concrete 
problems, solved by its aid, cannot by any possibility be 
incorporated with the Abstract Science of Algebra ; so I 
contend that the concrete problems of Astronomy, cannot by 
any possibility be incorporated with that division of Abstract- 
Concrete Science which develops the theory of the inter- 
actions of free bodies that attract one another. 

On this point I find myself at issue, not only with Prof. 
Bain, but also with Mr. Mill, who contends that : — 

" There is an abstract science of astronomy, namely, the theory 
of gravitation, which would equally agree with and explain the 
facts of a totally different solar system from the one of which our 
earth forms a part. The actual facts of our own system, the di- 
mensions, distances, velocities, temperatures, physical constitution, 
etc., of the sun, earth, and planets, are properly the subject of a 
concrete science, similar to natural history; but the concrete is 
more inseparably united to the abstract science than in any other 
case, since the few celestial facts really accessible to us are nearly 
all required for discovering and proving the law of gravitation as 
an universal property of bodies, and have therefore an indispensable 
place in the abstract science as its fundamental data." — Auguste 
Comte and Positivism, p. 43. 

In this explanation, Mr. Mill recognizes the fundamental 
distinction between the Concrete Science of Astronomy, 
dealing with the bodies actually distributed in space, and 
a science dealing with hypothetical bodies hypothetically 
distributed in space. Nevertheless, he regards these sciences 
as not separable; because the second derives from the first 
the data whence the law of inter-action is derived. But 
the truth of this premiss, and the legitimacy of this infer- 
ence, may alike be questioned. The discovery of the law of 
inter-action was not due primarily, but only secondarily, to 
observation of the heavenly bodies. The conception of an 
inter- acting force that varies inversely as the square of the 
distance, is an a priori conception rationally deducible from 
mechanical and geometrical considerations. Though unlike 
in derivation to the many empirical hypotheses of Kepler 



100 REPLIES TO CKITICISM8. 

respecting planetary orbits and planetary motions, yet it was 
like the successful among these in its relation to astronomical 
phenomena : it was one of many possible hypotheses, which 
admitted of having their consequences worked out and 
tested ; and one which, on having its implications compared 
with the results of observation, was found to explain them. 
In. short, the theory of gravitation grew out of experiences 
of terrestrial phenomena ; but the verification of it was 
reached through experiences of celestial phenomena. Pass- 
ing now from premiss to inference, I do not see that, even 
were the alleged parentage substantiated, it would necessitate 
the supposed inseparability ; any more than the descent of 
Geometry from land-measuring necessitates a persistent union 
of the two. In the case of Algebra, as above indicated, 
the disclosed laws of quantitative relations hold through- 
out multitudinous orders of phenomena that are extremelv 
heterogeneous ; and this makes conspicuous the distinction 
between the theory and its applications. Here the laws of 
quantitative relations among masses, distances, velocities, and 
momenta, being applied mainly (though not exclusively) to 
the concrete cases presented by Astronomy, the distinction 
between the theory and its applications is less conspicuous. 
But, intrinsically, it is as great in the one case as in the 
other. 

How great it is, we shall see on taking an analogy. This 
is a living man, of whom we may know little more than that 
he is a visible, tangible person ; or of whom we may know 
enough to form a voluminous biography. Again, this book 
tells of a fictitious hero, who, like the heroes of old romance, 
may be an impersonated virtue or vice, or, like a modern 
hero, one of mixed nature, whose various motives and con- 
sequent actions are elaborated into a semblance of reality. 
But no accuracy and completeness of the picture makes this 
fictitious personage an actual personage, or brings him any 
nearer to one. Nor does any meagreness in our knowledge 



ANALOGY WITH FICTION AND BIOGRAPHY. 101 

of a real man reduce him any nearer to the imaginary being 
of a novel. To the last, the division between fiction and 
biography remains an impassable gulf. So, too, remains the 
division between the Science dealing with the inter-actions 
of hypothetical bodies in space, and the Science dealing 
with the inter-actions of existing bodies in space. We may 
elaborate the first to any degree whatever by the intro- 
duction of three, four, or any greater number of factors under 
any number of assumed conditions, until we symbolize a 
solar system ; but to the last an account of our symbolic 
solar system is as far from an account of the actual solar 
system as fiction is from biography. 

Even more obvious, if it be possible, does the radical cha- 
racter of this distinction become, on observing that from the 
simplest proposition of General Mechanics we may pass to 
the most complex proposition of Celestial Mechanics, with- 
out a break. We take a body moving at a uniform velocity, 
and commence with the proposition that it will continue so 
to move for ever. Next, we state the law of its accelerated 
motion in the same line, when subject to a uniform force. 
We further complicate the proposition by supposing the 
force to increase in consequence of approach towards an 
attracting body ; and we may formulate a series of laws of 
acceleration, resulting from so many assumed laws of in- 
creasing attraction (of which the law of gravitation is one). 
Another factor may now be added by supposing the body to 
have motion in a direction other than that of the attracting 
body ; and we may determine, according to the ratios of the 
supposed forces, whether its course will be hyperbolic, para- 
bolic, elliptical, or circular — we may begin with this hypo- 
thetical additional force as infinitesimal, and formulate the 
varying results as it is little by little increased. The problem 
is complicated a degree more by taking into account the 
effects of a third force, acting in some other direction ; and 
beginning with an infinitesimal amount of this force we may 



102 REPLIES TO CRITICISMS. 

reach any amount. Similarly, by introducing factor after 
factor, each at first insensible in proportion to the rest, we 
arrive, through an infinity of gradations, at a combination 
of any complexity. 

Thus, then, the Science which deals with the inter-action 
of hypothetical bodies in space, is absolutely continuous with 
General Mechanics. "We have already seen that it is ab- 
solutely discontinuous with that account cf the heavenly 
bodies which has been called Astronomy from the beginning. 
"When these facts are recognized, it seems to me that there 
cannot remain a doubt respecting its true place in a classi- 
fication of the Sciences. 

Passing over minor criticisms, either as met by implication 
or as demanding space that cannot be here afforded, let me 
say something by way of enforcing the general argument. 
I will re-state the case in two ways : the first of them 
adapted only to those who accept the general doctrine of 
Evolution. 

We set out with concentrating nebulous matter. Trac- 
ing the re-distributions of this as the rotating contracting 
spheroid leaves behind successive annuli, and as these sever- 
ally breaking up eventually form secondary rotating spheroids, 
we come at length to planets in their early stages. Thus 
far we consider the phenomena dealt with purely astro- 
nomical; and so long as our Earth, regarded as one of 
these spheroids, was made up of gaseous and molten 
matters only, it presented no definite data for any more 
complex Concrete Science. In the lapse of cosmical time 
a solid film forms, which, in the course of millions of years, 
thickens, and, in the course of further millions of years, 
becomes cool enough to permit the precipitation, first of 
various other gaseous compounds, and finally of water. 
Presently, the varying exposure of different parts of the 
spheroid to the Sun's rays, begins to produce appreciable 



CONTINUITY IN EVOLUTION. 



103 



effects; until at length there have arisen meteorological 
actions, and consequent geological actions, such as those we 
now know : determined partly by the Sun's heat, partly by 
the still-retained internal heat of the Earth, and partly by 
the action of the Moon on the ocean? How have we 
reached these geological phenomena ? When did the astro- 
nomical changes end and the geological begin ? It needs 
but to ask this question to see that there is no real division 
between the two. Putting pre-conceptions aside, we find 
nothing more than a group of phenomena continually com- 
plicating under the influence of the same original factors ; 
and we see that our conventional division is defensible only 
on grounds of convenience. Let us advance a stage. As 
the Earth's surface continues to cool, passing through all 
degrees of temperature by infinitesimal gradations, the for- 
mation of more and more complex inorganic compounds 
becomes possible ; later its surface sinks to that heat at 
which the less complex compounds of the kinds called 
organic can exist; and finally the formation of the more 
complex organic compounds becomes possible. Chemists 
now show us that these compounds may be built up sjmthe- 
tically in the laboratory — each stage in ascending complexity 
making possible the next higher stage. Hence it is inferable 
that, in the myriads of laboratories, endlessly diversified in 
their materials and conditions, which the Earth's surface 
furnished during the myriads of years occupied in passing 
through these stages of temperature, such successive syn- 
theses were effected; and that the highly complex unstable 
substance out of which all organisms are composed, was 
eventually formed in microscopic portions: from which, by 
continuous integrations and differentiations, the evolution 
of all organisms has proceeded. Where then shall we draw 
the line between Geology and Biology? The synthesis of 
this most complex compound, is but a continuation of the 
syntheses by which all simpler compounds were formed. 



101 REPLIES TO CRITICISMS. 

The same primary factors have been co-operating with 
those secondary factors, meteorologic and geologic, pre- 
viously derived from them. Nowhere do we find a break 
in the ever-complicating series ; for there is a manifest 
connexion between those movements which various complex 
compounds undergo during their isomeric transformations, 
and those changes of form undergone by the protoplasm 
which we distinguish as living. Strongly contrasted as they 
eventually become, biological phenomena are at their root 
inseparable from geological phenomena — inseparable from 
the aggregate of transformations continually wrought in the 
matters forming the Earth's surface by the physical forces 
to which they arc exposed. Further stages I need not par- 
ticularize. The gradual development out of the biological 
group of phenomena, of the more specialized group we 
class as psychological, needs no illustration. And when we 
come to the highest psychological phenomena, it is clear 
that since aggregations of human beings may be traced 
upwards from single wandering families to tribes and nations 
of all sizes and complexities, we pass insensibly from the 
phenomena of individual human action to those of corporate 
human action. To resume, then, is it not manifest that in 
the group of sciences — Astronomy, Geology, Biology, Psy- 
chology, Sociology, we have a natural group that admits 
neither of disruption nor change of order? Here there is 
both a genetic dependence, and a dependence of interpre- 
tations. The phenomena have arisen in this succession in 
cosmical time; and complete scientific interpretation of each 
group depends on scientific interpretation of the preceding 
groups. ]S"o other science can be thrust in anywhere with- 
out destroying the continuity. To insert Thysics between 
Astronomy and Geology, would be to make a break in the 
history of a continuous series of changes ; and a like break 
would be produced by inserting Chemistry between GeoL gy 
and Biology. It is true that rhysies and Chemistry are 



ELEMENTS OF STATICS AND DYNAMICS. 105 

needful as interpreters of these successive assemblages of 
facts ; but it does not therefore follow that they are them- 
selves to be placed among these assemblages. 

Concrete Science, made up of these five concrete sub- 
sciences, being thus coherent within itself, and separated 
from all other science, there comes the question — Is all other 
science similarly coherent within itself ? or is it traversed by 
some second division that is equally decided ? It is thus 
traversed. A statical or dynamical theorem, however simple, 
has always for its subject-matter something that is conceived 
as extended, and as displaying force or forces — as being a 
scat of resistance, or of tension, or of both, and as capable 
of possessing more or less of vis viva. If we examine the 
simplest proposition of Statics, we see that the conception of 
Force must be joined with the conception of Space, before 
the proposition can be framed in thought ; and if we simi- 
larly examine the simplest proposition in Dynamics, we see 
that Force, Space, and Time, are its essential elements. The 
amounts of the terms are indifferent ; and, by reduction of 
its terms beyond the limits of perception, they are applied to 
molecules : Molar Mechanics and Molecular Mechanics are 
continuous. From questions concerning the relative motions 
of two or more molecules, Molecular Mechanics passes to 
changes of aggregation among many molecules, to changes 
in the amounts and kinds of the motions possessed by them 
as members of an aggregate, and to changes of the motions 
transferred through aggregates of them (as those constituting 
light). Daily extending its range of interpretations, it is 
coming to deal even with the components of each compound 
molecule on the same principles. And the unions and dis- 
unions of such more or less compound molecules, which 
constitute the phenomena of Chemistry, are also being con- 
ceived as resultant phenomena of essentially kindred natures 
— the affinities of molecules for one another, and their re- 
actions in relation to light, heat, and other modes of force, 



106 REPLIES TO CRITICISMS. 

being regarded as consequent on the combinations of the 
various mechanically-determined motions of their various 
components. Without at all out- running, however, this pro- 
gress in the mechanical interpretation of molecular phe- 
nomena, it suffices to point out that the indispensable 
elements in any chemical conception are units occupying 
places in space, and exerting forces on one another. This, 
then, is the common character of all these sciences which 
we at present group under the names of Mechanics, 
Physics, Chemistry. Leaving undiscussed the question 
whether it is possible to conceive of force apart from ex- 
tended somethings exerting it, wc may assert, as beyond 
dispute, that if the conception of force be expelled, no 
science of Mechanics, Physics, or Chemistry remains. Made 
coherent, as these sciences are, by this bond of uniou, it is 
impossible to thrust among them any other science without 
breaking their continuity. We cannot place Logic between 
Molar Mechanics and Molecular Mechanics. We cannot place 
Mathematics between the group of propositions concerning 
the behaviour of homogeneous molecules to one another, and 
the group of propositions concerning the behaviour of hetero- 
geneous molecules to one another (which we call Chemistry). 
Clearly these two sciences lie outside the coherent whole we 
have contemplated : separated from it in some radical way. 

By what arc they radically separated? By the absence of 
the conception of force. However true it may be that so 
long as Logic and Mathematics have any terms at all, these 
must be capable of affecting consciousness, and, by impli- 
cation, of exerting force ; yet it is the distinctive trait of 
these sciences that not only do their propositions make no 
reference to such force, but, as far as possible, they delibe- 
rately ignore it. Instead of being, as in all the other 
sciences, an element that is not only recognized but vital ; in 
Mathematics and Logic, force is an element that is not only 
not vital, but is studiously not recognized. The terms in 



SCIENCE A COLLECTION OF AGGREGATES. 107 

which. Logic expresses its propositions, are symbols that do 
not profess to represent things, properties, or powers, of one 
kind more than another ; and may equally well stand for the 
attributes belonging to members of some connected series of 
ideal curves which have never been drawn, as for so many 
real objects. And the theorems of Geometry, so far from 
contemplating perceptible lines and surfaces as elements in 
the truths enunciated, consider these truths as becoming 
absolute only when such lines and surfaces become ideal — 
only when the conception of something exercising force is 
extruded. 

Let me now make a second re-statement, not implying 
acceptance of the doctrine of Evolution, but exhibiting with 
a clearness almost if not quite as great, these fundamental 
distinctions. 

The concrete sciences, taken together or separately, con- 
template as their subject-matters, aggregates — either the entire 
aggregate of sensible existences, or some secondary aggre- 
gate separable from this entire aggregate, or some tertiary 
aggregate separable from this, and so on. Sidereal Astro- 
nomy occupies itself with the totality of visible masses dis- 
tributed through space; which it deals with as made up of 
identifiable individuals occupying specified places, and seve- 
rally standing towards one another, towards sub-groups, and 
towards the entire group, in defined ways. Planetary Astro- 
nomy, cutting out of this all-including aggregate that 
relatively minute part constituting the Solar System, deals 
with this as a whole — observes, measures, and calculates the 
sizes, shapes, distances, motions, of its primary, secondary, 
and tertiary members ; and, taking for its larger inquiries 
the mutual actions of all these members as parts of a co- 
ordinated assemblage, takes for its smaller inquiries the 
actions of each member considered as an individual, having 
a set of intrinsic activities that are modified by a set of 



108 REPLIES TO CRITICISMS. 

extrinsic activities. Restricting itself to one of these aggre- 
gates, which, admits of close examination, Geology (using 
this word in its comprehensive meaning) gives an account of 
terrestrial actions and terrestrial structures, past and present ; 
and, taking for its narrower problems local formations and 
the agencies to which they are due, takes for its larger 
problems the serial transformations undergone by the entire 
Earth. The geologist being occupied with this cosmically 
small, but otherwise vast, aggregate, the biologist occupies 
himself with small aggregates formed out of parts of the 
Earth's superficial substance, and treats each of these as a 
coordinated whole in its structures and functions ; or, when 
he treats of any particular organ, considers this as a whole 
made up of parts held in a sub-coordination that refers to 
the coordination of the entire organism. To the psycholo- 
gist he leaves those specialized aggregates of functions which 
adjust the actions of organisms to the complex activities 
surrounding them: doing this, not simply because they arc a 
stage higher in speciality, but because they are the counter- 
parts of those aggregated states of consciousness dealt with 
by the science of Subjective Psj'chology, which stands 
entirely apart from all other sciences. Finally, the sociolo- 
gist considers each tribe and nation as an aggregate pre- 
senting multitudinous phenomena, simultaneous and suc- 
cessive, that are held together as parts of one combination. 
Thus, in every case, a concrete science deals with a real 
aggregate (or a plurality of such aggregates) ; and it in- 
cludes as its subject-matter whatever is to be known of this 
aggregate in respect of its size, shape, motions, density, 
texture, general arrangement of parts, minute structure, 
chemical composition, temperature, etc., together with all 
the multitudinous changes, material and dynamical, gone 
through by it from the time it begins to exist as an aggre- 
gate to the time it ceases to exist as an aggregate. 

"No abstract-concrete science makes the remotest attempt 



GROUPS OF AGGREGATES. 109 

to do anything of this sort. Taken together, the abstract- 
concrete sciences give an account of the various kinds of 
properties which aggregates display ; and each abstract- 
concrete science concerns itself with a certain order of these 
properties. By this, the properties common to all aggregates 
are studied and formulated ; by that, the properties of ag- 
gregates having special forms, special states of aggregation, 
etc. ; and by others, the properties of particular components 
of aggregates when dissociated from other components. But 
by all these sciences the aggregate, considered as an indi- 
vidual object, is tacitly ignored; and a property, or a con- 
nected set of properties, exclusively occupies attention. It 
matters not to Mechanics whether the moving mass it con- 
siders is a planet or a molecule, a dead stick thrown into 
the river or the living dog that leaps after it : in any 
case the curve described by the moving mass conforms 
to the same laws. Similarly when the physicist takes for 
his subject the relation between the changing bulk of matter 
and the changing quantity of molecular motion it contains. 
Dealing with the subject generally, he leaves out of con- 
sideration the kind of matter; and dealing with the subject 
specially in relation to this or that kind of matter, he 
ignores the attributes of size and form : save in the still 
more special cases where the effect on form is considered, 
and even then size is ignored. So, too, is it with the 
chemist. A substance he is investigating, never thought of 
by him as distinguished in extension or amount, is not even 
required to be perceptible. A portion of carbon on which 
he is experimenting, may or may not have been visible under 
its forms of diamond or graphite or charcoal — this is in- 
different. He traces it through various disguises and various 
combinations — now as united with oxygen to form an in- 
visible gas; now as hidden with other elements in such 
more complex compounds as ether, and sugar, and oil. By 
sulphuric acid or other agent he precipitates it from these 



110 REPLIES TO CRITICISMS. 

as a coherent cinder, or as a diffused impalpable powder ; 
and again, by applying heat, forces it to disclose itself as an 
element of animal tissue. Evidently, while thus ascertain- 
ing the affinities and atomic equivalence of carbon, the 
chemist has nothing to do with any aggregate. He deals 
with carbon in the abstract, as something considered apart 
from quantity, form, appearance, or temporary state of com- 
bination ; and conceives it as the possessor of powers or 
properties, whence the special phenomena he describes re- 
sult : the ascertaining of all these powers or properties being 
his sole aim. 

Finally, the Abstract Sciences ignore alike aggregates and 
the powers which aggregates or their components possess; 
and occupy themselves with relations — either with the re- 
lations among aggregates, or among their parts, or the 
relations among aggregates and properties, or the relations 
among properties, or the relations among relations. The 
same logical formula applies equally well, whether its terms 
are men and their deaths, crystals and their planes of cleav- 
age, or letters and their sounds. And how entirely Mathe- 
matics concerns itself with relations, we see on remembering 
that it has just the same expression for the characters of an 
infinitesimal triangle, as for those of the triangle which has 
Sirius for its apex and the diameter of the Earth's orbit for 
its base. 

I cannot see how these definitions of these groups of 
sciences can be questioned. It is undeniable that every 
Concrete Science gives an account of an aggregate or of 
aggregates, inorganic, organic, or super-organic (a society); 
and that, not concerning itself with properties of this or that 
order, it concerns itself with the co-ordination of the as- 
sembled properties of all orders. It seems to me no less 
certain that an Abstract- Concrete Science gives an account 
of some order of properties, general or special ; not caring 
about the other traits of an aggregate displaying them, and not 



AGGREGATES, PROPERTIES, RELATIONS. Ill 

recognizing aggregates at all further than is implied by 
discussion of the particular order of properties. And I 
think it is equally clear that an Abstract Science, freeing 
its propositions, so far as the nature of thought permits, 
from aggregates and properties, occupies itself with the 
relations of co-existence and sequence, as disentangled 
from all particular forms of being and action. If then 
these three groups of sciences are, respectively, accounts of 
aggregates, accounts of properties, accounts of relations, it is 
manifest that the divisions between them are not simply 
perfectly clear, but that the chasms between them are ab- 
solute. 

Here, perhaps more clearly than before, will be seen the 
untenability of the classification made by M. Comte. Al- 
ready (p. 11), after setting forth in a general way these 
fundamental distinctions, I have pointed out the incongrui- 
ties that arise when the sciences, conceived as Abstract, 
Abstract-Concrete, and Concrete, are arranged in the order 
proposed by him. Such incongruities become still more 
conspicuous if for these general names of the groups we 
substitute the definitions given above. The series will then 
stand thus : — 

Mathematics An account of relations 

(including, under Mechanics, an account of properties). 

Astronomy An account of aggregates. 

Physics An account of properties. 

Chemistry An account of properties. 

Biology An account of aggregates. , 

Sociology An account of aggregates. j 

That those who espouse opposite views see clearly the 
defects in the propositions of their opponents and not those 
in their own, is a trite remark that holds in philosophical 
discussions as in all others: the parable of the mote and 



112 REPLIES TO CRITICISMS. 

the beam applies as well to men's appreciations of one 
another's opinions as to their appreciations of one another's 
natures. Possibly to my positivist friends I exemplify this 
truth, — just as they exemplify it to me. Those uncom- 
mitted to either view must decide where the mote exists and 
'where the beam. Meanwhile it is clear that one or other 
of the two views is essentially erroneous ; and that no quali- 
fications can bring them into harmony. Either the sciences 
admit of no such grouping as that which I have described, 
or they admit of no such serial order as that given by 
M. Comte. 

London, 
February, 1871. 



REASONS FOR DISSENTING FROM THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF M. COMTE 



EEASONS POK DISSENTING 



FROM THE 



PHILOSOPHY OP M. COMTE. 



While the. preceding pages were passing through, the 
press, there appeared in the Revue des Deux Mondes for 
February 15th, an article on a late work of mine — First 
Principles. To M. Auguste Laugel, the writer of this article, 
I am much indebted for the careful exposition he has made of 
some of the leading views set forth in that work ; and for the 
catholic and sympathetic spirit in which he has dealt with 
them. In one respect, however, M. Laugel conveys to his 
readers an erroneous impression — an impression doubtless 
derived from what appears to him adequate evidence, and 
doubtless expressed in perfect sincerity. M. Laugel describes 
me as being, in part, a follower of M. Comte. After describing 
the influence of M. Comte as traceable in the works of some 
other English writers, naming especially Mr. Mill and Mr. 
Buckle, he goes on to say that this influence, though not 
avowed, is easily recognizable in the work he is about to 
make known ; and in several places throughout his review, 
there are remarks having the same implication. I greatly 
regret having to take exception to anything said by a critic 
so candid and so able. But the Revue des Deux Mondes cir- 
culates widely in England, as well as elsewhere ; and finding 
that there exists in some minds, both here and in America, 
an impression similar to that entertained by M. Laugel — 
an impression likely to be confirmed by his statement — it 
appears to me needful to meet it. 



116 SEASONS FOE DISSENTING FROM COMTE. 

Two causes of quite different kinds, have conspired to diffuse 
the erroneous belief that M. Comte is an accepted exponent 
of scientific opinion. His bitterest foes and his closest 
friends, have unconsciously joined in propagating it. On the 
one hand, M. Comte having designated by the term " Positive 
Philosophy" all that definitely-established knowledge which 
men of science have been gradually organizing into a cohe- 
rent body of doctrine ; and having habitually placed this in 
opposition to the incoherent body of doctrine defended by 
theologians ; it has become the habit of the theological party 
to think of the antagonist scientific party, under the title 
of " positivists." And thus, from the habit of calling 
them "positivists," there has grown up the assumption 
that they call themselves " positivists," and that they are 
the disciples of M. Comte. On the other hand, those who 
have accepted M. Comte's system, and believe it to be 
the philosophy of the future, have naturally been prone 
to see everywhere the signs of its progress ; and wherever 
they have found opinions in harmony with it, have ascribed 
these opinions to the influence of its originator. It is always 
the tendency of disciplcship to magnify the effects of the 
master's teachings ; and to credit the master with all the 
doctrines he teaches. In the minds of his followers, M. 
Comte's name is associated with scientific thinking, which, 
in many cases, they first understood from his exjiosition of it. 
Influenced as they inevitably are by this association of ideas, 
they are reminded of M. Comte wherever they meet with 
thinking which corresponds, in some marked way, to M, 
Comte's description of scientific thinking ; and hence are apt 
to imagine him as introducing into other minds, the con- 
ceptions which he introduced into their minds. Such im- 
pressions are, however, in most cases quite unwarranted. 
That M. Comte has given a general exposition of the doctrine 
and method elaborated by Science, is true. 13nt it is not true 
that the holders of this doctrine and followers of this method, 



COMTE AND POSITIVISM. 117 

are disciples of M. Comte. Neither their modes of inquiry 
nor their views concerning human knowledge in its nature 
and limits, are appreciably different from what they were 
before. If they are " positivists," it is in the sense that all men 
of science have been more or less consistently "positivists;" 
and the applicability of M. Comte's title to them, no more 
makes them his disciples, than does its applicability to 
men of science who lived and died before M. Comte wrote, 
make these his disciples. M. Comte himself by no means 
claims that which some of his adherents are apt, by impli- 
cation, to claim for him. He says : — " II y a, sans doute, 
beaucoup d'analogie entre ma philosophie positive et ce 
que les savans anglais entendent, depuis JSTewton surtout, 
par philosophie naturelle ;" (see Avertissement) and further 
on he indicates the " grand mouvement imprime a Pesprit 
humain, il y a deux siecles, par Taction combinee des 
preceptes de Bacon, des conceptions de Descartes, et des de- 
couvertes de Galilee, comme le moment ou l'esprit de la 
philosophie positive a commence a se prononcer dans 
le monde." That is to say, the general mode of thought 
and way of interpreting phenomena, which M. Comte calls 
" Positive Philosophy," he recognizes as having been growing 
for two centuries ; as having reached, when he wrote, a 
marked development ; and as being the heritage of all men of 
science. 

That which M. Comte proposed to do, was to give scientific 
thought and method a more definite embodiment and organi- 
zation ; and to apply it to the interpretation of classes 
of phenomena not previously dealt with in a scientific 
manner. The conception was a great one ; and the endea- 
vour to work it out was worthy of sympathy and applause. 
Some such conception was entertained by Bacon. He, too, 
aimed at the organization of the sciences ; he, too, held that 
" Physics is the mother of all the sciences ;" he, too, held 
that the sciences can be advanced only by combining them, 



L18 EEASOXS FOR DISSEXTIXG- FROM COMTE. 

and saw the nature of the required combination ; he, too, 
held that moral and civil philosophy could not flourish when 
separated from their roots in natural philosophy ; and thus 
he, too, had some idea of a social science growing out of 
physical science. But the state of knowledge in his day pre- 
vented any advance beyond the general conception : indeed, 
it was marvellous that he should have advanced so far. In- 
stead of a vague, undefined conception, 1£ Comte has pre- 
sented the world with a defined and highly-elaborated 
conception. In working out this conception he has shown 
remarkable breadth of view, great originality, immense fer- 
tility of thought, unusual powers of generalization. Con- 
sidered apart from the question of its truth, his system of 
Positive Philosophy is a vast achievement. Put after ac- 
cording to M. Comte high admiration for his conception, for 
his effort to realize it, and for the faculty he has shown in 
the effort to realize it, there remains the inquiry — Has he 
succeeded ? A thinker who re-organizes the scientific method 
and knowledge of his age, and whose re-organization is 
accepted by his successors, may rightly be said to have such 
successors for his disciples. Put successors who accept this 
method and knowledge of his age, minus his re-organization, 
are certainly not his disciples. How then stands the 
with JSL Comte ? There are some few who receive his 
doctrines with but little reservation ; and these are his dis- 
ciples truly so called. There are others who regard with 
approval certain of his leading doctrines, but not the rest : 
these we may distinguish as partial adherents. There 
are others who reject all his distinctive doctrines ; and i 
must be classed as his antagonists. The members of this 
class stand substantially in the same position as they would 
have done had he not written. Declining his re-organ- 
ization of scientific doctrine, they possess this scientific 
doctrine in its pre-existing state, as the common heritage 
bequeathed by the past to the present ; and their adhesion to 



POINTS OF AGREEMENT WITH COMTE. 119 

this scientific doctrine in no sense implicates them with M 
Comte. In this class stand the great body of men of science. 
And in this case I stand myself. 

Coming thus to the personal part of the question, let me 
first specify those great general principles on which M. 
Comte is at one with preceding thinkers ; and on which I am 
at one with M. Comte. 

All knowledge is from experience, holds M. Comte ; and 
this I also hold — hold it, indeed, in a wider sense than M. 
Comte : since, not only do I believe that all the ideas acquired 
by individuals, and consequently all the ideas transmitted by 
past generations, are thus derived ; but I also contend that 
the very faculties by which they are acquired, are the pro- 
ducts of accumulated and organized experiences received by 
ancestral races of beings (see Principles of Psychology). But 
the doctrine that all knowledge is from experience, is not 
originated by M. Comte; nor is it claimed by him. lie 
himself says — " Tous les bons esprits repetent, depuis Bacon, 
qu'il n'y a de connaissances reelle que celles qui reposent sur 
des faites observes." And the elaboration and definite esta- 
blishment of this doctrine, has been the special characteristic 
of the English school of Psychology. Nor am I aware that 
M. Comte, accepting this doctrine, has done anything to 
make it more certain, or give it greater definiteness. Indeed it 
was impossible for him to do so ; since he repudiates that part 
of mental science by which alone this doctrine can be proved. 

It is a further belief of M. Comte, that all knowledge is 
phenomenal or relative ; and in this belief I entirely agree. 
But no one alleges that the relativity of all knowledge was 
first enunciated by M. Comte. Among others who have 
more or less consistently held this truth, Sir William Hamil- 
ton enumerates, Protagoras, Aristotle, St. Augustin, Boethius, 
Averroes, Albertus Magnus, Gerson, Leo Hebroeus, Melanc- 
thon, Scaliger, Francis Piccolomini, Giordano Bruno, Cam- 



120 REASONS FOR DISSENTING FROM COMTE. 

panella, Bacon, Spinoza, Newton, Kant. And Sir "William 
Hamilton, in his "Philosophy of the Unconditioned," first 
published in 1829, has given a scientific demonstration of this 
belief. Receiving it in common with other thinkers, from 
preceding thinkers, M. Comte has not, to my knowledge, 
advanced this belief. Nor indeed could he advance it, for 
the reason already given — he denies the possibility of that 
analysis of thought which discloses the relativity of all 
cognition. 

M. Comte reprobates the interpretation of different classes 
of phenomena by assigning metaphysical entities as their 
causes; and I coincide in the opinion that the assumption 
of such separate entities, though convenient, if not indeed 
necessary, for purposes of thought, is, scientifically con- 
sidered, illegitimate. This opinion is, in fact, a corollary 
from the last ; and must stand or fall with it. But like the 
last it has been held with more or less consistency for gene- 
rations. 1VI. Comte himself quotes Newton's favorite saying 
— " ! Physics, beware of Metaphysics !" Neither to this 
doctrine, any more than to the preceding doctrines, has If. 
Comte given a firmer basis. lie has simply re- asserted it ; 
and it was out of the question for him to do more. In this 
case, as in the others, his denial of subjective psychology 
debarred him from proving that these metaphysical entities are 
mere symbolic conceptions which do not admit of verification. 

Lastly, M. Comte believes in invariable natural laws — 
absolute uniformities of relation among phenomena. But 
very many before him have believed in them too. Long 
familiar even beyond the bounds of the scientific world, the 
proposition that there is an unchanging order in things, has, 
within the scientific world, held, for generations, the position 
of an established postulate : by some men of science recog- 
nized only as holding of inorganic phenomena ; but recog- 
nized by other men of science, as universal. And M. Comte, 
accepting this doctrine from the past, has left it substantially 



OVEE-CKEDIT BY ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS. 121 



as it was. Though he has asserted new uniformities, I do 
not think scientific men will admit that he has so demonstrated 
them, as to make the induction more certain ; nor has he 
deductively established the doctrine, by showing that uni- 
formity of relation is a necessary corollary from the per- 
sistence of force, as may readily be shown. 

These, then, are the pre-established general truths with 
which M. Comte sets out — truths which cannot be regarded 
as distinctive of his philosophy. " But why," it will perhaps 
be asked, " is it needful to point out this ; seeing that no 
instructed reader supposes these truths to be peculiar to M. 
Comte ? " I reply that though no disciple of M. Comte 
would deliberately claim them for him ; and though no 
theological antagonist at all familiar with science and philo- 
phy, supposes M. Comte to be the first propounder of them ; 
3^et there is so strong a tendency to associate any doctrines 
with the name of a conspicuous recent exponent of them, 
that false impressions are produced, even in spite of better 
knowledge. Of the need for making this reclamation, 
definite proof is at hand. In the "No. of the Revue des Deux 
Mondes named at the commencement, may be found, on p. 936, 
the words — " Toute religion, comme toute philosophic, a la 
pretention de donner une explication de Tunivers. La 
philosophic qui s'appelle positive se distingue de toutes les 
philosophies et de toutes les religions en ce qu'elle a renonce 
& cette ambition de l'esprit humain ;" and the remainder of 
the paragraph is devoted to explaining the doctrine of the 
relativity of knowledge. The next paragraph begins — 
" Tout imbu de ces idees, que nous exposons sans les discuter 
pour le moment, M. Spencer divise, etc." Now this is one 
of those collocations of ideas which tends to create, or to 
strengthen, the erroneous impression I would dissipate. I do 
not for a moment suppose that M. Laugel intended to say 
that these ideas which he describes as ideas of the " Positive 
Philosophy," are peculiarly the ideas of M. Comte. But 
6 



122 REASONS FOR DISSENTING- FROM COMTE. 

little as he probably intended it, bis expressions suggest this 
conception. In tbe minds of botb disciples and antagonists, 
"the Positive Philosophy'' means the philosophy of M. 
Comte ; and to be imbued with the ideas of " the Positive 
Philosophy" means to be imbued with the ideas of M. Comte 
— to have received these ideas from M. Comte. After what 
has been said above, I need scarcely repeat that the con- 
ception thus inadvertently suggested, is a wrong one. 1L 
Comte's brief enunciations of these general truths, gave me 
no clearer apprehensions of them than I had before. Such 
clarifications of ideas on these ultimate questions, as I can 
trace to any particular teacher, I owe to Sir "William 
Hamilton. 

From the principles which M. Comte held in common with 
many preceding and contemporary thinkers, let us pass now 
to the principles that are distinctive of his system. Just as 
entirely as I agree with M. Comte on those cardinal doctrines 
which we jointly inherit ; so entirely do I disagree with him 
on those cardinal doctrines which he propounds, and which 
determine the organization of his philosophy. The best wa}- 
of showing this will be to compare, side by side, the — 

Propositions held by rtopoeUUm uhich I hold. 

21. Comte. l 

" ... chacime de nos con- The progress of our conceptions, 

ceptions principalcs, chaque and of each branch of knowledge, i9 

branehe de nos connaissan- from beginning to end intrinsically 

ces, passe sueccssivement alike. There are not three methods 

par trois etats theoriques of philosophizing radically opposed; 

differens: l'etat theologiquc, but one method of philosophizing 

ou fictif; l'etat metaphy- which remains, in essence, the same. 

sique, ou abstrait ; l'etat At first, and to the last, the com , 

ecientifiquc, ou positif. Ed causal agencies of phenomena, have a 

d'autrcs termes, i'esprit hu- degree of generality corresponding to 

main, par sa nature, cm- the width of the generalizations 

ploie sueccssivement dans which experiences have determined; 

chacune de ses reeherches and they change just as gradually as 

trois me diodes de philoso- experiences accumulate. The into- 



THE THREE STAGES OF KNOWLEDGE. 



123 



pher, dont le caractere est 
essentiellement different et 
meme radicalement oppose : 
d'abord la methode theolo- 
gique, ensuite la methode 
metaphysique, et enfin la 
methode nositive." p. 3. 



gration of causal agencies, originally 
thought of as multitudinous and 
local, but finally believed to be one 
and universal, is a process which in- 
volves the passing through all inter- 
mediate steps between these extremes; 
and any appearance of stages can be 
but superficial. Supposed concrete 
and individual causal agencies, co- 
alesce in the mind as fast as groups 
of phenomena are assimilated, or seen 
to be similarly caused. Along with 
their coalescence, comes a greater ex- 
tension of their individualities, and 
a concomitant loss of distinctness in 
their individualities. Gradually, by 
continuance of such coalescences, 
causal agencies become, in thought, 
diffused and indefinite. And even- 
tually, without any change in the 
nature of the process, there is reached 
the consciousness of a universal causal 
agency, which cannot be conceived.* 

As the progress of thought is one, 
so is the end one. There are not 
three possible terminal conceptions ; 
but only a single terminal conception. 
"When the theological idea of the 
providential action of one being, is 
developed to its ultimate form, by the 
absorption of all independent second- 
ary agencies, it becomes the conception 
of a being immanent in all pheno- 
mena ; and the reduction of it to this 
state, implies the fading-away, in 
thought, of all those anthropomorphic 
attributes by which the aboriginal 

* A clear illustration of this process, is furnished by the recent mental inte- 
gration of Heat, Light, Electricity, etc., as modes of molecular motion. If we 
go a step back, we see that the modern conception of Electricity, resulted from 
the integration in consciousness, of the two forms of it evolved in the galvanic 
hattery and in the electric-machine. And going hack to a still earlier stage, we 
see how the conception of statical electricity, arose by the coalescence in thought, 
of the previously-separate forces manifested in rubbed amber, in ruhhed glass, and 
in lightning. With such illustrations before him, no one can, I think, doubt 
that the process has been the same from the beginning. 



" Le systeme theologique 
est parvenu a la plus haute 
perfection dont il soit sus- 
ceptible, quand il a substi- 
tu6 Taction providentielle 
d'un etre unique au jeu 
varie des nombreuses divi- 
nites independantes qui a- 
vaient ete imaginees primi- 
tivement. De meme, le 
dernier terme du systeme 
metaphysique consiste a 
concevoir, au lieu des dif- 
ferentes entitesparticulieres, 



124 



REASONS FOR DISSENTING FROM COMTE. 



une seule grande entite g<5- 
nerale, la nature, envisagee 
com me la source unique de 
tous les phenomenes. Pa- 
reillement, la perfection du 
systeme positif, vers laquelle 
il tend sans cesse, quoiqu'il 
soit tres-probable qu'il ne 
doive jamais l'atteindre, 
scrait de pouvoir se repre- 
senter tous les divers phe- 
nomenes observables comme 
dcs cas particuliers d'un 
seul fait general, tel que 
celui de la gravitation, par 
cxemple." p. 5. 



idea was distinguished. The alleged 
last term of the metaphysical system 
— the conception of a single great 
general entity, nature, as the source 
of all phenomena — is a conception 
identical with the previous one : the 
consciousness of a single source which, 
in coming to be regarded as universal, 
ceases to be regarded as conceivable, 
differs in nothing but name from the 
consciousness of one being, mani- 
fested in all phenomena. And simi- 
larly, that which is described as the 
ideal state of science — the power to 
represent all observable phenomena 
as particular cases of a single general 
fact, implies the postulating of some 
ultimate existence of which this 
single fact is alleged ; and the postu- 
lating of this ultimate existence, 
involves a state of consciousness in- 
distinguishable from the other two. 



"...la perfection du sys- 
teme positif, vers laquelle 
il tend sans cesse, quoiqu'il 
soit tres-probable qu'il ne 
doive jamais l'atteindre, 
scrait de pouvoir se repre- 
senter tous les divers phe- 
nomenes observables comme 
des cas particuliers d'un 
seul fait general, p. 5 ... 
. . . considerant comme ab- 
solument inaccessible, et 
vide de sens pour nous la 
recherche de ce qu'on ap- 
pelle les causes, soit pre- 
mieres, soit finales." p. 14. 



Though along with the extension 
of generalizations, and concomitant 
integration of conceived causal agen- 
cies, the conceptions of causal agencies 
grow more indefinite ; and though as 
they gradually coalesce into a uni- 
versal causal agency, they cease to be 
representable in thought, and are 
no longer supposed to be comprehen- 
sible ; yet the consciousness of cause 
remains as dominant to the last as it 
was at first; and can never be got 
rid of. The consciousness of eanae 
can be abolished only by abolishing 
consciousness itself.* [First jfln 
pies, § 26.) 



* Possibly it -will be said that M. Comte himself admits, that what he c." 
perfection of the positive system, will probably never be reached ; aud thai what 
he condemns is the inquiry into the natures of causes and not the general I 
nition of cause. To the first of these allegations, I reply tnat. as I understand 
M. Comte, the obstacle to the perfect realization of the positive philosophy is the 
impossibility of carrying generalization so far as to reduce all particular facta to 



THE WORLD GOVERNED BY FEELINGS. 



125 



"Ce n'cst pas aux lec- 
teurs de cet ouvrage que je 
croirai jamais devoir prou- 
ver que ies idees gouvernent 
et bouleversent le monde, 
ou, en d'autrcs termes, que 
tout le mecanisme social 
repose iinalement sur des 
opinions. lis savent surtout 
que la grande crise politique 
et morale des societes ac- 
tuelles tient, en derniere 
analyse, a ranarchie intel- 
lectuelle." p. 48.* 



Ideas do not govern and overthrow 
the world : the world is governed or 
overthrown by feelings, to which 
ideas serve only as guides. The 
social mechanism does not rest finally 
upon opinions; but almost wholly up- 
on character. Not intellectual anar- 
chy, but moral antagonism, is the 
cause of political crises. All social 
phenomena are produced by the to- 
tality of human emotions and beliefs : 
of which the emotions are mainly 
pre-determined, while the beliefs are 
mainly post-determined. Men's de- 
sires are chiefly inherited ; but their 
beliefs are chiefly acquired, and depend 
on surrounding conditions; and the 
most important surrounding condi- 
tions depend on the social state which 
the prevalent desires have produced. 
The social state at any time existing, 
is the resultant of all the ambitions, 
self-interests, fears, reverences, in- 
dignations, sympathies, etc., of an- 
cestral citizens and existing citizens. 
The ideas current in this social state, 
must, on the average, be congruous 
with the feelings of citizens ; and 
therefore, on the average, with the 
social state these feelings have pro- 
cases of one general fact — not the impossibility of excluding the consciousness of 
cause. And to the second allegation I reply, that the essential principle of his 
philosophy, is an avowed ignoring of cause altogether. For if it is not, what be- 
comes of his alleged distinction between the perfection of the positive system and the 
perfection of the metaphysical system ? And here let me point out that, by affirm- 
ing exactly the opposite to that which M. Comte thus affirms, I am excluded 
from the positive school. If his own definition of positivism is to be taken, 
then, as I hold that what he defines as positivism is an absolute impossibility, 
it is clear that I cannot be what he calls a positivist. 

*• A friendly critic alleges that M. Comte is not fairly represented by this 
quotation, and that he is blamed by his biographer, M. Littre, for his too-great 
insistance on feeling as a motor of humanity. If in his "Positive Politics," 
which I presume is here referred to, M. Comte abandons his original position, so 
much the better. But I am here dealing with what is known as "the Positive 
Philosophy;" and that the passage above quoted does not misrepresent it, ia 
proved by the fact that this doctrine is re-asserted at the commencement of the 
Sociologv. 



126 



REASONS FOE DISSENTING FROM COMTE. 



" .. . je nc dois pas negligcr 
d'indiquer d'avance, comme 
une propriete esscnticllc do 
lV'clicllc cncyclopediquc que 
je vais proposer, sa con- 
formite generale avee l'en- 
semble dc l'histoirc scien- 
tifique; en ce sens, quo, 
maigre la simultaneity reelle 
et continue du devcloppc- 
ment desdiile rentes sciences, 
celles qui seront classees 
comme anterieures seront, 
en effet, plus anciennes ct 
constamment plus avancees 
que celles presentees comme 

posterieures." p. 84 

. . . . " Cct ordre est de- 
termine par le degre de sim- 
plicity, ou, ce qui revient 
au nieme, par le degre de 
glneralite des phdnomencs." 
p. 87. 



duced. Ideas wholly foreign to this 
social state cannot be evolved, and if 
introduced from -without, cannot get 
accepted — or, if accepted, die out 
when the temporary phase of feeling 
which caused their acceptance, ends. 
Hence, though advanced ideas when 
once established, act upon society 
and aid its further advance; yet the 
establishment of such ideas depends 
on the fitness of the society for re- 
ceiving them. Practically, the popu- 
lar character and the social state, 
determine what ideas shall be cur- 
rent; instead of the current ideas 
determining the social state and the 
character. The modification of men's 
moral natures, caused by the continu- 
ous discipline of social life, which 
adapts them more and more to social 
relations, is therefore the chief proxi- 
mate cause of social progress. {Social 
St a tics, chap, xxx.) 

The order in which the generaliza- 
tions of science are established, is 
determined by the frequency and im- 
pressiveness with which different 
classes of relations are repeated in 
conscious experience ; and this de- 
pends, partly on the directness tcith 
ichich jwrsonal welfare is affected: 
partly on the conspicuousness of one or 
both the phenomena between tchich a 
relation is to be perceived; partly on the 
absolute frequency with which the re- 
lations occur ; partly on their reh 
frequency of occurrence ; partly on 
their degree of simplicity ; and partly 
on their degree of abstract ness. (/, 
Principles, 1st ed., § 06; appen 
to this pamphlet. 



SERIAL ARRANGEMENT OF THE SCIENCES. 



127 



"En r^sultat definitif, la 
mathematique, l'astronomie, 
la physique, la chimie, la 
physiologie, et la physique 
sociale ; telle est la formule 
enclyopedique qui, parmi le 
ties-grand nombre de clas- 
sifications que comportent 
lcs six sciences fondamen- 
tales, est seule logiquement 
conforme a la hierarchie 
naturelle et invariable dcs 
phenomenes." p. 115. 

" On congoit, en effct, que 
l'etude rationelle de cliaque 
science fondamentale exi- 
geant la culture prealable 
de toutes celles qui la pre- 
cedent dans notre hierarchie 
enclyopedique, n'a pu faire 
de progres reels et prendre 
son veritable caractere, qu' 
apres un grand developpe- 
ment des sciences ante- 
rieures relatives a. des phe- 
nomenes plus generaux, plus 
abstraits, moins compliques, 
ct independans des autres. 
C'est done dans cet ordre 
que la progression, quoique 
simultanee, a du avoir lieu. ,, 
p. 100. 



The sciences aa arranged in this 
succession specified by M. Comte, do 
not logically conform to the natural 
and invariable hierarchy of pheno- 
mena; and there is no serial order 
whatever in which they can be placed, 
which represents either their logical 
dependence or the dependence of phe- 
nomena. (See Genesis of Science, 
and foregoing Essay.) 



The historical development of the 
sciences has not taken place in this 
serial order ; nor in any other serial 
order. There is no "true filiation 
of the sciences." Erom the begin- 
ning, the abstract sciences, the 
abstract-concrete sciences, and the 
Concrete sciences, have progressed to- 
gether : the first solving problems 
which the second and third present- 
ed, and growing only by the solution 
of the problems ; and the second 
similarly growing by joining the first 
in solving the problems of the third. 
All along there has been a continuous 
action and reaction between the three 
great classes of sciences — an advance 
from concrete facts to abstract facts, 
and then an application of such ab- 
stract facts to the analysis of new 
orders of concrete facts. (See Genesis 
of Science.) 

Such then are the organizing principles of M. Comte's 
philosophy. Leaving out of his "Exposition" those pre- 
established general doctrines which are the common property 
of modern thinkers ; these are the general doctrines which 
remain — these are the doctrines which fundamentally dis- 
tinguish his system. From every one of them I dissent. 
To each proposition I oppose either a widely-different pro- 



128 



REASONS FOE DISSEXTTXG FEOM COMTE. 



position, or a direct negation ; and I not only do it now, but 
have done it from the time when I became acquainted with 
his writings. This rejection of his cardinal principles should, 
I think, alone suffice ; but there are sundry other views 
of his, some of them largely characterizing his system, 
which I equally reject. Let us glance at them. 



How organic beings have 
originated, is an inquiry 
which M. Comte deprecates 
as a useless speculation : as- 
serting, as he does, that 
species are immutable. 



M. Comte contends that 
cf what is commonly known 
as mental science, all that 
most important part which 
consists of the subjective 
analysis of our ideas, is an 
impossibility. 

M. Comte's ideal of so- 
ciety is one in which govern- 
ment is developed to the 
greatest extent — in which 
class-functions are far more 
under conscious public regu- 
lation than now — in which 
hierarchical organization 
with unquestioned authority 
shall guide everything — in 
which the individual life 
shall be subordinated in the 
greatest degree to the social 
life. 



This inquiry, I believe, admits of 
answer, and will be answered. That 
division of Biology which concerns 
itself with the origin of species, I 
hold to be the supreme division, to 
which all others are subsidiary. For 
on the verdict of Biology on this 
matter, must wholly depend our con- 
ception of human nature, past, pre- 
sent, and future ; our theory of the 
mind ; and our theory of society. 

I have very emphatically expressed 
my belief in a subjective science of 
the mind, by writing a Principles oj 
F>>/cJ(olorj)/, one half of which is sub- 
jective. 



That form of society towards which 
we are progressing, I hold to be one 
in which government will be reduced 
to the smallest amount possible, and 
freedom increased to the greatest 
amount possible — one in which 
human nature will have become so 
moulded by social discipline into fit- 
ness for the social state, that it will 
need little external restraint, but will 
be self-restrained — one in which the 
citizen will tolerate no interference 
with his freedom, save that which 
maintains the equal freedom of others 
— one in which the spontaneous 
operation which has developed our 
industrial system, and is now develop- 



TIIE RELIGIOUS SENTIMENT. 



129 



ing it with increasing rapidity, will 
produce agencies for the discharge of 
nearly all social functions, and will 
leave to the primary govermental 
agency nothing beyond the function 
of maintaining those conditions to 
free action, which make such spon- 
taneous co-operation possible — one in 
which individual life will thus be 
pushed to the greatest extent consis- 
tent with social life; and in which 
social life will have no other end than 
to maintain the completest sphere for 
individual life 



M. Comte, not including 
in his philosophy the con- 
sciousness of a cause mani- 
fested to us in all phe- 
nomena, and yet holding 
that there must be a reli- 
gion, which must have an 
object, takes for his object 
—Humanity. " This Col- 
lective Life (of Society)^ is 
in Comte' s system the Etre 
Supreme; the only one we 
can know, therefore the only 
one we can worship." 



I conceive, on the other hand, that 
the object of religious sentiment will 
ever continue to be, that which it has 
ever been — the unknown source of 
things. While the forms under which 
men are conscious of the unknown 
source of things, may fade away, 
the substance of the consciousness is 
permanent. Beginning with causal 
agents conceived as imperfectly 
known ; progressing to causal agents 
conceived as less known and less 
knowable; and coming at last to a 
universal causal agent posited as 
not to be known at all ; the religious 
sentiment must ever continue to oc- 
cupy itself with this universal causal 
agent. Having in the course of 
evolution, come to have for its object 
of contemplation, the Infinite Un- 
knowable, the religious sentiment can 
never again (unless by retrogression) 
take a Finite Knowable, like Human- 
ity, for its object of contemplation. 

Here, then, are sundry other points, all of them important, 
and the last two supremely important, on which I am 
diametrically opposed to M. Comte ; and did space permit, 
I could add many others. Radically differing from him as I 
thus do, in everything distinctive of his philosophy; and 



130 REASONS FOR DISSEXTIXG FROM COMTE. 

having invariably expressed my dissent, publicly and 
privately, from the time I became acquainted with his 
writings ; it may be imagined that I have been not a little 
startled to find myself classed as one of the same school. 
That those who have read First Principles only, may have 
been betrayed into this error in the way above shown, by the 
ambiguous use of the phrase "Positive Philosophy," I can 
understand. But that any who are acquainted with my pre- 
vious writings, should suppose I have any general sympathy 
with M. Comte, save that implied by preferring proved facts 
to superstitions, astonishes me. 

It is true that, disagreeing with M. Comte, though I do, 
in all those fundamental views that are peculiar to him, 
I agree with him in sundry minor views. The doctrine that 
the education of the individual should accord in mode and 
arrangement with the education of mankind, considered 
historically, I have cited from him ; and have endeavoured 
to enforce it. I entirely concur in his opinion that there 
requires a new order of scientific men, whose function shall 
be that of co-ordinating the results arrived at by the rest. 
To him I believe I am indebted for the conception of a 
social C0)isc)isus ; and when the time comes for dealing with 
this conception, I shall state my indebtedness. And I also 
adopt his word, Sociology. There are, I believe, in the part 
of his writings which I have read, various incidental thoughts 
of great depth and value ; and I doubt not that were I to 
read more of his writings, I should find many others.* It 
is very probable, too, that I have said (as I am told I have) 
some things which M. Comte had already said. It would be 
difficult, I believe, to find any two men who had no opinions 
in common. And it would be extremely strange if two men, 

* M. Comte's "Exposition" I read in the original in 1 S-33 ; and in two 

or throe other places have referred to the original t* 1 

The Inorganic Physics, and the first chapter oi the Biology. Miss 

Martineau's condensed translation, -when it appeared. The rest of M. C 
views I know only through Mr. Lewes's outline, and through inc. . . noes. 



THE DISAGREEMENTS FUNDAMENTAL. 131 

starting from the same general doctrines established by 
modern science, should traverse some of the same fields of 
inquiry, without their lines of thought having any points 
of intersection. But none of these minor agreements can be 
of much weight in comparison with the fundamental dis- 
agreements above specified. Leaving out of view that general 
community which we both have with the scientific thought 
of the age, the differences between us are essential, while 
the correspondences are non-essential. And I venture to 
think that kinship must be determined by essentials, and 
not by non-essentials.* 

Joined with the ambiguous use of the phrase "Positive 
Philosophy," which has led to a classing with M. Comte 
of many men who either ignore or reject his distinctive 
principles, there has been one special circumstance that has 
tended to originate and maintain this classing in my own 
case. The assumption of some relationship between M. Comte 
and myself, was unavoidably raised by the title of my first 
book — Social Statics. When that book was published, I was 
unaware that this title had been before used : had I 
known the fact, T should certainly have adopted an alternative 
title which I had in view.f If, however, instead of the title, 

* In his recent work, Auguste Comte ct la P/iilosophie Positive, M. Littre, 
defending the Comtean classification of the sciences from the criticism I made 
upon it in the " Genesis of Science," deals with me wholly as an antagonist. 
The chapter he devotes to his reply, opens hy placing me in direct antithesis 
to the English adherents of Comte, named in the preceding chapter. 

f I believed at the time, and have never doubted until now, that the choice 
of this title was absolutely independent of its previous use by M Comte. "While 
writing these pages, I have found reason to think the contrary. On referring to Social 
Statics, to see what were my views of social evolution in 1850, when M. Comte 
was to me but a name, I met with the following sentence : — " Social philosophy 
may be aptly divided (as political economy has been) into statics and dynamics." 
(p. 409). This I remembered to be a reference to a division which I had seen in 
the Political Economy of Mr. Mill. But why had I not mentioned Mr. Mill's name? 
On referring to the first edition of his work, I found, at the opening of Book iv., 
this sentence : — "The three preceding parts include as detailed a view as the limits 
of this treatise permit, of what, by a happy generalization of a mathematical 
phrase, has been called the Statics of the subject." Here was the solution of the 
question. The division had not been made by Mr. Mill, but by some writer 
(on Political Economy I supposed) who was not named by him ; and whom I did 
not know. It is now manifest, however, that while I supposed I was giving 
a more extended use to this division, I was but returning to the original use 



132 REASONS FOE DISSENTING EEOM COMTE. 

the work itself be considered, its irrelation to the philosopnv 
of M. Comte, becomes abundantly manifest. There is decisive 
testimony on this point. In the North British Review for 
August, 1851, a reviewer of Social Statics says — 

" The title of this work, however, is a complete misnomer. 
According to all analogy, the phrase "Social Statics" should be 
used only in some such sense as that in which, as we have already 
explained, it is used by Comte, namely as designating a branch of 
inquiry whose end it is to ascertain the laws of social equilibrium 
or order, as distinct ideally from those of social movement or progress. 
Of this Mr. Spencer docs not seem to have had the slightest notion, 
but to have chosen the name for his work only as a means of indi- 
cating vaguely that it proposed to treat of social concerns in a 
scientific manner." p. 321. 

Respecting M. Comtc's application of the words statics 
and dynamics to social phenomena, now that I know what 
it is, I will only say that while I perfectly understand how, 
by a defensible extension of their mathematical meanings, 
the one may be used to indicate social functions in balance, 
and the other social functions out of balance, I am quite at a 
loss to understand how the phenomena of structure can be 
included in the one any more than in the other. But the 
two things which here concern me, are, first, to point out that 
I had not "the slightest notion" of giving Social Statics the 
meaning which 31. Comte gave it ; and, second, to explain 
the meaning which I did give it. The units of any ag- 
gregate of matter, are in equilibrium when they severally 
act and re-act upon each other on all sides with equal forces. 
A state of change among them implies that there are forces 
exercised by some that are not counterbalanced by like 
forces exercised by others ; and a state of rest implies the 
absence of such uncounterbalaneed forces — implies, if the 
units are homogeneous, equal distances among them — 
implies a maintenance of their respective spheres of molecular 

which Mr. Mill had limited to his special topic. Another thing is. I think, 
tolerably manifest. As I evidently wished to point out my obligation t 
unknown political economist, whose division I thought I was extending, I should 

have named him had I known who he was. And in that case should not hav« 
put this extension of the division as though it wen D 






THE SOCIOLOGICAL DISAGREEMENT. 133 

motion. Similarly among the units of a society, the funda- 
mental condition to equilibrium, is, that the restraining forces 
which the units exercise on each other, shall be balanced. 
If the spheres of action of some units are diminished by 
extension of the spheres of action of others, there necessarily 
results an unbalanced force which tends to produce political 
change in the relations of individuals ; and the tendency 
to change can cease, only when individuals cease to aggress 
on each other's spheres of action — only when there is 
maintained that law of equal freedom, which it was, the 
purpose of Social Statics to enforce in all its consequences. 
Besides this toially-unlike conception of what constitutes 
Social Statics, the work to which I applied that title, is 
fundamentally at variance with M. Comte's teachings in 
almost everything. So far from alleging, as M. Comte does, 
that society is to be re-organized by philosophy ; it alleges 
that society is to be re-organized only by the accumulated 
effects of habit on character. Its aim is not the increase 
of authoritative control over citizens, but the decrease of it. 
A more pronounced individualism, instead of a more pro- 
nounced nationalism, is its ideal. So profoundly is my 
political creed at variance with the creed of M. Comte, that, 
unless I am misinformed, it has been instanced by a leading 
English disciple of M. Comte, as the creed to which he has 
the greatest aversion. One point of coincidence, however, 
is recognizable. The analogy between an individual organism 
and a social organism, which was held by Plato and by 
Ilobbes, is asserted in Social Statics, as it is in the Sociology 
of M. Comte. Yery rightly, M. Comte has made this 
analogy the cardinal idea of this division of his philosophy. 
In Social Statics, the aim of which is essentially ethical, 
this analogy is pointed out incidentally, to enforce certain 
ethical considerations; and is there obviously suggested 
partly by the definition of life which Coleridge derived from 
Schelling, and partly by the generalizations of physiologists 
there referred to (chap. xxx. §§. 12, 13, 16). Excepting 



131 REASONS FOE DJSSZOTTSG FROM COMTE. 

this incidental agreement, however, the contents of Social 
Statics are so wholly antagonistic to the philosophy of 
M. Comte, that, but for the title, the work would never, 
I think, have raised the remembrance of him — unless, indeed, 
by the association of opposites.* 

And now let me point out that which really has exercised 
a profound influence over my course of thought. The truth 
which Harvey's embryological inquiries first dimly indicated, 
which was afterwards more clearly perceived by T\ r olff, and 
which was put into a definite shape by Von Baer — the truth 
that all organic development is a change from a state of 
homogeneity to a state of heterogeneity— ;this it is from 
which very many of the conclusions which I now hold, 
have indirectly resulted. In Social Statics, there is every- 
where manifested a dominant belief in the evolution of man 
and of society. There is also manifested the belief that this 
evolution is in both cases determined by the incidence of 
conditions — the actions of circumstances. And there is 
further, in the sections above referred to, a recognition of 
the fact that organic and social evolutions, conform to the 
same law. Falling amid beliefs in evolutions of various 
orders, everywhere determined by natural causes (beliefs again 
displayed in the Theory of Population and in the Principles 
of Psychology) ; the formula of Yon Laer acted as an 
organizing principle. The extension of it to other kinds 
of phenomena than those of individual and social organiza- 

* Let me add that the conception developed in Social Statics, dates back to a 
Beiies of letters on the " Proper Sphere of Government," published in the 
Nonconformist newspaper, in the latter half of 1S42, and republished as a 
pamphlet in 184 3. In these letters will be found, along with many crudi: 
the same belief in the conformity of social phenomena to unvariable laws . 
same belief in human progression as determined by such laws ; the same 
in the moral modification of men as caused by social discipline ; the same 
belief hi the tendency of social arrangements "of themselves to as 
B condition of stable equilibrium ;" the same repudiation of state-control over 
various departments of social life ; the same limitation of state-action I 
maintenance of equitable relations among citizens. The writing of Social Si 
arose from a dissatisfaction with the basis on which the doctrines set forth in those 
letters were placed : the second half of that work is an elaboration or 
doctrines ; and the first half a statement of the principles from which th 
dedueible. 



ORIGIN OF THE DOCTRINE OF EVOLUTION. 135 

tion, is traceable through successive stages. It may be seen 
in the last paragraph of an essay on "The Philosophy of 
Style," published in October, 1852; again in an essay on 
"Manners and Fashion," published in April, 1854; and 
then, in a comparatively advanced form, in an essay on 
"Progess: its Law and Cause/' published in April, 1857. 
Afterwards, there came the recognition of the need for 
further limitation of this formula ; next the inquiry into 
(hose general laws of force from which this universal trans- 
formation necessarily results ; next the deduction of these 
from the ultimate law of the persistence of force ; next the 
perception that there is everywhere a process of Dissolution 
complementary to that of Evolution ; and, finally, the deter- 
mination of the conditions (specified in the foregoir g essay) 
under which Evolution and Dissolution respectively occur. 
The filiation of these results, is, I think, tolerably manifest. 
The process has been one of continuous development, set up 
by the addition of Yon Baer's law to a number of ideas that 
were in harmony with it. And I am not conscious of any 
other influences by which the process has been affected. 

It is possible, however, that there may have been influences 
of which I am not conscious ; and my opposition to M. 
Comte's system may have been one of them. The presenta- 
tion of antagonistic thoughts, often produces greater definite- 
ness and development of one's own thoughts. It is probable 
that the doctrines set forth in the essay on " The Genesis of 
Science," might never have been reached, had not my very 
decided dissent from M. Comte's conception led me to work 
them out ; and but for this, I might not have arrived at the 
classification of the sciences exhibited in the foregoing essay. 
Very possibly there are other cases in which the stimulus of 
repugnance to M. Comte's views, may have aided in elaborat- 
ing my own views : though I cannot call to mind any other 
cases. 

Let it by no means be supposed from all I have said, that 
I do not regard M. Comte's speculations as of great value 



13G BEASOXS FOE DISSENTING FEOM COMTE. 

True or untrue, liis system as a whole, has doubtless produced 
important and salutary revolutions of thought in many 
minds; and will doubtless do so in many more. Doubtless, 
too, not a few of those who dissent from his general views, 
have been heathfully stimulated by the consideration of them. 
The presentation of scientific knowledge and method as a 
whole, whether rightly or wrongly co-ordinated, cannot have 
failed greatly to widen the conceptions of most of his readers. 
And he has done especial service by familiarizing men with 
the idea of a social science, based on the other sciences. 
Beyond which benefits resulting from the general character 
and scope of his philosophy, I believe that there are scattered 
through his pages, many large ideas that are valuable not 
only as stimuli, but for their actual truth. 

It has been by no means an agreeable task to make these 
personal explanations ; but it has seemed to me a task not to 
be avoided. Differing so profoundly as I do from M. Ccm.^e 
on all fundamental doctrines, save those which wc inherit in 
common from the past ; it has become needful to dissipate 
the impression that I agree with him — needful to show that 
a large part of what is currently known as "positive 
philosophy," is not " positive philosophy" in the sense of 
being peculiarly M. Comtc's philosophy ; and to show that 
beyond that portion of the so-called "positive philosophy" 
which is not peculiar to him, I dissent from it. 

And now at the close, as at the outset, let me express my 
great regret that these explanations should have been called 
forth by the statements of a critic who has treated me so liber- 
alty. Nothing will, I fear, prevent the foregoing pages from 
appearing like a very ungracious response to M. Laugel'a 
sympathetically-written review. I can only hope that the 
gravity of the question at issue, in so far as it concerns 
myself, may be taken in mitigation, if not as a sufficient 
apology. 

March 12M, 1864. 



VI. 

Oji' LAWS IN GENERAL, AND THE ORDER 
OF THEIR DISCOVERY. 



OF LAWS IN GENEEAL, AND THE OEDER 
OF THEIE DISCOVEEY. 



{The following chapter was contained in the first edition of First 
Principles. 2" omitted it from the re-organized second edition, he- 
cause it did not form an essential part of the new structure. As it is 
referred to in the foregoing pages, and as its general argument is ger- 
mane to the contents of those pages, I have thought well to append it 
here. Moreover, though I hope eventually to incorporate it in that 
division of the Principles of Sociology which treats of Intellectual 
Progress, yet as it must be long before it can thus re-appear in its 
permanent place, and as, should I not get so far in the execution of 
my undertaking, it may never thus re-appear at all, it seems proper 
to maize it more accessible than it is at present. The first and last 
sections, which served to link it into the argument of the work to 
which it originally belonged, are omitted. The rest has teen carefully 
revised, and in some parts considerably altered^ 

The recognition of Law being the recognition of uni- 
formity of relations among phenomena, it follows that the 
order in which different groups of phenomena are reduced to 
law, must depend on the frequency with which the uniform 
relations they severally display are distinctly experienced. 
At any given stage of progress, those uniformities will be 
best known with which men's minds have been oftenest and 
most strongly impressed. In proportion partly to the 
number of times a relation has been presented to con- 
sciousness (not merely to the senses), and in proportion 



140 OF LAWS IN GENERAL. 

partly to the vividness with which the terms of the relation 
have been cognized, will be the degree in which the con- 
stancy of connexion is perceived. 

The succession in which relations are generalized being 
thus determined, there result certain derivative principles 
to which this succession must more immediately and ob- 
viously conform. First is the directness with which 
personal welfare is affected. While, among surrounding 
things, many do not appreciably influence us in any 
way, some produce pleasures and some pains, in various 
degrees ; and manifestly, those things whose actions on the 
organism for good or evil are most decided, will, caeteris 
paribus, be those whose laws of action are earliest ob- 
served. Second comes the conspicuousness of one or both 
phenomena between which a relation is to be perceived. On 
every side are phenomena so concealed as to be detected only 
by close observation ; others not obtrusive enough to attract 
notice ; others which moderately solicit the attention ; others 
so imposing or vivid as to force themselves on consciousness ; 
and, supposing conditions to be the same, these last will of 
course be among the first to have their relations general- 
ized. In the third place, we have the absolute frequency 
with which the relations occur. There are coexistences and 
sequences of all degrees of commonness, from those which 
are ever present to those which are extremely rare ; and 
manifestly, the rare coexistences and sequences, as well 
as the sequences which are very long in taking place, 
will not be reduced to law so soon as those which are 
familiar and rapid. Fourthly has to be added 
the relative frequency of occurrence. Many events and ap- 
pearances are limited to certain times or certain places, or 
both ; and, as a relation which does not exist within the 
environment of an observer cannot be perceived by him, 
however common it may be elsewhere or in another age, we 
have to take account of the surrounding physical circum- 



SIMPLE RELATIONS OBSERVED EARLIEST. 141 

stances, as well as of the state of society, of the arts, and of 
the sciences — all of which affect the frequency with which 
certain groups of facts are observable. The 

fifth corollary to be noticed is, that the succession in 
which different classes of relations are reduced to law, de- 
pends in part on their simplicity. Phenomena presenting 
great composition of causes or conditions, have their essential 
relations so masked, that it requires accumulated experiences 
to impress upon consciousness the true connexions of ante- 
cedents and consequents they involve. Hence, other things 
equal, the progress of generalization will be from the simple 
to the complex ; and this it is which M. Comte has wrongly 
asserted to be the sole regulative principle of the pro- 
gress. Sixth comes the degree of abstractness. 
Concrete relations are the earliest acquisitions. Such ana- 
lyses of them as separate the essential connexions from their 
disguising accompaniments, necessarily come later. The 
analyses of the connexions, always more or less compound, 
into their elements then becomes possible. And so on con- 
tinually, until the highest and most abstract truths have 
been reached. 

These, then, are the several derivative principles. The 
frequency and vividness with which uniform relations are 
repeated in conscious experience, determining the recognition 
of their uniformity, and this frequency and vividness depend- 
ing on the above conditions, it follows that the order in 
which different classes of facts are generalized, must depend 
on the extent to which the above conditions are fulfilled in 
each class. Let us mark how the facts harmonize with this 
conclusion : taking first a few that elucidate the general 
truth, and afterwards some that exemplify the special truths 
which we here see follow from it. 

The relations earliest known as uniformities, are those sub- 
sisting between the common properties of matter — tangi- 



1-12 OF LAWS IX GEXEEAL. 

bility, visibility, cohesion, weight, etc. We have no trace of 
a time when the resistance offered by an object was regarded 
as caused by the will of the object ; or when the pressure of 
a body on the hand holding it, was ascribed to the agency of a 
living being. And accordingly, these are the relations of which 
we are oftenest conscious ; being objectively frequent, conspi- 
cuous, simple, concrete, and of immediate personal concern. 

Similarly with the ordinary phenomena of motion. The 
fall of a mass on the withdrawal of its support, is a sequence 
which directly affects bodily welfare, is conspicuous, simple 
concrete, and very often repeated. Hence it is one of the 
uniformities recognized before the dawn of tradition. "We 
know of no era when movements due to terrestrial gravi- 
tation were attributed to volition. Only when the relation 
is obscured — only, as in the case of an aerolite, where the 
antecedent of the descent is unperceived, do we find the con- 
ception of personal agency. On the other hand, mo- 
tions of intrinsically the same order as that of a falling stone 
— those of the heavenly bodies— long remain ungeneralized ; 
and until their uniformity is seen, are construed as results of 
will. This difference is clearly not dependent on compara- 
tive complexity or abstractness ; since the motion of a planet 
in an ellipse, is as simple and concrete a phenomenon as the 
motion of a projected arrow in a parabola. But the ante- 
cedents are not conspicuous; the sequences are of long 
duration ; and they are not often repeated. And that these 
are the causes of their slow reduction to law, we see in the 
fact that they are severally generalized in the order of their 
frequency and conspicuousness — the moon's monthlv cvclc, 
the sun's annual change, the periods of the inferior planets, 
the periods of the superior planets. 

While astronomical sequences were still ascribed to voli- 
tion, certain terrestrial sequences of a different kind, but 
some of them equally without complication, were interpreted 
in like manner. The solidification of wafer at a low tempo- 



UNIFORMITIES EAELY PERCEIVED. 143 

rature, is a phenomenon that is simple, concrete, and of 
much personal concern. But it is neither so frequent as 
those which we see are earliest generalized, nor is the pre- 
sence of the antecedent so manifest. Though in all but 
tropical climates, mid-winter displays the relation between 
cold and freezing with tolerable constancy ; yet, during the 
spring and autumn,. the occasional appearance of ice in the 
mornings has no very obvious connexion with coldness of 
the weather. Sensation being so inaccurate a measure, it is 
not possible for the savage to experience the definite relation 
between a temperature of 32° and the congealing of water ; 
and hence the long continued belief in personal agency. 
Similarly, but still more clearly, with the winds. The ab- 
sence of regularity and the inconspicuousness of the ante- 
cedents, allowed the mythological explanation to survive for 
a great period. 

During the era in which the uniformity of many quite 
simple inorganic relations was still unrecognized, certain 
organic relations, intrinsically very complex and special, 
were generalized. The constant coexistence of feathers and 
a beak, of four legs with an internal bony framework, are 
facts which were, and are, familiar to every savage. Did a 
savage find a bird with teeth, or a mammal clothed with 
feathers, he would be as much surprised as an instructed 
naturalist. Now these uniformities of organic structure thus 
early perceived, are of, exactly the same kind as those more 
numerous ones later established by biology. The constant 
coexistence of mammary glands with two occipital condyles 
to the skull, of vertebrae with teeth lodged in sockets, of 
frontal horns with the habit of rumination, are generaliza- 
tions as purely empirical as those known to the aboriginal 
hunter. The botanist cannot in the least understand the 
complex relation between papilionaceous flowers and seeds 
borne in flattened pods : he knows these and like connexions 
simply in the same way that the barbarian knows the con- 



144 OF LAWS IN GEXEEAL. 

nexions between particular leaves and particular kinds of 
wood. But the fact that sundry of the uniform relations 
which chiefly make up the organic sciences, were very early 
recognized, is due to the high degree of vividness and fre- 
quency with which they were presented to consciousness. 
Though the connexion between the sounds characteristic of 
a bird, and the possession of edible flesh, is extremely in- 
volved ; yet the two terms of the relation are conspicuous, 
often recur in experience, and a knowledge of their con- 
nexion has a direct bearing on personal welfare. !Mean while 
innumerable relations of the same order, which are displayed 
with even greater frequency by surrounding plants and 
animals, remain for thousands of years unrecognised, if they 
are unobtrusive or of no apparent moment. 

When, passing from this primitive stage to a more ad- 
vanced stage, we trace the discovery of those less familiar uni- 
formities which mainly constitute what is distinguished as 
Science, we find the succession in which knowledge of them 
is reached, to be still determined in the same manner. This 
will become obvious on contemplating separately the in- 
fluence of each derivative condition. 

How relations that have immediate bearings on the 
maintenance of life, are, other things equal, fixed in the 
mind before those which have no immediate bearings, the 
history of Science abundantly illustrates. The habits of 
existing uncivilized races, who fix times by moons and barter 
so many of one article for so many of another, show us that 
conceptions of equality and number, which are the germs of 
mathematical science, were developed under the immediate 
pressure of personal wants ; and if can scarcely be doubted 
that those laws of numerical relations which are embodied in 
the rules of arithmetic, were first brought to light through 
the practice of mercantile exchange. Similarly with geo- 
metry. The derivation of the word shows us that it ori- 



THE USEFUL AND THE PRACTICAL. 145 

ginally included only certain methods of partitioning ground 
and laying out buildings. The properties of the scales and 
the lever, involving the first principle in mechanics, were 
early generalized under the stimulus of commercial and 
architectural needs. To fix the times of religious festivals 
and agricultural operations, were the motives which led to 
the establishment of the simpler astronomic periods. Such 
small knowledge of chemical relations as was involved in 
ancient metallurgy, was manifestly obtained in seeking how 
to improve tools and weapons. In the alchemy of later 
times, we see how greatly an intense hope of private benefit 
contributed to the disclosure of a certain class of uniformities. 
Nor is our own age barren of illustrations. " Here," says 
Humboldt, when in Guiana, " as in many parts in Europe, the 
sciences are thought worthy to occupy the mind, only so far 
as they confer some immediate and practical benefit on 
society." " How is it possible to believe," said a missionary 
to him, " that you have left your country to come to be de- 
voured by mosquitoes on this river, and to measure lands 
that are not your own." Our coasts furnish like instances. 
Every sea-side naturalist knows how great is the contempt 
with which fishermen regard the collection of objects for the 
microscope or aquarium. Their incredulity as to the possible 
value of such things is so great, that they can scarcely be 
induced even by bribes to preserve the refuse of their nets. 
JSTay, we need not go for evidence beyond daily table-talk. 
The demand for "practical science" — for a knowledge that 
can be brought to bear on the business of life — joined to the 
ridicule commonly vented on scientific pursuits having no 
obvious uses, suffice to show that the order in which laws 
are discovered greatly depends on the directness with which 
they affect our welfare. 

That, when all other conditions are the same, obtrusive 
relations will be generalized before unobtrusive ones, is so 
nearly a truism that examples appear almost superfluous. If 



146 OF LAWS IN GENERAL. 

it be admitted that by tbe aboriginal man, as by the child, 
the co-existent properties of large surrounding objects are 
noticed before those of minute objects, and that the external 
relations which bodies present are generalized before their 
internal relations, it must be admitted that in subsequent 
stages of progress, the comparative conspicuousness of rela- 
tions has greatly affected the order in which they were 
recognized as uniform. Hence it happened that after the 
establishment of those very manifest sequences constituting 
a lunation, and those less manifest ones marking a year, and 
those still less manifest ones marking the planetary periods, 
astronom}' occupied itself with such inconspicuous sequences 
as those displayed in the repeating cycle of lunar eel: 
and those which suggested the theory of epicycles and eccen- 
trics ; while modern astronomy deals with still more incon- 
spicuous sequences, some of which, as the planetary rotation?, 
are nevertheless the simplest which the heavens present. In 
physics, the early use of canoes implied an empirical know- 
ledge of certain hydrostatic relations that are intrinsically 
m< re complex than sundry static relations not empirically 
known ; but these hydrostatic relations were thrust upon 
observation. Or, if we compare the solution of the problem 
of specific gravity by Archimedes with the discovery of at- 
mospheric pressure by Torricelli (the two involving me- 
chanical relations of exactly the same kind), we perceive that 
the much earlier occurrence of the first than the last was 
determined, neither by a difference in the irbearings on per- 
sonal welfare, nor by a difference in the frequency with 
which illustrations of them came under observation, nor by 
relative simplicity ; but by the greater obtrusiveness of the 
connexion between antecedent and consequent in the one 
than in the other. Among miscellaneous illustrations, it 
ma}- be pointed out that the connexions between lightning 
and thunder, and between rain and clouds, were recognized 
long before others of the same order, simply because they 



FREQUENCY OE OBSEKVED TTNIFOKMITIES. 147 

tlirust themselves on the attention. Or the long-delayed 
discovery of the microscopic forms of life, with all the phe- 
nomena they present, may be named as very clearly showing 
how certain groups of relations not ordinarily perceptible, 
though in other respects like long-familiar relations, have 
to wait until changed conditions render them perceptible. 
But, without further details, it needs only to consider the 
inquiries which now occupy the electrician, the chemist, 
the physiologist, to see that science has advanced, and is 
advancing, from the more conspicuous phenomena to the less 
conspicuous ones. 

How the degree of absolute frequency of a relation affects 
the recognition of its uniformity, we see in contrasting certain 
biological facts. The connexion between death and bodily 
injury, constantly displayed not only in men but in all in- 
ferior creatures, was known as an instance of natural causa- 
tion while yet deaths from diseases were thought super- 
natural. Among diseases themselves, it is observable that 
unusual ones were regarded as of demoniacal origin during 
ages when the more frequent were ascribed to ordinary 
causes : a truth paralleled among our own peasantry, who by 
the use of charms show a lingering superstition with respect 
to rare disorders, which they do not show with respect to 
common ones, such as colds. Passing to physical illustra- 
tions, we may note that within the historic period whirl- 
pools were accounted for by the agency of water-spirits ; but 
we do not find that within the same period the disappearance 
of water on exposure either to the sun or to artificial heat 
was interpreted in an analogous way : though a more mar- 
vellous occurrence, and a much more complex one, its great 
frequency led to the early recognition of it as a natural uni- 
formity. Rainbows and comets do not differ much in con- 
spicuousness, and a rainbow is intrinsically the more involved 
phenomenon ; but chiefly because of their far greater com- 
monness, rainbows were perceived to have a direct dependence 



148 OF LAWS IX GENERAL. 

on sun and rain while yet comets were regarded as signs of 
divine wrath. 

That races living inland must long have remained ignorant 
of the daily and monthly sequences of the tides, and that 
tropical races could not early have comprehended the pheno- 
mena of northern winters, are extreme illustrations of the 
influence which relative frequency has on the recognition of 
uniformities. Animals which, where they are indigenous, 
call forth no surprise by their structures or habits, because 
these are so familiar, when taken to countries where they 
have never been seen, are looked at with an astonishment 
approaching to awe — are even thought supernatural : a fact 
which will suggest numerous others that show how the local- 
ization of phenomena in part controls the order in which they 
are reduced to law. JSTot only however does their localization 
in space- affect the progression, but also their localization in 
time. Facts which are rarely if ever manifested in one era, 
are rendered very frequent in another, simply through the 
changes wrought by civilization. The lever, of which the 
properties are illustrated in the use of sticks and weapons, is 
vaguely understood by every savage — on applying it in a 
certain way he rightly anticipates certain effects ; but the 
whecl-and-axle, pulley, and screw, cannot have their powers 
either empirically or rationally known till the advance of the 
arts has more or less familiarized them. Through those 
various 'means of exploration which we have inherited and 
added to, we have become acquainted with a vast range of 
chemical relations that were relatively non-existent to the 
primitive man. To highly- developed industries we owe both 
the substances and the appliances that have disclosed to us 
countless uniformities which our ancestors had no oppor- 
tunity of seeing. These and like instances that will occur 
to the reader, show that the accumulated materials, and pro- 
cesses, and products, which characterize the environments of 
complex societies, greatly increase the accessibility of various 



PROGRESS OF GEOMETRY. 149 

classes of relations ; and by so multiplying the experiences 
of them, or making them relatively frequent, facilitate their 
generalization. Moreover, various classes of phenomena 
presented by society itself, as for instance those which 
political economy formulates, become relatively frequent, and 
therefore recognizable, in advanced social states ; while in 
less advanced ones they are either too rarely displayed to 
have their relations perceived, or, as in the least advanced 
ones, are not displayed at all. 

That, where no other circumstances interfere, the order in 
which different uniformities are established varies as their 
complexity, is manifest. The geometry of straight lines was 
understood before the geometry of curved lines ; the proper- 
ties of the circle before the properties of the ellipse, parabola, 
and hyperbola ; and the equations of curves of single cur- 
vature were ascertained before those of curves of double 
curvature. Plane trigonometry comes in order of time and 
simplicity before spherical trigonometry ; and the mensura- 
tion of plane surfaces and solids before the mensuration of 
curved surfaces and solids. Similarly with mechanics : the 
laws of simple motion were generalized before those of com- 
pound motion ; and those of rectilinear motion before those 
of curvilinear motion. The properties of equal- armed levers 
or scales, were understood before those of levers with un- 
equal arms ; and the law of the inclined plane was formulated 
earlier than that of the screw, which involves it. In chemis- 
try, the progress has been from the simple inorganic com- 
pounds to the more involved or organic compounds. And 
where, as in the higher sciences, the conditions of the explo- 
ration are more complicated, we still may clearly trace 
relative complexity as determining the order of discovery 
where other things are equal. 

The progression from concrete relations to abstract ones, 
and from the less abstract to the more abstract, is equally 
obvious. Numeration, which in its primary form concerned 



150 OF LA.W3 IX GENERAL. 

itself only with groups of actual objects, came earlier than 
simple arithmetic ; the rules of which deal with numbers 
apart from objects. Arithmetic, limited in its sphere to con- 
crete numerical relations, is alike earlier and less abstract 
than Algebra, which deals with the relations of these rela- 
tions. And in like manner, the Calculus cf Operations comes 
after Algebra, both in order of evolution and in order of ab- 
stractness. In Mechanics, the more concrete relations of 
forces exhibited in the lever, inclined plane, etc., were un- 
derstood before the more abstract relations expressed in the 
laws of resolution and composition of forces ; and later than 
the three abstract laws of motion as formulated by Xewton 
came the still more abstract law of inertia. Similarly with 
Physics and Chemistry, there has been an advance from 
truths entangled in all the specialities of particular facts 
and particular classes of facts, to truths disentangled from 
the disguising incidents under which they are manifested — 
to truths of a higher abstractness. 

Brief and rude as is this sketch of a mental development 
that has been long and complicated, I venture to think it 
shows inductivel}' what was deductively inferred, that the 
order in which separate groups of uniformities are recog- 
nized, depends not on one circumstance but on several cir- 
cumstances. The various classes of relations are generalized 
in a certain succession, not solely because of one particular 
kind of difference in their natures ; but also because they 
are variously placed in time and in space, variously open to 
observation, and variously related to our own constitutions : 
our perception of them being influenced by all these con- 
ditions in endless combinations. The comparative degrees 
of importance, of obtrusiveness, of absolute frequency, of 
relative frequency, of simplicity, of concreteness, are every 
one of them factors ; and from their unions in proportions 
that are never twice alike, there results a highly complex 
process of mental evolution. But while it is thus manifest 



DISCOVERT CONFORMS TO LAW. 151 

that the proximate causes of the succession in which relations 
are reduced to law, are numerous and involved ; it is also 
manifest that there is one ultimate cause to which these 
proximate causes are subordinate. -As the several circum- 
stances that determine the early or late recognition of uni- 
formities are circumstances that determine the number and 
strength of the impressions which these uniformities make 
on the mind, it follows that the progression conforms to a 
certain fundamental principle of psychology. We see d 
posteriori, what we concluded a priori, that the order in which 
relations are generalized, depends on the frequency and 
impressiveness with which they are repeated in conscious 
experience. 

Having roughly analyzed the progress of the past, let 
us take advantage of the light thus thrown on the present, 
and consider what is implied respecting the future. 

Note first that the likelihood of the universality of Law 
has been ever growing greater. Out of the countless co- 
existences and sequences with which mankind are environed, 
they have been continually transferring some from the group 
whose order was supposed to be arbitrary, to the group 
whose order is known to be uniform. And manifestly, as 
fast as the relations that are unreduced to law become 
fewer, the probability that among them there are some that 
do not conform to law, becomes less. To put the argument 
numerically — It is clear that when out of surrounding phe- 
nomena a hundred of several kinds have been found to occur 
in constant connexions, there arises a slight presumption that 
all phenomena occur in constant connexions. When uni- 
formity has been established in a thousand cases, more varied 
in their kinds, the presumption gains strength. And when 
the known cases of uniformity amount to myriads, including 
many of each variety, it becomes an ordinary induction that 
uniformity exists every where. 



152 OF LAWS IN GENERAL. 

Silently and insensibly their experiences have been press- 
ing men on towards the conclusion thus drawn. ]J\ot out of 
a conscious regard for these reasons, but from a habit of 
thought which these reasons formulate and justify, all minds 
have been advancing towards a belief in the constancy of 
surrounding coexistences and sequences. Familiarity with 
concrete uniformities has generated the abstract conception 
of uniformity — the idea of Law ; and this idea has been in 
successive generations slowly gaining fixity and clearness. 
Especially has it been thus among those whose knowledge of 
natural phenomena is the most extensive — men of science. 
The mathematician, the physicist, the astronomer, the che- 
mist, severally acquainted with the vast accumulations of 
uniformities established by their predecessors, and themselves 
daily adding new ones as well as verifying the old, acquire a 
far stronger faith in law than is ordinarily possessed. With 
them this faith, ceasing to be merely passive, becomes an 
active stimulus to inquiry. Wherever there exist pheno- 
mena of which the dependence is not yet ascertained, these 
most cultivated intellects, impelled by the conviction that 
here too there is some invariable connexion, proceed to ob- 
serve, compare, and experiment ; and when they discover 
the law to which the phenomena conform, as they eventually 
do, their general belief in the universality of law is further 
strengthened. So overwhelming is the evidence, and such 
the effect of this discipline, that to the advanced student of 
nature, the proposition that there are lawless phenomena 
has become not only incredible but almost inconceivable. 

This habitual recognition of law which already distin- 
guishes modern thought from ancient thought, must spread 
among men at large. The fulfilment of predictions made 
possible by every new step, and the further command gained 
of nature's forces, prove to the uninitiated the validity of 
scientific generalizations and the doctrine they illustrate. 
Widening education is daily diffusing among the mass of 



UNIFORMITIES YET TO BE DISCOVERED. 153 

men that knowledge of these generalizations which has been 
hitherto confined to the few. And as fast as this diffusion 
goes on, must the belief of the scientific become the belief of 
the world at large. 

That law is universal, will become an irresistible con- 
clusion when it is perceived that the progress in the dis- 
covery of laws itself conforms to law ; and when this percep- 
tion makes it clear why certain groups of phenomena have 
been reduced to law, while other groups are still unreduced. 
When it is seen that the order in which uniformities are 
recognized, must depend upon the frequency and vividness 
with which they are repeated in conscious experience ; when 
it is seen that, as a matter of fact, the most common, impor- 
tant, conspicuous, concrete, and simple, uniformities were the 
earliest recognized, because they were experienced oftenest 
and most distinctly ; it will by implication be seen that long 
after the great mass of phenomena have been generalized, 
there must remain phenomena which, from their rareness, 
or unobtrusiveness, or seeming unimportance, or complexity, 
or abstractness, are still un generalized. Thus will be 

furnished a solution to a difficulty sometimes raised. When 
it is asked why the universality of law is not already fully 
established, there will be the answer that the directions in 
which it is not yet established are those in which its estab- 
lishment must necessarily be latest. That state of things 
which is inferable beforehand, is just the state which we find 
to exist. If such coexistences and sequences as those of 
Biology and Sociology are not yet reduced to law, the pre- 
sumption is not that they are irreducible to law, but that their 
laws elude our present means of analysis. Having long ago 
proved uniformity throughout all the lower classes of rela- 
tions, and having been step by step proving uniformity 
Ihroughout classes of relations successively higher and higher, 
if we have not yet succeeded with the highest classes, it may 



154: OF LAWS IN GEXEfiAL. 

be fairly concluded that our powers are at fault, rather 
than that the uniformity does not exist. And unless we 
make the absurd assumption that the process of generaliza- 
tion, now going on with unexampled rapidity, has reached 
its limit, and will suddenly cease, we must infer that ul- 
timately mankind will discover a constant order of mani* 
festation even in the most involved and obscure phenomena. 



VII. 

TEE GENESIS OF SCIENCE. 

[FROM THE ILLUSTRATIONS OF UNIVERSAL FROGRESS.] 



THE GENESIS OF SCIENCE. 



TTIIIERE has ever prevailed among men a vague notion 
JL that scientific knowledge differs in nature from ordinary 
knowledge. By the Greeks, with whom Mathematics — 
literally things learnt — was alone considered as knowledge 
proper, the distinction must have been strongly felt ; and 
it has ever since maintained itself in the general mind. 
Though, considering the contrast between the achievements 
of science and those of daily unmethodic thinking, it is not 
surprising that such a distinction has been assumed ; yet it 
needs but to rise a little above the common point of view, 
to see that no such distinction can really exist : or that at 
best, it is but a superficial distinction. The same faculties 
are employed in both cases ; and in both cases their mode 
of operation is fundamentally the same. 

If we say that science is organized knowledge, we are 
met by the truth that all knowledge is organized in a great- 
er or less degree — that the commonest actions of the house- 
hold and the field presuppose facts colligated, inferences 
drawn, results expected ; and that the general success of 
these actions proves the data by which they were guided 
to have been correctly put together. If, again, we say 
that science is prevision — is a seeing beforehand — is a know- 



158 THE GEXESIS OF SCIENCE. 

ing in what times, places, combinations, or sequences, spe- 
cified phenomena will be found ; we are yet obliged to con 
fess that the definition includes much that is utterly foreign 
to science in its ordinary acceptation. For example, a child's 
knowledge of an apple. This, as far as it goes consists in 
previsions. When a child sees a certain form and colours, 
it knows that if it puts out its hand it will have certain im- 
pressions of resistance, and roundness, and smoothness ; 
and if it bites, a certain taste. And manifestly its general 
acquaintance with surrounding objects is of like nature — is 
made up of facts concerning them, so grouped as that any 
part of a group being perceived, the existence of the other 
facts included in it is foreseen. 

If, once more, we say that science is exact prevision, we 
still fail to establish the supposed difference. Not only do 
we find that much of what we call science is not exact, 
and that some of it, as physiology, can never become exact ; 
but we find further, that many of the previsions constitu- 
ting the common stock alike of wise and ignorant, are ex- 
act. That an unsupported body will fall ; that a lighted candle 
will go out when immersed in water ; that ice will melt 
when thrown on the fire — these, and many like predictions 
relating to the familiar properties of things have as high a 
degree of accuracy as predictions are capable of. It is true 
that the results predicated are of a very general character ; 
but it is none the less true that they are rigorously correct 
as far as they go : and this is all that is requisite to fulfil 
the definition. There is perfect accordance between the* 
anticipated phenomena and the actual ones ; and no mor£ 
than this can be said of the highest achievements of the 
sciences specially characterised as exact. 

Seeing thus that the assumed distinction between scien- 
tific knowledge and common knowledge is not logically 
justifiable ; and yet feeling, as we must, that however im- 
possible it may be to draw a line between them, the two 



SCIENCE AND ORDINARY KNOWLEDGE. 159 

are not practically identical ; there arises the question— 
What is the relationship that exists between them ? A 
partial answer to this question may be drawn from the il- 
lustrations just given. On reconsidering them, it will be 
observed that those portions of ordinary knowledge which 
are identical in character with scientific knowledge, com- 
prehend only such combinations of phenomena as are direct- 
ly cognizable by the senses, and are of simple, invariable 
nature. That the smoke from a fire which she is lighting 
will ascend, and that the fire will presently boil water, are 
previsions which the servant-girl makes equally well with 
the most learned physicist ; they are equally certain, 
equally exact with his ; but they are previsions concerning 
phenomena in constant and direct relation — phenomena 
that follow visibly and immediately after their antecedents 
— phenomena of which the causation is neither remote nor 
obscure — phenomena which may be predicted by the sim* 
plest possible act of reasoning. 

If, now, we pass to the previsions constituting what is 
commonly known as science — that an eclipse of the moon 
will happen at a specified time ; and when a barometer is 
taken to the top of a mountain of known height, the mer- 
curial column will descend a stated number of inches ; that 
the poles of a galvanic battery immersed in water will give 
off, the one an inflammable and the other an inflaming gas, 
in definite ratio — we perceive that the relations involved 
are not of a kind habitually presented to our senses ; that 
they depend, some of them, upon special combinations of 
causes ; and that in some of them the connection between 
antecedents and consequents is established only by an ela- 
borate series of inferences. The broad distinction, there- 
fore, between the two orders of knowledge, is not in their 
nature, but in their remoteness from perception. 

If we regard the cases in their most general aspect, we 
>?ee that the labourer, who, on hearing certain notes in the 



160 THE GENESIS OF SCIL2XE. 

adjacent hedge, can describe the particular form and col- 
ours of the bird making them ; and the astronomer, who, 
having calculated a transit of Yenus, can delineate the black 
spot entering on the sun's disc, as it will appear through 
the telescope, at a specified hour ; do essentially the same 
thing. Each knows that on fulfilling the requisite condi- 
tions, he shall have a preconceived impression — that after a 
definite series of actions will come a group of sensations of 
a foreknown kind. The difference, then, is not in the funda- 
mental character of the mental acts; or in the correctness 
of the previsions accomplished by them ; but in the com- 
plexity of the processes required to achieve the previsions. 
Much of our commonest knowledge is, as far as it goes, rig- 
orously precise. Science does not increase this precision ; 
cannot transcend it. AYhat then does it do ? It reduces 
other knowledge to the same degree of precision. That 
certainty which direct perception gives us respecting coex- 
istences and sequences of the simplest and most accessi- 
ble kind, science gives us respecting coexistences and se- 
quences, complex in their dependencies or inaccessible to 
immediate observation. In brief, regarded from this point 
of view, science may be called an extension of the percep- 
tions by means of reasoning. 

On further considering the matter, however, it will per- 
haps be felt that this definition does not express the whole 
fact — that inseparable as science may be from common 
knowledge, and completely as we may fill up the gap be- 
tween the simplest previsions of the child and the most re- 
condite ones of the natural philosopher, by interposing a 
series of previsions in which the complexity of reasoning 
involved is greater and greater, there is yet a difference 
between the two beyond that which is here described. And 
this is true. But the difference is still not such as enables 
ns to draw the assumed line of demarcation. It is a differ- 
ence not between common knowledge and scientific know! 



SCIENCE ADVANCES TO MEASUREMENT. 161 

edge ; but between the successive phases of science itself, 
or knowledge itself — whichever we choose to call it. In 
its earlier phases science attains only to certainty of fore- 
knowledge ; in its later phases it further attains to com- 
pleteness. We begin by discovering a relation : we end 
by discovering the relation. Our first achievement is to 
foretell the hind of phenomenon which will occur under 
specific conditions : our last achievement is to foretell not 
only the kind but the amount. Or, to reduce the proposi- 
tion to its most definite form — undeveloped science is qual- 
itative prevision : developed science is quantitative previ- 
sion. 

This will at once be perceived to express the remaining 
distinction between the lower and the higher stages of posi- 
tive knowledge. The prediction that a piece of lead will 
take more force to lift it than a piece of wood of equal size, 
exhibits certainty, but not completeness, of foresight. The 
kind of effect in which the one body will exceed the other 
is foreseen ; but not the amount by which it will exceed. 
There is qualitative prevision only. On the other hand, the 
prediction that at a stated time two particular planets will 
be in conjunction ; that by means of a lever having arms in 
a given ratio, a known force will raise just so many pounds ; 
that to decompose a specified quantity of sulphate of iron 
by carbonate of soda will require so many grains — these 
predictions exhibit foreknowledge, not only of the nature 
of the effects to be produced, but of the magnitude, either 
of the effects themselves, of the agencies producing them, 
or of the distance in time or space at which they will be 
produced. There is not only qualitative but quantitative 
prevision. 

And this is the unexpressed difference which leads us 
to consider certain orders of knowledge as especially scien- 
tific when contrasted with knowledge in general. Are the 
phenomena measurable ? is the test which we unconsciously 



IG2 THE GENESIS OF SCIENCE. 

employ. Space is measurable : hence Geometry. Force 
and space are measurable : hence Statics. Time, force, and 
space are measurable : hence Dynamics. The invention of 
the barometer enabled men to extend the principles of me 
chanics to the atmosphere ; and Aerostatics existed. "When 
a thermometer was devised there arose a science of heat, 
which was before impossible. Such of our sensations as we 
have not yet found modes of measuring do not originate 
sciences. We have no science of smells ; nor have we one 
of tastes. We have a science of the relations of sounds 
differing in pitch, because we have discovered a way to 
measure them ; but we have no science of sounds in respect 
to their loudness or their timbre, because we have got no 
measures of loudness and timbre. 

Obviously it is this reduction of the sensible phenomena 
it represents, to relations of magnitude, which gives to any 
division of knowledge its especially scientific character. 
Originally men's knowledge of weights and forces was in 
the same condition as their knowledge of smells and t 
is now — a knowledge not extending beyond that given by 
the unaided sensations ; and it remained so until weighing 
instruments and dynamometers were invented. Before 
there were hour-glasses and clepsydras, most phenomena 
could be estimated as to their durations and intervals, with 
no greater precision than degrees of hardness can be esti- 
mated by the fingers. Until a thcrmometric scale was con- 
trived, men's judgments respecting relative amounts of 
heat stood on the same footing with their present judg- 
ments respecting relative amounts of sound. And as in 
these initial stages, with no aids to observation, only the 
roughest comparisons of cases could be made, and only the 
most marked diiferences perceived ; it is obvious that only 
the most simple laws of dependence could be ascertained — 
only those laws which being uncomplicated with others, 
and not disturbed in their manifestations, required no nice- 



QUANTITATIVE SCIENCE DEDUCTIVE. 103 

ties of observation to disentangle them. Whence it ap- 
pears not only that in proportion as knowledge becomes 
quantitative do its previsions become complete as well as 
certain, but that until its assumption of a quantitative char- 
acter it is necessarily confined to the most elementary rela- 
tions. 

Moreover it is to be remarked that while, on the one 
hand, we can discover the laws of the greater proportion 
of phenomena only by investigating them quantitatively ; 
on the other hand we can extend the range of our quanti- 
tative previsions only as fast as we detect the laws of the 
results we predict. For clearly the ability to specify the 
magnitude of a result inaccessible to direct measurement, 
implies knowledge of its mode of dependence on something 
which can be measured — implies that we know the particu- 
lar fact dealt with to be an instance of some more general 
fact. Thus the extent to which our quantitative previsions 
have been carried in any direction, indicates the depth to 
which our knowledge reaches in that direction. And here, 
as another aspect of the same fact, we may further observe 
that as we pass from qualitative to quantitative prevision, 
we pass from inductive science to deductive science. Sci- 
ence while purely inductive is purely qualitative : when in- 
accurately quantitative it usually consists of part induction, 
part deduction: and it becomes accurately quantitative only 
when wholly deductive. We do not mean that the deduct- 
ive and the quantitative are coextensive ; for there is mani- 
festly much deduction that is qualitative only. We mean 
that all quantitative prevision is reached deductively ; and 
that induction can achieve only qualitative prevision. 

Still, however, it must not be supposed that these dis- 
tinctions enable us to separate ordinary knowledge from 
Bcience ; much as they seem to do so. While they show in 
what consists the broad contrast between the extreme forms 
of the two, they yet lead us to recognise their essential iden* 



104: THE GENESIS OF SCIENCE. 

tity ; and once more prove the difference to be one of de- 
gree only. For, on the one hand, the commonest positive 
knowledge is to some extent quantitative ; seeing that the 
amount of the foreseen result is known within certain wide 
limits. And, on the other hand, the highest quantitative 
prevision does not reach the exact truth, but only a very 
near approximation to it. 'Without clocks the savage- 
knows that the day is longer in the summer than in the 
winter ; without scales he knows that stone is heavier than 
flesh : that is, he can foresee respecting certain results that 
their amounts will exceed these, and be loss than those — he 
knows about what they will be. And, with his most deli- 
cate instruments and most elaborate calculations, all that 
the man of science can do, is to reduce the difference be- 
tween the foreseen and the actual results to an unimportant 
quantity. 

Moreover, it must be borne in mind not only that all 
the sciences are qualitative in their first stages, — not only 
that some of them, as Chemistry, have but recently reached 
the quantitative stage — but that the most advanced sciences 
have attained to their present power of determining quan- 
tities not present to the senses, or not directly measurable, 
by a slow process of improvement extending through thou- 
sands of years. So that science and the knowledge of the 
uncultured are alike in the nature of their previsions, widely 
as they differ in range ; they possess a common imperfec- 
tion, though this is immensely greater in the last than in 
the first; and the transition from the one to the other has 
been through a series of steps by which the imperfection 
has been rendered continually less, and the range continu- 
ally wider. 

These facts, that science and the positive knowledge ot 
the uncultured cannot be separated in nature, and that the 
one is but a perfected and extended form of the other, 
must necessarily underlie the whole theorv of science, ita 



HOW SCIENCE SHOULD BE REGARDED. 1G5 

progress, and the relations of its parts to each other. 
There must be serious incompleteness in any history of the 
sciences, which, leaving out of view the first steps of their 
genesis, commences with them only when they assume defi- 
nite forms. There must be grave defects, if not a general 
untruth, in a philosophy of the sciences considered in their 
interdependence and development, which neglects the in- 
quiry how they came to be distinct sciences, and how they 
were severally evolved out of the chaos of primitive ideas. 

Not only a direct consideration of the matter, but all 
analogy, goes to show that in the earlier and simpler stages 
must be sought the key to all subsequent intricacies. The 
time was when the anatomy and physiology of the human 
being were studied by themselves — when the adult man 
was analyzed and the relations of parts and of functions 
investigated, without reference either to the relations ex- 
hibited in the embryo or to the homologous relations exist- 
ing in other creatures. Now, however, it has become 
manifest that no true conceptions, no true generalizations, 
are possible under such conditions. Anatomists and phys- 
iologists now find that the real natures of organs and tis- 
sues can be ascertained only by tracing their early evolu- 
tion ; and that the affinities between existing genera can 
be satisfactorily made out only by examining the fossil gen- 
era to which they are allied. Well, is it not clear that the 
like must be true concerning all things that undergo devel- 
opment ? Is not science a growth ? Has not science, too, 
its embryology ? And must not the neglect of its embry- 
ology lead to a misunderstanding of the principles of its 
evolution and of its existing organization ? 

There are a priori reasons, therefore, for doubting the 
truth of all philosophies of the sciences which tacitly pro- 
ceed upon the common notion that scientific knowledge 
and ordinary knowledge are separate ; instead of com- 
mencing, as they should, by affiliating the one upon the 



166 THE GEXESIS OF SCIENCE. 

other, and showing how it gradually came to be distin- 
guishable from the other. We may expect to find theii 
generalizations essentially artificial ; and we shall not be 
deceived. Some illustrations of this may here be fitly in- 
troduced, by way of preliminary to a brief sketch of tho 
genesis of science from the point of view indicated. And 
we cannot more readily find such illustrations than by 
glancing at a few of the various classificatio)is of the sci- 
ences that have from time to time been proposed. To con- 
sider all of them would take too much space : we must 
content ourselves with some of the latest. 

Commencing with those which may be soonest disposed 
of, let us notice first the arrangement propounded by Okt-n 
An abstract of it runs thus : — 

Part I. Matiiesis. — Pneumatogeny : Primary Art, Primary 
Consciousness, God, Primary Rest, Time, Polarity, Mo- 
tion, Man, Space, Point, Line, Surface, Globe, Rotation. 
— Ilylogeny: Gravity, Matter, Ether, Heavenly Bodies, 
Light, lieat, Fire. 

(lie explains that Matiiksis is the doctrine of the whole; 
Pneumatogeny being the doctrine of immaterial totality 
Ilylogeny that of material totalities.) 

Part II. Ontology. — Cosmogcny : Rest. Centre, Motion, Line, 
Planets, Form, Planetary System. Comets. — > 
geny : Condensation, Simple Matter, Elements, Air, 
Water, Earth. — Stochiology : Functions of the Elements, 
&C. ccc. — Kingdoms of Xature : Individuals. 

(He says in explanation that " Ontology teaches as 
phenomena of matter. The first of these are the heavenly 
bodies comprehended by Cosmogeny. These divide into ele- 
ments — Stocliiogeny. The earth element divides into miner- 
als— Min era logy. These unite into one collective body — 
Geogeny. The wbole in singulars is !h< 



ESTIMATE OF OKEn's CLASSIFICATION", 167 

which again divides into plants and animals. Biology, there- 
fore, divides into Organogeny, Phytosophy, Zoosophy .") 

Fiest Kingdom. — Minerals. Mineralogy, Geology. 
Part III. Biology. — Organosophy, Phytogeny, Phyto-physiology, 
Phytology, Zoogeny, Physiology, Zoology, Psychology? 

A glance over this confused scheme shows that it is an 
attempt to classify knowledge, not after the order in which 
it has been, or may be, built up in the human conscious- 
ness ; but after an assumed order of creation. It is a 
pseudo-scientific cosmogony, akin to those which men have 
enunciated from the earliest times downwards ; and only a 
little more respectable. As such it will not be thought 
worthy of much consideration by those who, like ourselves, 
hold that experience is the sole origin of knowledge. Oth- 
erwise, it might have been needful to dwell on the incon- 
gruities of the arrangements — to ask how motion can be 
treated of before space ? how there can be rotation with- 
out matter to rotate ? how polarity can be dealt with with- 
out involving points and lines ? But it will serve our pres- 
ent purpose just to point out a few of the extreme absurdi- 
ties resulting from the doctrine which Oken seems to hold 
in common with Hegel, that " to philosophize on Nature is 
to rc-think the great thought of Creation." Here is a sam- 
ple : — 

" Mathematics is the universal science ; so also is Phys- 
io-philosophy, although it is only a part, or rather but a 
condition of the universe ; both are one, or mutually con- 
gruent. 

" Mathematics i , however, a science of mere forms 
without substance. Physio-philosophy is, therefore, mathe- 
matics endowed with substance." 

From the English point of view it is sufficiently amus- 
ing to find such a dogma not only gravely stated, but 
stated as an unquestionable truth. Here we see the expe- 



LG8 THE GENESIS OF SCIENCE. 

riences of quantitative relations which men have gathered 
from surrounding bodies and generalized (experience? 
which had been scarcely at all generalized at the beginning 
of the historic period) — we find these generalized expe- 
riences, these intellectual abstractions, elevated into con 
crete actualities, projected back into Nature, and consid- 
ered as the internal frame-work of things — the skeleton by 
which matter is sustained. But this new form of the old 
realism, is by no means the most startling of the physio- 
philosophic principles. We presently read that, 

"The highest mathematical idea, or the fundamental 
principle of all mathematics is the zero = 0." * * * 

" Zero is in itself nothing. Mathematics is based upon 
nothing, and, consequently, arises out of nothing. 

" Out of nothing, therefore, it is possible for something 
to arise ; for mathematics, consisting of propositions, is 
something, in relation to 0." 

By such " consequentlys" and " therefores" it is, that 
men philosophize when they " re-think the great thought 
of creation." By dogmas that pretend to be reasons, noth- 
ing is made to generate mathematics ; and by clothing 
mathematics with matter, we have the universe ! If now 
we deny, as we do deny, that the highest mathematical idea 
is the zero ; — if, on the other hand, we assert, as we do 
assert, that the fundamental idea underlying all mathemat- 
ics, is that of equality ; the whole of Oken*s cosmogony 
disappears. And here, indeed, we may see illustrated, the 
distinctive peculiarity of the German method of procedure 
in these matters — the bastard djrriori method, as it may 
be termed. The legitimate a priori method sets out with 
propositions of which the negation is inconceivable ; the J 
priori method as illegitimately applied, sets out either with 
propositions of which the negation is not inconceivable, or 
with propositions like Oken's, of which the affirmatu 
inconceivable. 



169 

It is needless to proceed further with the analysis ; else 
might we detail the steps by which Oken arrives at the 
conclusions that " the planets are coagulated colours, for 
they are coagulated light ; that the sphere is the expanded 
nothing ; " that gravity is " a weighty nothing, a heavy es- 
sence, striving towards a centre ; " that " the earth is the 
identical, water the indifferent, air the different ; or the 
first the centre, the second* the radius, the last the peri- 
phery of the general globe or of fire." To comment on 
them would be nearly as absurd as are the propositions 
themselves, Let us pass on to another of the German sys- 
tems of knowledge — that of Hegel. 

The simple fact that Hegel puts Jacob Bcehme on a par 
with Bacon, suffices alone to show that his stand-point is 
far remote from the one usually regarded as scientific : so 
far remote, indeed, that it is not easy to find any common 
basis on which to found a criticism. Those who hold that 
the mind is moulded into conformity with surrounding 
things by the agency of surrounding things, are necessarily 
at a loss how to deal with those, who, like Schelling and 
Hegel, assert that surrounding things are solidified mind — 
that Nature is " petrified intelligence." However, let ua» 
briefly glance at Hegel's classification. He divides philoso • 
phy into three parts : — 

1. Logic, or the science of the idea in itself, the puro 
idea. 

2. Tlie Philosophy of Nature, or the science of the idea 
considered under its other form — of the idea as Nature. 

3. The Philosophy of the Mind, or the science of the 
idea m its return to itself. 

Of these, the second is divided into the natural sciences, 
commonly so called ; so that in its more detailed form the 
series runs thus : — Logic, Mechanics, Physics, Organic Phy 
fcies, Psychology. 

Now, if we believe with llcga], first, that thought is tho 

8 



170 THE GENESIS OF SCIENCE. 

true essence of man ; second, that thought is the essence of 
the world ; and that, therefore, there is nothing but thought ; 
his classification, beginning with the science of pure thought, 
may be acceptable. But otherwise, it is an obvious objec- 
tion to his arrangement, that thought implies things thought 
of — that there can be no logical forms without the substance 
of experience — that the science of ideas and the science oi 
things must have a simultaneous origin. Hegel, however, 
anticipates this objection, and, in his obstinate idealism, re- 
plies, that the contrary is true; that all contained in the 
forms, to become something, requires to be thought : and 
that logical forms are the foundations of all things. 

It is not surprising that, starting from such premises, and 
reasoning after this fashion, Hegel finds his way to strange 
conclusions. Out of space and time he proceeds to build up 
motion, matter, repulsion, attraction, weight, and inertia. 
He then goes on to logically evolve the solar system. In 
doing this he widely diverges from the Newtonian theory ; 
reaches by syllogism the conviction that the planets are the 
most perfect celestial bodies ; and, not being able to bring 
the stars within his theory, says that they are mere formal 
existences and not living matter, and that as compared with 
the solar system they are as little admirable as a cutaneous 
eruption or a swarm of flics.* 

Results so outrageous might be left as self-disproved, 
tvere it not that speculators of this class are not alarmed by 
any amount of incongruity with established beliefs. The 
only efficient mode of treating systems like this of Hegel, is 
to show that they are self-destructive — that by their first 
steps they ignore that authority on which all their subse- 
quent steps depend. If Hegel professes, as he manifestly 
does, to develop his scheme by reasoning — if he presents 

* It is somewhat curious that the author of M The Plurality of Worlds,*' 
irith quite other aims, should have persuaded himself into similar conelu 
sions. 



171 

successive inferences as necessarily following from certain 
premises ; he implies the postulate that a belief which ne- 
cessarily follows after certain antecedents is a true belief: 
and, did an opponent reply to one of his inferences, that, 
though it was impossible to think the opposite, yet the 
opposite was true, he would consider the reply irrational 
The procedure, however, which he would thus condemn as 
destructive of all thinking whatever, is just the procedure 
exhibited in the enunciation of his own first principles. 

Mankind find themselves unable to conceive that there 
can be thought without things thought of. Hegel, how- 
ever, asserts that there can be thought without things 
thought of. That ultimate test of a true proposition — the 
inability of the human mind to conceive the negation of it 
— which in all other cases he considers valid, he considers 
invalid where it suits his convenience to do so ; and yet at 
the same time denies the right of an opponent to follow his 
example. If it is competent for him to posit dogmas, which 
are the direct negations of what human consciousness recog- 
nises; then is it also competent for his antagonists to stop 
him at every step in his argument by saying, that though 
the particular inference he is drawing seems to his mind, 
and to all minds, necessarily to follow from the premises, 
yet it is not true, but the contrary inference is true. Or, 
to state the dilemma in another form : — If he sets out with 
inconceivable propositions, then may he with equal propri- 
ety make all his succeeding propositions inconceivable ones 
— may at every step throughout his reasoning draw exactly 
the opposite conclusion to that which seems involved. 

Hegel's mode of procedure being thus essentially sui- 
cidal, the Hegelian classification which depends upon 
it, falls to the ground. Let us consider next that of 
M Comte. 

As all his readers must admit, M. Comte presents us 
?vich a scheme of the sciences which, unlike the foregoing 



172 THE GENESIS OF SCIENCE. 

ones, demands respectful consideration. Widely as we 
differ from him, we cheerfully bear witness to the largeness 
of his views, the clearness of his reasoning, and the value 
of his speculations as contributing to intellectual progress. 
Did we believe a serial arrangement of the sciences to be 
possible, that of M. Comte would certainly be the one we 
should adopt. His fundamental propositions are thor- 
oughly intelligible ; and if not true, have a great semblance 
of truth. His successive steps are logically co-ordinated ; 
and he supports his conclusions by a considerable amount of 
evidence — evidence which, so long as it is not critically exam- 
ined, or not met by counter evidence, seems to substantiate 
his positions. But it only needs to assume that antagon- 
istic attitude which ought to be assumed towards new 
doctrines, in the belief that, if true, they will prosper by 
conquering objectors — it needs but to test his leading 
doctrines either by other facts than those he cites, or by 
his own facts differently applied, to at once show that they 
will not stand. AVe will proceed thus to deal with the 
general principle on which he bases his hierarchy of the 
sciences. 

In the second chapter of his Cowrs de PhUosophie 1 
tive, M. Comte says : — u Our problem is, then, to tind 
the one rational order, amongst a host of possible sys- 
tems." . . . "This order is determined by the degree 
of simplicity, or, what comes to the same thing, of general- 
ity of their phenomena." And the arrangement he de- 
duces runs thus: Mathematics, Astronomy, Physics, Chem- 
istry, Physiology, Social Physics. This he asserts to be 
" the true Jiliatio?i of the sciences." He asserts further, 
that the principle of progression from a greater to a less 
degree of generality, " which gives this order to the whole 
body of science, arranges the parts of each science.'" And, 
finally, he asserts that the gradations thus established d 
priori among the sciences, and the parts of each science, ''is 



173 

in essential conformity with the order which has sponta 
neously taken place among the branches of natural philoso 
phy ; " or, in other words — corresponds with the order of 
historic development. 

Let us compare these assertions with the facts. That 
there may be perfect fairness, let us make no choice, but 
take as the field for our comparison, the succeeding section 
treating of the first science — Mathematics ; and let us use 
none but M. Comte's own facts, and his own admissions. 
Confining ourselves to this one science, of course our com- 
parisons must be between its several parts. M. Comte says, 
that the parts of each science must be arranged in the 
order of their decreasing generality; and that this oider 
of decreasing generality agrees with the order of historic 
development. Our inquiry must be, then, whether the his- 
tory of mathematics confirms this statement. 

Carrying out his principle, M. Comte divides Mathe- 
matics into " Abstract Mathematics, or the Calculus (tak- 
ing the word in its most extended sense) and Concrete 
Mathematics, which is composed of General Geometry and 
of Rational Mechanics.'' The subject-matter of the first of 
these is number ; the subject-matter of the second includes 
space, time, motion, force. The one possesses the highest 
possible degree of generality ; for all things whatever 
admit of enumeration. The others are less general ; see- 
ing that there are endless phenomena that are not cogniza- 
ble either by general geometry or rational mechanics. In 
conformity with the alleged law, therefore, the evolution 
of the calculus must throughout have preceded the evolu- 
tion of the concrete sub-sciences. Now somewhat awk- 
wardly for him, the first remark M. Comte makes bearing 
upon this point is, that " from an historical point of view, 
mathematical analysis appears to have risen out q/*the con- 
templation of geometrical and mechanical facts." True, 
he goes on to say that, " it is not the less independent of 



174 TIIE GEXESIS OF SCIENCE. 

these sciences logically speaking ; " for that " analytical 
ideas are, above all others, universal, abstract, and simple ■ 
and geometrical conceptions are necessarily founded on 
them." 

We will not take advantage of this last passage to 
charge M. Comte with teaching, after the fashion of Hegel, 
that there can be thought without things thought of. We 
are content simply to compare the two assertions, that 
analysis arose out of the contemplation of geometrical and 
mechanical facts, and that geometrical conceptions are 
founded upon analytical ones. Literally interpreted they 
exactly cancel each other. Interpreted, however, in a 
liberal sense, they imply, what we believe to be de- 
monstrable, that the two had a simultaneous origin. The 
passage is either nonsense, or it is an admission that 
abstract and concrete mathematics are coeval. Thus, 
at the very first step, the alleged congruity between the 
order of generality and the order of evolution, does not 
hold good. 

But may it not be that though abstract and concrete 
mathematics took their rise at the same time, the one 
afterwards developed more rapidly than the other ; and 
has ever since remained in advance of it ? Xo : and again 
we call M. Comte himself as witness. Fortunately for his 
argument he has said nothing respecting the early stages 
of the concrete and abstract divisions after their diver- 
gence from a common root ; otherwise the advent o'l 
Algebra long after the Greek geometry had reached a high 
development, would have been an inconvenient fact for 
him to deal with. But passing over this, and limit 
ourselves to his own statements, we find, at the opening of 
the next chapter, the admission, that "the historical de- 
relopment of the abstract portion of mathematical science 
has, since the time of Descartes, been for the most part 
determined bv that of the concrete." Further on we read 



175 

respecting algebraic functions that " most functions were 
concrete in their origin — even those which are at present 
the most purely abstract ; and the ancients discovered 
only through geometrical definitions elementary algebraic 
properties of functions to which a numerical value was not 
attashed till long afterwards, rendering abstract to us 
what was concrete to the old geometers." How do these 
Btatements tally with his doctrine ? Again, having divided 
the calculus into algebraic and arithmetical, M. Comte 
admits, as perforce he must, that the algebraic is more 
general than the arithmetical ; yet he will not say that 
algebra preceded arithmetic in point of time. And again, 
having divided the calculus of functions into the calculus 
of direct functions (common algebra) and the calculus of 
indirect functions (transcendental analysis), he is obliged 
to speak of this last as possessing a higher generality than 
the first ; yet it is far more modern. Indeed, by implica- 
tion, M. Comte himself confesses this incongruity ; for he 
says : — " It might seem that the transcendental analysis 
ought to be studied before the ordinary, as it provides the 
equations which the other has to resolve ; but though the 
transcendental is logically independent of the ordinary, it 
is best to follow the usual method of study, taking the 
ordinary first." In all these cases, then, as well as at the 
close, of the section where he predicts that mathematicians 
will in time " create procedures of a wider generality," M. 
Comte makes admissions that are diametrically opposed to 
the alleged law. 

In the succeeding chapters treating of the concrete de- 
partment of mathematics, we find similar contradictions. 
M. Comte himself names the geometry of the ancients spe- 
cial geometry, and that of moderns the general geometiy. 
lie admits that while " the ancients studied geometry with 
reference to the bodies under notice, or specially; the 
moderns study it with reference to the phenomena to be 



176 THE GENESIS OF SCIENCE. 

considered, or generally." He admits that while " the an 
cients extracted all they could out of one line or surface 
before passing to another," " the moderns, since Descartes, 
employ themselves on questions which relate to any figure 
whatever." These facts are the reverse of what, according 
to his theory, they should be. So, too, in mechanics. Be- 
fore dividing it into statics and dynamics, M. Comte treats 
of the three laws of motion, and is obliged to do so ; for 
statics, the more general of the two divisions, though it 
does not involve motion, is impossible as a science until the 
laws of motion are ascertained. Yet the laws of motion 
pertain to dynamics, the more special of the divisions. 
Further on he points out that alter Archimedes, who dis- 
covered the law of equilibrium of the lever, statics made 
no progress until the establishment of dynamics enabled us 
to seek " the conditions of equilibrium through the laws of 
the composition of forces." And he adds — " At this day 
this is the method universally employed. At the first glance 
it does not appear the most rational — dynamics being more 
complicated than statics, and precedence being natural to the 
simpler. It would, in fact, be more philosophical to refer 
dynamics to statics, as has since been done. " Sundry dis- 
coveries are afterwards detailed, showing how completely 
the development of statics has been achieved by consider- 
ing its problems dynamically ; and before the close of the 
section M. Comte remarks that M before hydrostatics could 
be comprehended under statics, it was necessary that the 
abstract theory of equilibrium should be made so general 
as to apply directly to fluids as well as solids. This was ac- 
complished when Lagrange supplied, as the basis of the 
whole of rational mechanics, the single principle of virtual 
velocities." In which statement we have two facta directly 
%t variance with M, Comte's doctrine ; — first, that the sim- 
ph-r science, statics, reached its present development only 
by the aid of the principle of virtual velocities, which be* 



COMTE' S LAW OF PROGRESSION. 177 

longs to the more complex science, dynamics ; and that this 
" single principle " underlying all rational mechanics — this 
most general form which includes alike the relations of stat- 
ical, hydrostatical, and dynamical forces — was reached so 
late as the time of Lagrange. 

Thus it is not true that the historical succession of the 
divisions of mathematics has corresponded with the order 
of decreasing generality. It is not true that abstract math- 
ematics was evolved antecedently to, and independently 
of concrete mathematics. It is not true that of the sub- 
divisions of abstract mathematics, the more general came 
before the more special. And it is not true that concrete 
mathematics, in either of its two sections, began with the 
most abstract and advanced to the less abstract truths. 

It may be well to mention, parenthetically, that in de- 
fending his alleged law of progression from the general to 
the special, M. Comte somewhere comments upon the two 
meanings of the word general, and the resulting liability to 
confusion. Without now discussing whether the asserted 
distinction can be maintained in other cases, it is manifest 
that it does not exist here. In sundry of the instances 
above quoted, the endeavors made by M. Comte himself to 
disguise, or to explain away, the precedence of the special 
over the general, clearly indicate that the generality spoken 
of, is of the kind meant by his formula. And it needs but 
a brief consideration of the matter to show that, even did 
he attempt it, he could not distinguish this generality, which, 
as above proved, frequently comes last, from the generality 
which he says always comes first. For what is the nature 
of that mental process by which objects, dimensions, 
weights, times, and the rest, are found capable of having 
their relations expressed numerically ? It is the formation 
of certain abstract conceptions of unity, duality and multi- 
plicity, which are applicable to all things alike. It is the 
invention of general symbols serving to express thenumer 



178 TIIE GENESIS OF SCIENCE. 

ical relations of entities, whatever be their special charac- 
ters. And what is the nature of the mental process by 
which numbers are found capable of having their relations 
expressed algebraically ? It is just the same. It is the for- 
mation of certain abstract conceptions of numerical func- 
tions which are the same whatever be the magnitudes o( 
the numbers. It is the invention of general symbols serv- 
ing to express the relations between numbers, as numbers 
express the relations between things. And transcendental 
analysis stands to algebra in the same position that algebr? 
stands in to arithmetic. 

To briefly illustrate their respective powers ; — arithme- 
tic can express in one formula the value of a particular 
tangent to % particular curve ; algebra can express in one 
formula the values of all tangents to a /w?/cMforr curve ; 
transcendental analysis can express in one formula the val- 
ues of all tangents to all curves. Just as arithmetic deals 
with the common properties of lines, areas, bulks, forces, 
periods ; so does algebra deal with the common properties 
of the numbers which arithmetic presents ; so does tran- 
scendental analysis deal with the common properties of the 
equations exhibited by algebra. Thus, the generality of 
the higher branches of the calculus, when compared with 
the lower, is the same kind of generality as that of the lower 
branches when compared with geometry or mechanics. 
And on examination it will be found that the like relation 
exists in the various other cases above given. 

Having shown that M. Comtek alleged law of progres- 
sion does not hold among the several parts of the same 
science, let us see how it agrees with the facts when applied 
to separate sciences. " Astronomy,*' says M. Comte, at the 
opening o( Book III., " was a positive science, in its geo- 
metrical aspect, from the earliest days of the school of Alex- 
andria ; but Physics, which we are now to consider, had no 
positive character at all till Galileo made his great disco* 



TESSESTRIAL PHYSICS PRECEDES CELESTIAL. 179 

cries on the fall of heavy bodies*" On this, our comment ia 
simply that it is a misrepresentation based upon an arbi- 
trary misuse of words— a mere verbal artifice. By choosing 
to exclude from terrestrial physics those laws of magnitude, 
motion, and position, which he includes in celestial physics, 
M. Comte makes it appear that the one owes nothing to 
the other. Not only is this altogether unwarrantable, but 
it is radically inconsistent with his own scheme of divisions. 
At the outset he says — and as the point is important we 
quote from the original — " Pour la physique inorganique 
nous voyons d'abord, en nous conformant toujours a l'ordre 
de generalite et de dependance des phenomenes, qu'tile doit 
6tre partag^e en deux sections distinctes, suivant qu'elle 
considere les phenomenes generaux de l'univers, ou, en par- 
ticulier, ceux que presentent les corps terrestres. D'oi\ la 
physique celeste, ou l'astronomie, soit geometrique, soit 
mechanique ; et la physique terrestre." 

Here then we have inorganic physics clearly divided 
into celestial physics and terrestrial pthysics — the pheno- 
mena presented by the universe, and the phenomena pre- 
sented by earthly bodies. If now celestial bodies and ter- 
restrial bodies exhibit sundry leading phenomena in com- 
mon, as they do, how can the generalization of these com- 
mon phenomena be considered as pertaining to the one class 
rather than to the other ? If inorganic physics includes 
geometry (which M. Comte has made it do by comprehend- 
ing geometrical astronomy in its sub-section — celestial phy- 
sics) ; and if its sub-section — terrestrial physics, treats of 
things having geometrical properties ; how can the laws of 
geometrical relations be excluded from terrestrial physics? 
Clearly if celestial physics includes the geometry of ob- 
jects in the heavens, terrestrial physics includes the geometry 
of objects on the earth. And if terrestrial physics includes 
terrestrial geometry, while celestial physics includes celestial 
geometry, then the geometrical part of terrestrial physics 



180 THE GENESIS OF SCIENCE. 

precedes the geometrical part of celestial physics ; see- 
ing that geometry gained its first ideas from surrounding 
objects. Until men had learnt geometrical relations from 
bodies on the earth, it was impossible for them to under- 
stand the geometrical relations of bodies in the heavens. 

So, too, with celestial mechanics, which had terrestrial 
mechanics for its parent. The very conception of force, 
which underlies the whole of mechanical astronomy, is bor- 
rowed from our earthly experiences ; and the leading laws 
of mechanical action as exhibited in scales, levers, projec- 
tiles, &c, had to be ascertained before the dynamics of the 
solar system could be entered upon. What were the laws 
made use of by Newton in working out his grand discovery ? 
The law of falling bodies disclosed by Galileo ; that of the 
composition of forces also disclosed by Galileo ; and that 
of centrifugal force found out by Huyghens — all of them 
generalizations of terrestrial physics. Yet, with facts like 
these before him, M. Comte places astronomy before phy- 
sics in order of evolution ! He does not compare the geo- 
metrical parts of the two together, and the mechanical 
parts of the two together ; for this would by no means 
suit his hypothesis. But he compares the geometrical part 
of the one with the mechanical part of the other, and so 
gives a semblance of truth to his position. He is led away 
by a verbal delusion. Had he confined his attention to the 
things and disregarded the words, he would have seen that 
before mankind scientifically co-ordinated any one class of 
vhenomena displayed in the heavens, they had previously 
co-ordinated a parallel class of phenomena displayed upon 
the surface of the earth. 

Were it needful we could fill a score pages with the in- 
congruities of 31. Court e's scheme. But the foregoing sam- 
ples will suffice. So far is his law of evolution of the 
sciences from being tenable, that, by following his exam 
pie, and arbitrarily ignoring one class of facts, it would be 



181 

possible to present, with great plausibility, just the opposite 
generalization to that which he enunciates. "While he as- 
serts that the rational order of the sciences, like the order 
of their historic development, " is determined by the de- 
gree of simplicity, or, what comes to the same thing, of 
generality of their phenomena ; " it might contrariwise be 
asserted, that, commencing with the complex and the spe- 
cial, mankind have progressed step by step to a knowledge 
of greater simplicity and wider generality. So much evi- 
dence is there of this as to have drawn from "Whewell, in 
his History of the Inductive Sciences, the general remark 
that " the reader has already seen repeatedly in the course 
of this history, complex and derivative principles present- 
ing themselves to men's minds before simple and elemen- 
tary ones." 

Even from M. Comte's own work, numerous facts, ad- 
missions, and arguments, might be picked out, tending to 
show this. We have already quoted his words in proof 
that both abstract and concrete mathematics have pro- 
gressed towards a higher degree of generality, and that he 
looks forward to a higher generality still. Just to strength- 
en this adverse hypothesis, let us take a further instance. 
From the particular case of the scales, the law of equilibri- 
um of which was familiar to the earliest nations known, Ar- 
chimedes advanced to the more general case of the unequal 
lever with unequal weights; the law of equilibrium of 
which includes that of the scales. By the help of Galileo's 
discovery concerning the composition of forces, D'Alembert 
" established, for the first time, the equations of equilibrium 
of any system of forces applied to the different points of a 
solid body" — equations which include all cases of levers 
and an infinity of cases besides. Clearly this is progress 
towards a higher generality — towards a knowledge more 
independent of special circumstances — towards a study of 
phenomena " the most disengaged from the incidents of 



LS2 THE GENESIS OF SCIEZnXE. 

particular cases ; " which is M. Comte's definition of u the 
most simple phenomena." Docs it not indeed follow from 
the familiarly admitted fact, that mental advance is from 
the concrete to the abstract, from the particular to the gen- 
eral, that the universal and therefore most simple truths are 
the last to be discovered ? Is not the government of the 
solar system by a force varying inversely as the square of 
the distance, a simpler conception than any that preceded 
it ? Should we ever succeed in reducing all orders of phe- 
nomena to some single law — say of atomic action, as M. 
Comte suggests — must not that law answer to his test of 
being independent of all others, and therefore most simple ? 
And would not such a law generalize the phenomena of 
gravity, cohesion, atomic affinity, and electric repulsion, just 
as the laws of number generalize the quantitative phenom- 
ena of space, time and force ? 

The possibility of saying so much in support of an hypo- 
thesis the very reverse of M. Comte's, at once proves that 
his generalization is only a hall-truth. The fact is, that 
neither proposition is correct by itself; and the actuality is 
expressed only by putting the two together. The progress 
of science is duplex : it is at once from the special to the 
general, and from the general to the special: it is analytical 
and synthetical at the same time. 

M. Comte himself observes that the evolution of science 
has been accomplished by the division of labour; but he 
quite misstates the mode in which this division of labour 
has operated. As he describes it, it has simply been an ar- 
rangement of phenomena into classes, and the study of each 
class by itself. He does not recognise the constant effect 
of progress in each class upon cdl other classes; but only on 
the class succeeding it in his hierarchical scale. Or if he 
occasionally admits collateral influences and intercommuni- 
cations, he does it so grudgingly, and so quickly puts the 
admissions out of sight and forgets them, as to leave the 



HOW THE SCIENCES AID EACH OTHER. 183 

impression that, with but trifling exceptions, the sciences 
aid each other only in the order of their alleged succession. 
The fact is, however, that the division of labour in science, 
like the division of labour in society, and like the " physio- 
logical division of labour " in individual organisms, has been 
not only a specialization of functions, but a continuous help- 
ing of each division by all the others, and of all by each. 
Every particular class of inquirers has, as it were, secreted 
its own particular order of truths from the general mass of 
material which observation accumulates ; and all other 
classes of inquirers have made use of these truths as fast 
as they were elaborated, with the effect of enabling them 
the better to elaborate each its own order of truths. 

It was thus in sundry of the cases we have quoted as at 
variance with M. Comte's doctrine. It was thus with the 
application of Huyghens's optical discovery to astronomical 
observation by Galileo. It was thus w r ith the application 
of the isochronism of the pendulum to the making of in- 
struments for measuring intervals, astronomical and other. 
It w T as thus when the discovery that the refraction and dis- 
persion of light did not follow the same law of variation, 
affected both astronomy and physiology by giving us achro- 
matic telescopes and microscopes. It was thus when Brad- 
ley's discovery of the aberration of light enabled him to 
make the first step towards ascertaining the motions of the 
stars. It was thus when Cavendish's torsion-balance ex- 
periment determined the specific gravity of the earth, and 
so gave a datum for calculating the specific gravities of the 
sun and planets. It was thus when tables of atmospheric 
refraction enabled observers to write down the real places 
of the heavenly bodies instead of their apparent places. It 
was thus when the discovery of the different expansibilities 
of metals by heat, gave us the means of correcting our 
chronometrical measurements of astronomical periods. It 
was thus when the lines of the prismatic spectrum were 



1-84 THE GENESIS OF SCIENCE. 

ased to distinguish the heavenly bodies that are of like na- 
ture with the sun from those which are not. It was thus 
when, as recently, an electro-telegraphic instrument was in- 
vented for the more accurate registration of meridional 
transits. It was thus when the difference in the rates of a 
clock at the equator, and nearer the poles, gave data for 
calculating the oblateness of the earth, and accounting for 
the precession of the equinoxes. It was thus — but it is 
needless to continue. 

Here, within our own limited knowledge of its history, we 
have named ten additional cases in which the single science 
of astronomy has owed its advance to sciences coming after 
it in M. Comtc's scries. Not only its secondary steps, but 
its greatest revolutions have been thus determined. Kep- 
ler could not have discovered his celebrated laws had it not 
been for Tyclio Brahe's accurate observations ; and it was 
only after some progress in physical and chemical science 
that the improved instruments with which those observa- 
tions were made, became possible. The heliocentric theory 
of the solar system had to wait until the invention of the 
telescope before it could be finally established. Nay, even 
the grand discovery of all — the law of gravitation — depend- 
ed for its proof upon an operation of physical science, the 
measurement of a degree on the Earth's surface. So complete- 
ly indeed did it thus depend, that Xewton had actually 
abandoned his hyjiothcsis because the length of a degree, 
as then stated, brought out wrong results ; and it was only 
after Picart's more exact measurement was published, that 
he returned to his calculations and proved his great gener- 
alization. Now this constant intercommunion, which, for 
brevity's sake, we have illustrated in the case of one science 
only, has been taking place with all the sciences. Through- 
out the whole course of their evolution there has been a 
continuous conse?isus of the sciences — a consensus exhibit- 
ing a general correspondence with the consensus of faeul 



THE SERIAL ORDER ERRONEOUS. 185 

ties in each phase of mental development ; the one being 
an objective registry of the subjective state of the other. 

From our present point of view, then, it becomes obvi- 
ous that the conception of a serial arrangement of the sci- 
ences is a vicious one. It is not simply that the schemes 
we have examined are untenable; but it is that the sciences 
cannot be rightly placed in any linear order whatever. It 
is not simply that, as M. Comte admits, a classification 
" will always involve something, if not arbitrary, at least 
artificial ; " it is not, as he would have us believe, that, 
neglecting minor imperfections a classification may be sub- 
stantially true ; but it is that any grouping of the sciences 
in a succession gives a radically erroneous idea of their 
genesis and their dependencies. There is no " one rational 
order among a host of possible systems." There is no 
" true filiation of the sciences." The whole hypothesis is 
fundamentally false. Indeed, it needs but a glance at its 
origin to see at once how baseless it is. Why a series f 
What reason have we to suppose that the sciences admit 
of a linear arrangement? Where is our warrant for 
assuming that there is some succession in which they can 
be placed? There is no reason; no warrant. Whence 
then has arisen the supposition ? To use M. Comte's own 
phraseology, we should say, it is a metaphysical conception. 
It adds another to the cases constantly occurring, of the 
human mind being made the measure of Nature. We are 
obliged to think in sequence ; it is the law of our minds 
that we must consider subjects separately, one after 
another : therefore Nature must be serial — therefore the 
sciences must be classifiable in a succession. See here the 
birth of the notion, and the sole evidence of its truth. 
Men have been obliged when arranging in books their 
schemes of education and systems of knowledge, to choose 
some order or other. And from inquiring what is the best 



L86 THE GENESIS OF SCIENCE. 

order, have naturally fallen into the belief that there is an 
order which truly represents the facts — have persevered in 
seeking such an order; quite overlooking the previous 
question whether it is likely that Xature has consulted the 
convenience of book-making. 

For German philosophers, who hold that Xature is 
" petrified intelligence," and that logical forms are the 
foundations of all things, it is a consistent hypothesis that 
as thought is serial, Xature is serial ; but that M. Comte, 
who is so bitter an opponent of all anthropomorphism, 
even in its most evanescent shapes, should have committed 
the mistake of imposing upon the external world an ar- 
rangement which so obviously springs from a limitation of 
the human consciousness, is somewhat strange. And it is 
the more strange when we call to mind how, at the outset, 
M. Comte remarks that in the beginning M toutcs les sciences 
sont cullivees simultanement par les mimes esprit s / " that 
this is " inevitable et mime indispensable ; " and how he 
further remarks that the different sciences are "eomme 
les diverses branches aVun tronc unique." Were it not 
accounted for by the distorting influence of a cherished 
hypothesis, it would be scarcely possible to understand 
how, after recognising truths like these, 31. Comte should 
have persisted in attempting to construct u une echelle en- 
eyclopedique." 

The metaphor which M. Comte has here so incc 
tently used to express the relations of the sciences — 
branches of one trunk — is an approximation to the truth, 
though not the truth itself. It suggests the tacts that the 
sciences had a common origin ; that they have been de- 
veloping simultaneously ; and that they have been from 
time to time dividing and sub-dividing. But it does not 
suggest the yet more important fact, that the divisions and 
sub-divisions thus arising do not remain separate, but now 
and ac:ain re-unite in direct and indirect wavs. They 



INOSCULATION OF THE SCIENCES. 187 

inosculate ; they severally send off and receive connecting 
growths ; and the intercommunion has been ever becom- 
ing more frequent, more intricate, more widely ramified. 
There has all along been higher specialization, that there 
might be a larger generalization ; and a deeper analysis, 
that there might be a better synthesis. Each larger gen- 
eralization has lifted sundry specializations still higher ; and 
each better synthesis has prepared the way for still deeper 
analysis. 

And here we may fitly enter upon the task awhile since 
indicated — a sketch of the Genesis of Science, regarded as 
a gradual outgrowth from common knowledge — an exten- 
sion of the perceptions by the aid of the reason. We pro- 
pose to treat it as a psychological process historically dis- 
played ; tracing at the same time the advance from qualita- 
tive to quantitative prevision ; the progress from concrete 
facts to abstract facts, and the application of such abstract 
facts to the analysis of new orders of concrete facts ; the 
simultaneous advance in gereralization and specialization ; 
the continually increasing subdivision and reunion of the 
sciences ; and their constantly improving consensus. 

To trace out scientific evolution from its deepest roois 
wculd, of course, involve a complete analysis of the mind. 
For as science is a development of that common knowledge 
acquired by the unaided senses and uncultured reason, so 
is that common knowledge itself gradually built up out of 
the simplest perceptions. We must, therefore, begin 
somewhere abruptly ; and the most appropriate stage 
to take for our point of departure will be the adult mind 
of the savage. 

Commencing thus, without a proper preliminary analy- 
sis, we are naturally somewhat at a loss how to present, in 
a satisfactory manner, those fundamental processes of 
thought out of which science ultimately originates. Per- 



188 THE GENESIS OF BCTfiJTCE. 

haps our argument may be best initiated by the proposi 
tion, that all intelligent action whatever depends upon the 
discerning of distinctions among surrounding things. The 
condition under which only it is possible for any creature 
to obtain food and avoid danger is, that it shall be differ- 
ently affected by different objects — that it shall be led to 
act in one way by one object, and in another way by 
another. In the lower orders of creatures this condition is 
fulfilled by means of an apparatus which acts automatically. 
In the higher orders the actions are partly automatic, 
partly conscious. And in man they are almost wholly 
conscious. 

Throughout, however, there must necessarily exist a 
certain classification of things according to their properties 
— a classification which is either organically registered in 
the system, as in the inferior creation, or is formed by 
experience, as in ourselves. And it may be further re- 
marked, that the extent to which this classification is 
carried, roughly indicates the height of intelligence — that, 
while the lowest organisms are able to do little more than 
discriminate organic from inorganic matter ; while the 
generality of animals carry their classifications no further 
than to a limited number of plants or creatures serving 
for food, a limited number of beasts of prey, and a limited 
number of places and materials ; the most degraded of the 
human race possess a knowledge of the distinctive natures 
of a great variety of substances, plants, animals, tools, per- 
sons, etc., not only as classes but as individuals. 

What now is the mental process by which classification 
is effected ? Manifestly it is a recognition of the likeness 
or vnlikeness of things, either in respect of their sizes, 
colours, forms, weights, textures, tastes, etc., or in respect 
of their modes of action. By some special mark, sound, or 
motion, the savage identities a certain four-legged crea- 
ture he sees, as one that is good for food, and to be caught 



BASIS OF CLASSIFICATION. 189 

in a particular way ; or as one that is dangerous ; and acts 
accordingly. He has classed together all the creatures 
that are alike in this particular. And manifestly in choos- 
ing the wood out of which to form his bow, the plant with 
which to poison his arrows, the bone from which to make 
his fish-hooks, he identifies them through their chief sensi- 
ble properties as belonging to the general classes, wood, 
plant, and bone, but distinguishes them as belonging to 
sub-classes by virtue of certain properties in which they are 
unlike the rest of the general classes they belong to; and so 
forms genera and species. 

And here it becomes manifest that not only is classifica- 
tion carried on by grouping together in the mind things 
that are like ; but that classes and sub-classes are formed 
and arranged according to the degrees ofunlikeness. Things 
widely contrasted are alone distinguished in the lower 
stages of mental evolution ; as may be any day observed in 
an infant. And gradually as the powers of discrimination 
increase, the widely contrasted classes at first distinguished, 
come to be each divided into sub-classes, differing from 
each other less than the classes differ ; and these sub-classes 
are again divided after the same manner. By the continu- 
ance of which process, things are gradually arranged into 
groups, the members of which are less and less unlike / 
ending, finally, in groups whose members differ only as 
individuals, and not specifically. And thus there tends 
ultimately to arise the notion of complete likeness. For 
manifestly, it is impossible that groups should continue to 
be sub-divided in virtue of smaller and smaller differences, 
without there being a simultaneous approximation to the 
notion of no difference. 

Let us next notice that the recognition of likeness and 
unlikeness, which underlies classification, and out of which 
continued classification evolves the idea of complete like- 
ness — let us next notice that it also underlies the process 



190 THE GENESIS OF SCIENCE. 

of naming, and by consequence language. For all lan- 
guage consists, at the beginning, of symbols which are as 
like to the things symbolized as it is practicable to make 
them. The language of signs is a means of conveying ideas 
by mimicking the actions or peculiarities of the things re- 
ferred to. Verbal language is also, at the beginning, a 
mode of suggesting objects or acts by imitating the sounds 
which the objects make, or with which the acts are accom« 
panied. Originally these two languages were used simul- 
taneously. It needs but to watch the gesticulations with 
which the savage accompanies his speech — to see a Bush- 
man or a Kaffir dramatizing before an audience his mode 
of catching game — or to note the extreme paucity of 
words in all primitive vocabularies ; to infer that at first, 
attitudes, gestures, and sounds, were all combined to pro- 
duce as good a likeness as possible, of the things, animals, 
persons, or events described ; and that as the sounds came 
to be understood by themselves the gestures fell into dis- 
use : leaving traces, however, in the manners of the more 
excitable civilized races. But be this as it may, it suffices 
simply to observe, how many of the words current among 
barbarous peoples are like the sounds appertaining to the 
things signified ; how many of our own oldest and simplest 
words have the same peculiarity ; how children tend to in- 
vent imitative words ; and how the sign-language sponta- 
neously formed by deaf mutes is invariably based upon 
imitative actions — to at once see that the notion of HI 
is that from which the nomenclature of objects takes its 
rise. 

Were there space we might go on to point out how this 
law of life is traceable, not only in the origin but in the de- 
velopment of language ; how in primitive tongues the plu- 
ral is made by a duplication of the singular, which is a 
multiplication of the word to make it like the multiplicity 
of the things ; how the use of metaphor — that proline 



GENESIS OF LANGUAGE AND REASONING, 191 

source of new words — is a suggesting of ideas that are likt 
the ideas to be conveyed in some respect or other ; and 
how, in the copious use of simile, fable, and allegory among 
uncivilized races, we see that complex conceptions, which 
there is yet no direct language for, are rendered, by pre- 
senting known conceptions more or less like them. 

This view is further confirmed, and the predominance 
of this notion of likeness in primitive times further illus- 
trated, by the fact that our system of presenting ideas to 
the eye originated after the same fashion. Writing and 
printing have descended from picture-language. The ear- 
liest mode of permanently registering a fact was by depict- 
ing it on a wall ; that is — by exhibiting something as like to 
the thing to be remembered as it could be made. Grad- 
ually as the practice grew habitual and extensive, the most 
frequently repeated forms became fixed, and presently ab- 
breviated ; and, passing through the hieroglyphic and ideo- 
graphic phases, the symbols lost all apparent relations to 
the things signified : just as the majority of our spoken 
words have done. 

Observe again, that the same thing is true respecting 
the genesis of reasoning. The likeness that is perceived to 
exist between cases, is the essence of all early reasoning 
and of much of our present reasoning. The savage, hav- 
ing by experience discovered a relation between a certain 
object and a certain act, infers that the like relation will be 
found in future cases. And the expressions we constantly 
use in our arguments — " analogy implies," " the cases are 
not parallel," " by parity of reasoning," " there is no simi- 
larity," — show how constantly the idea of likeness under- 
lies our ratiocinative processes. 

Still more clearly will this be seen on recognising the 
fact that there is a certain parallelism between reasoning 
and classification ; that the two have a common root ; and 
that neither can go on without the other. For on the one 



192 THE GENESIS OF SCIENCE. 

hand, it is a familiar truth that the attributing to a body in 
consequence of some of its properties, all those other prop- 
erties in virtue of which it is referred to a particular class, 
is an act of inference. And, on the other hand, the form- 
ing of a generalization is the putting together in one class, 
all those cases which present like relations ; while the draw- 
ing a deduction is essentially the perception that a particu- 
lar case belongs to a certain class of cases previously gener- 
alized. So that as classification is a grouping together of 
like things ; reasoning is a grouping together of like rela- 
tions among things. Add to which, that while the perfec- 
tion gradually achieved in classification consists in the form- 
ation of groups of objects which are completely alike ; the 
perfection gradually achieved in reasoning consists in the 
formation of groups of cases which are completely alike. 

Once more we may contemplate this dominant idea of 
likeness as exhibited in art. All art, civilized as well as 
savage, consists almost wholly in the making of objects like 
other objects ; either as found in Nature, or as produced 
by previous art. If we trace back the varied art-products 
now existing, we find that at each stage the divergence 
from previous patterns is but small when compared with 
the agreement ; and in the earliest art the persistency of 
imitation is yet more conspicuous. The old forms and 
ornaments and symbols were held sacred, and perpetually 
copied. Indeed, the strong imitative tendency notoriously 
displayed by the lowest human races, ensures among them 
a constant reproducing of likenesses of things, forms, signs, 
sounds, actions, and whatever else is imitable ; and we may 
even suspect that this aboriginal peculiarity is in some way 
connected with the culture and development of this gen- 
eral conception, which we have found so deep and wide- 
spread in its applications. 

And now let us go on to consider how, by a further 
unfolding of this same fundamental notion, there is a grad- 



ORIGIN OF IDEAS OF EQUALITY. 193 

nal formation of the first germs of science. This idea oi 
likeness which underlies classification, nomenclature, lan- 
guage spoken and written, reasoning, and art ; and which 
plays so important a part because all acts of intelligence 
are made possible only by distinguishing among surround- 
ing things, or grouping them into like and unlike ; — this 
ilea we shall find to be the one of which science is the es- 
pecial product. Already during the stage we have been 
describing, there has existed qualitative prevision in re- 
spect to the commoner phenomena with which savage life 
is familiar ; and we have now to inquire how the elements 
of quantitative prevision are evolved. We shall find that 
they originate by the perfecting of this same idea of like- 
ness ; that they have their rise in that conception of com- 
plete likeness which, as we have seen, necessarily results 
from the continued process of classification. 

For when the process of classification has been carried 
as far as it is possible for the uncivilized to carry it — when 
the animal kingdom has been grouped not merely into 
quadrupeds, birds, fishes, and insects, but each of these di- 
vided into kinds — when there come to be sub-classes, in 
each of which the members differ only as individuals, and 
not specifically ; it is clear that there must occur a frequent 
observation of objects which differ so little as to be indis- 
tinguishable. Among several creatures which the savage 
has killed and carried home, it must often happen that 
some one, which he wished to identify, is so exactly like 
another that he cannot tell which is which. Thus, then, 
there originates the notion of equality. The things which 
among ourselves are called equal — whether lines, angles, 
weights, temperatures, sounds or colours — are things which 
produce in us sensations that cannot be distinguished from 
each other. It is true that we now apply the word equal 
chiefly to the separate phenomena which objects exhibit, 
and not to groups of phenomena ; but this limitation of the 
9 



1-9-A THE GENESIS OF SCIENCE. 

idea has evidently arisen by subsequent analysis. And that 
the notion of equality did thus originate, will, we think, 
become obvious on remembering that as there were no ar- 
tificial objects from which it could have been abstracted, it 
must have been abstracted from natural objects ; and that 
the various families of the animal kingdom chiefly furnish 
those natural objects which display the requisite exactitude 
of likeness. 

The same order of experiences out of which this gene- 
ral idea of equality is evolved, gives birth at the same time 
to a more complex idea of equality ; or, rather, the process 
just described generates an idea of equality which further 
experience separates into two ideas — equality of things and 
equality of relations. "While organic, and more especially 
animal forms, occasionally exhibit this perfection of likeness 
out of which the notion of simple equality arises, they more 
frequently exhibit only that kind of likeness which we call 
similarity ; and which is really compound equality. For 
the similarity of two creatures of the same species but of 
different sizes, is of the same nature as the similarity of two 
geometrical figures. In either case, any two parts of the 
one bear the same ratio to one another, as the homologous 
parts of the other. Given in any species, the proportions 
found to exist among the bones, and we may, and zoologists 
do, predict from any one, the dimensions of the rest ; just as, 
when knowing the proportions subsisting among the parts 
of a geometrical figure, we may, from the length of one, 
calculate the others. And if, in the case of similar geome- 
trical figures, the similarity can be established only by 
proving exactness of proportion among the homologous 
parts; if we express this relation between two parts in the 
one, and the corresponding parts in the other, by the for- 
mula A is to B as a is to b ; if we otherwise write this, A 
to B=a to b ; if, consequently, the fact we prove is that 
the relation of A to B equals the relation of a to b ; then 



EQUALITY OF THINGS AND DELATIONS. 195 

it is manifest that the fundamental conception of similarity 
is equality of relations. 

With this explanation we shall be understood when we 
say that the notion of equality of relations is the basis of 
all exact reasoning. Already it has been shown that reasoning 
in general is a recognition of likeness of relations ; and 
here we further find that while the notion of likeness of 
things ultimately evolves the idea of simple equality, the 
notion of likeness of relations evolves the idea of equality 
of relations : of which the one is the concrete germ of ex- 
act science, while the other is its abstract germ. 

Those who cannot understand how the recognition of 
similarity in creatures of the same kind, can have any alli- 
ance with reasoning, will get over the difficulty on remem- 
bering that the phenomena among which equality of rela- 
tions is thus perceived, are phenomena of the same order 
and are present to the senses at the same time ; while those 
among which developed reason perceives relations, are gen- 
erally neither of the same order, nor simultaneously present. 
And if further, they will call to mind how Cuvier and Owen, 
from a single part of a creature, as a tooth, construct the 
rest by a process of reasoning based on this equality of re- 
lations, they will see that the two things are intimately 
connected, remote as they at first seem. But we anticipate. 
What it concerns us here to observe is, that from familiari- 
ty with organic forms there simultaneously arose the ideas 
of simple equality, and equality of relations. 

At the same time, too, and out of the same mental pro- 
cesses, came the first distinct ideas of number. In the earli- 
est stages, the presentation of several like objects produced 
merely an indefinite conception of multiplicity ; as it still 
does among Australians, and Bushmen, and Damaras, when 
the number presented exceeds three or four. With such a 
fact before us we may safely infer that the first clear numer- 
ical conception was that of duality as contrasted with uni- 



196 THE GENESIS OF SCIEXCE. 

ty. And this notion of duality must necessarily have grown 
up side by side with those of likeness and equality ; seeing 
that it is impossible to recognise the likeness of two things 
without also perceiving that there are two. From the 
very beginning the conception of number must have been, 
as it is still, associated w T ith the likeness or equality of 
the things numbered. If we analyze it, we find that sim- 
ple enumeration is a registration of repeated impres- 
sions of any kind. That these may be capable of enu- 
meration it is needful that they be more or less alike ; and 
before any absolutely true numerical results can be reach- 
ed, it is requisite that the units be absolutely equal. The 
only way in which we can establish a numerical relation- 
ship between things that do not yield us like impressions, 
is to divide them into parts that do yield us like impres- 
sions. Two unlike magnitudes of extension, force, time, 
weight, or what not, can have their relative amounts esti- 
mated, only by means of some small unit that is contained 
many times in both ; and even if we finally write down the 
greater one as a unit and the other as a fraction of it, we 
state, in the denominator of the fraction, the number of 
parts into which the unit must be divided to be compara- 
ble with the fraction. 

It is, indeed, true, that by an evidently modern process of 
abstraction, we occasionally apply numbers to unequal units, 
as the furniture at a sale or the various animals on a farm, 
simply as so many separate entities ; but no true result can 
be brought out by calculation with units of this order. 
And, indeed, it is the distinctive peculiarity of the calculus 
in general, that it proceeds on the hypothesis of that abso- 
lute equality of its abstract units, which no real units pos- 
sess ; and that the exactness of its results holds only in 
virtue of this hypothesis. The first ideas of number must 
necessarily then have been derived from like or equal mag- 
nitudes as seen chiefly in organic objects; and as the like 



EARLY NUMERICAL IDEAS. 197 

magnitudes most frequently observed were magnitudes of 
extension, it follows that geometry and arithmetic had a 
simultaneous origin. 

"Not only are the first distinct ideas of number co-ordin 
ate with ideas of likeness and equality, but the first efforts 
at numeration displayed the same relationship. On read- 
ing the accounts of various savage tribes, we find that the 
method of counting by the fingers, still followed by many 
children, is the aboriginal method. Neglecting the several 
cases in which the ability to enumerate does not reach even 
to the number of fingers on one hand, there are many cases 
in which it does not extend beyond ten — the limit of the 
simple finger notation. The fact that in so many instances, 
remote, and seemingly unrelated nations, have adopted ten 
as their basic number ; together with the fact that in the re- 
maining instances the basic number is either^e (the fingers 
of one hand) or twenty (the fingers and toes) ; almost of 
themselves show that the fingers were the original units of 
numeration. The still surviving use of the word digits as 
the general name for a figure in arithmetic, is significant ; 
and it is even said that our word ten (Sax. tyn ; Dutch, 
tien ; German, zehn) means in its primitive expanded form 
two hands. So that originally, to say there were ten things, 
was to say there were two hands of them. 

From all which evidence it is tolerably clear that the 
earliest mode of conveying the idea of any number of 
things, was by holding up as many fingers as there were 
things ; that is— using a symbol which was equal, in respect 
of multiplicity, to the group symbolized. For which infer- 
ence there is, indeed, strong confirmation in the recent 
statement that our own soldiers are even now spontaneous- 
ly adopting this device in their dealings with the Turks. 
And here it should be remarked that in this recombination 
of the notion of equality with that of multiplicity, by which 
the first steps in numeration are effected, we may see one 



198 THE GENESIS OF SCIENCE. 

of the earliest of those inosculations between the diverging 
branches of science, which are afterwards of perpetual occur 
rence. 

Indeed, as this observation suggests, it will be well, be- 
fore tracing the mode in which exact science finally emerges 
from the merely approximate judgments of the senses, and 
showing the non-serial evolution of its divisions, to note 
the non-serial character of those preliminary processes of 
which all after development is a continuation. On re-con- 
sidering them it will be seen that not only are they diver- 
gent growths from a common root, — not only arc they sim- 
ultaneous in their progress; but that they are mutual aids ; 
and that none can advance without the rest. That com- 
pleteness of classification for which the unfolding of the 
perceptions paves the way, is impossible without a corre- 
sponding progress in language, by which greater varieties 
of objects are thinkable and expressible. On the one hand 
it is impossible to carry classification far without names by 
which to designate the classes ; and on the other hand it 
is impossible to make language faster than things are classi- 
fied. 

Again, the multiplication of classes and the consequent 
narrowing of each class, itself involves a greater likeness 
among the things classed together ; and the consequent ap- 
proach towards the notion of complete likeness itself allows 
classification to be carried higher. Moreover, classification 
necessarily advances pari passu with rationality — the clas- 
sification of things with the classification of relations. For 
things that belong to the same class are, by implication, 
things of which the properties and modes of behaviour — 
the co-existences and sequences — are more or less the same ; 
and the recognition of this sameness of co-existences and 
sequences is reasoning. Whence it follows that the advance 
of classification is necessarily proportionate to the advance 
of generalizations. Yet further, the notion of likeness, both 



QUANTITATIVE EVOLUTION OF KNOWLEDGE. 199 

in things and relations, simultaneously evolves by one pro- 
cess of culture the ideas of equality of things and equality 
of relations ; which are the respective bases of exact con- 
crete reasoning and exact abstract reasoning — Mathematics 
and Logic. And once more, this idea of equality, in the 
very process of being formed, necessarily gives origin to 
two series of relations — those of magnitude and those of 
number: from which arise geometry and the calculus. Thus 
the process throughout is one of perpetual subdivision and 
perpetual intercommunication of the divisions. From the 
very first there has been that consensus of different kinds of 
knowledge, answering to the consensus of the intellectual 
faculties, which, as already said, must exist among the sci- 
ences. 

Let us now go on to observe how, out of the notions of 
equality and number, as arrived at in the manner described, 
there gradually arose the elements of quantitative prevision. 

Equality, once having come to be definitely conceived, 
was readily applicable to other phenomena than those of 
magnitude. Being predicable of all things producing indis- 
tinguishable impressions, there naturally grew up ideas of 
equality in weights, sounds, colours, &c. ; and indeed it can 
scarcely be doubted that the occasional experience of equal 
weights, sounds, and colours, had a share in developing the 
abstract conception of equality — that the ideas of equality 
in size, relations, forces, resistances, and sensible proper- 
ties in general, were evolved during the same period. 
But however this may be, it is clear that as fast as the no- 
tion of equality gained definiteness, so fast did that lowest 
kind of quantitative prevision which is achieved without 
any instrumental aid, become possible. 

The ability to estimate, however roughly, the amount 
of a foreseen result, implies the conception that it will be 
equal to a certain imagined quantity ; and the correctness 
of the estimate will manifestly depend upon the accuracy at 



200 THE GENESIS OF SCIENCE. 

which the perceptions of sensible equality have arrived. A 
savage with a piece of stone in his hand, and another piece 
lying before him of greater bulk but of the same kind (a 
fact which he infers from the equality of the two in colour 
and texture) knows about what effort he must put forth to 
raise this other piece; and he judges accurately in propor- 
tion to the accuracy with which he perceives that the one 
is twice, three times, four times, &c. as large as the other ; 
that is — in proportion to the precision of his ideas of equali- 
ty and number. And here let us not omit to notice that 
even in these vaguest of quantitative previsions, the concep- 
tion of equality of relations is also involved. For it is only 
in virtue of an undefined perception that the relation be- 
tween bulk and weight hi the one stone is equal to the re- 
lation between bulk and weight in the other, that even the 
roughest approximation can be made. 

But how came the transition from those uncertain per- 
ceptions of equality which the unaided senses give, to the 
certain ones with which science deals ? It came by placing 
the things compared in juxtaposition. Equality being pre- 
dicated of things which give us indistinguishable impres- 
sions, and no accurate comparison of impressions being 
possible unless they occur in immediate succession, it re- 
sults that exactness of equality is ascertainable in propor- 
tion to the closeness of the compared things. Hence the 
fact that when we wish to judge of two shades of coloui 
whether they are alike or not, we place them side by side ; 
hence the fact that we cannot, with any precision, say which 
of two allied sounds is the louder, or the higher in pitch, 
unless we hear the one immediately after the other ; hence 
the fact that to estimate the ratio of weights, we take one 
in each hand, that we may compare their pressures by rap- 
idly alternating in thought from the one to the other ; hence 
the fact, that in a piece of music, we can continue to make 
equal beats when the first beat has been given, but cannot 



ORIGIN OF THE IDEA OF MEASURE. 201 

ensure commencing with the same length of beat on a fu 
ture occasion ; and hence, lastly, the fact, that of all magni- 
tudes, those of linear extension are those of which the 
equality is most accurately ascertainable, and those to 
which by consequence all others have to be reduced. For 
it is the peculiarity of linear extension that it alone allows 
its magnitudes to be placed in absolute juxtaposition, or, 
rather, in coincident position ; it alone can test the equality 
of two magnitudes by observing whether they will coalesce, 
as two equal mathematical lines do, when placed between 
the same points ; it alone can test equality by trying wheth- 
er it will become identity. Hence, then, the fact, that all 
exact science is reducible, by an ultimate analysis, to results 
measured in equal units of linear extension. 

Still it remains to be noticed in what manner this deter- 
mination of equality by comparison of linear magnitudes 
originated. Once more may we perceive that surrounding 
natural objects supplied the needful lessons. From the be- 
ginning there must have been a constant experience of like 
things placed side by side — men standing and walking to- 
gether ; animals from the same herd ; fish from the same 
shoal. And the ceaseless repetition of these experiences 
could not fail to suggest the observation, that the nearer 
together any objects were, the more visible became any in- 
equality between them. Hence the obvious device of put- 
ting in apposition, things of which it was desired to ascer- 
tain the relative magnitudes. Hence the idea of measure. 
And here we suddenly come upon a group of facts which 
afford a solid basis to the remainder of our argument; while 
they also furnish strong evidence in support of the forego- 
ing speculations. Those who look sceptically on this at- 
tempted rehabilitation of the earliest epochs of mental de- 
velopment, and who more especially think that the derivation 
of so many primary notions from organic forms is somewhat 
strai ed, will perhaps see more probability in the several 



202 THE GENESIS OF SCIENCE. 

hypotheses that have been ventured, on discovering that all 
measures of extension and force originated from the lengths 
and weights of organic bodies ; and all measures of time 
from the periodic phenomena of either organic or inorganic 
bodies. 

Thus, among linear measures, the cubit of the Hebrews 
was the length of the forearm from the elbow to the end 
of the middle finger ; and the smaller scriptural dimensions 
are expressed in hand-breadths and spans. The Egyptian 
cubit, which was similarly derived, was divided into digits, 
which were finger-breadths ; and each finger-breadth was 
more definitely expressed as being equal to four grains of 
barley placed breadthwise. Other ancient measures were 
the orgyia or stretch of the arms, the pace, and the palm. 
So persistent has been the use of these natural units of 
length in the East, that even now some of the Arabs mete 
out cloth by the forearm. So, too, is it with European 
measures. The foot prevails as a dimension throughout 
Europe, and has done since the time of the Romans, by 
whom, also, it was used : its lengths in different places va- 
rying not much more than men's feet vary. The heights 
of horses are still expressed in hands. The inch is the 
length of the terminal joint of the thumb; as is clearly 
shown in France, where pouce means both thumb and inch. 
Then we have the inch divided into three barley-corns. 

So completely, indeed, have these organic dimensions 
served as the substrata of all mensuration, that it is only 
by means of them that we can form any estimate of some 
of the ancient distances. For example, the length of a 
degree on the Earth's surface, as determined by the Ara- 
bian astronomers shortly after the death of Haroun-al-Rns- 
chid, was fifty-six of their miles. We know nothing of 
their mile further than that it was 4000 cubits ; and whether 
these were sacred cubits or common cubits, would remain 
doubtful, but that the length of the cubit is given as twen* 



DEVELOPMENT OF THE IDEA OF MEASURE. 203 

ty*seven inches, and each inch defined as the thickness of 
six barley- grains. Thus one of the earliest measurements 
of a degree comes down to us in barley-grains. Not only 
did organic lengths furnish those approximate measures 
which satisfied men's needs in ruder ages, but they fur- 
nished also the standard measures required in later 
times. One instance occurs in our own history. To 
remedy the irregularities then prevailing, Henry I. com- 
manded that the ulna, or ancient ell, which answers to 
the modern yard, should be made of the exact length of 
his own arm. 

Measures of weight again had a like derivation. Seeds 
seem commonly to have supplied the unit. The original 
of the carat used for weighing in India is a small bean. 
Our own systems, both troy and avoirdupois, are derived 
primarily from wheat- corns? Our smallest weight, the 
grain, is a grain of wheat. This is not a speculation ; it is 
an historically registered fact. Henry III. enacted that an 
ounce should be the weight of 640 dry grains of wheat 
from the middle of the ear. And as all the other weights 
are multiples or sub-multiples of this, it follows that the 
grain of wheat is the basis of our scale. So natural is it to 
use organic bodies as weights, before artificial weights 
have been established, or where they are not to be had, 
that in some of the remoter parts of Ireland the people 
are said to be in the habit, even now, of putting a man 
into the scales to serve as a measure for heavy com* 
modities. 

Similarly with time. Astronomical periodicity, and the 
periodicity of animal and vegetable life, are simultaneously 
used in the first stages of progress for estimating epochs. 
The simplest unit of time, the day, nature supplies ready 
made. The next simplest period, the mooneth or month, 
is also thrust upon men's notice by the conspicuous changes 
a lunation. For larger divisions than these, 



204 TIIE GENESIS OF SCIENCE. 

the phenomena of the seasons, and the chief events from 
time to time occurring, have been used by early and un- 
civilized races. Among the Egyptians the rising of the 
Nile served as a mark. The New Zealanders were found 
to begin their year from the reappearance of the Pleiades 
above the sea. One of the uses ascribed to birds, by the 
Greeks, was to indicate the seasons by their migrations. 
Barrow describes the aboriginal Hottentot as denoting 
periods by the number of moons before or after the ripen- 
ing of one of his chief articles of food. He further states 
that the Kaffir chronology is kept by the moon, and is 
registered by notches on sticks — the death of a favourite 
chief, or the gaining of a victory, serving for a new era. 
By which last fact, we are at once reminded that in early 
history, events are commonly recorded as occurring in cer- 
tain reigns, and in certain years of certain reigns: a proceed- 
ing which practically made a king's reign a measure of 
duration. 

And, as further illustrating the tendency to divide time 
by natural phenomena and natural eveuts, it may be no- 
ticed that even by our own peasantry the definite divisions 
of months and years are but little used ; and that they 
habitually refer to occurrences as " before sheep-shearing," 
or "after harvest," or " about the time when the squire 
died." It is manifest, therefore, that the more or loss 
equal periods perceived in Nature gave the first units of 
measure for time; as did Nature's more or less equal 
lengths and weights give the first units of measure for space 
and force. 

It remains only to observe, as further illustrating the 
evolution of quantitative ideas after this manner, that 
measures of value were similarly derived. Barter, in one 
form or other, is found among all but the very lowest hu- 
man races. It is obviously based upon the notion of 
equality of icorth. And as it gradually* merges into trade 



PRIMITIVE MEASUREMENTS OF TIME. 205 

by the introduction of some kind of currency, we find 
that the measures of worth, constituting this currency, 
are organic bodies ; in some cases cowries, in others 
cocoa-nuts, in others cattle, in others pigs; among the 
American Indians peltry or skins, and in Iceland dried 
fish. 

Notions of exact equality and of measure having been 
reached, there came to be definite ideas of relative magni- 
tudes as being multiples one of another ; whence the prac* 
tice of measurement by direct apposition of a measure. 
The determination of linear extensions by this process can 
scarcely be called science, though it is a step towards it ; 
but the determination of lengths of time by an analogous 
process may be considered as one of the earliest samples of 
quantitative prevision. For when it is first ascertained 
that the moon completes the cycle of her changes in about 
thirty days — a fact known to most uncivilized tribes that 
can count beyond the number of their fingers — it is mani- 
fest that it becomes possible to say in what number of days 
any specified phase of the moon will recur ; and it is also 
manifest that this prevision is effected by an opposition of 
two times, after the same manner that linear space is meas- 
ured by the opposition of two lines. For to express the 
moon's period in days, is to say how many of these units 
of measure are contained in the period to be measured — is 
to ascertain the distance between two points in time by 
means of a scale of days, just as we ascertain the distance 
between two points in space by a scale of feet or inches : 
and in each case the scale coincides with the thing meas- 
ured — mentally in the one ; visibly in the other. So that 
in this simplest, and perhaps earliest case of quantitative 
prevision, the phenomena are not only thrust daily upon 
men's notice, but Nature is, as it were, perpetually repeat- 
ing that process of measurement by observing which 
the prevision is effected. And thus there may be signi- 



206 TTTE GENESIS OF SCIENCE. 

Seance in the remark which some have made, that alike 
in Hebrew, Greek, and Latin, there is an affinity be- 
tween the word meaning moon, and that meaning measure. 

This fact, that in very early stages of social progress it 
is known that the moon goes through her changes in about 
thirty days, and that in about twelve moons the seasons 
return — this fact that chronological astronomy assumes a 
certain scientific character even before geometry does ; 
while it is partly due to the circumstance that the astro- 
nomical divisions, day, month, and year, are ready made 
for us, is partly due to the further circumstances that 
agricultural and other operations were at first regulated 
astronomically, and that from the supposed divine nature 
of the heavenly bodies their motions determined the 
periodical religious festivals. As instances of the one we 
have the observation of the Egyptians, that the rising of 
the Nile corresponded with the heliacal rising of Sirius ; 
the directions given by Hesiod for reaping and ploughing, 
according to the positions of the Pleiades ; and his maxim 
that " fifty days after the turning of the sun is a seasonable 
time for beginning a voyage." As instances of the other, 
we have the naming of the days after the sun, moon, and 
planets ; the early attempts among Eastern nations to 
regulate the calendar so that the gods might not be offend- 
ed by the displacement of their sacrifices ; and the fix- 
ing of the great annual festival of the Peruvians by the 
position of the sun. In all which facts we see that, 
at first, science was simply an appliance of religion and 
industry. 

After the discoveries that a lunation occupies nearly 
thirty days, and that some twelve lunations occupy a year 
— discoveries of which there is no historical account, but 
which may be inferred as the earliest, from the fact that 
existing uncivilized races have made them — we come to 
the first known astronomical records, which are those of 



EARLY ASTEONOMICA-. PREVISIONS. 207 

eclipses. The Chaldeans were able to predict these. 
" This they did, probably," says Dr. Whewell in his useful 
history, from which most of the materials we are about to 
use will be drawn, " by means of their cycle of 223 months, 
or about eighteen years ; for at the end of this time, the 
eclipses of the moon begin to return, at the same intervals 
and in the same order as at the beginning." "Now this meth* 
od of calculating eclipses by means of a recurring cycle,— 
the JSaros as they called it — is a more complex case of pre- 
vision by means of coincidence of measures. For by what 
observations must the Chaldeans have discovered this 
cycle ? Obviously, as Delambre infers, by inspecting their 
registers ; by comparing the successive intervals ; by find- 
ing that some of the intervals were alike ; by seeing that 
these equal intervals were eighteen years apart ; by discov- 
ering that all the intervals that were eighteen years apart 
were equal ; by ascertaining that the intervals formed a 
series which repeated itself, so that if one of the cycles of 
intervals were superposed on another the divisions would 
fit. This once perceived, and it manifestly became possi- 
ble to use the cycle as a scale of time by which to measure 
out future periods. Seeing thus that the process of so pre- 
dicting eclipses, is in essence the same as that of predicting 
the moon's monthly changes by observing the number of 
days after which they repeat — seeing that the two differ 
only in the extent and irregularity of the intervals, it is not 
difficult to understand how such an amount of knowledge 
should so early have been reached. And we shall be less 
surprised, on remembering that the only things involved 
in these previsions were time and number y and that the 
time was in a manner self-numbered. 

Still, the ability to predict events recurring only after 
so long a period as eighteen years, implies a considerable 
advance in civilization — a considerable development of gen- 
eral knowledge ; and we have now to inquire what progress 



208 



THE G-EXESIS OF SCIENCE. 



in other sciences accompanied, and was necessary to. these 
astronomical previsions. In the first place, there must 
clearly have been a tolerably efficient system of calculation. 
Mere finger-counting, mere head-reckoning, even with the 
aid of a regular decimal notation, could not have sufficed 
for numbering the days in a year ; much less the years, 
months, and days between eclipses. Consequently there 
must have been a mode of registering numbers ; probably 
even a system of numerals. The earliest numerical rec- 
ords, if we may judge by the practices of the less civilized 
races now existing, were probably kept by notches cut on 
sticks, or strokes marked on walls ; much as public-house 
scores are kept now. And there seems reason to believe 
that the first numerals used were simply groups of straight 
strokes, as some of the still-extant Roman ones are ; lead- 
ing us to suspect that these groups of strokes were used to 
represent groups of fingers, as the groups of fingers had 
been used to represent groups of objects — a supposition 
quite in conformity with the aboriginal system of picture 
writing and its subsequent modifications. Be this so or 
not, however, it is manifest that before the Chaldeans dis- 
covered their jSaros, there must have been both a set of 
written symbols serving for an extensive numeration, and 
a familiarity with the simpler rules of arithmetic. 

Not only must abstract mathematics have made some 
progress, but concrete mathematics also. It is scarcely 
possible that the buildings belonging to this era should 
have been laid out and erected without any knowledge of 
geometry. At any rate, there must have existed that ele- 
mentary geometry which deals with direct measurement — 
with the apposition of lines ; and it seems that only after 
the discovery of those simple proceedings, by which right 
angles are drawn, and relative positions fixed, could so reg- 
ular an architecture be executed. In the case o^ the other 
division of concrete mathematics — mechanics, we have del* 



KNOWLEDGE IMPLIED BY EARLY ASTRONOMY. 209 

nite evidence of progress. We know that the lever and 
the inclined plane were employed during this period : im- 
plying that there was a qualitative prevision of their effects, 
though not a quantitative one. But we know more. We 
read of weights in the earliest records ; and we find weights 
in ruins of the highest antiquity. Weights imply scales, 
of which we have also mention ; and scales involve the 
primary theorem of mechanics in its least complicated form 
— involve not a qualitative but a quantitative prevision of 
mechanical effects. And here we may notice how mechan- 
ics, in common with the other exact sciences, took its rise 
from the simplest application of the idea of equality. For 
the mechanical proposition which the scales involve, is, that 
if a lever with equal arms, have equal weights suspended 
from them, the weights will remain at equal altitudes. 
And we may further notice, how, in this first step of ra- 
tional mechanics, we see illustrated that truth awhile since 
referred to, that as magnitudes of linear extension are the 
only ones of which the equality is exactly ascertainable, the 
equalities of other magnitudes have at the outset to be de- 
termined by means of them. For the equality of the 
weights which balance each other in scales, wholly depends 
upon the equality of the arms : we can know that the 
weights are equal only by proving that the arms are equal. 
And when by this means we have obtained a system of 
weights, — a set of equal units of force, then does a science 
of mechanics become possible. Whence, indeed, it follows, 
that rational mechanics could not possibly have any other 
starting-point than the scales. 

Let us further remember, that during this same period 
there was a limited knowledge of chemistry. The many 
arts which we know to have been carried on must have 
been impossible without a generalized experience of the 
modes in which certain bodies affect each other under spe- 
cial conditions. In metallurgy, which was extensively 



210 THE GEXE3I3 OF SCIENCE. 

practised, this is abundantly illustrated. And we even 
have evidence that in some cases the knowledge possessed 
was, in a sense, quantitative. For, as we find by analysis 
that the hard alloy of which the Egyptians made their cut- 
ting tools, was composed of copper and tin in fixed pro- 
portions, there must have been an established prevision that 
such an alloy was to be obtained only by mixing them in 
these proportions. It is true, this was but a simple empiri- 
cal generalization ; but so was the generalization respecting 
the recurrence of eclipses ; so are the first generalizations 
of every science. 

Respecting the simultaneous advance of the sciences 
during this early epoch, it only remains to remark that 
even the most complex of them must have made some 
progress — perhaps even a greater relative progress than 
any of the rest. For under what conditions only were the 
foregoing developments possible ? There first required an 
established and organized social system. A long continued 
registry of eclipses ; the building of palaces ; the use of 
scales ; the practice of metallurgy — alike imply a fixed and 
populous nation. The existence of such a nation not only 
presupposes laws, and some administration of justice, which 
we know existed, but it presupposes successful laws — laws 
conforming in some degree to the conditions of social sta- 
bility — laws enacted because it was seen that the actions 
forbidden by them were dangerous to the State. We do 
not by any means say that all, or even the greater part, of 
the laws were of this nature ; but we do say, that the fun- 
damental ones were. It cannot be denied that the laws 
affecting life and property were such. It cannot be denied 
that, however little these were enforced between class and 
class, they were to a considerable extent enforced between 
members of the same class. It can scarcely be questioned, 
that the administration of them between members of the 
same class was seen by rulers to be necessary for keeping 




IMPLICATIONS OF EAKLY ASTRONOMY. 211 

their subjects together. And knowing, as we do, that, 
other things equal, nations prosper in proportion to the 
justness of their arrangements, we may fairly infer that 
the very cause of the advance of these earliest nations out 
of aboriginal barbarism, was the greater recognition among 
them of the claims to life and property. 

But supposition aside, it is clear that the habitual recog- 
nition of these claims in their laws, implied some prevision 
of social phenomena. Even thus early there was a certain 
amount of social science. Nay, it may even be shown that 
there was a vague recognition of that fundamental princi- 
ple on which all the true social science is based — the equal 
rights of all to the free exercise of their faculties. That 
same idea of equality, which, as we have seen, underlies 
all other science, underlies also morals and sociology. The 
conception of justice, which is the primary one in morals ; 
and the administration of justice, which is the vital condi- 
tion of social existence ; are impossible, without the recog- 
nition of a certain likeness in men's claims, in virtue of their 
common humanity. Equity literally means equalness ; and 
if it be admitted that there were even the vaguest ideas of 
equity in these primitive eras, it must be admitted that 
there was some appreciation of the equalness of men's lib- 
erties to pursue the objects of life — some appreciation, 
therefore, of the essential principle of national equilibrium. 

Thus in this initial stage of the positive sciences, before 
geometry had yet done more than evolve a few empirical 
rules — before mechanics had passed beyond its first theo- 
rem — before astronomy had advanced from its merely chro- 
nological phase into the geometrical ; the most involved of 
the sciences had reached a certain degree of development 
— a development without which no progress in other sci- 
ences was possible. 

Only noting as we pass, how, thus early, we may see 
that the progress of exact science was not only towards an 



212 THE GENESIS 01 SCIENCE. 

increasing number of previsions, but towards previsions 
more accurately quantitative — how, in astronomy, the re- 
curring period of the moon's motions was by and by more 
correctly ascertained to be nineteen years, or two hundred 
and thirty-five lunations ; how Callipus further corrected 
this Metonic cycle, by leaving out a day at the end of every 
seventy-six years ; and how these successive advances im 
plied a longer continued registry of observations, and the 
co-ordination of a greater number of facts — let us go on tc 
inquire how geometrical astronomy took its rise. 

The first astronomical instrument was the gnomon 
This was not only early in use in the East, but it was found 
also among the Mexicans ; the sole astronomical observa- 
tions of the Peruvians were made by it ; and we read that 
1100 B.C., the Chinese found that, at a certain place, the 
length of the sun's shadow, at the summer solstice, was to 
the height of the gnomon, as one and a half to eight. 
Here again it is observable, not only that the instrument is 
found ready made, but that Nature is perpetually perform- 
ing the process of measurement. Any fixed, erect object 
— a column, a dead palm, a pole, the angle of a building — 
serves for a gnomon ; and it needs but to notice the chang- 
ing position of the shadow it daily throws, to make the 
first step in geometrical astronomy. How small this first 
step was, may be seen in the fact that the only things as- 
certained at the outset were the periods of the summer 
and winter solstices, which corresponded with the least and 
greatest lengths of the mid-day shadow ; and to fix which, 
it was needful merely to mark the point to which each 
day's shadow reached. 

And now let it not be overlooked that in the observing 
at what time during the next year this extreme limit of the 
shadow was again reached, and in the inference that the 
sun had then arrived at the same turning point in his an- 
nual course, we have one of the simplest instances of that 



PROGRESS OF GEOMETRICAL ASTRONOMY. 213 

combined use of equal magnitudes and equal relations, by 
which all exact science, all quantitative prevision, is reached, 
For the relation observed was between the length of the 
sun's shadow and his position in the heavens ; and the in- 
ference drawn was that when, next year, the extremity of 
his shadow came to the same point, he occupied the same 
place. That is, the ideas involved were, the equality of the 
shadows, and the equality of the relations between shadow 
and sun in successive years. As in the case of the scales, 
the equality of relations here recognized is of the simplest 
order. It is not as those habitually dealt with in the higher 
kinds of scientific reasoning, which answer to the general 
type — the relation between two and three equals the rela- 
tion between six and nine ; but it follows the type — the re- 
lation between two and three, equals the relation between 
two and three ; it is a case of not simply equal relations, 
but coinciding relations. And here, indeed, we may see 
beautifully illustrated how the idea of equal relations take3 
its rise after the same manner that that of equal magnitude 
does. As already shown, the idea of equal magnitudes 
arose from the observed coincidence of two lengths placed 
together ; and in this case we have not only two coincident 
lengths of shadows, but two coincident relations between 
sun and shadows. 

From the use of the gnomon there naturally grew up 
the conception of angular measurements ; and with the 
advance of geometrical conceptions there came the hemi- 
sphere of Berosus, the equinoctial armil, the solstitial armil, 
and the quadrant of Ptolemy — all of them employing shad- 
ows as indices of the sun's position, but in combination 
with angular divisions. It is obviously out of the question 
for us here to trace these details of progress. It must suf- 
fice to remark that in all of them we may see that notion 
of equality of relations of a more complex kind, which is 
best illustrated in the astrolabe, an instrument which eon* 



214 THE GENESIS OF SCIENCE. 

sisted " of circular rims, moveable one within the other, or 
about poles, and contained circles which were to be brought 
into the position of the ecliptic, and of a plane passing 
through the sun and the poles of the ecliptic" — an instru- 
ment, therefore, which represented, as by a model, the rel- 
ative positions of certain imaginary lines and planes in the 
heavens ; which was adjusted by putting these representa- 
tive lines and planes into parallelism and coincidence with 
the celestial ones ; and which depended for its use upon the 
perception that the relations between these representative 
lines and planes were equal to the relations between those 
represented. 

Were there space, we might go on to point out how the 
conception of the heavens as a revolving hollow sphere, 
the discovery of the globular form of the earth, the expla- 
nation of the moon's phases, and indeed all the successive 
steps taken, involved this same mental process. But we 
must content ourselves with referring to the theory of ec- 
centrics and epicycles, as a further marked illustration of 
it. As first suggested, and as proved by Ilipparchus to af- 
ford an explanation of the leading irregularities in the ce- 
lestial motions, this theory involved the perception that 
the progressions, retrogressions, and variations of velocity 
seen in the heavenly bodies, might be reconciled with their 
assumed uniform movement in circles, by supposing that 
the earth was not in the centre of their orbits ; or by sup- 
posing that they revolved in circles whose centres revolved 
round the earth ; or by both. The discovery that this 
would account for the appearances, was the discovery that 
in certain geometrical diagrams the relations were such, 
that the uniform motion of a point would, when looked at 
from a particular position, present analogous irregularities; 
and the calculations of Hipparchus involved the belief that the 
relations subsisting among these geometrical curves were 
equal to the relations subsisting among the celestial orbits. 



REACTIONS OF ABSTRACT AND CONCRETE SCIENCE. 215 

Leaving here these details of astronomical progress, and 
the philosophy, of it, let us observe how the relatively con- 
crete science of geometrical astronomy, having been thus 
far helped forward by the development of geometry in gen- 
eral, reacted upon geometry, caused it also to advance, and 
was again assisted by it. Hipparchus, before making hia 
solar and lunar tables, had to discover rules for calculating 
the relations between the sides and angles of triangles — 
trigonometry a subdivision of pure mathematics. Further, 
the reduction of the doctrine of the sphere to the quanti- 
tative form needed for astronomical purposes, required the 
formation of a spherical trigonometry, which was also 
achieved by Hipparchus. Thus both plane and spherical 
trigonometry, which are parts of the highly abstract and 
simple science of extension, remained undeveloped until 
the less abstract and more complex science of the celestial 
motions had need of them. The fact admitted by M. 
Comte, that -since Descartes the progress of the abstract 
division of mathematics has been determined by that of 
the concrete division, is paralleled by the still more signifi- 
cant fact that even thus early the progress of mathematics 
was determined by that of astronomy. 

And here, indeed, we may see exemplified the truth, 
which the subsequent history of science frequently illus- 
trates, that before any more abstract division makes a fur- 
ther advance, some more concrete division must suggest 
the necessity for that advance — must present the new order 
of questions to be solved. Before astronomy presented 
Hipparchus with the problem of solar tables, there was 
nothing to raise the question of the relations between lines 
and angles ; the subject-matter of trigonometry had not 
been conceived. And as there must be subject-matter be- 
fore there can be investigation, it follows that the progress 
of the concrete divisions is as necessary to that of the ab- 
stract, as the progress of the abstract to that of the concrete, 



216 THE GEXESIS OF SCIEXCE. 

Just incidentally noticing the circumstance that the 
epoch we are describing witnessed the evolution of algebra, 
a comparatively abstract division of mathematics, by the 
union of its less abstract divisions, geometry and arithme- 
tic — a fact proved by the earliest extant samples of alge- 
bra, which are half algebraic, half geometric — we go on to 
observe that during the era in which mathematics and 
astronomy were thus advancing, rational mechanics made 
its second step ; and something was done towards giving a 
quantitative form to hydrostatics, optics, and harmonics. 
In each case we shall see as before, how the idea of equal- 
ity underlies all quantitative prevision ; and an what simple 
forms this idea is first applied. 

As already shown, the first theorem established in me- 
chanics was, that equal weights suspended from a lever with 
equal arms would remain in equilibrium. Archimedes dis- 
covered that a lever with unequal arms was in equilibrium 
when one weight was to its arm as the other arm to its 
weight ; that is — when the numerical relation between one 
weight and its arm was equal to the numerical relation be- 
tween the other arm and its weight. 

The first advance made in hydrostatics, which we also 
owe to Archimedes, was the discovery that fluids press 
equally in all directions ; and from this followed the solu- 
tion of the problem of floating bodies: namely, that they 
are in equilibrium when the upward and downward pres- 
sures are equal. 

In optics, again, the Greeks found that the angle of in- 
cidence is equal to the angle of reflection ; and their knowl- 
edge reached no further than to such simple deductions 
from this as their geometry sufliced for. In harmonies 
they ascertained the fact that three strings of equal lengths 
would yield the octave, fifth and fourth, when strained by 
weights having certain definite ratios ; and they did not 
progress much bevond this. In the one of which cases we 



SCIENTIFIC NOTIONS OF THE ANCIENTS. 21 7 

see geometry used in elucidation of the laws of light ; and 
in the other, geometry and arithmetic made to measure the 
phenomena of sound. 

Did space permit, it would be desirable here to de- 
scribe the state of the less advanced sciences — to point out 
how, while a few had thus reached the first stages of quan- 
titative prevision, the rest were progressing in qualitative 
prevision — how some small generalizations were made re- 
specting evaporation, and heat, and electricity, and mag- 
netism, which, empirical as they were, did not in that re- 
spect differ from the first generalizations of every science- 
how the Greek physicians had made advances in physiology 
and pathology, which, considering the great imperfection 
of our present knowledge, are by no means to be despised 
— how zoology had been so far systematized by Aristotle, 
as, to some extent, enabled him from the presence of cer- 
tain organs to predict the presence of others — how in Aris- 
totle's Politics, there is some progress towards a scientific 
conception of social phenomena, and sundry previsions re- 
specting them — and how in the state of the Greek socie- 
ties, as well as in the writings of Greek philosophers, we 
may recognise not only an increasing clearness in that con- 
ception of equity on which the social science is based, but 
also some appreciation of the fact that social stability de- 
pends upon the maintenance of equitable regulations. We 
might dwell at length upon the causes which retarded the 
development of some of the sciences, as for example, chemis- 
try : showing that relative complexity had nothing to do 
with it — that the oxidation of a piece of iron is a simpler 
phenomenon than the recurrence of eclipses, and the dis- 
covery of carbonic acid less difficult than that of the pre- 
cession of the equinoxes — but that the relatively slow ad- 
vance of chemical knowledge was due, partly to the fact 
ihat its phenomena were not daily thrust on men's notice 
a» those of astronomy were ; partly to the fact that Mature 
10 



218 THE GENESIS OF SCIENCE. 

does not habitually supply the means, and suggest th< 
modes of investigation, as in the sciences dealing with time 
extension, and force ; and partly to the fact that the great 
majority of the materials with which chemistry deals, in 
stead of being ready to hand, are made known only by thf 
arts in their slow growth ; and partly to the fact that even 
when known, their chemical properties are not self-exhibit 
ed, but hare to be sought out by experiment. 

Merely indicating all these considerations, however, let 
us go on to contemplate the progress and mutual influence 
of the sciences in modern days ; only parenthetically no- 
ticing how, on the revival of the scientific spirit, the suc- 
cessive stages achieved exhibit the dominance of the same 
law hitherto traced — how the primary idea in dynamics, a 
uniform force, was defined by Galileo to be a force which 
generates equal velocities in equal successive times — how 
the uniform action of gravity was first experimentally de- 
termined by showing that the time elapsing before a body 
thrown up, stopped, was equal to the time it took to fall — 
how the first fact in compound motion which Galileo ascer- 
tained was, that a body projected horizontally will have a 
uniform motion onwards and a uniformly accelerated mo- 
tion downwards ; that is, will describe equal horizontal 
spaces in equal times, compounded with equal vertical in- 
crements in equal times — how his discovery respecting the 
pendulum was, that its oscillations occupy equal intervals 
of time whatever their length — how the principle of virtual 
velocities which he established is, that in any machine the 
weights that balance each other, are reciprocally as their 
virtual velocities ; that is, the relation of one set of weights 
to tbeir velocities equals the relation of the other set of 
relocities to their weights ; — and how thus his achieve- 
ments consisted in showing the equalities of certain magni- 
tudes and relations, whose equalities had not been pre- 
viously recognised. 



ORIGIN C>¥ PHYSICAL ASTRONOMY. 219 

When mechanics had reached the point to which Galileo 
brought it — when the simple laws of force had been dis- 
entangled from the friction and atmospheric resistance by 
which all their earthly manifestations are disguised — when 
progressing knowledge of physics had given a due insight 
into these disturbing causes — when, by an effort of abstrac- 
tion, it was perceived that all motion would be uniform 
and rectilinear unless interfered with by external forces — - 
and when the various consequences of this perception had 
been worked out ; then it became possible, by the union of 
geometry and mechanics, to initiate physical astronomy. 
Geometry and mechanics having diverged from a common 
root in men's sensible experiences ; having, with occasional 
inosculations, been separately developed, the one partly in 
connexion with astronomy, the other solely by analyzing 
terrestrial movements ; now join in the investigations of 
Newton to create a true theory of the celestial motions. 
And here, also, we have to notice the important fact that, 
in the very process of being brought jointly to bear upon 
astronomical problems, they are themselves raised to a 
higher phase of development. For it was in dealing with 
the questions raised by celestial dynamics that the then 
incipient infinitesimal calculus was unfolded by ISTewton and 
his continental successors ; and it was from inquiries into 
the mechanics of the solar system that the general theorems 
of mechanics contained in the " Principia," — many of them 
of purely terrestrial application — took their rise. Thus, as 
in the case of Hipparchus, the presentation of a new order 
of concrete facts to be analyzed, led to the discovery of 
new abstract facts; and these abstract facts having been 
laid hold of, gave means of access to endless groups 
of concrete facts before incapable of quantitative treat- 
ment. 

Meanwhile, physics had been carrying further that pro- 
gress without which, as just shown, rational mechanics 



220 THE GENESIS OF SCIENCE. 

could not be disentangled. In hydrostatics, Stevinus had 
extended and applied the discovery of Archimedes. Tor 
ricelli had proved atmospheric pressure, " by showing that 
this pressure sustained different liquids at heights inversely 
proportional to their densities ; " and Pascal " established 
the necessary diminution of this pressure at increasing 
heights in the atmosphere : " discoveries which in part 
reduced this branch of science to a quantitative form. 
Something had been done by Daniel Bernouilli towards 
the dynamics of fluids. The thermometer had been invent- 
ed ; and a number of small generalizations reached by it. 
Huyghens and Newton had made considerable progress in 
optics ; Newton had approximately calculated the rate of 
transmission of sound ; and the continental mathematicians 
had succeeded in determining some of the laws of sonorous 
vibrations. Magnetism and electricity had been consid- 
erably advanced by Gilbert. Chemistry had got as &r as 
the mutual neutralization of acids and alkalies. And 
Leonardo da Vinci had advanced in geology to the con- 
ception of the deposition of marine strata as the origin 
of fossils. Our present purpose does not require that 
we should give particulars. All that it here concerns us 
to do is to illustrate the consensus subsisting in this stage 
of growth, and afterwards. Let as look at a few cases. 

The theoretic law of the velocity of sound enunciated 
by Newton on purely mechanical considerations, was found 
wrong by one-sixth. The error remained unaccounted for 
until the time of Laplace, who, suspecting that the heat 
disengaged by the compression of the undulating strata of 
the air, gave additional elasticity, and so produced the 
difference, made the needful calculations and found he was 
ight. Thus acoustics was arrested until thermology over- 
took and aided it. When Boyle and Marriot had discov- 
ered the relation between the density of gases and the 
pressures they are subject to ; and when it thus becamti 



MUTUAL INFLUENCE OF THE SCIENCES. 221 

possible to calculate the rate of decreasing density in the 
upper parts of the atmosphere ; it also became possible tc 
make approximate tables of the atmospheric refraction of 
light. Thus optics, and with it astronomy, advanced with 
barology. After the discovery of atmospheric pressure 
had led to the invention of the air-pump by Otto Guericke; 
and after it had become known that evaporation increases 
in rapidity as atmospheric pressure decreases ; it became 
possible for Leslie, by evaporation in a vacuum, to produce 
the greatest cold known ; and so to extend our knowledge 
of thermology by showing that there is no zero within 
reach of our researches. When Fourier had determined 
the laws of conduction of heat, and when the Earth's tem- 
perature had been found to increase below the surface 
one degree in every forty yards, there were data for in- 
ferring the past condition of our globe ; the vast period 
it has taken to cool down to its present state; and the 
immense age of the solar system — a purely astronomical 
consideration. 

Chemistry having advanced sufficiently to supply the 
needful materials, and a physiological experiment having 
furnished the requisite hint, there came the discovery of 
galvanic electricity. Galvanism reacting on chemistry dis- 
closed the metallic bases of the alkalies, and inaugurated 
the electro-chemical theory ; in the hands of Oersted and 
Ampere it led to the laws of magnetic action ; and by its 
aid Faraday has detected significant facts relative to the 
constitution of light. Brewster's discoveries respecting 
double refraction and dipolarization proved the essential 
truth of the classification of crystalline forms according to 
the number of axes, by showing that the molecular con- 
stitution depends upon the axes. In these and in numer- 
ous other cases, the mutual influence of the sciences has 
been quite independent of any supposed hierarchical order. 
Often, too, their inter-actions are more complex than as 



222 THE GENESIS OF SCIENCE. 

thus instanced — involve more sciences than two. One 
illustration of this must suffice. We quote it in full from 
the History of the Inductive Sciences. In Book XL, chap. 
II., on "The Progress of the Electrical Theory," Dr 
Whewell writes : — 

"Thus at that period, mathematics was behind experiment, 
and a problem was proposed, in wLich theoretical results were 
wanted for comparison with observation, but could not be ac- 
curately obtained ; as was the case in astronomy also, till the time 
of the approximate solution of the problem of three bodies, and 
the consequent formation of the tables of the moon and planets, 
on the theory of universal gravitation. After some time, elec- 
trical theory was relieved from this reproach, mainly in conse- 
quence of the progress which astronomy had occasioned in pure 
mathematics. About 1801 there appeared in the Bulletin des 
/Sciences, an exact solution of the problem of the distribution of 
electric fluid on a spheroid, obtained by Biot, by the application 
of the peculiar methods which Laplace had invented for the prob- 
lem of the figure of the planets. And, in 1811, M. Poisson applied 
Laplace's artifices to the case of two spheres acting upon one 
another in contact, a case to which many of Coulomb's experi- 
ments were referrible; and the agreement of the results of 
theory and observation, thus extricated from Coulomb's num- 
bers obtained above forty years previously, was very striking anl 
convincing." 

Not only do the sciences affect each other after this 
direct manner, but they affect each other indirectly. 
Where there is no dependence, there is yet analogy — 
equality of relations / and the discovery of the relations 
subsisting among one set of phenomena, constantly sug- 
gests a search for the same relations among another set. 
Thus the established fact that the force of gravitation varies 
inversely as the square of the distance, being recognized as 
a necessary characteristic of all influences proceeding from 
a centre, raised the suspicion that heat and light follow the 
same law ; which proved to be the case — a suspicion and 3 






ONE SCIENCE DEPENDS ON ANOTHEE. 223 

confirmation which were repeated in respect to the electric 
and magnetic forces. Thus again the discovery of the 
polarization of light led to experiments which ended in the 
discovery of the polarization of heat — a discovery that 
could never have been made without the antecedent 
one. Thus, too, the known refrangibility of light and 
heat lately produced the inquiry whether sound also is not 
refrangible ; which on trial it turns out to be. 

In some cases, indeed, it is only by the aid of concep- 
tions derived from one class of phenomena that hypoth- 
eses respecting other classes can be formed. The theory, 
at one time favoured, that evaporation is a solution of 
water in air, was an assumption that the relation between 
water and air is like the relation between salt and water ; 
and could never have been conceived if the relation be- 
tween salt and water had not been previously known. 
Similarly the received theory of evaporation — that it is a 
diffusion of the particles of the evaporating fluid in virtue 
of their atomic repuision — could not have been entertained 
without a foregoing experience of magnetic and electric 
repulsions. So complete in recent days has become this 
consensus among the sciences, caused either by the natural 
entanglement of their phenomena, or by analogies in the 
relations of their phenomena, that scarcely any consider- 
able discovery concerning one order of facts now takes 
place, without very shortly leading to discoveries concern- 
ing other orders. 

To produce a tolerably complete conception of this pro- 
cess of scientific evolution, it would be needful to go back 
to the beginning, and trace in detail the growth of classifi- 
cations and nomenclatures ; and to show how, as subsidiary 
to science, they have acted upon it, and it has reacted upon 
them. We can only now remark that, on the one hand, 
classifications and nomenclatures have aided science by con- 
tinually subdividing the subject-matter of research, and giv« 



224: THE GEXESIS OF SCIENCE. 

ing fixity and diffusion to the truths disclosed ; and that on 
the other hand, they have caught from it that increasing 
quantitativeness, and that progress from considerations 
touching single phenomena to considerations touching the 
relations among many phenomena, which we have been de 
scribing. 

Of this last influence a few illustrations must be given. 
In chemistry it is seen in the facts, that the dividing of mat- 
ter into the four elements was ostensibly based upon the 
single property of weight ; that the first truly chemical di- 
vision into acid and alkaline bodies, grouped together bod- 
ies which had not simply one property in common, but in 
which one property was constantly related to many others ; 
and that the classification now current, places together in 
groups supporters of combustion, metallic and non-metallic 
bases, acids, salts, &c, bodies which are often quite unlike 
in sensible qualities, but which are like in the majority of 
their relations to other bodies. In mineralogy again, 
the first classifications were based upon differences in as- 
pect, texture, and other physical attributes. Berzelius 
made two attempts at a classification based solely on chem- 
ical constitution. That now current, recognises as far as 
possible the relations between physical and chemical char- 
acters. In botany the earliest classes formed were frees, 
shrubs, and herbs : magnitude being the basis of distinction. 
Dioscorides divided vegetables into aromeitic, alimentary, 
medicinal, and vinous : a division of chemical character. 
Caesalpinus classified them by the seeds, and seed-vessels, 
which he preferred because of tne relations found to sub- 
sist between the character of the fructification and th« 
general character of the other parts. 

While the "natural system" since developed, carrying out 
the doctrine of Linnaeus, that " natural orders must be formed 
by attention not to one or two, but to all the parts of plants,' 1 
bases its divisions on like peculiarities which are found 



ITS DIVISIONS MUST ADVANCE TOGETHER. 225 

to be constantly related to the greatest number of otheT 
like peculiarities. And similarly in zoology, the successive 
classifications, from having been originally determined by 
external and often subordinate characters not indicative of 
the essential nature, have been gradually more and more 
determined by those internal and fundamental differences, 
which have uniform relations to the greatest number of other 
differences. Nor shall we be surprised at this analogy between 
the modes of progress of positive science and classification, 
when we bear in mind that both proceed by making gener- 
alizations ; that both enable us to make previsions differing 
only in their precision ; and that while the one deals with 
equal properties and relations, the other deals with proper- 
ties and relations that approximate towards equality in var- 
iable degrees. 

Without further argument, it will, we think, be suffi- 
ciently clear that the sciences are none of them separately 
evolved — are none of them independent either logically or 
historically ; but that all of them have, in a greater or less 
degree, required aid and reciprocated it. Indeed, it needs 
but to throw aside theses, and contemplate the mixed char- 
acter of surrounding phenomena, to at once see that these 
notions of division and succession in the kinds of knowledge 
are none of them actually true, but are simple scientific 
fictions . good, if regarded merely as aids to study ; bad, 
if regarded as representing realities in Nature. Consider 
them critically, and no facts whatever are presented to our 
senses uncombined with other facts — no facts whatever but 
are in some degree disguised by accompanying facts : 
disguised in such a manner that all must be partially under- 
stood before any one can be understood. If it be said, as 
by M. Comte, that gravitating force should be treated of 
before other forces, seeing that all things are subject to it, 
it may on like grounds be said that heat should be first 
dealt with ; seeing that thermal forces are everywhere in 



226 



THE GENESIS OF SCIENCE. 



action ; that the ability of any portion of matter to mani 
fest visible gravitative. phenomena depends on its state of 
aggregation, which is determined by heat ; that only by 
the aid of thermology can we explain those apparent ex- 
ceptions to the gravitating tendency which are presented 
by steam and smoke, and so establish its universality, and 
that, indeed, the very existence of the solar system in a sol- 
id form is just as much a question of heat as it is one of 
gravitation. 

Take other cases : — All phenomena recognised by the 
eyes, through which only are the data of exact science as- 
certainable, are complicated with optical phenomena ; and 
cannot be exhaustively known until optical principles are 
known. The burning of a candle cannot be explained 
without involving chemistry, mechanics, thermology. 
Every wind that blows is determined by influences partly 
solar, partly lunar, partly hygrometric ; and implies con- 
siderations of fluid equilibrium and physical geography 
The direction, dip, and variations of the magnetic needle, 
are facts half terrestrial, half celestial — are caused by earth- 
ly forces which have cycles of change corresponding with 
astronomical periods. The flowing of the gulf-stream and the 
annual migration of icebergs towards the equator, depend- 
ing as they do on the balancing of the centripetal and centri- 
fugal forces acting on the ocean, involve in their explana- 
tion the Earth's rotation and spheroidal form, the laws of 
hydrostatics, the relative densities of cold and warm water, 
and the doctrines of evaporation. It is no doubt true, as 
M. Comte says, that " our position in the solar system, and 
the motions, form, size, equilibrium of the mass of our 
world among the planets, must be known before we can un- 
derstand the phenomena going on at its surface.'' But, fa- 
tally for his hypothesis, it is also true that we must under- 
stand a great port of the phenomena going on at its surtace 
before we can know its position, etc., in the solar system 



INTERCONNEXION OF ITS BRANCHES. 227 

It is not simply that, as we have already shown, those geo- 
metrical and mechanical principles by which celestial ap- 
pearances are explained, were first generalized from terres- 
trial experiences ; but it is that the very obtainment of cor- 
rect data, on which to base astronomical generalizations, 
implies advanced terrestrial physics. 

Until after optics had made considerable advance, the 
Copernican system remained but a speculation. A single 
modern observation on a star has to undergo a careful anal- 
ysis by the combined aid of various sciences — has to be digest 
ed by the organism of the sciences / which have severally 
to assimilate their respective parts of the observation, be- 
fore the essential fact it contains is available for the further 
development of astronomy. It has to be corrected not 
only for nutation of the earth's axis and for precession of 
the equinoxes, but for aberration and for refraction ; and 
the formation of the tables by which refraction is calculat- 
ed, presupposes knowledge of the law of decreasing density 
in the upper atmospheric strata ; of the law of decreasing 
temperature, and the influence of this on the density ; and of 
hygrometric laws as also affecting density. So that, to get 
materials for further advance, astronomy requires not only 
the indirect aid of the sciences which have presided over 
the making of its improved instruments, but the direct aid 
of an advanced optics, of barology, of thermology, of hy- 
grometry; and if we remember that these delicate obser- 
vations are in some cases registered electrically, and that 
they are further corrected for the " personal equation " — the 
time elapsing between seeing and registering, which varies 
with different observers — we may even add electricity and 
psychology. If, then, so apparently simple a thing as as- 
certaining the position of a star is complicated with so 
many phenomena, it is clear that this notion of the inde- 
pendence of the sciences, or certain of them, will not hold. 

Whether objectively independent or not, they cannot 



228 



THE GENESIS OF SCIENCE 



be subjectively so — they cannot have independence as pre- 
sented to our consciousness ; and this is the only kind of 
independence with which we are concerned. And here, 
before leaving these illustrations, and especially this last 
one, let us not omit to notice how clearly they exhibit that 
increasingly active consensus of the sciences which charac- 
terizes their advancing development. Besides finding that 
in these later times a discovery in one science commonly 
causes progress in others ; besides finding that a great part 
of the questions with which modern science deals are so mix- 
ed as to require the co-operation of many sciences for their 
solution ; we find in this last case that, to make a single good 
observation in the purest of the natural sciences, requires 
the combined assistance of half a dozen other sciences. 

Perhaps the clearest comprehension of the interconnect- 
ed growth of the sciences may be obtained by contemplat- 
ing that of the arts, to which it is strictly analogous, and 
with which it is inseparably bound up. Most intelligent 
persons must have been, at one time or other, struck with 
the vast array of antecedents pre-supposed by one of our 
processes of manufacture. Let him trace the production 
of a printed cotton, and consider all that is implied by it. 
There are the many successive improvements through 
which the power-looms reached their present perfection ; 
there is the steam-engine that drives them, having its long 
history from Papin downwards ; there are the lathes in 
which its cylinder was bored, and the string of ancestral 
lathes from which those lathes proceeded ; there is the 
steam-hammer under which its crank shaft was welded; 
there are the puddling-furnaces, the blast-furnaces, the coal- 
mines and the iron-mines needful for producing the raw 
material ; there are the slowly improved appliances by 
which the factory was built, and lighted, and ventilated; 
there are the printing engine, and the die house, and the col- 
our laboratory with its stock of materials from all parts of 



INTERDEPENDENCE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES. 229 

the world, implying cochineal-culture, logwood-cutting, in- 
digo-growing ; there are the implements used by the pro- 
ducers of cotton, the gins by which it is cleaned, the elab- 
orate machines by which it is spun : there are the vessels 
in which cotton is imported, with the building-slips, the 
rope-yards, the sail-cloth factories, the anchor-forges, need- 
ful for making them ; and besides all these directly neces- 
sary antecedents, each of them involving many others, 
there are the institutions which have developed the requi- 
site intelligence, the printing and publishing arrangements 
which have spread the necessary information, the social or- 
ganization which has rendered possible such a complex co- 
operation of agencies. 

Further analysis would show that the many arts thus 
concerned in the economical production of a child's frock, 
have each of them been brought to its present efficiency 
by slow steps which the other arts have aided ; and that 
from the beginning this reciprocity has been ever on the 
increase. It needs but on the one hand to consider how 
utterly impossible it is for the savage, even with ore and 
coal ready, to produce so simple a thing as an iron hatchet ; 
and then to consider, on the other hand, that it would have 
been impracticable among ourselves, even a century ago, 
to raise the tubes of the Britannia bridge from lack of the 
hydraulic press ; to at once see how mutually dependent 
are the arts, and how all must advance that each may ad- 
vance. Well, the sciences are involved with each other 
in just the same manner. They are, in fact, inextricably 
woven into this same complex web of the arts ; and are 
only conventionally independent of it. Originally the two 
were one. How to fix the religious festivals ; when to sow : 
how to weigh commodities ; and in what manner to meas- 
ure ground; were the purely practical questions out of 
which arose astronomy, mechanics, geometry. Since then 
there has been a perpetual inosculation of the sciences and 



230 THE GENESIS OF SCIENCE. 

the arts. Science has been supplying art with truer generali 
zations and more completely quantitative previsions. Art has 
been supplying science with better materials and more per- 
fect instruments. And all along the interdependence has been 
growing closer, not only between art and science, but among 
the arts themselves, and among the sciences themselves. 

How completely the analogy holds throughout, become? 
yet clearer when we recognise the fact that the sciences arc 
arts to each other. If, as occurs in almost every case, the 
fact to be analyzed by any science, has first to be prepared 
— to be disentangled from disturbing facts by the afore 
discovered methods of other sciences ; the other sciences 
so used, stand in the position of arts. If, in solving a dyna- 
mical problem, a parallelogram is drawn, of which the sides 
and diagonal represent forces, and by putting magnitudes 
of extension for magnitudes of force a measurable relation 
is established between quantities not else to be dealt with ; 
it may be fairly said that geometry plays towards mechan- 
ics much the same part that the fire of the founder plays 
towards the metal he is going to cast. If, in analyzing the 
phenomena of the coloured rings surrounding the point of 
contact between two lenses, a Xewton ascertains by calcu- 
lation the amount of certain interposed spaces, far too mi- 
nute for actual measurement ; he employs the science of 
number for essentially the same purpose as that for which 
the watchmaker employs tools. If, before writing down 
his observation on a star, the astronomer has to separate 
from it all the errors resultiug from atmospheric and optical 
laws, it is manifest that the refraction-tables, and logarithm- 
books, and formulae, which he successively uses, serve him 
much as retorts, and filters, and cupels serve the assayer 
who wishes to separate the pure gold from all accompany- 
in 2: ingredients. 

So close, indeed, is the relationship, that it is impossi- 
ble to say where science begins and art ends. All the in 



ART AND SCIENCE. 231 

struments of the natural philosopher are the products of 
art ; the adjusting one of them for use is an art ; there is 
art in making an observation with one of them ; it requires 
art properly to treat the facts ascertained ; nay, even the 
employing established generalizations to open the way to 
new generalizations, may be considered as art. In each of 
these cases previously organized knowledge becomes the 
implement by which new knowledge is got at : and whether 
that previously organized knowledge is embodied in a tan- 
gible apparatus or in a formula, matters not in so far as it's 
essential relation to the new knowledge is concerned. If, 
as no one will deny, art is applied knowledge, then such 
portion of a scientific investigation as consists of applied 
knowledge is art. So that we may even say that as soon 
as any prevision in science passes out of its originally pas- 
sive state, and is employed for reaching other previsions, 
it passes from theory into practice — becomes science in ac- 
tion — becomes art. And when we thus see how purely 
conventional is the ordinary distinction, how impossible it 
is to make any real separation — when we see not only that 
science and art were originally one ; that the arts have 
perpetually assisted each other ; that there has been a con- 
stant reciprocation of aid between the sciences and arts ; 
but that the sciences act as arts to each other, and that the 
established part of each science becomes an art to the 
growing part — when we recognize the closeness of these 
associations, we shall the more clearly perceive that as the 
connexion of the arts with each other has been ever be- 
coming more intimate ; as the help given by sciences to 
arts and by arts to sciences, has been age by age increas- 
ing ; so the interdependence of the sciences themselves has 
been ever growing greater, their mutual relations more in- 
volved, their consensus more active. 

In here ending our sketch of the Genesis of Science, we 



232 THE GENESIS OF SCIENCE. 

are conscious of having done the subject but scant justice 
Two difficulties have stood in our way : one, the having to 
touch on so many points in such small space ; the other, 
the necessity of treating in serial arrangement a process 
which is not serial — a difficulty which must ever attend all 
attempts to delineate processes of development, whatever 
their special nature. Add to which, that to present in any- 
thing like completeness and proportion, even the outlines 
of so vast and complex a history, demands years of study. 
Nevertheless, we believe that the evidence which has been 
assigned suffices to substantiate the leading propositions 
with which we set out. Inquiry into the first stages of 
science confirms the conclusion which we drew from the 
analysis of science as now existing, that it is not distinct 
from common knowledge, but an outgrowth from it — an 
extension of the perception by means of the reason. 

That which we further found by analysis to form the 
more specific characteristic of scientific previsions, as con- 
trasted with the previsions of uncultured intelligence — their 
quantitativeness — we also see to have been the character- 
istic alike in the initial steps in science, and of all the steps 
succeeding them. The facts and admissions cited in dis- 
proof of the assertion that the sciences follow one another, 
both logically and historically, in the order of their de- 
creasing generality, have been enforced by the sundry in- 
stances we have met with, in which the more general or 
abstract sciences have been advanced only at the instiga- 
tion of the more special or concrete — instances serving to 
show that a more general science as much owes its progress 
to the presentation of new problems by a more special 
science, as the more special science owes its progress to 
the solutions which the more general science is thus led to 
nt tempt — instances therefore illustrating the position that 
scientific advance is as much from the special to the general 
as from the general to the special. 



IMPORTANCE OF THE SUBJECT. 233 

Quite in harmony with this position we find to be the 
admissions that the sciences are as branches of one trunk, 
and that they were at first cultivated simultaneously ; and 
this harmony becomes the more marked on finding, as we 
have done, not only that the sciences have a common root, 
but that science in general has a common root with lan- 
guage, classification, reasoning, art ; that throughout civili- 
zation these have advanced together, acting and reacting 
upon each other just as the separate sciences have done ; 
and that thus the development of intelligence in all its di- 
visions and subdivisions has conformed to this same law 
which we have shown that the sciences conform to. From 
all which we may perceive that the sciences can with no 
greater propriety be arranged in a succession, than language, 
classification, reasoning, art, and science, can be arranged 
in a succession ; that, however needful a succession may be 
for the convenience of books and catalogues, it must be 
recognized merely as a convention ; and that so far from its 
being the function of a philosophy of the sciences to estab- 
lish a hierarchy, it is its function to show that the linear 
arrangements required for literary purposes, have none of 
them any basis either in Nature or History. 

There is one further remark we must not omit — a re- 
mark touching the importance of the question that has been 
discussed. Unfortunately it commonly happens that topics 
of this abstract nature are slighted as of no practical mo- 
ment ; and, we doubt not, that many will think it of very 
little consequence what theory respecting the genesis of 
science may be entertained. But the value of truths is of- 
ten great, in proportion as their generality is wide. Re- 
mote as they seem from practical application, the highest 
generalizations are not unfrequently the most potent in 
their effects, in virtue of their influence on all those subor 
dinate generalizations which regulate practice. And it must 
be so here. Whenever established, a correct theory of the 



234 THE GENESIS OF SCIENCE. 

historical development of the sciences must have an immense 
effect upon education ; and, through education, upon civili- 
zation. Greatly as we differ from him in other respects, 
we agree with M. Comte in the belief that, rightly conduct- 
ed, the education of the individual must have a certain cor- 
respondence with the evolution of the race. 

No one can contemplate the facts we have cited in illus- 
tration of the early stages of science, without recognising 
the necessity of the processes through which those stages 
were reached — a necessity which, in respect to the leading 
truths, may likewise be traced in all after stages. This ne- 
cessity, originating in the very nature of the phenomena to 
be analyzed and the faculties to be employed, more or less 
fully applies to the mind of the child as to that of the sav- 
age. We say more or less fully, because the correspondence 
is not special but general only. Were the environment the 
same in both cases, the correspondence would be complete. 
But though the surrounding material out of which science is 
to be organized, is, in many cases, the same to the juvenile 
mind and the aboriginal mind, it is not so throughout ; as, 
for instance, in the case of chemistry, the phenomena of 
which are accessible to the one, but were inaccessible to 
the other. Hence, in proportion as the environment differs, 
the course of evolution must differ. After admitting sun- 
dry exceptions, however, there remains a substantial par- 
allelism ; and, if so, it becomes of great moment to ascer- 
tain what really has been the process of soientiiic evolution. 
The establishment of an erroneous theory must be disas- 
trous in its educational results ; while the establishment of 
a true one must eventually be fertile in school-reforms and 
consequent social benefits. 



vm. 

SPECIALIZED ADMINISTRATION. 

fFROM THE FORTNIGHTLY REVIEW, DECEMBER, 187U 



SPECIALIZED ADMINISTRATION. 



It is contrary to common-sense that fish should be 
more difficult to "get at the sea-side than in London ; but 
it is true, nevertheless. No less contrary to common- 
sense seems the truth that though, in the West Highlands, 
oxen are to be seen everywhere, no beef can be had with- 
out sending two or three hundred miles to Glasgow for it. 
Hulers who, guided by common-sense, tried to suppress 
certain opinions by forbidding the books containing them, 
never dreamed that their interdicts would cause the diffu- 
sion of these opinions ; and rulers who, guided by com- 
mon-sense, forbade excessive rates of interest, never 
dreamed that they were thereby making the terms harder 
for borrowers than before. When printing replaced copy- 
ing, any one who had prophesied that the number of per- 
sons engaged in the manufacture of books would im- 
mensely increase, as a consequence, would have been 
thought wholly devoid of common-sense. And equally 
devoid of common-sense would have been thought any one 
who, when railways were replacing coaches, said that the 
number of horses employed in bringing passengers and 
goods to and from railways, would be greater than the 
number directly replaced by the railways. Such cases 
might be multiplied indefinitely. Whoso remembers that, 
among quite simple phenomena, causes produce effects 



238 SPECIALIZED ADMINISTRATION - . 

which are often utterly at variance with anticipation, will 
see how habitually this must happen among complex phe- 
nomena. That a balloon is made to rise by the same 
force which makes a stone fall ; that the melting of ice 
may be greatly retarded by wrapping the ice in a blanket ; 
that the simplest way of setting potassium on fire is to 
throw it into the water ; are truths which those who know 
only the outside aspects of things would regard as mani- 
fest falsehoods. And, if, when the factors are few and 
simple, the results may be so absolutely opposed to seem- 
ing probability, much more will they be often thus op- 
posed when the factors are many and involved. The sav- 
ing of the French respecting political events, that " it is 
always the unexpected which happens " — a saying which 
they have been abundantly reillustrating of late — is one 
which legislators, and those who urge on schemes of legis- 
lation, should have ever in mind. Let us pause a mo- 
ment to contemplate a seemingly-impossible set of results 
which social forces have wrought out. 

Up to quite recent days, Language was held to be of 
supernatural origin. That this elaborate apparatus of 
symbols, so marvellously adapted for the conveyance of 
thought from mind to mind, was a miraculous gift, seemed 
unquestionable. Ko possible alternative way could be 
thought of by which there had come into existence these 
multitudinous assemblages of words of various orders, 
genera, and species, moulded into fitness for articulating 
with one another, and capable of being united from mo- 
ment to moment into ever-new combinations, that repre- 
sent with precision each idea as it arises. The supposi- 
tion that, in the slow progress of tilings. Language grew 
out of the continuous use of signs — at first mainly mimet- 
ic, afterward partly mimetic, partly vocal, and at length 
almost wholly vocal — was an hypothesis ne^er even con- 



SPONTANEOUS EVOLUTION OF LANGUAGE. 239 

ceived by men in early stages of civilization ; and when 
the hypothesis was at length conceived, it was thought 
too monstrous an absurdity to be even entertained. Yet 
this monstrous absurdity proves to be true. Already the 
evolution of Language has been traced back far enough 
to show that all its particular words, and all its leading 
traits of structure, have had a natural genesis ; and day 
by day investigation makes it more manifest that its gen- 
esis has been natural from the beginning. Not only has 
it been natural from the beginning, but it has been spon- 
taneous. No language is a cunningly-devised scheme of 
a ruler or body of legislators. There was no council of 
savages to invent the parts of speech, and decide on what 
principles they should be used. Nay, more. Going on 
without any authority or appointed regulation, this nat- 
ural process went on without any man observing that it 
was going on. Solely under pressure of the need for com- 
municating their ideas and feelings — solely in pursuit of 
their personal interests — men little by little developed 
speech in absolute unconsciousness that they were doing 
any thing more than pursuing their personal interests. 
Even now the unconsciousness continues. Take the whole 
population of the globe, and there is probably not above 
one in a million who knows that in his daily talk he is 
carrying on the process by which Language has been 
evolved. 

I commence thus by way of giving the key-note to 
the argument which follows. My general purpose, iD 
dwelling a moment on this illustration, has been that of 
showing how utterly beyond the conceptions of common- 
sense, literally .so called, and even beyond the conceptions 
of cultivated common-sense, are the workings-out of socio- 
logical processes — how these workings-out are such that 
even those who have carried to the uttermost " the scien- 



24:0 SPECIALIZED ADMINISTRATION. 

tific use of the imagination," would never have anticipated 
them. And my more special purpose has been that of 
showing how marvellous are the results indirectly and un- 
intentionally achieved by the cooperation of men who are 
severally pursuing their private ends. Let me pass now 
to the particular topic to be here dealt with. 

I have greatly regretted to see Prof. Huxley strength- 
ening, by his deservedly high authority, a school of poli- 
ticians which can scarcely be held to need strengthening 
— its opponents being so few. I regret it the more be- 
cause, thus far, men prepared for the study of Sociology 
by previous studies of Biology and Psychology, have 
scarcely expressed any opinions on the question at issue ; 
and that Prof. Huxley, who by both general and special 
culture is so eminently fitted to judge, should have come 
to the conclusions set forth in the last number of the 
Fortnightly Review, will be discouraging to the small 
number who have reached opposite conclusions. Greatly 
regretting however, though I do, this avowed antagonism 
of Prof. Huxley to a general political doctrine with which 
I am identified, I do not propose to make any reply to 
his arguments at large : being deterred partly by reluc- 
tance to dwell on points of difference with one whom I so 
greatly admire, and partly by the consciousness that what 
I should say would be mainly a repetition of what I have 
explicitly or implicitly said elsewhere. But with one point 
raised I feel obliged to deal. Prof. Huxley tacitly puts to 
me a question. By so doing he leaves me to choose be- 
tween two alternatives, neither of which is agreeable to 
me. I must either, by leaving it unanswered, accept the 
implication that it isunansAverable, and the doctrine I hold 
untenable ; or else I must give it an adequate answer. 
Little as I like it, I sec that the latter of these alternatives 



THE PKIMARY DIFFERENTIATION OF STRUCTURES. 241 

is that which, on public as well as on personal grounds, I 
must accept. 

Had I been allowed to elaborate more fully the Review- 
article from which Prof. Huxley quotes, this question 
would possibly not have been raised. That article closes 
with the following words : " "We had hoped to say some- 
thing respecting the different types of social organization, 
and something also on social metamorphoses ; but we have 
reached our assigned limits." These further developments 
of the conception — developments to be hereafter set forth 
in the " Principles of Sociology " — I must here sketch in 
outline before my answer can be made intelligible. In 
sketching them, I must say much that would be needless 
were my answer addressed to Prof. Huxley only. Bare 
allusions to general phenomena of organization, with 
which he is immeasurably more familiar than I am, would 
suffice. But, as the sufficiency of my answer has to be 
judged by the general reader, the general reader must be 
supplied with the requisite data — my presentation of them 
being under correction from Prof. Huxley if it is inaccu- 
rate. 

The primary differentiation in organic structures, mani- 
fested alike in the history of each organism and in the his- 
tory of the organic world as a whole, is the differentiation 
between outer and inner parts — the parts which hold di- 
rect converse with the environment and the parts which 
do not hold direct converse with the environment. We 
see this alike in those smallest and lowest forms improper- 
ly, though suggestively, sometimes called unicellular, and 
also in the next higher division of creatures which, with 
considerable reason, are regarded as aggregations of the 
lower. In these creatures the body is divisible into endo- 
derm and ectoderm, differing very little in their characters, 
11 



242 SPECIALIZED ADMTNTSTEATIOX. 

but serving the one to form the digestive sac, and the 
other to form the outer wall of the body. As Prof. Hux- 
ley describes them in his " Oceanic Hydrozoa," these layers 
represent respectively the organs of nutrition and the or- 
gans of external relation — generally, though not univer- 
sally, for there are exceptions, especially among parasites. 
In the embryos of higher types, these two layers severally 
become double by the splitting of a layer formed between 
them ; and from the outer double layer is developed the 
body-wall with its limbs, nervous system, senses, muscles, 
etc. ; while from the inner double layer there arise the 
alimentary canal and its appendages, together with the 
heart and lungs. Though in such higher types these two 
systems of organs, which respectively absorb nutriment 
and expend nutriment, become so far connected by rami- 
fying blood-vessels and nerves that this division cannot be 
sharply made, still the broad contrast remains. At the 
very outset, then, there arises this separation, which im- 
plies at once a cooperation and an antagonism — a cooper- 
ation, because, while the outer organs secure for the inner 
organs the crude food, the inner organs elaborate and sup- 
ply to the outer organs the prepared materials by which 
they are enable to do their work ; and an antagonism, be- 
cause each set of organs, living and growing at the cost of 
these prepared materials, cannot appropriate any portion 
of the total supply without diminishing by so much the 
supply available for the other. This general cooperation 
and general antagonism becomes complicated with special 
cooperations and special antagonisms, as fast as these two 
great systems of organs develop. The originally simple 
alimentary canal, differentiating into many parts, becomes 
a congeries of structures which, by cooperation, fulfil bet- 
ter their general function, but between which there never- 
theless arise antagonisms ; since each has to make good its 



THE TWO CONTROLLING SYSTEMS. 243 

waste and to get matter for growth, at the cost of the gen- 
eral supply of nutriment available for them all. Similar- 
ly, as fast as the outer system develops into special senses 
and limbs, there arise among these, also, secondary cooper- 
ations and secondary antagonisms. By their variously- 
combined actions, food is obtained more effectually ; and 
yet the activity of each set of muscles, or each directive 
nervous structure, entails a draft upon the stock of pre- 
pared nutriment which the outer organs receive, and is by 
so much at the cost of the rest. Thus the method of or- 
ganization, both in general and in detail, is a simultaneous 
cooperation and opposition. All the organs unite in sub- 
serving the interests of the organism they form ; and yet 
they have all their special interests, and compete with one 
another for blood. 

A form of government, or control, or coordination, de- 
velops as fast as these systems of organs develop. Event- 
ually this becomes double. A general distinction arises 
between the two controlling systems belonging to the two 
great systems of organs. "Whether the inner controlling 
system is or is not originally derived from the outer, mat- 
ters not to the argument — when developed it is in great 
measure independent.* And if we contemplate their re- 

* Here, and throughout the discussion, I refer to these controlling sys- 
tems only as they exist in the Vertebrata, because their relations are far bet- 
ter known in this great division of the animal kingdom — not because like re- 
lations do not exist elsewhere. Indeed, in the great sub-kingdom Annulosa, 
these controlling systems have relations that are extremely significant to us 
here. For while an inferior annulose animal has only a single set of nervous 
structures, a superior annulose animal (as a moth) has a set of nervous struct- 
ures presiding over the viscera, as well as a more conspicuous set presiding 
over the organs of external relation. And this contrast is analogous to one 
of the contrasts between undeveloped and developed societies ; for, while 
among the uncivilized and incipiently civilized there is but a single set of di- 
rective agencies, there are among the fully civilized, as we shall presently see, 
two sets of directive agencies, for the outer and inner structures respectively. 



244: SPECIALIZED ADMIXISTBATIOX. 

spective sets of functions, we shall perceive the origin of 
this distinction. That the outer organs may cooperate 
effectively for the purposes of catching prey, escaping dan- 
ger, etc., it is needful that they should be under a govern- 
ment capable of directing their combined actions, now in 
this way and now in that, according as outer circumstances 
vary. From instant to instant there must be quick adjust- 
ments to occasions that are more or less new ; and hence 
there requires a complex and centralized nervous appara- 
tus, to which all these organs are promptly and completely 
obedient. The government needful for the inner system 
of organs is a different and much simpler one. "Wlien the 
food obtained by the outer organs has been put into the 
stomach, the cooperation required of the viscera, though 
it varies somewhat as the quantity or kind of food varies, 
has nevertheless a general uniformity ; and it is required 
to go on in much the same way whatever the outer cir- 
cumstances may be. In each case the food has to be re- 
duced to a pulp, supplied with various solvent secretions, 
propelled onward, and its nutritive part taken up by ab- 
sorbent surfaces. That these processes may be effective, 
the organs which carry them on must be supplied with fit 
blood; and to this end the heart and the lungs have to act 
with greater vigor. This visceral cooperation, carried on 
with this comparative uniformity, is regulated by a ner- 
vous system which is to a large extent independent of that 
higher and more complex nervous system controlling the 
external organs. The act of swallowing is, indeed, main- 
ly effected by the higher nervous system ; but, being swal- 
lowed, the food affects by its presence the local nerves, 
through them the local ganglia, and indirectly, through 
nervous connections w'th other ganglia, excites the rest 
of the viscera into cooperative activity. It is true that the 
functions of the sympathetic or ganglionic nervous system, 



COOPERATION IN THE NERVOUS SYSTEM. 245 

or " nervous system of organic life," as it is otherwise 
called, are imperfectly understood. But, since we know 
positively that some of its plexuses, as the cardiac, are cen- 
tres of local stimulation and coordination, which can act 
independently, though they are influenced by higher cen- 
tres, it is fairly to be inferred that the other and still 
larger plexuses, distributed among the viscera, are also such 
local and largely independent centres ; especially as the 
nerves they send into the viscera, to join the many subor- 
dinate ganglia distributed through them, greatly exceed 
in quantity the cerebro-spinal fibres accompanying them. 
Indeed, to suppose otherwise is to leave unanswered the 
question, What are their functions ? as well as the ques- 
tion, How are these unconscious visceral coordinations 
effected? There remains only to observe the kind of co- 
operation which exists between the two nervous systems. 
This is both a general and a special cooperation. The 
general cooperation is that by which either system of or- 
gans is enabled to stimulate the other to action. The ali- 
mentary canal yields through certain nervous connections 
the sensation of hunger to the higher nervous system ; 
and so prompts efforts for procuring food. Conversely, 
the activity of the nervo-muscular system, or, at least, its 
normal activity, sends inward to the cardiac and other 
plexuses a gush of stimulus which excites the viscera to 
action. The special cooperation is one by which it would 
seem that each system puts an indirect restraint on the 
other. Fibres from the sympathetic accompany every ar- 
tery throughout the organs of external relation, and exer- 
cise on the artery a constrictive action ; and the converse 
is done by certain of the cerebro-spinal fibres which ram- 
ify with the sympathetic throughout the viscera : through 
the vagus and other nerves, an inhibitory influence is ex- 
ercised on the heart, intestines, pancreas, etc. Leaving 



246 SPECIALIZED ADMINISTRATION. 

doubtful details, however, the fact which concerns us here 
is sufficiently manifest. There are, for these two systems 
of organs, two nervous systems, in great measure inde- 
pendent ; and, if it is true that the higher system influ- 
ences the lower, it is no less true that the lower very pow- 
erfully influences the higher. The restrictive action of the 
sympathetic upon the circulation, throughout the nervo- 
muscular system, is unquestionable ; and it is possibly 
through this that, when the viscera have much work to do, 
the nervo-muscular system is incapacitated in so marked a 
manner.* 

The one further fact here concerning us is the contrast 
presented in different kinds of animals, between the de- 
grees of development of these two great systems, of organs 
that carry on respectively the outer functions and the in- 
ner functions. There are active creatures in which the 
locomotive organs, the organs of sense, together with the 
nervous apparatus which combines their actions, bear a 
large ratio to the organs of alimentation and their append- 
ages; while there are inactive creatures in which these 

* To meet the probable objection that the experiments of Bernard, Lud- 
wig, and others, show that in the case of certain glands the nerves of the 
cerebro-spinal system are those which set up the secreting process, I would 
remark that in these cases, and in many others where the relative functions 
of the cerebro-spinal nerves and the sympathetic nerves have been studied, 
the organs have been those in which scjisation is cither the stimulus to activ- 
ity or its accompaniment ; and that from these cases no conclusion can be 
drawn applying to the cases of those viscera which normally perform their 
functions without sensation. Perhaps it may even be that the functions of 
those sympathetic fibres which accompany the arteries of the outer organs 
are simply ancillary to those of the central parts of the sympathetic system, 
which stimulate and regulate the viscera — ancillary in this sense, that they 
check the diffusion of blood in external organs when it is wanted in internal 
organs : cerebro-spinal inhibition (except in its action on the heart) work- 
ing the opposite way. And possibly this is the instrumentality for carrying 
on that competition for nutriment which, as we saw, arises at the very out 
«et between these two great systems of organs. 



METAMORPHOSIS OF TYPES. 247 

organs of external relation bear a very small ratio to the 
organs of alimentation. And a remarkable fact, here es- 
pecially instructive to us, is that very frequently there 
occurs a metamorphosis, which has for its leading trait a 
great change in the ratio of these two systems — a meta- 
morphosis which accompanies a great change in the mode 
of life. The most familiar metamorphosis is variously 
illustrated among insects. During the early or larval 
stage of a butterfly, the organs of alimentation are largely 
developed, while the organs of external relation are but 
little developed ; and then, during a period of quiescence 
the organs of external relation undergo an immense devel- 
ment, making possible the creature's active and varied ad- 
justments to the surrounding world, while the alimentary 
system becomes relatively small. On the other hand, 
among the lower invertebrate animals there is a very com- 
mon metamorphosis of an opposite kind. When young, 
the creature, with scarcely any alimentary system, but sup- 
plied with limbs and sense organs, swims about actively. 
Presently it settles in a habitat where food is to be ob- 
tained without moving about, loses in great part its organs 
of external relation, develops its visceral system, and, as 
it grows, assumes a nature utterly unlike that which it 
originally had — a nature adapted almost exclusively to 
alimentation and the propagation of the species. 

Let us turn now to the social organism, and the anal- 
ogies of structure and function which may be traced in it. 
Of course these analogies between the phenomena pre- 
sented in a physically coherent aggregate forming an indi- 
vidual, and the phenomena presented in a physically inco- 
herent aggregate of individuals distributed over a wide 
area, cannot be analogies of a visible or sensible kind ; but 
can only be analogies between the systems, or methods, 



248 SPECIALIZED ADMDTCSTBATION. 

of organization. Such analogies as exist result from the 
one unquestionable community between the two organ- 
izations : there isHn doth a mutual dependence of parts . 
This is the origin of all organization ; and determines 
what similarities there are between an individual organ- 
ism and a social organism. Of course the similarities thus 
determined are accompanied by transcendent differences, 
determined, as above said, by the unlikenesses of the ag- 
gregates. One cardinal difference is that, while in the in- 
dividual organism there is but one centre of consciousness 
capable of pleasure or pain, there are, in the social organ- 
ism, as many such centres as there are individuals, and the 
aggregate of them has no consciousness of pleasure or pain 
— a difference which entirely changes the ends to be pur- 
sued. Bearing in mind this qualification, let us now 
glance at the parallelisms indicated. 

A society, like an individual, has a set of structures fit- 
ting it to act upon its environment — appliances for attack 
and defence, armies, navies, fortified and garrisoned places. 
At the same time, a society has an industrial organization 
which carries on all those processes that make possible the 
national life. Though these two sets of organs for exter- 
nal activity and internal activity do not bear to one an- 
other just the same relation which the outer and inner or- 
gans of an animal do (since the industrial structures in a 
society supply themselves with raw materials, instead of 
being supplied by the external organs), yet they bear a 
relation otherwise similar. There is at once a cooperation 
and an antagonism. By the help of the defensive system 
the industrial system is enabled to carry on its functions 
without injury from foreign enemies ; and by the help of 
the industrial system, which supplies it with food and ma- 
terials, the defensive system is enabled to maintain this 
security. At the same time the two systems are opposed 



BALANCING OF SOCIAL NEEDS. 249 

in so far that they both depend for their existence upon 
the common stock of produce. Further, in the social or- 
ganism, as in the individual organism, this primary coop- 
eration and antagonism subdivides into secondary coop- 
erations and antagonisms. If we look at the industrial 
organization, we see that its agricultural part and its man- 
ufacturing part aid one another by the exchange of their 
products, and are yet otherwise opposed to one another ; 
since each takes of the other's products the most it can 
get in return for its own products. Similarly throughout 
the manufacturing system itself. Of the total returns 
secured by Manchester for its goods, Liverpool obtains as 
much as possible for the raw material, and Manchester 
gives as little as possible — the two at the same time coop- 
erating in secreting for the rest of the community the 
woven fabrics it requires, and in jointly obtaining from the 
rest of the community the largest payment in other com- 
modities. And thus it is in all kinds of direct and indi- 
rect ways throughout the industrial structures. Men 
prompted by their own needs as well as those of their 
children, and bodies of such men more or less aggregated, 
are quick to find every unsatisfied need of their fellow- 
men, and to satisfy it in return for the satisfaction of their 
own needs ; and the working of this process is inevitably 
such that the strongest need, ready to pay the most for 
satisfaction, is that which draws most workers to satisfy it, 
so that there is thus a perpetual balancing of the needs 
and of the appliances which subserve them. 

This brings us to the regulative structures under which 
these two systems of cooperating parts work. As in the 
individual organism, so in the social organism, the outer 
parts are under a rigorous central control. For adjust- 
ment to the varying and incalculable changes in the envi- 
ronment, the external organs, offensive and defensive. 



250 SPECIALIZED ADMINISTRATION. 

must be capable of prompt combination ; and that their 
actions may be quickly combined to meet each exigency 
as it arises, they must be completely subordinated to a su- 
preme executive power — armies and navies must be des- 
potically controlled. Quite otherwise is it with the regu- 
lative apparatus required for the industrial system. This, 
which carries on the nutrition of a society, as the visceral 
system carries on the nutrition of an individual, has a reg- 
ulative apparatus in great measure distinct from that 
which regulates the external organs. It is not by any 
" order in council " that farmers are determined to grow 
so much wheat and so much barley, or to divide their land 
in due proportion between arable and pasture. There re- 
quires no telegram from the Home Office to alter the pro- 
duction of woollens in Leeds, so that it may be properly 
adjusted to the stocks on hand and the forthcoming crop 
of wool. Staffordshire produces its due quantity of pot- 
tery, and Sheffield sends out cutlery with rapidity adjusted 
to the consumption, without any legislative stimulus or 
restraint. The spurs and checks to production which 
manufacturers and manufacturing centres receive, have 
quite another origin. Partly by direct orders from dis- 
tributors and partly by the indirect indications furnished 
by the market reports throughout the kingdom, they are 
prompted to secrete actively or to diminish their rates of 
secretion. The regulative apparatus by which these in- 
dustrial organs are made to cooperate harmoniously, acts 
somewhat as the sympathetic does in a vertebrate animal. 
There is a system of communications among the great 
producing and distributing centres, which excites or re- 
tards as the circumstances vary. From hour to horn- 
messages pass between all the chief provincial towns, as 
well as between each of them and London ; from hour to 
hour prices are adjusted, supplies are ordered hither or 



EQUALIZATION OP SOCIAL ACTIONS. 251 

thither, and capital is drafted from place to place, accord- 
ing as there is greater or less need for it. All this goes on 
without any ministerial overseeing — without any dictation 
from those execntive centres which combine the actions of 
the outer organs. There is, however, one all-essential in- 
fluence which these higher centres exercise over the indus- 
trial activities — a restraining influence which prevents ag- 
gression, direct and indirect. The condition under which 
only these producing and distributing processes can go on 
healthfully is that, wherever there is work and waste, there 
shall be a proportionate supply of materials for repair. 
And securing this is nothing less than secnring fulfilment 
of contracts. Just in the same way that a bodily organ which 
performs function, but is not adequately paid in blood, must 
dwindle, and the organism as a whole eventually suffer ; so 
an industrial centre which has made and sent out its spe- 
cial commodity, but does not get adequately paid in other 
commodities, must decay. And when we ask what is 
requisite to prevent this local innutrition and decay, we 
find the requisite to be that agreements shall be carried 
out ; the goods shall be paid for at the stipulated prices ; 
that justice shall be administered. 

One further leading parallelism must be described — 
that between the metamorphoses which occur in the two 
cases. These metamorphoses are analogous in so far that 
they are changes in the ratios of the inner and outer sys- 
tems of organs ; and also in so far as they take place under 
analogous conditions. At the one extreme we have that 
small and simple type of society which a wandering horde 
of savages presents. This is a type almost wholly preda- 
tory in its organization. It consists of little else than a co- 
operative structure for carrying on warfare — the industrial 
part is almost absent, being represented only by the wom- 
en. "When the wandering tribe becomes a settled tribe, an 



252 SPECIALIZED ADMINISTRATION. 

industrial organization begins to show itself — especially 
where, by conquest, there has been obtained a slave-class 
that may be forced to labor. The predatory structure, 
however, still for a long time predominates. Omitting 
the slaves and the women, the whole body politic consists 
of parts organized for offence and defence, and is efficient 
in proportion as the control of them is centralized. Com- 
munities of this kind, continuing to subjugate their neigh- 
bors, and developing an organization of some complexity, 
may nevertheless retain a mainly-predatory type, with 
just such industrial structures as are needful for support- 
ing the offensive and defensive structures. Of this Sparta 
furnished a good example. The characteristics of such a 
social type are these — that each member of the ruling 
race is a soldier ; that war is the business of life ; that 
every one is subject to a rigorous discipline fitting him for 
this business ; that centralized authority regulates all the 
social activities, down to the details of each man's daily 
conduct ; that the welfare of the State is every thing, and 
that the individual lives for public benefit. So long as 
the environing societies are such as necessitate and keep 
in exercise the predatory organization, these traits con- 
tinue ; but when, mainly by conquest and the formation 
of large aggregates, the predatory activity becomes less 
constant, and war ceases to be the occupation of every 
free man, the industrial structures begin to predominate. 
"Without tracing the transition, it will suffice to take, as 
a sample of the pacific or industrial type, the Xorthern 
States of America before the late war. Here military or- 
ganization had almost disappeared; the infrequent local 
assemblings of militia had turned into occasions for jol- 
lity, and every thing martial had fallen into contempt. 
The traits of the pacific or industrial type are these — that 
the central authority is relatively feeble; that it interferes 



CHANGE OF SOCIAL TYPES. 253 

scarcely at all with the private actions of individuals ; and 
that the State, instead of being that for the benefit of 
which individuals exist, has become that which exists for 
the benefit of individuals. 

It remains to add that this metamorphosis, which takes 
place in societies along with a higher civilization, very 
rapidly retrogrades if the surrounding conditions become 
unfavorable to it. During the late war in America, Mr. 
Seward's boast — " I touch this bell, and any. man in the 
remotest State is a prisoner of the Government " (a boast 
which was not an empty one, and which was by many of 
the Republican party greatly applauded) — shows us how 
rapidly, along with predatory activities, there tends to be 
resumed the needful type of centralized structure; and 
how there quickly grow up the corresponding sentiments 
and ideas. Our own history since 1815 has shown a 
double change of this kind. During the thirty years' 
peace, the predatory organization dwindled, the military 
sentiment greatly decreased, the industrial organization 
rapidly developed, the assertion of the individuality of the 
citizen became more decided, and many restrictive and 
despotic regulations were got rid of. Conversely, since 
the revival of predatory activities and structures on the 
Continent, our own offensive and defensive structures 
have been redeveloping, and the tendency toward increase 
of that centralized control which accompanies such struct- 
ures has become marked. 

And now, closing this somewhat elaborate introduc- 
tion, I am prepared to deal with the question put to me. 
Prof. Huxley, after quoting some passages from that es- 
say on the " Social Organism" which I have supplemented 
in the foregoing paragraphs ; and after expressing a quali- 
fied concurrence which I greatly value as coming from so 



254 SPECIALIZED AmnXISTRATIOX. 

highly fitted a judge, proceeds, with characteristic acumen, 
to comment on what seems an incongruity between certain 
analogies set forth in that essay, and the doctrine I hold 
respecting the duty of the State. Referring to a passage 
in which I have described the function of the individual 
brain as " that of averaging the interests of life, physical, 
intellectual, moral, social," and have compared it to the 
function of Parliament as " that of averaging the interests 
of the various classes in a community," adding that " a 
good Parliament is one in which the parties answering to 
these respective interests are so balanced that their united 
legislation concedes to each class as much as consists with 
the claims of the rest" — Prof. Huxley proceeds to say : 

"All this appears to be very just. But if the resemblances be- 
tween the body physiological and the body politic are any indica- 
tion, not only of what the latter is, and how it has become what it is, 
but what it ought to be, and what it is tending to become, I cannot 
but think that the real force of the analogy is totally opposed to 
the negative view of State function. 

" Suppose that, in accordance with this view, each muscle were 
to maintain that the nervous system had no right to interfere with 
its contraction, except to prevent it from hindering the contraction 
of another muscle; or each gland, that it had a right to secrete, so 
long as its secretion interfered with no other ; suppose every sepa- 
rate cell left free to follow its own " interest, 1 ' and laissez-faire Lord 
of all, what would become of the body physiological? "^ 

On this question the remark I have first to make is, 
that if I held the doctrine of M. Proudhon, who deliber- 
ately named himself an " anarchist," and if along with 
this doctrine I held the above-indicated theory of social 
structures and functions, the inconsistency implied by the 
question put would be clear, and the question would be un- 
answerable. But since I entertain no such view as that of 
Proudhon — since I hold that within its proper limits gov- 
ernmental action is not simply legitimate but all-important 



REGULATIVE FUNCTIONS OF THE STATE. 255 

' — 1 do not see how I am concerned with a question which 
tacitly supposes that I deny the legitimacy and the impor- 
tance. Not only do I contend that the restraining power 
of the State over individuals, and bodies or classes of in- 
dividuals, is requisite, but I have contended that it should 
be exercised much more effectually, and carried out much 
further, than at present.* And as the maintenance of 
this control implies the maintenance of a controlling appa- 
ratus, I do not see that I am placed in any difficulty when 
I am asked what would happen were the controlling appa- 
ratus forbidden to interfere. Further, on this general as- 
pect of the question I have to add that, by comparing the 
deliberative assembly of a nation to the deliberative ner- 
vous centre of a vertebrate animal, as respectively averag- 
ing the interests of the society and of the individual, and 
as both doing this through processes of representation, I do 
not mean to identify the two sets of interests ; for these 
in a society (or at least a peaceful society) refer mainly to 
interior actions, while in an individual creature they refer 
mainly to exterior actions. The " interests " to which I 
refer, as being averaged by a representative governing 
body, are the conflicting interests between class and class, 
as well as between man and man — conflicting interests the 
balancing of which is nothing but the preventing of ag- 
gression and the administration of justice. 

I pass now from this general aspect of the question, 
which does not concern me, to a more special aspect 
which does concern me. Dividing the actions of govern- 
ing structures, whether in bodies individual or bodies 
politic, into the positively regulative and the negatively 
regulative, or those which stimulate and direct, as dis- 
tinguished from those which simply restrain, I may say 
that if there is raised the question — "What will happen 

* See " Social Statics," chap, xxi., "The Duty of the State." 



256 SPECIALIZED ADMIXISTEATIOX. 

when the controlling apparatus does not act ? there are 
quite different replies according as one or other system 
of organs is referred to. If, in the individual body, the 
muscles were severally independent of the deliberative and 
executive centres, utter impotence would result : in the 
absence of muscular coordination, there would be no pos- 
sibility of standing, much less of acting on surrounding 
things, and the body would be a prey to the first enemy. 
Properly to combine the actions of these outer organs, the 
great nervous centres must exercise functions that are 
both positively regulative and negatively regulative — 
must both command action and arrest action. Similarly 
with the outer organs of a political body. Unless the 
offensive and defensive structures can be despotically com- 
manded by a central authority, there cannot be those 
prompt combinations and adjustments required for meet- 
ing the variable actions of external enemies. But if, in- 
stead of asking what would happen supposing the outer 
organs in either case were without control from the great 
governing centres, we ask what would happen were the 
inner organs (the industrial and commercial structures in 
the one case, and the alimentary and distributive in the 
other) without such control, the answer is quite different. 
Omitting the respiratory and some minor ancillary parts 
of the individual organism, to which the social organism has 
nothing analogous ; and limiting ourselves to absorptive, 
elaborative, and distributive structures, which are found in 
both ; it may, I think, be successfully contended that in 
neither the one case nor the other do they require the posi- 
tively regulative control of the great governing centres, but 
only the negatively regulative. Let us glance at the facts.* 

* Lest there should be any misunderstanding of the terms positiv-:' 
lative and negatively regulative, let me briefly illustrate them. If a man has 
land, and I either cultivate it for him, partially or wholly, t>r dictate any or 



CONTROL OF THE ORGANIC FUNCTIONS. 257 

Digestion and circulation go on very well in lunatics 
and idiots, though the higher nervous centres are either 
deranged or partly absent. The vital functions proceed 
properly during sleep, though less actively than when the 
brain is at work. In infancy, while the cerebro-spinal 
system is almost incapable, and cannot even perform such 
simple actions as those of commanding the sphincters, the 
visceral functions are active and regular. Nor in an adult 
does that arrest of cerebral action shown by insensibility, 
or that extensive paralysis of the spinal system which 
renders all the limbs immovable, prevent these functions 
from being carried on for a considerable time; though 
they necessarily begin to flag in the absence of the de- 
mand which an active system of outer organs makes upon 
them. These internal organs are, indeed, so little under 
the positively directive control of the great nervous 
centres, that their independence is often very inconven- 
ient. ~No mandate sent into the interior stops an attack 
of diarrhoea ; nor, when an indigestible meal excites the 
circulation at night, and prevents sleep, will the bidding 
of the brain cause the heart to pulsate more quietly. It 
is doubtless true that these vital processes are modified in 
important ways, both by general stimulation and by in- 
hibition, from the cerebro-spinal system; but that they 
are mainly independent cannot, I think, be questioned. 
The facts that peristaltic motion of the intestines can go 
on when their nervous connections are cut, and that the 

all of his modes of cultivation, my action is positively regulative ; but, if, leav- 
ing him absolutely unhelped and unregulated in his farming, I simply prevent 
him from taking his neighbor's crops, or from making approach-roads over 
his neighbor's land, or from depositing rubbish upon it, my action is nega- 
tively regulative. There is a tolerably sharp distinction between the act of 
securing a citizen's ends for him or interfering with his mode of securing 
them, and the act of checking him when he interferes with another citizen 
in the pursuit of his ends. 



258 SPECIALIZED ADMINISTRATION. 

heart (in cold-blooded vertebrates, at least) continues to 
pulsate for some time after being detached from the body, 
make it manifest that the spontaneous activities of these 
vital organs subserve the wants of the body at large with- 
out direction from its higher governing centres. And 
this is made even more manifest if it be a fact, as alleged 
by Schmulewitsch experimenting under Lud wig's direc- 
tion, that, under duly-adjusted conditions, the secretion 
of bile may be kept up for some time when blood is 
passed through the excised liver of a newly-killed rabbit. 
There is an answer, not, I think, unsatisfactory, even to 
the crucial part of the question — " Suppose every sepa- 
rate cell left free to follow its own interests, and laissez- 
faire Lord of all, what would become of the body physio- 
logical ? " Limiting the application of this question in the 
way above shown to the organs and parts of organs which 
carry on vital actions, it seems to me that much evidence 
may be given for the belief that, when they follow their 
respective " interests " (limited here to growing and mul- 
tiplying), the general welfare will be tolerably well se- 
cured. It was proved by Hunter's experiments on a kite 
and a sea-gull, that a part of the alimentary canal which 
has to triturate harder food than that which the creature 
naturally eats, acquires a thicker and harder lining. 
When a stricture of the intestine impedes the passage of 
its contents, the muscular walls of the intestine above, 
thicken and propel the contents with greater force. 
"When there is somewhere in the course of a circulation a 
serious resistance to the passage of blood, there habitually 
occurs hypertrophy of the heart, or thickening of its mus- 
cular walls ; giving it greater power to propel the blood. 
And similarly, when the duct through which it discharges 
its contents is obstructed, the gall-bladder thickens and 
strengthens. These changes go on without any direction 



ANALOGY OF NERVELESS ANIMALS. 259 

from the brain — without any consciousness that they are 
going on. They are effected by the growth, or multipli- 
cation, or adaptation, of the local units, be they cells or 
fibres, which results from the greater action or modified 
action thrown upon them. The only prerequisite to this 
spontaneous adaptive change is, that these local units shall 
be supplied with extra blood in proportion as they per- 
form extra function — a prerequisite answering to that se- 
cured by the administration of justice in a society ; name- 
ly, that more work shall bring more pay. If, however, 
direct proof be called for that a system of organs may, by 
carrying on their several independent activities uncon- 
trolled, secure the welfare of the aggregate they form, we 
have it in that extensive class of creatures which do not 
possess any nervous systems at all ; and which neverthe- 
less show, some of them, considerable degrees of activity. 
The Oceanic Hydrozoa supply good examples. Notwith- 
standing " the multiplicity and complexity of the organs 
which some of them possess," these creatures have no ner- 
vous centres — no regulative apparatus by which the ac- 
tions of their organs are coordinated. One of their higher 
kinds is composed of different parts distinguished as coeno- 
sarc, polypites, tentacles, hydrocysts, nectocalyces, geno- 
calyces, etc., and each of these different parts is com- 
posed of many partially-independent units — thread-cells, 
ciliated cells, contractile fibres, etc. ; so that the whole or- 
ganism is a group of heterogeneous groups, each one of 
which is itself a more or less heterogeneous group. And, 
in the absence of a nervous system, the arrangement must 
necessarily be such that these different units, and different 
groups of units, severally pursuing their individual lives 
without positive direction from the rest, nevertheless do, 
by virtue of their constitutions, and the relative positions 
into which they have grown, cooperate for the mainte- 



2G0 SPECIALIZED ADMENISTEATIOX. 

nance of one another and the entire aggregate. And if 
this can be so with a set of organs that are not connected 
by nerves, much more can it be so with a set of organs 
which, like the viscera of a higher animal, have a special 
set of nervous communications for exciting one another to 
cooperation. 

Let us turn now to the parallel classes of phenomena 
which the social organism presents. In it, as in the indi- 
vidual organism, we find that while the system of external 
organs must be rigorously subordinated to a great govern- 
ing centre which positively regulates it, the system of in- 
ternal organs needs no such positive regulation. The 
production and interchange by which the national life is 
maintained, go on as well while Parliament is not sitting 
as while it is sitting. When the members of the Ministry 
are following grouse or stalking deer, Liverpool imports, 
Manchester manufactures, London distributes, just as usual. 
All that is needful for the normal performance of these 
internal social functions is, that the restraining or inhibi- 
tory structures shall continue in action : these activities oi 
individuals, corporate bodies, and classes, must be carried 
on in such ways as not to transgress certain conditions 
necessitated by the simultaneous carrying on of other ac- 
tivities. So long as order is maintained, and the fulfil - 
ment of contracts is everywhere enforced — so long as 
there is secured to each citizen, and each combination of 
citizens, the full return agreed upon for work done or 
commodities produced; and so long as each may enjoy 
what he obtains by labor, without trenching on his neigh- 
bor's like ability to enjoy; these functions will go on 
healthfully — more healthfully, indeed, than when regulated 
in any other way. Fully to recognize the fact, it is 
needful only to look at the origins and actions of the lead- 
ing industrial structures. ATe will take two of them, the 
most remote from one another in their natures. 



SELF-REGULATION IN SOCIETY. 261 

The first shall be those by which food is produced and 
distributed. In the fourth of his " Introductory Lectures 
on Political Economy," Archbishop Whately remarks that : 

"Many of the most important objects are accomplished by the 
joint agency of persons who never think of them, nor have any idea 
of acting in concert; and that, with a certainty, completeness, and 
regularity, which probably the most diligent benevolence, under the 
guidance of the greatest human wisdom, could never have attained." 

To enforce this truth he goes on to say : " Let any one 
propose to himself the problem of supplying with daily 
provisions of all kinds such a city as our metropolis, con- 
taining above a million of inhabitants." And then he 
points out the many immense difficulties of the task 
caused by inconstancy in the arrival of supplies ; by the 
perishable nature of many of the commodities ; by the 
fluctuating number of consumers ; by the heterogeneity 
of their demands ; by variations in the stocks, immediate 
and remote, and the need for adjusting the rate of con- 
sumption ; and by the complexity in the process of dis- 
tribution, required to bring due quantities of these many 
commodities to the homes of all citizens. And, having 
dwelt on these many difficulties, he finishes his picture by 
saying : 

" Yet this object is accomplished far better than it could be by 
any effort of human wisdom, through the agency of men, who think 
each of nothing beyond his own immediate interest — who, with that 
object in view, perform their respective parts with cheerful zeal — 
and combine unconsciously to employ the wisest means for effecting 
an object, the vastness of which it would bewilder them even to 
contemplate." 

But though the far-spreading and complex organization 
by which foods of all kinds are produced, prepared,- and 
distributed throughout the entire kingdom, is a natural 
growth and not a State manufacture ; though the State 



262 SPECIALIZED ADMINISTRATION. 

does not determine where and in what quantities cereals 
and cattle and sheep shall be reared ; though it does not 
arrange their respective prices so as to make supplies last 
until fresh supplies can come ; though it has done nothing 
toward causing that great improvement of quality which 
has taken place in food since early times ; though it has 
not the credit of that elaborate apparatus by which bread, 
and meat, and milk, and groceries, come round to our 
doors with a daily pulse that is as regular as the pulse of 
the heart ; yet the State has not been wholly passive. It 
has from time to time done a great deal of mischief. 
When Edward I. forbade all towns to harbor forestallers, 
and when Edward VI. made it penal to buy grain for the 
purpose of selling it again, they were preventing the pro- 
cess by which consumption is adjusted to supply; they 
were doing all that could be done to insure alternations 
of abundance and starvation. Similarly with the many 
legislative attempts since made to regulate one branch or 
other of the food-industry, down to the corn-law sliding- 
scale of odious memory. For the marvellous efficiency of 
this organization we are indebted to private enterprise ; 
while the derangements of it we owe to the positively- 
regulative action of the Government. Meanwhile, the 
negatively-regulative action required to keep this organi- 
zation in order, Government has not duly performed. A 
quick and costless remedy for breach of contract, when a 
trader sells, as the commodity asked for, what proves to be 
wholly or in part some other commodity, is still wanting. 
Our second case shall be the organization which so im- 
mensely facilitates commerce by transfers of claims and 
credits. Banks were not inventions of rulers or their 
counsellors. They grew up by small stages out ot^ the 
transactions of traders with one another. Men who for 
security deposited money with goldsmiths, and took re- 



GK0WTH OF THE BANKING SYSTEM. 2G£ 

ceipts ; goldsmiths who began to lend out at interest the 
moneys left with them, and then to offer interest at lower 
rates to those who would deposit money ; were the found- 
ers of them. And when, as presently happened, the re- 
ceipt-notes became transferable by indorsement, banking 
commenced. From that stage upward the development, 
notwithstanding many hinderances, has gone on naturally. 
Banks have sprung up under the same stimulus which has 
produced all other kinds of trading bodies ; the multiplied 
forms of credit have been gradually differentiated from the 
original form ; and while the banking system has spread 
and become complex, it has also become consolidated into 
a whole by a spontaneous process. The clearing-house, 
which is a place for carrying on the banking between 
bankers, arose unobtrusively out of the effort to econo- 
mize time and money. And when, in 1862, Sir John 
Lubbock — not in his legislative capacity, but in his capa- 
city as banker — succeeded in extending the privileges of 
the clearing-house to country banks, the unification was 
made perfect ; so that now the transactions of any trader 
in the kingdom with any other may be completed by the 
writing off and balancing of claims in bankers' books. 
This natural evolution, be it observed, has reached with 
us a higher phase than has been reached where the posi- 
tively-regulative control of the State is more decided. 
They have no clearing-house in France ; and, in France, 
the method of making payments by checks, so dominant 
among ourselves, is very little employed and in an imper- 
fect way. I do not mean to imply that in England the 
IS tat e has been a mere spectator of this development. 
Unfortunately, it has from the beginning had relations 
with banks and bankers : not much, however, to their ad- 
vantage, or that of the public. The first kind of deposit- 
bank was in some sense a State-bank : merchants left funds 



284 SPECIALIZED ADMINISTEATTON. 

for security at the Mint in the Tower. But when Charles 
I. appropriated their property without consent, and gave 
it back to them only under pressure, after a long delay, 
he destroyed their confidence. Similarly, when Charles 
II., in furtherance of State-business, came to have habitual 
transactions with the richer of the private bankers ; and 
when, having got nearly a million and a half of their 
money in the Exchequer, he stole it, ruined a multitude 
of merchants, distressed ten thousand depositors, and 
made some lunatics and suicides, he gave a considerable 
shock to the banking system as it then existed. Though 
the results of State-relations with banks in later times 
have not been so disastrous in this direct way, yet they 
have been indirectly disastrous — perhaps even in a greater 
degree. In return for a loan, the State gave the Bank of 
England special privileges ; and fur the increase and con- 
tinuance of this loan the bribe was the maintenance of 
these privileges — privileges which immensely hindered the 
development of banks. The State did worse — it led the 
Bank of England to the verge of bankruptcy by a forced 
issue of notes, and then authorized it to break its prom- 
ises to pay. Nay, worse still, it prevented the Bank of 
England from fulfilling its promises to pay when it wished 
to fulfil them. The evils that have arisen from the posi- 
tively-regulative action of the State on banks are too 
multitudinous to be here enumerated. They may be 
found in the writings of Tookc, Xcwmaivh, Fullarton. 
Macleod, "Wilson, J. S. Mill, and others. All we have 
here to note is, that while the enterprise of citizens in the 
pursuit of private ends has developed this great trading 
process, which so greatly iacilitates all other trading-pro- 
cesses, Governments have over and over again disturbed 
it to an almost fatal extent ; and that, while they have 
done immense mischief of one kind by their positively- 



EXAMPLES OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISE. 265 

regulative action, they have done immense mischief of 
another kind by failing in their negatively-regulative ac- 
tion. They have not done the one thing they had to do : 
they have not uniformly insisted on fulfilment of contract 
between the banker and the customer who takes his prom- 
ise to pay on demand. 

Between these two cases of the trade in food and the 
trade in money might be put the cases of other trades — 
all of them carried on by organizations similarly evolved, 
and similarly more or less deranged from time to time by 
State-meddling. Passing over these, however, let us turn 
from the positive method of elucidation to the compara- 
tive method. When it is questioned whether the spon- 
taneous cooperation of men in pursuit of personal benefits 
will adequately work out the general good, we may get 
guidance for judgment by comparing the results achieved 
in societies where spontaneous cooperation has been most 
active and least regulated, with the results achieved in so- 
cieties where spontaneous cooperation has been less trusted 
and State-action more trusted. Two cases, furnished by 
the two leading nations on the Continent, will suffice : 

In France, the Ecole des Ponts et Chaussees was found- 
ed in 1747 for educating civil engineers; and in 1795 
was founded the Ecole Polytechnique, serving, among 
other purposes, to give a general scientific training to 
those who were afterward to be more specially trained 
for civil engineering. Averaging the two dates, we may 
say that for a century France has had a State-established 
and State-maintained appliance for producing skilled men 
of this class — a double gland, we may call it, to secrete 
engineering faculty for public use. In England, until 
quite recently, we have had no institution for preparing 
civil engineers. ISTot by intention, but unconsciously, we 
left the furnishing of engineering faculty to take place 

12 



266 SPECIALIZED ADiTINISTRATION. 

under the law " of supply and demand — a law which at 
present seems to be no more recognized as applying to 
education, than it was recognized as applying to com- 
merce in the days of bounties and restrictions. This, 
however, by the way. "We have here simply to note that 
Brindley, Smeaton, Rennie, Telford, and the rest, down to 
George Stephenson, acquired their knowledge, and got 
their experience, without State aid or supervision. "What 
have been the comparative results in the two nations ? 
Space does not allow a detailed comparison : the later re- 
sults must suffice. Railways originated in England, not 
in France. Railways spread through England faster than 
through France. Many railways in France were laid out 
and officered by English engineers. The earlier French 
railways were made by English contractors.; and English 
locomotives served the French makers as models. The 
first French work written on locomotive engines, published 
about ISiO (at least I had a copy at that date), was by the 
Comte de Pambour, who had studied in England, and 
who gave in his work nothing whatever but drawings and 
descriptions of the engines of English makers. 

The second illustration is supplied to us by the model 
nation, now so commonly held up to us for imitation. 
Let us contrast London and Berlin in respect of an all- 
essential appliance for the comfort and health of citizens. 
"When, at the beginning of the seventeenth century, the 
springs and local conduits, supplemented by water-carriers, 
failed to supply the Londoners ; and when the water-fam- 
ine, for a long time borne, had tailed to make the Corpo- 
ration do more than propose schemes, and had not spurred 
the central government to do any thing ; Hugh Myddleton, 
a merchant citizen, took in hand himself the work of 
bringing the New River to Islington. "When he had half- 
completed the work, the king came to his help — not, in- 



CASES OF WATER-SUPPLY. 267 

deed, in his capacity of ruler, but in the capacity of specu- 
lator, investing his money with a view to profit : his share 
being disposed of by his successor after the formation of 
the New Biver Company, which finished the distributing 
system. Subsequently, the formation of other water-com- 
panies, utilizing other sources, has given London a water- 
supply that has grown with its growth. What, mean- 
while, happened at Berlin ? Did there in 1613, when 
Hugh Myddleton completed his work, grow up there a 
like efficient system % Not at all. The seventeenth cen- 
tury passed, the eighteenth century passed, the middle of 
the nineteenth century was reached, and still Berlin had no 
water-supply like that of London. What happened then ? 
Did the paternal government at length do what had been 
so long left undone? No. Did the citizens at length 
unite to secure the desideratum % No. It was finally 
achieved by the citizens of another nation, more accus- 
tomed to cooperate in securing their own profits by minis- 
tering to public needs. In 1845 an English company was 
formed for giving Berlin an adequate water-supply ; and 
the work was executed by English contractors — Messrs. 
Fox and Crampton. 

Should it be said that great works of ancient nations, 
in the shape of aqueducts, roads, etc., might be instanced 
in proof that State agency secures such ends, or should it 
be said that a comparison between the early growth of in- 
land navigation on the Continent, and its later growth 
here, would be to our disadvantage, I reply that, little as 
they at first seem so, these facts are congruous with the gen- 
eral doctrine. While the predatory social type is domi- 
nant, and the industrial organization but little developed, 
there is but one coordinating agency for regulating both 
sets of activities, just as we saw happens with the lower 
types of individual organisms. It is only when a consid- 



268 SPECIALIZED ADMDsISTKATTON. 

erable advance has been made in that metamorphosis 
which develops the industrial structures at the expense of 
the predatory structures, and which brings along with it a 
substantially independent coordinating agency for the in- 
dustrial structures — it is only then that the efficiency of 
these spontaneous cooperations for all purposes of internal 
social life becomes greater than the efficiency of the central 
governing agency. 

Possibly it will be said that, though, for subserving ma- 
terial needs, the actions of individuals, stimulated by ne- 
cessity and made quick by competition, are demonstrably 
adequate, they are not adequate for subserving other 
needs. I do not see, however, that the facts justify this 
position. "We have but to glance around to find in abun- 
dance- similarly-generated appliances for satisfying our 
higher desires, as well as our lower desires. The fact that 
the Fine Arts have not thriven here as much as in some 
Continental countries is ascribable to natural character, to 
absorption of our energies in other activities, and to the 
repressive influence of chronic asceticism, rather than to 
the absence of fostering agencies : these the interests of 
individuals have provided in abundance. Literature, in 
which we are second to none, owes, with us, nothing to 
State aid. The poetry which will live is poetry which has 
been written without official prompting, and, though we 
have habitually had a prize-poet, paid to write loyal verse-, 
it may be said, without disparaging the present one, that a 
glance over the entire list does not show any benefit de- 
rived by poetry from State patronage. Nor are other 
forms of literature any more indebted to State patronage. 
It was because there was a public liking for fiction that 
fiction began to be produced, and the continued public 
liking causes a continued production, including, along 
with much that is worthless, much that could not have 



CASE OF THE NEWSPAPER PRESS. 269 

been made better by any academic or other supervision. 
And the like holds of biographies, histories, scientific 
books, etc. Or, as a still more striking case of an agency 
that has grown np to meet a non-material want, take the 
newspaper press. "What has been the genesis of this mar- 
vellous appliance, which each day gives us an abstract of 
the world's life the day before? Under what promptings 
have there been got together its staffs of editors, sub-edi- 
tors, article-writers, reviewers ; its reporters of parliamen- 
tary debates, of public meetings, of law cases and police 
cases ; its critics of music, theatricals, paintings, etc. ; its 
correspondents in all parts of the world % "Who devised 
and brought to perfection this system which at six o'clock 
in the morning gives the people of Edinburgh a report of 
the debates that ended at two or three o'clock in the 
House of Commons, and at the same time tells them of 
events that occurred the day before in America ? It is 
not a Government invention. It is not a Government 
suggestion. It has not been in any way improved or de- 
veloped by legislation. On the contrary, it has grown up 
in spite of many hinderances from the Government, and 
burdens which the Government has imposed on it. For a 
long time the reporting of parliamentary debates was re- 
sisted ; for generations censorships and prosecutions kept 
newspapers down, and for several subsequent generations 
the laws in force negatived a cheap press, and the educa- 
tional benefits accompanying it. From the war-corre- 
spondent, whose letters give to the very nations that are 
fighting their only trustworthy accounts of what is being 
done, down to the newsboy who brings round the third 
edition with the latest telegrams, the whole organization 
is a product of spontaneous cooperation among private in- 
dividuals, aiming to benefit themselves by ministering to 
the intellectual needs of their fellows — aiming also, not a 



270 SPECIALIZED ADMIXISTBATIOX. 

few of them, to benefit their fellows by giving them 
clearer ideas and a higher standard of right. JSay, more 
than this is true. "While the press is not indebted to the 
Government, the Government is enormously indebted to 
the press, without which, indeed, it would stumble daily 
in the performance of its functions. This agency, which 
the State once did its best to put down, and has all along 
impeded, now gives to the ministers news in anticipation 
of their dispatches, gives to members of Parliament a 
guiding knowledge of public opinion, and enables them to 
speak from the House of Commons benches to their con- 
stituents, and gives to both legislative chambers a full 
record of their proceedings. 

I do not see, therefore, how there can be any doubt 
respecting the sufficiency of agencies thus originating. 
The truth, that, in this condition of mutual dependence 
brought about by social life, there inevitably grow up ar- 
rangements such that each secures his own ends by min- 
istering to the ends of others, seems to have been for a 
long time one of those open secrets which remain secret 
because they are so open ; and even now the conspicuous- 
ness of this truth seems to cause an imperfect conscious- 
ness of its full meaning. The evidence shows, however, 
that, even were there no other form of spontaneous 
cooperation among men than that dictated by self-inter- 
est, it might be rationally held that this, under the neg- 
atively-regulative control of a central power, would work 
out, in proper order, the appliances for satisfying all needs, 
and carrying on healthfully all the essential social functions. 

But there is a further kind of spontaneous coopera- 
tion, arising, like the other, independently of State action, 
which takes a large share in satisfying certain classes of 
needs. Familiar though it is, this kind of spontaneous co- 
operation is habitually ignored in sociological discussions 



AGENCY OF SYMPATHY. 271 

Alike from newspaper articles and parliamentary debates, 
it might be inferred that, beyond the force due to men's 
selfish activities, there is no other social force than the 
governmental force. There seems to be a deliberate omis- 
sion of the fact that, in addition to their selfish interests, 
men have sympathetic interests, which, acting individually 
and cooperatively, work out results scarcely less remark- 
able than those which the selfish interests work out. It is 
true that, during the earlier phases of social evolution, 
while yet the type is mainly predatory, agencies thus pro- 
duced do not exist : among the Spartans, I suppose, there 
were few, if any, philanthropic agencies. But as there 
arise forms of society leading toward the pacific type — 
forms in which the industrial organization develops itself, 
and men's activities become of a kind that do not perpetu- 
ally sear their sympathies — these structures which their 
sympathies generate become many and important. To 
the egoistic interests, and the cooperations prompted by 
them, there come to be added the altruistic interests and 
their cooperations ; and, what the one set fails to do, the 
other does. That, in his presentation of the doctrine he 
opposes, Prof. Huxley did not set down the effects of fel- 
low-feeling as supplementing the effects of self-regarding 
feelings, surprises me the more, because he displays fellow- 
feeling himself in so marked a degree, and shows in his 
career how potent a social agency it becomes. Let us 
glance rapidly over the results wrought out among our- 
selves by individual and combined "altruism" — to employ 
M. Comte's useful word. 

Though they show a trace of this feeling, I will not 
dwell upon the numerous institutions by which men are 
enabled to average the chances throughout life by insur- 
ance societies, which provide against the evils entailed by 
premature deaths, accidents, fires, wrecks, etc., for these 



272 SPECIALIZED ADMINISTRATION. 

are mainly mercantile and egoistic in their origin. jSTor 
will I do more than name those multitudinous Friendly 
Societies that have arisen spontaneously among the work- 
ing-classes to give mutual aid in time of sickness, and 
which the Commission now sitting is showing to be im- 
mensely beneficial, notwithstanding their defects; for 
these also, though containing a larger element of sym- 
pathy, are prompted chiefly by anticipations of personal 
benefits. Leaving these, let us turn to the organiza- 
tions in which altruism is more decided — taking first 
that by which religious ministrations are carried on. 
Throughout Scotland and England, cut away all that part 
of it which is not established by law — in Scotland, the 
Episcopal Church, the Free Church, the United Presbyte- 
rians, and other Dissenting bodies ; in England, the Wee* 
leyans, Independents, and the various minor sects. Cut 
oiF, too, from the Established Church itself, all that part 
added in recent times by voluntary zeal, made conspicu- 
ous enough by the new steeples that have been rising on 
all sides ; and then also take out, from the remainder of 
the Established Church, that energy which has during 
these three generations been infused into it by competi- 
tion with the Dissenters : so reducing it to the degraded, 
inert state in which John Wesley found it. Do this, and 
it becomes manifest that more than half the organization, 
and immensely more than half its function, is extra-gov- 
ernmental. Look round, again, at the multitudinous in- 
stitutions for mitigating men's ills — the hospitals, dispen- 
saries, almshouses, and the like — the various benevolent 
and mendicity societies, etc., of which London alone con- 
tains between six and seven hundred. From our vast St. 
Thomas's, exceeding the palace of the Legislature itself 
in bulk, down to Dorcas societies, and village clothing- 
clubs, we have charitable agencies, many in kind and 



SPONTANEOUS CHAEITY. 273 

countless in number, which supplement, perhaps too 
largely, the legally-established one, and which, whatever 
evil they may have done along with the good, have done 
far less evil than the Poor-Law organization did before it 
was reformed in 1834. Akin to these are still more strik- 
ing examples of power in agencies thus originating, such 
as that furnished by the Antislavery Society, which car- 
ried the emancipation of the slaves, notwithstanding the 
class opposition so predominant in the Legislature. And, 
if we look for more recent like instances, we have them in 
the organization which promptly and efficiently dealt with 
the cotton-famine in Lancashire, and in that which last 
year ministered to the wounded and distressed in France. 
Once more, consider our educational system as it existed 
till within these few years. Such part of it as did not 
consist of private schools, carried on for personal profit, 
consisted of schools or colleges set up or maintained by 
men for the benefit of their fellows, and the posterity of 
their fellows. Omitting the few founded or partially 
founded by kings, the numerous endowed schools scat- 
tered throughout the kingdom originated from altruistic 
feelings (so far, at least, as they were not due to egoistic 
desires for good places in the other world). And then, 
after these appliances for teaching the poor had been al- 
most entirely appropriated by the rich, whence came the 
remedy? Another altruistic organization grew up for 
educating the poor, struggled against the opposition of 
the Church and the governing classes, eventually forced 
these to enter into competition, and produce like altruistic 
organizations, until by school systems, local and general, 
ecclesiastical, dissenting, and secular, the mass of the peo- 
ple had been brought from a state of almost entire igno- 
rance to one in which nearly all of them possessed the 
rudiments of knowledge. But for these spontaneously- 



274 SPECIALIZED ADMINISTRATION. 

developed agencies, ignorance would have been universal, 
Not only such knowledge as the poor now possess, not 
only the knowledge of the trading-classes, not only the 
knowledge of those who write books and articles for the 
press, but the knowledge of those who carry on the busi- 
ness of the country as ministers and legislators, has been 
derived from these extra-governmental agencies, egoistic or 
altruistic. Yet now, strangely enough, the cultured intel- 
ligence of the country has taken to spurning its parent ; 
and that to which it owes both its existence and the con- 
sciousness of its own value is pooh-poohed as though it 
had done, and could do, nothing of importance. One 
other fact let me add : While such teaching organizations, 
and their results in the shape of enlightenment, are due to 
these spontaneous agencies, to such agencies also are due 
the great improvements in the quality of the culture now 
happily beginning to take place. The spread of scientific 
knowledge, and of the scientific spirit, has not been 
brought about by laws and officials. Our scientific soci- 
eties have arisen from the spontaneous cooperation of 
those interested in the accumulation and diffusion of the 
kinds of truth they respectively deal with. Though the 
British Association has from time to time obtained certain 
small subsidies, their results in the wav of advancing sci- 
ence have borne but an extremely small ratio to the re- 
sults achieved without any such aid. If there needs i 
conclusive illustration of the power of agencies thus aris- 
ing, we have it in the history and achievements of the 
Royal Institution. From this, which is a product of altru- 
istic cooperation and which has had for its successive pro- 
fessors Young, Davy, Faraday, and Tyndall. there has come 
a series of brilliant discoveries which it would be diffi- 
cult to parallel by a series from any State-nurtured institu- 
tion. 



STRENGTH OF THE SPONTANEOUS FORCES. 275 

1 hold, then, that forced, as men in society are, to seek 
satisfaction of their own wants by saisfying the wants of 
others ; and led as they also are by sentiments which so- 
cial life has fostered, to satisfy many wants of others irre- 
spective of their own ; they are moved by two sets of 
forces which, working together, will amply suffice to carry 
on all needful activities ; and I think the facts fully justify 
this belief. It is true that, a priori, one would not have 
supposed that by their unconscious cooperations men could 
have wrought out such results, any more than one would 
have supposed, a priori, that by their unconscious cooper- 
ation they, could have evolved Language. But reasoning 
a posteriori, which it is best to do when we have the facts 
before us, it becomes manifest that they can do this ; that 
they have done it in very astonishing ways ; and perhaps 
they may do it hereafter in ways still more transcending 
expectation. Scarcely any scientific generalization has, I 
think, a broader inductive basis than we have for the be- 
lief that these egoistic and altruistic feelings are powers 
which, taken together, amply suffice to originate and carry 
on all the activities which constitute healthy national life : 
the only prerequisite being, that they shall be under the 
negatively-regulative control of a central power — that the 
entire aggregate of individuals, acting through the legisla- 
ture and executive as its agents, shall put upon each indi- 
vidual, and group of individuals, the restraints needful to 
prevent aggression, direct and indirect. 

And here I might go on to supplement the argument 
by showing that the immense majority of the evils which 
government aid is invoked to remedy, are evils which 
arise immediately or remotely because it does not perform 
properly its negatively-regulative function. From the 
waste of, probably, £100,000,000 of national capital in un- 
productive railways, for which the Legislature is respon- 



276 SPECIALIZED ADMINISTRATION. 

sible by permitting tlie original proprietary contracts to 
be broken,* down to the railway accidents and loss of life 
caused by unpunctuality, which would never have grown 
to its present height were there an easy remedy for breach 
of contract between company and passenger ; nearly all 
the vices of railway management have arisen from the 
non-administration of justice. And everywhere else we 
shall find that, were the restraining action of the State 
prompt, effective, and costless to those aggrieved, the 
pleas put in for positive regulation would nearly all disap- 
pear. 

I am thus brought naturally to remark on the title 
given to this theory of State functions. That " Adminis- 
trative Nihilism " adequately describes the view set forth 
by Yon Humboldt, may be : I have not read his work. 
But I cannot see how it adequately describes the doctrine I 
have been defending ; nor do I see how this can be prop- 
erly expressed by the more positive title, " police-govern- 
ment." The conception suggested by police-government 
does not include the conception of an organization for ex- 
ternal protection. So long as each nation is given to 
burglary, I quite admit each other nation must keep 
guards, under the forms of army or navy, or both, to pre- 
vent burglars from breaking in. And the title police-gov- 
ernment does not in its ordinary acceptation comprehend 
these offensive and defensive appliances needful for deal- 
ing with foreign enemies. At the other extreme, too, it 
falls short of the full meaning to be expressed. \Yhile it 
duly conveys the idea of an organization required for 
checking and punishing criminal aggression, it does not 
convey any idea of the no less important organization re- 
quired for dealing with civil aggression — an organization 

* See Essay on " Railway Morals and Railway Policy." 



CONDITION OF STATE EFFICIENCY. ■ 277 

quite essential for properly discharging the negatively- 
regulative function. Though latent police-force may be 
considered as giving their efficiency to legal decisions on 
all questions brought into nisijprius courts, yet, since here 
police-force rarely comes into visible play, police-govern- 
ment does not suggest this very extensive part of the ad- 
ministration of justice. Far from contending for a laissez- 
favre policy in the sense which the phrase commonly sug- 
gests, I have contended for a more active control of the 
kind distinguishable as negatively regulative. One of the 
reasons I have urged for excluding State action from other 
spheres, is, that it may become more efficient within its 
proper sphere. And I have urged that the wretched per- 
formance of its duties within its proper sphere continues, 
because it is mainly occupied with other duties.* The 
facts that often, in bankruptcy cases, three-fourths and 
more of the assets go in costs ; that creditors are led by 
the expectation of great delay and a miserable dividend to 
accept almost any composition offered; and that so the 
bankruptcy-law offers a premium to roguery; are facts 
which would long since have ceased to be facts, had citi- 
zens been mainly occupied in getting an efficient judicial 
system. If the due performance by the State of its all- 
essential function had been the question on which elections 
were fought, we should not see, as we now do, that a shiv- 
ering cottager who steals palings for firewood, or a hungry 
tramp who robs an orchard, gets punishment in more than 
the old Hebrew measure, while great financial frauds 
which ruin their thousands bring no punishments. Were 
the negatively-regulative function of the State in internal 
affairs dominant in the thoughts of men, within the Legis- 
lature and without, there would be tolerated no such treat- 
ment as that suffered lately by Messrs. "Walker, of Corn 

* See Essay on " Over-Legislation." 



273 SPECIALIZED ADMLNISTRATIOM:. 

hill ; who, having been robbed of £6,000 worth of prop- 
erty and having spent £950 in rewards for apprehending 
thieves, and in prosecuting them, cannot get back the pro- 
ceeds of their property found on the thieves — who bear 
the costs of administering justice, while the Corporation 
of London makes £9i0 profit out of their loss. It is in 
large measure because I hold that these crying abuses and 
inefficiencies, which everywhere characterize the adminis- 
tration of justice, need more than any other evils to be 
remedied ; and because I hold that remedy of them can go 
on only as fast as the internal function of the State is 
more and more restricted to the administration of justice ; 
that I take the view which I have been reexplaining. It 
is a law universally illustrated by organizations of every 
kind, that, in proportion as there is to be efficiency, there 
must be specialization, both of structure and function — 
specialization which, of necessity, implies accompanying 
limitation. And, as I have elsewhere argued, the de- 
velopment of representative government is the develop- 
ment of a type of government fitted above all others for 
this negatively-regulative control, and, above all others, 
ill fitted for positively-regulative control.* This doctrine, 
that while the negatively-regulative control should be ex- 
tended and made better, the positively-regulative control 
should be diminished, and that the one change implies the 
other, may be properly called the doctrine of Specialized 
Administration — if it is to be named from its administra- 
tive aspect. I regret that my presentation of this doc- 
trine has been such as to lead to misinterpretation. 
Either it is that I have not adequately explained it, which, 
if true, surprises me, or else it is that the space occupied 
in seeking to show what are not the duties of the State is 
so much greater than the space occupied in defining its 

* See Essay on " Representative Government : what is it good for ? " 



PROF. HUXLEY S TITLE. 279 

duties, that these last make but little impression. In any 
case, that Prof. Huxley should have construed my view 
in the way he has done, shows me that it needs fuller ex- 
position ; since, had he put upon it the construction I in- 
tended, he would not, I think, have included it under the 
title he has used, nor would he have seen it needful to 
raise the question I have endeavored to answer. 



IX 

WHAT IS ELECTRICITYt 

[FROM THE READER, No. 99.] 



WHAT IS ELECTEICITY? 



Pkobably few, if any, competent physicists have, of 
late years, used the term " electric fluid " in any other 
than a conventional sense. "When distinguishing electric- 
ity into the two kinds, "positive" and "negative," or 
" vitreous " and " resinous," they have used the ideas sug- 
gested by these names merely as convenient symbols, and 
not as representatives of different entities. And, now that 
heat and light are proved to be modes of motion, it has 
become obvious that all the allied manifestations of force 
must be modes of motion. 

What is the particular mode of motion which consti- 
tutes electricity, thus becomes the question. That it is 
some kind of molecular vibration, different from the molec- 
ular vibrations which luminous bodies give off, is, I pre- 
sume, taken for granted by all who bring to the considera- 
tion of the matter a knowledge of recent discoveries. Be- 
yond those simple oscillations of molecules, from which 
light and heat result, may we not suspect that there will, 
in some cases, arise compound oscillations ? Let us con- 
sider whether the conditions under which electricity arises 
are not such as to generate compound oscillations ; and 
whether the phenomena of electricity are not such as 



284 WHAT IS ELECTRICITY? 

must result from oscillations ; and whether the phenomena 
of electricity are not such as must result from compound 
oscillations. 

The universal antecedent to the production of electric- 
ity is the immediate or mediate contact of heterogeneous 
substances — substances that are heterogeneous either in 
their molecular constitutions, or in their molecular states. 
If, then, electricity is some mode of molecular motion, and 
if, whenever it is produced, the contact of substances hav- 
ing unlike molecules, or molecules in unlike states, is the 
antecedent, there seems thrust upon us the conclusion that 
electricity results from some mutual action of molecules 
whose motions are unlike. "What must this mutual action 
be? 

Before proceeding to answer this question, it will be 
needful to dispose of a demurrer that may be entered 
against the assumption, that unlike molecules have unlike 
motions in whatever states of aggregation they may be. 
It is currently admitted that, so long as they exist in the 
form of a gas, the particles of each kind of matter have a 
rate of vibration peculiar to themselves — a rate unlike the 
rates which the particles of other kinds of matter have. 
Prof. Tyndall has shown further that, when aggregated 
into a liquid, particles of any kind still maintain a rate of 
vibration synchronous with that which they had when 
diffused as a gas. But it is alleged that, on coalescing into 
solid masses, particles of different orders no longer main- 
tain their distinctive rates of vibration. It is concluded 
that they severally take on vibrations of all orders, because 
solid matters, of whatever kinds, send off ethereal undula- 
tions of all lengths ; as is proved by the fact that each of 
them produces a continuous spectrum. I venture to think, 
however, that this inference is not a legitimate one. It 
seems to me demonstrablv at variance with ultimate me 



THE PERSISTENCE OF FOKCE. 285 

chanical laws ; and I think the facts are explicable without 
assuming it. To take the first — the a priori argument — 
it is incongruous with the doctrine of the persistence of 
force. Any difference between the vibrations of two or- 
ders of molecules, A and B, existing in a gaseous state, 
implies some kind of difference between the characters of 
the molecules. Be this a difference of inertia, of bulk, or 
of form, matters not to the argument ; in any case, it is 
expressible as some unlikeness between the forces with 
which the molecules severally act and react on the medium 
that moves them. To say that, under the same conditions, 
the molecules A and B have different rates of vibration, 
though there exists between them no differential force, 
is to assert an effect without a cause, which is to deny 
the persistence of force. And if there exists between them 
some differential force, by virtue of which they react dif- 
ferently on incident forces, and acquire different rates of 
vibration, then this differential force must continue, under 
all states of aggregation, to produce its differential effect. 
To say that, when molecules of the kind A and molecules 
of the kind B are severally aggregated into solids, there 
ceases to be any distinction between their vibrations, is to 
say that the differential force ceases to produce any effect, 
and this is to deny the persistence of force. But now, 
passing to the a posteriori aspect of the question, it will be 
asked, How, then, can two solids, unlike in the natures of 
their molecules, severally produce, when heated, spectra 
that appear to be identical — spectra that severally imply 
ethereal undulations of all lengths ? The answer to this 
question is to be sought in the effects produced on the 
mutual actions of molecules by their state of aggregation. 
Were all the particles similarly conditioned — were they all 
restrained by each other in like ways and degrees, then no 
reason for differences in their times of vibration could be 



286 WHAT IS ELECTRICITY ? 

assigned. But they are differently conditioned in two 
ways — one of them contingent, the other necessary. In 
the first place, the process of consolidation, however it has 
gone on, is almost sure to have induced unlike states of 
tension throughout the mass — here the crystallization being 
more complete ; there the cooling having gone on more 
rapidly. In the second place, the superficial particles, the 
layer of particles below it, and the subjacent particles to 
some depth, are subject to sets of restraining forces quite 
different from those which the inner particles are subject 
to ; since, while the inner particles are exposed to the ac- 
tions of particles all around them, the outer particles are 
exposed to such actions only on one side. And, as the 
periods of oscillation must be in part determined by the 
amounts and distributions of the tensions, it follows that 
the rates of oscillation of particles on the surface must be 
unlike those of particles near the surface, and progressively 
more unlike those of particles successively farther away 
from the surface. Hence, besides impressing on the sur- 
rounding medium undulations corresponding with their 
own, the surface-molecules will conduct to the surrounding 
medium the somewhat different undulations passed on to 
them by the subjacent molecules ; and the still more differ- 
ent undulations passed on to theru by molecules placed 
still deeper, and so on. Besides waves like their own, and 
waves a little unlike their own, and waves still more un- 
like then- own, they will generate waves of various orders 
widely unlike their own. They will give off various vi- 
brations shorter than their own, answering to the differ- 
ences between the vibrations conveyed through them ; and 
various vibrations longer than their own, answering to the 
periodic coincidences of the vibrations conveyed through 
them. Thus it becomes comprehensible how molecules of 
two different orders, having strongly contrasted rates of 



MOLECULES WITH UNLIKE MOTIONS. 287 

vibration, may, when severally aggregated with solid mass- 
es, both produce continuous spectra, and so appear to be in 
like states of agitation. 

From this preliminary explanation, let us now return 
to the question propounded — What must be that mutual 
action of molecules having unlike motions, which, as we 
see, is the universal antecedent of electrical disturbance ? 
The answer to this question does not seem difficult to 
reach, if we take the simplest case — the case of contact- 
electricity. "When two pieces of metal of the same kind, 
and at the same temperature, are applied to one another, 
there is no electrical excitation ; but, if the metals applied 
to one another be of different kinds, there is a genesis of 
electricity. This, which has been regarded as an anoma- 
lous fact — a fact so anomalous that it has been much dis- 
puted because apparently at variance with every hypothe- 
sis — is a fact to which an interpretation is at once supplied 
by the hypothesis that electricity results from the mutual 
disturbances of unlike molecular motions. For, if, on the 
one hand, we have homogeneous metals in contact, their 
respective molecules, oscillating synchronously, will give 
and take any forces which they impress on one another 
without producing an oscillation of a new order. But, if, 
on the other hand, the molecules of the one mass have pe- 
riods of oscillation different from those of the other mass, 
then their mutual impacts will not agree with the period 
of oscillation of either, but will generate a new rhythm, 
differing from, and much slower than, that of either. The 
production of what are called " beats " in acoustics, will 
best illustrate this. It is a familiar fact that two strings, 
vibrating at different rates, from time to time concur in 
sending off aerial waves in the same direction at the same 
instant ; that then, their vibrations getting more and more 
out of correspondence, they send off their aerial waves in 



288 WHAT IS ELECTEICITY? 

the same direction at exactly intermediate instants ; and 
presently, coming once more into correspondence, they 
again generate coinciding waves. So that, when their 
periods of vibration differ but little, and when consequently 
it takes an appreciable time to complete their alternations 
of agreement and disagreement, there results an audible 
alternation in the sound — a succession of pulses of louder 
and feebler sound. In other words, besides the primary, 
simple, and rapid series of waves, constituting the two 
sounds themselves, there is a series of slow compound 
waves, resulting from their repeated conflicts and concur- 
rences. Now, if, instead of the two strings communicating 
their vibrations to the air, each communicated its vibra- 
tions to the other, we should have just the same alterna- 
tion of concurrent and conflicting pulses. And if each 
of the two strings was combined with an aggregate of 
others like itself, in such way that it communicated to its 
neighbors both its normal and its abnormal vibrations, it 
is clear that through each a^orre^ate of strings there would 
be propagated one of these compound waves of oscillation, 
in addition to their simple rapid oscillations. This illus- 
tration will, I think, make it manifest that when a mass 
of molecules, which have a certain period of vibration, is 
placed in contact with a mass of molecules which have an- 
other period of vibration, there must result an alternation 
of coincidences and antagonisms in the molecular motions, 
such as will make the molecules alternately increase and 
decrease one another's motions. There will be instants 
at which they are moving in the same direction, and inter- 
vening instants at which they are moving in opposite 
directions ; whence will arise periods of greatest and least 
deviations from their ordinary motions. And these great- 
est and least deviations, being communicated to neighbor- 
ing molecules, and passed on by them to the next, will 



ACTION OF PEKTUKBING WAVES. 289 

result in waves of perturbation propagated throughout 
each mass. 

Let us now ask what will be the mutual relations of 
these waves. Action and reaction being equal and oppo- 
site, it must happen that whatever effect a molecule of the 
mass A produces upon an adjacent molecule of the mass B, 
must be accompanied by an equivalent reverse effect upon 
itself. If a molecule of the mass A is at any instant mov- 
ing in such way as to impress on a molecule of the mass 
B an additional momentum in any given direction, then 
the momentum of the molecule of B, in that direction, will 
be diminished to an equal amount. That is to say, to any 
wave of increased motion propagated through the mole- 
cules of B, there must be a reactive wave of decreased mo- 
tion propagated in the opposite direction through the mole- 
cules of A. See, then, the two significant facts. Any 
addition of motion, which at one of these alternate periods 
is given by the molecules of A to the molecules of B, must 
be propagated through the molecules of B in a direction 
away from A ; and simultaneously there must be a sub- 
traction from the motion of the molecules of A, which will 
be propagated through them in a direction away from B. 
To every wave of excess sent through the one mass, there 
will be a corresponding wave of defect sent through the 
other; and these positive and negative waves will be ex- 
actly coincident in their times, and exactly equal in their 
1 amounts. "Whence it obviously follows that, if these waves, 
proceeding from the surface of contact through the two 
'masses in contrary directions, are brought into relation, 
they will neutralize each other. Action and reaction being 
equal and opposite, these plus and minus molecular mo- 
tions will cancel one another if they are added together, 
and there will be a restoration of equilibrium. 

These positive and negative waves of perturbation will 
13 



290 WHAT IS ELECTRICITY 'I 

travel through the two masses of molecules with great fa- 
cility. It is now an established truth that molecules ab- 
sorb, in the increase of their own vibrations, those rhyth- 
mical impulses or waves which have periodic times the 
same as their own ; but that they cannot thus absorb suc- 
cessive impulses that have periodic times different from 
their own. Hence these differential undulations, being 
very long undulations in comparison with those of the 
molecules themselves, will readily pass through the masses 
of molecules, or be conducted by them. Further observe 
that, if the two masses of molecules continue joined, these 
positive and negative differential waves travelling away 
from the surface of contact in opposite directions, and 
severally arriving at the outer surfaces of the two masses, 
will be reflected from these; and, travelling back again 
toward the surface of contact, will there meet and neutral- 
ize one another. Hence no current will be produced along 
a wire joining the outer surfaces of the masses ; since neu- 
tralization will be more readily effected by this return of 
the waves through the masses themselves. But, though no 
external current arises, the masses will continue in what 
we call opposite electric states ; as a delicate electrometer 
shows that they do. And further, if they are parted, the 
positive and negative waves which have the instant before 
been propagated through them respectively, remaining un- 
neutralized, the masses will display their opposite electric 
states in a more conspicuous way. The residual positive 
and negative waves will then neutralize each other along 
any conductor that is placed between them, seeing that 
the plus waves communicated from the one mass to the 
conductor, meeting with the minus waves communicated 
from the other, and being mutually cancelled as they meet, 
the conductor will become a line of least resistance to the 
waves of each mass. 



THE CASE OF THERMOELECTRICITY. 291 

Let us pass now to the allied phenomena of thermo-elec- 
tricity. Suppose these two masses of metal to be heated 
at their surfaces of contact ; the forms of the masses be- 
ing such that their surfaces of contact can be considerably 
heated without their remoter parts being much heated. 
What will happen % Prof. Tyndall has shown, in the 
cases of various gases and liquids, that, other things 
equal, when molecules have given to them more of the 
insensible motion which we call heat, there is no altera- 
tion in their periods of oscillation, but an increase in 
the dimensions of their oscillations ; the molecules make 
wider excursions in the same times. As above implied, 
we have good reason to conclude that the like is true of 
solids ; the apparent proof of changed periods of vibration 
being explicable in the manner shown. Assuming this, it 
will follow that, when the two metals are heated at their 
surfaces of contact, the result will be the same as before in 
respect of the natures and intervals of the differential 
waves. There will be a change, however, in the strengths 
of these waves. For, if the two orders of molecules have 
severally given to them increased quantities of motion, the 
perturbations which they impress on each other will also 
be increased. These somewhat stronger positive and neg- 
ative waves of differential motion will, as before, travel 
through either mass away from the surfaces of contact — ■ 
that is, toward the cold extremities of the masses. From 
these cold extremities they will, as before, rebound toward 
the surfaces of contact ; and as before will tend thus to 
equilibriate each other. But they will meet with resistance 
in thus travelling back. It is a well-ascertained fact that 
raising the temperatures of metals decreases their conduct- 
ing powers. Hence, if the two cold ends of the masses be 
put in connection by some other mass whose molecules 
can take on with facility these differential undulations — ■ 



292 WHAT IS ELECTRICITY ? 

that is, if the two ends be joined by a conductor, the posi- 
tive and negative waves will meet and neutralize one an- 
other along this conductor, instead of being reflected back 
to the surfaces of contact. In other words, there will be 
established a current along the wire joining the two cold 
ends of the metallic masses. 

Carried a step further, this reasoning affords us an ex- 
planation of the thermo-electric pile. If a number of these 
bars of different metals, as antimony and bismuth, are 
soldered together, end to end, in alternate order, AB, AB, 
AB, etc., then, so long as they remain cold, there is no 
manifestation of an electric current ; or, if all the joints 
are equally heated, there is no manifestation of an electric 
current beyond that which would arise from any relative 
coolness of the two ends of the compound bar. But, if 
alternate joints are heated, an electric current is produced 
in a wire joining the two ends of the compound bar — a 
current that is intense in proportion to the number of 
pairs. What is the cause of this ? Clearly, so long as all 
the joints are of the same temperature, the differential 
waves propagated from each joint toward the two adjacent 
joints will be equal and opposite to those from the adjacent 
joints, and no disturbance will be shown. But if alternate 
joints are heated, the positive and negative differential 
waves propagated away from them will be stronger than 
those propagated from the other joints. Hence, if the 
joint of bar A with bar B be heated, the other end of the 
bar B, which is joined to A2, not being heated, will receive 
a stronger differential wave than it sends back. In addi- 
tion to the wave which its molecules would otherwise induce 
in the molecules of A2, there is an effect which it conducts 
from Al ; and this extra impulse propagated to the other 
end of B2 is added to the impulse which its heated mole- 
cules would otherwise give to the molecules of A3 ; and 






HETEROGENEITY OF MOLECULES. 293 

so on throughout the series. The waves being added to- 
gether, become more violent, and the current through the 
wire joining the extremities of the series, more intense. 

This interpretation of the facts of thermo-electricity will 
probably be met by the objection that there are, in some 
cases, thermo-electric currents developed between masses 
of metal of the same kind, and even between different 
parts of the same mass. It may be urged that, if unlike- 
ness between the rates of vibration of molecules in contact 
is the cause of these electric disturbances; then, heat 
ought not to produce any electric disturbances when the 
molecules are of the same kind ; since we have reason to 
conclude that heat does not change the periodic times of 
molecular vibrations. This objection, which seems at first 
sight a serious one, introduces us to a confirmation. For, 
where the masses of molecules are homogeneous in all 
other respects, difference of temperature does not generate 
any thermo-electric current. The junction of hot with 
cold mercury sets up no electric excitement. In all cases 
where thermo-electricity is generated between metals of 
the same kind, there is evidence of heterogeneity in their 
molecular structures — either one has been hammered and 
the other not, or one is annealed and the other unannealed. 
And, where the current is between different parts of the 
same mass, there are differences in the crystalline states of 
the parts, or differences between the ways in which the 
parts have cooled after being cast. That is to say, there 
is proof that the molecules in the two masses, or in differ- 
ent parts of the same mass, are in unlike relations to their 
neighbors — are in unlike states of tension. Now, however 
true it may be that molecules of the same kind vibrate at 
the same rate, whatever may be their temperature, it is 
obviously true so long only as their motions are not modi- 
fied by restraining forces. If molecules of the same kind 



294: WHAT IS ELECTRICITY? 

are in one mass arranged into that state which produces 
crystallization, while in another mass they are not thus 
bound together ; or if in the one their molecular relations 
have been modified by hammering, and in the other not ; 
the differences in the restraints under which they respec- 
tively vibrate will effect their rates of vibration. And if 
their rates of vibration are rendered unequal, then the 
alleged cause of electrical disturbance comes into exist- 
ence. 

To sum up, may it not be said that by some such 
action alone can the phenomena of electricity be explained ; 
and that some such action must inevitably arise under the 
conditions ? On the one hand, electricity, being a mode 
of motion, implies the transformation of some preexisting 
motion — implies also, a transformation such that there are 
two new kinds of motion simultaneously generated, equal 
and opposite in their directions — implies further that these 
differ in being plus and minus, and being therefore capable 
of neutralizing each other. On the other hand, in the above 
cases, molecular motion is the only source of motion that 
can be assigned ; and this molecular motion must, under 
the circumstances, produce effects of the kind witnessed. 
Molecules vibrating at different rates cannot be brought in 
proximity without affecting one another's motions. They 
must affect one another's motions by periodically adding 
to, or deducting from one another's motions; and any 
excess of motion which those of the one order receive, 
must be accompanied by an equivalent defect of motion in 
those of the other order. When such molecules are units 
of aggregates placed in contact, they must pass on these 
pertubations to their neighbors. And so, from the surface 
of contact, there must be waves of excessive and defective 
molecular motion, equal in their amounts, and opposite in 
their directions — waves which must exactly compensate 



ONLY SIMPLE PHENOMENA CONSIDERED. 295 

one another when brought into relation. In brief, 1 think 
it will be admitted that the canse alleged is " a true cause," 
and that it is a cause which must work some such effects 
as those described Is it possible for differently vibrating 
molecules to be brought together without affecting one 
another's motions % If it is impossible — if they must affect 
one another's motions, then there must be some resulting 
phenomena. And if these phenomena are not what we 
call electric phenomena, what are they % 

I have here dealt only with electrical phenomena of 
the simplest kind. Hereafter I may possibly endeavor to 
show how this hypothesis furnishes interpretations of other 
forms of electricity. 



X. 

THE CONSTITVTION OF THE STJN. 

fFROM THE READER, No. 113.] 



THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SUN. 



The hypothesis of M. Faye, which you have described 
in your numbers for January 28 and February 4, is to a 
considerable extent coincident with one which I ventured 
to suggest in an article on " Hecent Astronomy and the 
Nebular Hypothesis," published in the " "Westminster 
Review" for July, 1858. In considering the possible 
causes of the immense differences of specific gravity among 
the planets, I was led to question the validity of the tacit 
assumption that each planet consists of solid or liquid mat- 
ter from centre to surface. It seemed to me that any 
other internal structure, which was mechanically stable, 
might be assumed with equal legitimacy. And the hypothe- 
sis of a solid or liquid shell, having its cavity filled with 
gaseous matter at high pressure and temperature, was one 
which seemed worth considering, since it promised an ex- 
planation of the anomalies named, as well as sundry 
others. 

Hence arose the inquiry — "What structure will result 
from the process of nebular condensation % " Starting with 
a rotating spheroid of aeriform matter, in the latter stages 
of its concentration, but before it has begun to take a 
liquid or solid form," it was argued that the actions going 



300 



THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SUN. 



on in it will be these — increasing aggregation, and conse- 
quent evolution of heat, which must be greater at the cen- 
tre than at the surface, resulting want of equilibrium, and 
the setting up of a circulation of gases from the hottest 
part to the coolest part, along lines of least resistance to 
expansion : and hence an establishment of constant cur- 
rents from the centre along the axis of rotation toward 
each pole followed by a flowing over of the accumulation 
at each pole in currents along the surface to the equator ; 
such currents being balanced by the continual collapse, 
toward the centre, of gaseous matter lying in the equatorial 
plane. It was further argued that gases travelling from 
the centre by way of the poles to the equator, must be 
cooled first by expansion on approaching the surface, and 
afterward by freedom of radiation into space ; and it was 
hence inferred that the outside of the spheroid at the equa- 
tor will be the place of greatest refrigeration. It was con- 
cluded that the earliest precipitation will therefore occur 
in that region. 

" An equatorial belt of vapor will be the first formed, 
and, widening into a zone, will by-and-by condense into a 
fluid (liquid). Gradually this fluid (liquid) film will extend 
itself on each side the equator, and, encroaching upon the 
two hemispheres, will eventually close over at the poles : 
thus forming a thin, hollow globe, or rather spheroid, filled 
with gaseous matter. ~\Ye do not mean that this conden- 
sation will take place at the very outermost surface ; for 
probably round the denser gases forming the principal 
mass there will extend strata of gases too rare to be en- 
tangled in these processes. It is the surface of this inner 
spheroid of denser gases to which our reasoning points as 
the place of earliest condensation." 

" The internal circulation we have described continu- 
ing, as it must, after the formation of this liquid film, there 



PRESENT STAGE OF SOLAR CONDENSATION. 301 

will still go on the radiation of heat, and the progressive 
aggregation. The film will thicken at the expense of the 
internal gaseous substances precipitated upon it. As it 
thickens, as the globe contracts, and as the gravitative 
force augments, the pressure will increase, and the evolu- 
tion and radiation of heat will go on more rapidly. Event- 
ually, however, when the liquid shall become very thick, 
and the internal cavity relatively small, the obstacle put to 
the escape of heat by this thick liquid, with its slowly-cir- 
culating currents, will turn the scale ; the temperature of 
the outer surface will begin to diminish, and a solid crust 
will form while the internal cavity is yet unobliterated " 
(pp. 215, 216). 

Omitting the various confirmations which this a priori 
conclusion was shown to derive from the contrasted spe- 
cific gravities of the planets, as well as from sundry other 
peculiarities they present, I will pass to the deductions re- 
specting the constitution of the sun which were drawn 
from this hypothesis. The process of condensation being 
in its essentials the same for all concentrating nebular 
spheroids, planetary or solar, it was argued that the sun 
is still passing through that incandescent stage which all 
the planets have long ago passed through : his later aggre- 
gation, joined with the immensely greater ratio of his mass 
to his surface, involving the comparative lateness of cool- 
ing. Supposing the sun to have reached the state of a 
molten shell, enclosing a gaseous nucleus, it was concluded 
that this molten shell, ever radiating its heat, but ever ac- 
quiring fresh heat by further integration of the sun's mass, 
will be constantly kept up to that temperature at which 
its substance evaporates. 

" If we consider what must have been the state of 
things here when the surface of the earth was molten, we 
shall see that, round the still molten surface of the sun, 



302 THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SDK. 

there probably exists a stratum of dense aeriform matter, 
made up of sublimed metals and metallic compounds, and 
above this a stratum of comparative rare medium anal- 
ogous to air. What now will happen with these two 
strata ? Did they both consist of permanent gases, they 
could not remain separate : according to a well-known 
law, they would eventually form a homogeneous mixture. 
But this will by no means happen when the lower stratum 
consists of matters that are gaseous only at excessively high 
temperatures. Given off from a molten surface, ascending, 
expanding, and cooling, these will presently reach a limit 
of elevation above which they cannot exist as vapor, but 
must condense and precipitate. Meanwhile, the upper 
stratum, habitually charged with its quantum of these 
denser matters, as our air with its quantum of water, and 
ready to deposit them on any depression of temperature, 
must be habitually unable to take up any more of the 
lower stratum ; and therefore this lower stratum will re- 
main quite distinct from it. We conclude, then, that there 
will be two concentric atmospheres, having a definite limit 
or separation " (pp. 222, 223). 

To a revised edition of this essay, republished along 
with others in November, 1S63, I made the following ad- 
ditions : 

" Since the foregoing paragraph was originally pub- 
lished, in 1S5S, the proposition it annunciates as a corollary 
from the nebular hypothesis has been in great part veri- 
fied. The marvellous disclosures made by spectrum analy- 
sis have proved beyond the possibility of doubt that the 
solar atmosphere contains, in a gaseous state, the metals 
iron, calcium, magnesium, sodium, chromium, and nickel, 
along with small quantities of barium, copper, and zinc. 
.... And here let us not omit to note also the significant 
bearing which Ivirchhoff's results have on the doctrine 



RESULTS OF SPECTRUM ANALYSIS. 303 

contended for in a foregoing section. Leaving ont the 
barium, copper, and zinc, of which the quantities are in- 
ferred to be small, the metals existing as vapors in the 
sun's atmosphere, and by consequence as molten in his in- 
candescent body, have an average specific gravity of 4.25. 
But the average specific gravity of the sun is about 1. 
How is this discrepancy to be explained % To say that the 
sun consists almost wholly of the three lighter metals 
named, would be quite unwarranted by the evidence : the 
results of spectrum analysis would just as much warrant 
the assertion that the sun consists almost wholly of the 
three heavier. Three metals (two of them heavy) having 
been already left out of the estimate because their quanti- 
ties appear to be small, the only legitimate assumption on 
which to base an estimate of specific gravity, is that the 
rest are present in something like equal amounts. Is it, 
then, that the lighter metals exist in larger proportions in 
the molten mass, though not in the atmosphere % This is 
very unlikely ; the known habitudes of matter rather im- 
ply that the reverse is the case. Is it, then, that, under 
the conditions of temperature and gravitation existing in 
the sun, the state of liquid aggregation is wholly unlike 
that existing here ? This is a very strong assumption ; it 
is one for which our terrestrial experience affords no ade- 
quate warrant ; and, if such unlikeness exists, it is very im- 
probable that it should produce so immense a contrast in 
specific gravity as that of 4 to 1. The more legitimate con- 
clusion is that the sun's body is not made up of molten 
matter all through, but that it consists of a molten shell 
with a gaseous nucleus. And this we have seen to be a 
corollary from the nebular hypothesis." The conception 
of the sun's constitution thus set forth is like that of M. 
Faye in so far as the successive changes, the resulting struct- 
ures, and the ultimate state are concerned ; but unlike it 



304: THE COXSTTTTJTION OF THE SOS. 

in so far as the sun is supposed to have reached a later 
stage of concentration. As I gather from your abstract of 
M. Faye's paper, he considers the sun to be at present a 
gaseous spheroid, having an envelope of metallic matters 
precipitated in the shape of luminous clouds, the local dis- 
persions of which, caused by currents from within, appear 
to us as spots ; and he looks forward to the future forma- 
tion of a liquid film as an event that will rapidly be fol- 
lowed by extinction. Whereas the above hypothesis is 
that the liquid film already exists beneath the visible pho 
tosphere, and that extinction cannot result until, in the 
course of further aggregation, the gaseous nucleus has be- 
come so much reduced, and the shell so much thickened, 
that the escape of the heat generated is greatly retarded. 
I think this view escapes some objections to which that of 
M. Faye is open, and that it harmonizes with the appear- 
ances as well, if not better. Let us contrast the two. 

Though the specific gravity of the sun is so low as al- 
most to negative the supposition that its body consists of 
solid or liquid matter from center to surface, yet it seems 
higher than is probable for a gaseous spheroid with a cloudy 
envelope. Possibly, notwithstanding intense temperature, 
the gravitation of the sun's substance toward its centre 
might be great enough to produce considerable density in 
its interior ; but that the interior density of a gaseous me- 
dium might be thus made great enough to give the entire 
mnss a specific gravity equal to that of water, is a strong 
assumption. Near its surface the heated gases can scarcely 
be supposed to have so high a specific gravity, and, if not, 
the interior must be supposed to have a much higher spe- 
cific gravity. Again, M. Faye's hypothesis appears to be 
espoused by him, partly because it afiords an explanation 
of the spots, which are considered as openings in the pho- 
tosphere, exposing the comparatively non-luminous gases 



305 

filling the interior. But if these interior gases are non- 
luminous from the absence of precipitated matter, must 
they not for the same reason be transparent % And if 
transparent, will not the light from the remote side of the 
photosphere seen through them be nearly as bright as that 
of the side next to us \ By as much as the intensely-heated 
gases of the interior are disabled by the dissociation of 
their molecules from giving off luminiferous undulations, 
by so much must they be disabled from absorbing the light 
transmitted through them. And if their great light-trans- 
mitting power is exactly complementary to their small 
light-emitting power, there seems no reason why the in- 
terior of the sun, disclosed to us by openings in the pho- 
tosphere, should not appear as bright as its exterior. 

Take now the supposition that a more advanced state 
of concentration has been reached. A shell of molten 
metallic matter enclosing a gaseous nucleus still higher in 
temperature than itself, and ever giving off, in the shape 
of heat, that motion which the molecules of the whole 
mass lose as they approach the common centre of gravity, 
will be continually raised to the highest temperature consist- 
ent with its state of liquid aggregation. Unless we assume 
that simple radiation suffices to give off all the heat gen- 
erated by progressive integration, we must conclude that 
the mass will be raised to that temperature at which part 
of its heat is absorbed in vaporizing its superficial parts. 
The atmosphere of metallic gases hence resulting cannot 
continue to accumulate without eventually reaching a 
height above the sun's surface, at which the cooling caused 
by radiation and rarefaction will cause condensation into 
a cloud — cannot, indeed, cease accumulating until the pre- 
cipitation from the upper limit of the atmosphere balances 
the evaporation from its lower limit. This upper limit of 
the atmosphere of metallic gases, whence precipitation is 



306 THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SUN. 

perpetually taking place, will form the visible photosphere 
— partly giving off light of its own, partly letting through 
the more brilliant light of the incandescent mass below. 
This conclusion harmonizes with the appearances. Sir John 
Herschel, advocating though he does an antagonist hypoth- 
esis, gives a description of the sun's surface which agrees 
very completely with the processes here supposed. lie 



" There is nothing which represents so faithfully this 
appearance as the slow subsidence of some flocculent 
chemical precipitation into a transparent fluid, when viewed 
perpendicularly from above ; so faithfully indeed, that it 
is hardly possible not to be impressed with the idea of a 
luminous medium intermixed, but not confounded, with a 
transparent and non-luminous atmosphere, either floating 
as clouds in our air, or pervading it in vast sheets and 
columns like flame or the streamers of our northern lights, 
directed in lines perpendicular to the surface." 

If the constitution of the sun be that which is above 
inferred, it does not seem difficult to conceive still more 
specifically the production of these appearances. Every- 
where, throughout the atmosphere of metallic vapors which 
clothes the solar surface, there must be ascending and de- 
scending currents. The magnitude of these currents will 
obviously depend on the depth of this atmosphere ; if it is 
shallow, the currents will be small ; but if many thousands 
of miles deep, the currents may be wide enough to render 
visible to us the place at which they impinge on the limit 
of the atmosphere, and the places whence the descending 
currents commence. The top of an ascending current will 
be a space over which the thickness of condensed cloud is 
the least, and through which the greatest amount of light 
from beneath penetrates. The clouds perpetually formed 
at the top of such a current will be perpetually thrust 



CURRENTS IN THE SOLAR ATMOSPHERE. 307 

aside by the uncondensed gases from below them ; and, 
growing while they are thrust aside, will collect in the 
spaces between the ascending currents, where there will 
result the greatest degree of opacity. Hence the mottled 
appearance — hence the " pores " or dark interspaces sepa- 
rating the light -giving spots. 

Of the more special appearances which the photosphere 
presents, let us take first the faculae. These are ascribed 
to waves in the photosphere ; and the way in which such 
waves might produce an excess of light has been variously 
explained in conformity with various hypotheses. "What 
would result from them in a photosphere constituted and 
conditioned as above supposed \ Traversing a canopy of 
cloud, here thicker and there thinner, a wave would cause 
a disturbance very unlikely to leave the thin and thick 
parts without any change in their average permeability to 
light. There would probably be, at some parts of the 
wave, extensions in the areas of the light-transmitting 
clouds resulting in the passage of more rays from below. 
Another phenomenon, less common but more striking, 
appears also to be in harmony with the hypothesis. I re- 
fer to those spots, of a brilliancy much greater than that 
of the photosphere, which are sometimes observed. In the 
course of a physical process so vast and so active as that 
here supposed to be going on in the sun, we may expect 
that concurrent causes will occasionally produce ascending 
currents much hotter than usual, or more voluminous, or 
both. One of these, on reaching the stratum of luminous 
and illuminated cloud forming the photosphere, will burst 
through it, dispersing and dissolving it, and ascending to a 
greater height before it begins itself to condense ; mean- 
while allowing to be seen, through its transparent mass, 
the incandescent molten shell of the sun's body. 

But what of the spots commonly so called ? it will bo 



308 THE COXSTITTTIOX OF THE SUIT. 

asked. In the essay from, which the above passages are 
quoted, it was suggested that refraction of the light, pass- 
ing through the depressed centres of cyclones in this at- 
mosphere of metallic gases, might possibly be the cause ; 
but this, though defensible as a " true cause," appeared on 
further consideration to be an inadequate cause. Keeping 
the question in mind, however, and still taking as a pos- 
tulate the conclusion of Sir John Ilerschel, that the spots 
are in some way produced by cyclones, I was led, in the 
course of the year following the publication of the essay, 
to an hypothesis which seemed more satisfactory. This, 
which I named at the time to Prof. Tyndall, had a point 
in common with the one afterward published by Prof. 
Kirchhoff, in so far as it supposed cloud to be the cause of 
darkness ; but diifered in so far as the cause of the cloud 
was assigned. More pressing matters prevented me from 
developing the idea for some time ; and, afterward, I was 
deterred from including it in the revised edition of the 
essay, by its inconsistency with the " willow-leaf" doctrine, 
at that time dominant. The reasoning was as follows : 
The central region of a cyclone must be a region of 
rarefaction, and consequently a region of refrigeration. 
In an atmosphere of metallic gases rising from a molten 
surface, and presently reaching a limit at which condensa- 
tion takes place, the molecular state, especially toward its 
upper part, must be such that a moderate diminution of 
density, and fall of temperature, will cause precipitation. 
That is to say, the rarefied interior of a solar cyclone will 
be filled with cloud ; condensation, instead of taking place 
only at the level of the photosphere, will here extend to a 
great depth below it, and over a wide area. What will be 
the characters of a cloud, thus occupying the interior of a 
cyclone ? It will have a rotatory motion ; and this it has 
been seen to have. Being funnel-shaped, as analogy war- 



CAUSES OF THE SOLAR SPOTS. 309 

rants us in assuming its central parts will be much deeper 
than its peripheral parts, and therefore more opaque. 
This, too, corresponds with observation. Mr. Dawes 
has discovered that in the middle of the spot there is a 
blacker spot ; just where there would exist a funnel-shaped 
prolongation of the cyclonic cloud down toward the sun's 
body, the darkness is greater than elsewhere. Moreover, 
there is furnished no adequate reason for the depression 
which one of these dark spaces exhibits. In a whirlwind, 
as in a whirlpool, the vortex will be below the general 
level, and all around the surface of the medium will de- 
scend toward it. Hence, a spot seen obliquely, as when 
carried toward the sun's limb, will have its umbra more 
and more hidden, while its penumbra still remains visible. 
ISTor are we without some interpretation of the penumbra. 
If, as is implied by what has been said, the so-called " wil- 
low-leaves," or " rice-grains," are the tops of the currents 
ascending from the sun's body, what changes of appear- 
ance are they likely to undergo in the neighborhood of a 
cyclone % Tor some distance round a cyclone there will 
be a drawing in of the superficial gases toward the vortex. 
All the luminous spaces of more transparent cloud forming 
the adjacent photosphere will be changed in shape by 
these centripetal currents ; they will be greatly elongated ; 
and there will so be produced that " thatch "-like aspect 
which the penumbra presents. 

Of course these views are to be regarded simply as 
speculative, in common with all others at present current 
respecting the sun's structure. But, in the absence of any 
hypothesis supported by something like scientific proof, it 
has seemed to me well to suggest this one as being war 
ranted by established physical principles, and having a 
general congruity with the appearances. 



XL 

"TEE COLLECTIVE WISDOM" 

[FROM THE READER, No. 120.] 



"THE COLLECTIVE WISDOM." 



A test of senatorial capacity is a desideratum. "We 
rarely learn how near the mark or how wide of the mark 
the calculations of statesmen are ; the slowness and com- 
plexity of social changes, hindering, as they do, the definite 
comparison of results with anticipations. Occasionally, 
however, parliamentary decisions admit of being definitely 
valued. One which was arrived at a few weeks ago fur- 
nished a measure of legislative judgment too significant to 
be passed by. 

On the edge of the Cotswolds, overhanging the valley 
of the Severn, occur certain springs, which, as they happen 
to be at the end of the longest of the hundred streams 
which join to form the Thames, have been called by a 
poetical fiction "the sources -of the Thames." Names, 
even when poetical fictions, suggest conclusions ; and con- 
clusions drawn from words instead of facts are equally apt 
to influence conduct. Thus it happened that, when, re- 
cently, there was formed a company for supplying Chelten- 
ham and some other places from these springs, great oppo- 
sition arose. The Times published a paragraph, headed, 
" Threatened Absorption of the Thames," stating that the 

application of this company to Parliament had " caused 
14 



314: " THE COLLECTIVE WISDOM." 

some little consternation in the city of Oxford, and will, 
doubtless, throughout the valley of the Thames ; " and that 
" such a measure, if carried out, will diminish the water of 
that noble river a million of gallons per day." A million 
is an alarming word — suggests something necessarily vast. 
Translating words into thoughts, however, would have 
calmed the fears of the Times paragraphist. Considering 
that a million gallons would be contained by a room fifty- 
six feet cube, the nobility of the Thames would not be 
much endangered by the deduction. The simple fact is, 
that the current of the Thames, above the point at which 
the tides influence it, discharges in twenty-four hours eight 
hundred times this amount. 

When the bill of this proposed water company was 
brought before the House of Commons for second reading, 
it became manifest that the imaginations of members were 
affected by such expressions as the " sources of the Thames," 
and " a million gallons daily," in much the same way as 
the imaginations of the ignorant. Though the quantity of 
water proposed to be taken bears, to the quantity which 
runs over Teddington weir, about the same ratio that a 
yard bears to half a mile, it was thought by many mem- 
bers that its loss would be a serious evil. Xo method of 
measurement would be accurate enough to detect the dif- 
ference between the Thames as it now is, and the Thames 
minus the Cerney springs ; and yet it was gravely stated 
in the House that, were the Thames diminished in the 
proposed way, " the proportion of sewage to pure watei 
would be seriously increased." Taking a minute out of 
twelve hours, would be taking as large a proportion as the 
Cheltenham people wish to take from the Thames. Never- 
theless, it was contended that to let Cheltenham have this 
quantity would be " to rob the towns along the banks of 
the Thames of their rights." Though, of the Thames tlow 



ON THE WATER QUESTION. 315 

ing by each of these towns, some 999 parts out of 1,000 
pass by unused, it was held that a great injustice would be 
committed were one or two of these 999 parts appropriated 
by the inhabitants of a town who can now obtain daily but 
four gallons of foul water per head. 

But the apparent inability thus shown to think of causes 
and effects in something like their true quantitive relations, 
was still more conspicuously shown. It was stated by sev- 
eral members that the Thames Navigation Commissioners 
would have opposed the bill if the commission had not been 
bankrupt ; and this hypothetical opposition appeared to 
have weight. If we may trust the reports, the House of 
Commons listened with gravity to the assertion of one of 
its members, that, if the Cerney springs were diverted, 
" shoals and flats would be created." Not a laugh nor a 
cry of " Oh ! oh," appears to have been produced by the 
prophecy, that the volume and scouring power of the 
Thames would be seriously affected by taking away from 
it twelve gallons per second ! The whole quantity which 
these springs supply would be delivered by a current mov- 
ing through a pipe one foot in diameter at the rate of less 
than two miles per hour. Yet, when it was said that the 
navigability of the Thames would be injuriously affected 
by this deduction, there were no shouts of derision. On 
the contrary, the House rejected the Cheltenham Water 
Bill by a majority of one hundred and eighteen to eighty- 
eight. It is true that the data were not presented in the 
above shape. But the remarkable fact is, that, even in the 
absence of a specific comparison, it should not have been 
at once seen that the water of springs, which drain but a 
few square miles at most, can be but an inappreciable part 
of the water which runs out of the Thames basin, extend- 
ing over several thousand square miles. In itself, this is 
a matter of small moment.\ It interests us here simply as 



316 

an example of legislative judgment. The decision is one 
of those small holes through which a wide prospect may be 
seen, and a disheartening prospect it is. In a very simple 
case there is here displayed a scarcely credible inability to 
see how much effect will follow so much cause ; and yet 
the business of the assembly exhibiting this inability is 
that of dealing with causes and effects of an extremely in- 
volved kind. All the processes going on in society arise 
from the concurrences and conflicts of human actions, 
which are determined in their nature and amounts by the 
human constitution as it now is — are as much results of 
natural causation as any other results, and equally imply 
definite quantitive relations between causes and effects. 
Every legislative act presupposes a diagnosis and a prog- 
nosis ; both of them involving estimations of social forces 
and the work done by them. Before it can be remedied, 
an evil must be traced to its source in the motives and 
ideas of men as they are, living under the social conditions 
which exist — a problem requiring that the actions tending 
toward the result shall be identified, and that there shall 
be something like a true idea of the quantities of their ef- 
fects as well as the qualities. A further estimation has 
then to be made of the kinds and degrees of influence that 
will be exerted by the additional factors which the pro- 
posed law will set in motion : what will be the resultants 
produced by the new forces cooperating with preexisting 
forces — a problem still more complicated than the other. 

We are quite prepared to hear the unhesitating reply, that 
men incapable of forming an approximately true judgment 
on a matter of simple physical causation may yet be very 
good law-makers. So obvious will this be thought In- 
most, that a tacit implication to the contrary will seem to 
them absurd ; and that it will seem to them absurd is one 
of the many indications of the profound ignorance that 



DEFECTS OP GENEEAL EDUCATION. 317 

prevails. It is true that mere empirical generalizations 
which men draw from their dealings with their fellows 
suffice to give them some ideas of the proximate effects 
which new enactments will work : and, seeing these, they 
think they see as far as needful. Discipline in physical 
science, however, would help to show them the utter inade- 
quacy of calculating consequences based on simple data. 
And if there needs proof that calculations of consequences 
so based are inadequate, we have it in the enormous labor 
annually entailed on the Legislature in trying to undo the 
mischiefs it has previously done. 

Should any say that it is useless to dwell on this in- 
competency, seeing that the House of Commons contains 
the select of the nation, than whose judgments no better 
are to be had, we reply, that there may be drawn two 
inferences which have important practical bearings. In 
the first place, we are shown how completely the boasted 
intellectual discipline of our upper classes fails to give 
them the power of following out in thought, with any cor- 
rectness, the sequences of even simple phenomena, much 
less those of complex phenomena. And, in the second 
place, we may draw the corollary, that if the sequences of 
those complex phenomena which societies display, diffi- 
cult beyond all others to deal with, are so unlikely to be 
understood by them, they may advantageously be re- 
stricted in their interferences with them. 

In one direction, especially, shall we see reason to re- 
sist the extension of legislative action. There has of late 
been urged the proposal that the class contemptuously de- 
scribed as dividing its energeis between business and beth- 
els shall have its education regulated by the class which 
might, with equal justice, be described as dividing its 
energies between club-rooms and game preserves. This 
scheme does not seem to us a hopeful one. Considering 



318 



THE COLLECTIVE WISDOM.' 



that during the last half century our society has been 
remoulded by ideas that have come from the proposed pupil, 
and have had to overcome the dogged resistance of the 
proposed teacher, the propriety of the arrangement is not 
obvious. And if the propriety of the arrangement is not 
obvious on the face of it, still less obvious does it become 
when the competency of the proposed teacher comes to be 
measured. British intelligence, as distilled through the 
universities and redistilled into the House of Commons, is 
a product admitting of such great improvement in quality, 
that we should be sorry to see the present method oi 
manufacture extended and permanently established. 



XIL 

POLITICAL FETICHISM. 

ITROM THE READER, No. 128.] 



POLITICAL FETICHISlt 



A Hindoo, who, before beginning his day's work, 
salaams to a bit of plastic clay, out of which, in a few mo- 
ments, he has extemporized a god in his own image, is an 
object of amazement to the European. ~We read with 
surprise bordering on scepticism of worship done by ma- 
chinery, and of prayers which owe their supposed efficacy to 
the motion given by the wind to the papers they are writ- 
ten on. "When told how certain of the Orientals, if dis- 
pleased with their wooden deities, take them down and 
beat them, men laugh and wonder. 

"Why should men wonder? Kindred superstitions 
are exhibited by their fellows every day — superstitions that 
are, indeed, not so gross, but are intrinsically of the same 
nature. There is an idolatry which, instead of carving the 
object of its worship out of dead matter, takes humanity 
for its raw material, and expects, by moulding a mass of 
this humanity into a particular form, to give it powers or 
properties quite different from those it had before it was 
moulded. In the one case as in the other, the raw ma- 
terial is, as much as may be, disguised ; there are decora- 
tive appliances by which the savage helps himself to think 
that he has something more than wood before him ; and 



322 POLITICAL FETICHISM. 

the citizen gives to the political agencies he has helped to 
create, such imposing externals and distinctive names ex- 
pressive of power as serve to strengthen his belief in the 
benefits prayed for. Some faint reflection of that " divin- 
ity " which " doth hedge a king " spreads down through 
every state department to the lowest rank, so that, in the 
eyes of the people, even the policeman puts on along with 
his uniform a certain indefinable power — nay, the mere 
dead symbols of authority excite reverence in spite of bet- 
ter knowledge ; a legal form of words seems to have some- 
thing especially binding in it, and there is a preternatural 
efficiency about a government-stamp. 

The parallelism is still more conspicuous between the 
persistency of faith in the two cases, notwithstanding per- 
petual disappointments. It is difficult to perceive how 
graven images, that have been thrashed for not responding 
to their worshipper's desire, should still be reverenced and 
petitioned; but the difficulty of conceiving this is dimin- 
ished when we remember how, in their turns, all the idols 
in our political pantheon undergo castigations for failing to 
do what was expected of them, and are nevertheless daily 
looked up to in the trustful hope that future prayers will be 
answered. The stupidity, the slowness, the perversity, the 
dishonesty of officialism, in one or other of its embodi- 
ments, are demonstrated afresh in almost every newspaper 
that issues. Probably half the leading articles written 
have for texts some absurd official blunder, some exasper- 
ating official delay, some astounding corruption, some gross 
official injustice, some incredible official extravagance. 
And yet these whippings, in which balked expectation con- 
tinually vents itself, are immediately followed by renewed 
faith ; the benefits that have not come are still hoped for, 
and prayers for others are put up. Along with proof that 
the old State machines are in themselves inert, and owe 



BLIND FAITH IN OFFICIALISM. 323 

such powers as they seem to have to the public opinion 
that sets their parts in motion, there are continually pro- 
posed new state machines of the same type as the old. 
This inexhaustible credulity is counted on by men of 
the widest political experience. Lord Palmerston, who 
probably knows his public better than any other man, 
lately said, in reply to a charge made in the House — " I 
am quite convinced that no person belonging to the gov- 
ernment, in whatever department he may be, high or low, 
would be guilty of any breach of faith in regard to any 
matter confided to him." To assert as much in the face of 
facts continually disclosed, implies that Lord Palmerston 
knows well that men's faith in officialism survives all ad- 
verse evidence. 

In which case are the hopes from state agency realized ? 
One might have thought that the vital interests at stake 
would have kept the all-essential apparatus for administer- 
ing justice up to its work ; but they do not. On the one 
hand, here is a man wrongly convicted, and afterward 
proved to be innocent, who is " pardoned " for an offence 
he did not commit ; and has this as consolation for his un- 
merited suffering. On the other hand, here is a man 
whose grave delinquencies a Lord Chancellor overlooks, on 
partial restitution being made — nay, more, countenances 
the granting of a pension to him. Proved guilt is re- 
warded, while proved innocence is left without compensa- 
tion for pains borne and fortunes blasted ! This marvellous 
antithesis, if not often fully paralleled in the doings of 
officialism as administrator of justice, is, in endless cases, 
paralleled in part. The fact that imprisonment is the sen- 
tence on a boy for stealing a pennyworth of fruit, while 
thousands of pounds may be transferred from a public into 
a private purse without any positive punishment being ad- 
judged, is an anomaly kept in countenance by numerous 



324 POLITICAL FETTCHISM. 

other judicial acts. Theoretically, the state is a protector 
of the rights of subjects ; practically, the state continually 
plays the part of aggressor. Though it is a recognized prin- 
ciple of equity that he who makes a false charge shall pay the 
costs of the defence, yet, until quite recently, the Crown 
has persisted in refusing to pay the costs of citizens against 
whom it has brought false charges. Nay, worse, deliberate 
attempts used to be made to establish charges by corrupt 
means. Within the memory of those now living, the 
Crown, in excise-prosecutions, bribed juries ; when the 
verdict was for the Crown, the custom was to give double 
fees ; and the practice was not put an end to until the 
counsel for a defendant announced in open court that the 
jury should have double fees if their verdict was for his 
client ! 

Not alone in the superior parts of our judicial apparatus 
is this ill-working of officialism so thrust on men's notice 
as to have become proverbial ; not alone in the life-long 
delays and ruinous expenses that have made Chancery a 
word of dread ; not alone in the extravagances of bank- 
ruptcy courts, that lead creditors carefully to shun them ; not 
alone in that uncertainty which makes men submit to gross 
injustice rather than risk the still grosser injustice which 
the law will, as likely as not, inflict on them ; but down 
through the lower divisions of the judicial apparatus are all 
kinds of failures and absurdities daily displayed. It may 
be fairly urged in mitigation of the sarcasms current re- 
specting the police, that among so many men cases of mis- 
conduct and inefficiency must be frequent ; but we might 
have expected the orders under which they act to be just and 
well considered. Yery little inquiry shows that they are 
not. There is a story current that, in the accounts of an 
Irish official, a small charge for a telegram, which an emer- 
gency had called for, was objected to at the head office in 






AUTHORITY AS AN -OBSTRUCTION TO JUSTICE. 325 

London, and, after a long correspondence, finally allowed, 
bnt with the understanding that in future no such item 
would be passed, unless the department in London had au- 
thorized it ! "We cannot vouch for this story, but we can 
vouch for something which gives credibility to it. A 
friend who had been robbed by his cook went to the 
police-ofKce, detailed the case, gave good reasons for infer- 
ring the direction of her flight, and requested the police to 
telegraph, that she might be intercepted. He was told, 
however, that they could not do this without authority ; 
and this authority was not to be had without a long delay. 
The result was that the thief, who had gone to the town at 
the time supposed, escaped, and has not since been heard 
of. Take another function assumed by the police — the regu- 
lation of traffic. Daily, all through London, ten thousand 
fast-going vehicles, with hard-pressed men of business in 
them, are stopped by a sprinkle of slow-going carts and wag- 
ons. Greater speed in these comparatively few carts and 
wagons, or limitation of them to early and late hours, 
would immensely diminish the evil . But, instead of dealing 
with these really great hinderances to traffic, the police deal 
with that which is practically no hindrance. Men with ad- 
vertisement-boards were lately forbidden to walk about, on 
the groundless plea that they are in the way ; and incapa- 
bles, prevented thus from getting a shilling a day, were 
driven into the ranks of paupers and thieves. Worse cases 
may be observed. For years past there has been a feud 
between the police and the orange girls, who are chased 
hither and thither because they are said to be obstructions 
to foot-passengers. Meanwhile, in some of the chief thor- 
oughfares, may constantly be seen men standing with 
toys, which they delude children and their parents into 
buying by pretending that the toys make certain sounds, 
which they themselves make, and when the police, quietly 



326 POLITICAL FETICHI3M. 

watching this obtainment of money under false pretences, 
are asked why they do not interfere, they reply that they 
have no orders. Admirable contrast ! Trade dishonestly, 
and you may collect a small crowd on the pavement with- 
out complaint being made that you interrupt the traffic. 
Trade honestly, and you shall be driven from the pavement- 
edge as an impediment — shall be driven to dishonesty ! 

One might have thought that the notorious inefficiency 
of officialism as a protector against injustice would have 
made men skeptical of its efficiency in other things. If 
here, where citizens have such intense interests in getting 
a function well discharged, they have failed through all 
these many centuries in getting it well discharged — if this 
agency, which is in theory the guardian of each citizen, is 
in so many cases his enemy, that going to law is sugges- 
tive of impoverishment and possible ruin, it might have been 
supposed that officialism would scarcely be expected to 
work in all directions where the interests at stake are less 
intense. But so strong is the influence of political fetich- 
ism, that neither these experiences, nor the parallel experi- 
ences which every state-department affords, diminish men's 
faith. For years past there has been thrust before them 
the fact that, of the funds of Greenwich Hospital, one-third 
goes to maintain the sailors, while two-thirds go in adminis- 
tration ; but this and other such facts do not stop their 
advocacy of more public administrations. The parable of 
straining at gnats and swallowing camels they see abso- 
lutely paralleled by officialism, in the red-tape particularity 
with which all minute details are enforced, and the as- 
tounding carelessness with which the accounts of a whole 
department, like the Patent Office, are left utterly uncon- 
trolled ; and yet we continue to hear men propose govern- 
ment-audits as checks for mercantile companies ! Xo 
diminution of confidence seems to result from the disclos- 



BLIND FAITH IN GOVERNMENT MACHINERY. 327 

ure of stupidities which even a wild imagination would 
scarcely have thought possible ; instance the method of 
promotion lately made public, under which a clerk in one 
branch of a department takes the higher duties of some 
deceased superior clerk, without any rise of salary, while 
some clerk in another branch of the department gets the 
rise of salary without any increase in his responsibilities ! 

Endless are these evils and absurdities, and surviving 
generation after generation, as they do, spite of commis- 
sions and reports and debates, there is an annual crop of 
new schemes for government agencies that are expected 
by citizens to work just as they propose them to work. 
With a system of army promotion which insures an organ- 
ized incompetence, but which survives perpetual protests ; 
with a notoriously ill-constituted admiralty, of which the 
doings are stock-subjects of ridicule ; with a church that 
maintains its most effete formulas, notwithstanding almost 
universal repudiation of them ; there are daily fresh de- 
mands for more law-established appliances. "With build- 
ing acts under which arise houses less stable than those 
of the last generation ; with coal-mine inspection that does 
not prevent coal-mine explosions ; with railway inspection 
that has for its accompaniment plenty of railway accidents 
— with these and other such failures continually displayed, 
there still prevails what M. Guizot rightly calls that " gross 
delusion, a belief in the sovereign power of political ma- 
chinery." 

A great service would be done by any man who would 
analyze the legislation, say of the last half century, and 
compare the expected results of Acts of Parliament with 
their*proved results. He might make it an instructive 
revelation by simply taking all the preambles, and observ- 
ing how many of the evils to be rectified were evils pro- 
duced by preceding enactments. His chief difficulty would 



328 POLITICAL FETICHISM. 

be that of getting within any moderate compass the im- 
mense number of cases in which the benefits anticipated 
were not achieved, while unanticipated disasters were 
caused. And then he might effectively close his digest by 
showing what immense advantages have, in instance after 
instance, followed the entire cessation of legislative action ; 
not, indeed, that such an accumulation of cases, however 
multitudinous and however conclusive, would have an ap- 
preciable effect on the average mind. Political fetichism 
will continue so long as men remain without scientific dis- 
cipline — so long as they recognize only proximate causes, 
and never think of the remoter and more general causes 
by which their special agencies are set in motion. Until 
the thing which now usurps the name of education has been 
dethroned by a true education, having for its end to teach 
men the nature of the world they live in, new political de- 
lusions will grow up as fast as old ones are extinguished. 
But there is a select class existing, and a larger select class 
arising, on whom a work of the kind described would have 
an effect, and for whom it would be well worth while to 
write it. 



XIII. 

MR. MARTINEATJ ON EVOLUTION. 



. 



ME. MARTINEAU ON EVOLUTION. 



The article by Mr. Martineau, in the April number of 
the Contemporary Review, on " The Place of Mind in Na- 
ture, and Intuition of Man," recalled to me a partially- 
formed intention to deal with the chief criticisms that have 
from time to time been made on the general doctrine set 
forth in " First Principles ; " since, though not avowedly 
directed against propositions asserted or implied in that 
work, Mr. Martineau's reasoning tells against them by im- 
plication. The fulfilment of this intention I should, how- 
ever, have continued to postpone, had I not learned that 
the arguments of Mr. Martineau are supposed by many to 
be conclusive, and that, in the absence of replies, it will be 
assumed that no replies can be made. It seems desirable, 
therefore, to notice these arguments at once — especially as 
the essential ones may, I think, be effectually dealt with 
in a comparatively small space. 

The first definite objection which Mr. Martineau raises 
is, that the hypothesis of General Evolution is powerless 
to account even for the simpler orders of facts in the ab- 
sence of numerous different substances. He argues that, 
were matter all of one kind, no such phenomena as chemi- 
cal changes would be possible ; and that, " in order to start 
the world on its chemical career, you must enlarge its 



332 MK. MAKTTNEAU on evolution. 

capital, and present it with an outfit of heterogeneous con- 
stituents. Try, therefore, the effect of such a gift ; fling 
into the preexisting caldron the whole list of recognized 
elementary substances, and give leave to their affinities to 
work." The intended implication obviously is, that there 
must exist the separately-created elements before evolu- 
tion can begin. 

Here, however, Mr. Hartineau makes an assumption 
which few, if any, chemists will commit themselves to, and 
which many will distinctly deny. There are no u recog- 
nized elementary substances," if the expression means sub- 
stances known to be elementary. What chemists, for 
convenience, call elementary substances, are merely sub- 
stances which they have thus far failed to decompose ; but, 
bearing in mind past experiences, they do not dare to say 
that they are absolutely undecomposable. Water was taken 
to be an element for more than two thousand years, and 
then was proved to be a compound ; and, until Davy 
brought a galvanic current to bear upon them, the alkalies 
and the earths were supposed to be elements. So little 
true is it that "recognized elementary substances" are 
supposed to be absolutely elementary, that there has been 
much speculation among chemists respecting the process 
of compounding and recompounding by which they have 
been formed out of some ultimate substance — some chem- 
ists having supposed the atom hydrogen to be the unit of 
composition, but others having contended that the atomic 
weights of the so-called elements are not thus interpret- 
able. If I remember rightly, Sir John Herschel was one, 
among others, who, some five-and-twenty years ago, threw 
out suggestions respecting a system of compounding that 
might explain these relations of the atomic weights. 

"What was at that time a suspicion has now become 
practically a certainty. Spectrum analysis yields results 



ARGUMENT FROM THE ELEMENTS. 333 

wholly irreconcilable with the assumption that the conven- 
tionally-named simple substances are really simple. Each 
yields a spectrum having lines varying in number from 
two to eighty or more, every one of which implies the in- 
tercepting of ethereal undulations of a certain order by 
something oscillating in unison or in harmony with them. 
Were iron absolutely elementary, it is not conceivable 
that its atom could intercept ethereal undulations of 
eighty different orders : though it does not follow that its 
molecule contains as many separate atoms as there are 
lines in its spectrum, it must clearly be a complex mole- 
cule. Still more clearly is this general implication con- 
firmed by facts furnished by nitrogen ; the spectrum of 
which has two quite different sets of lines, and changes 
from one set to the other as the temperature is varied. 
The evidence thus gained points to the conclusion that, 
out of some primordial units, the so-called elements arise 
by compounding and recompounding ; just as by the com- 
pounding and recompounding of so-called elements there 
arise oxides, and acids, and salts. 

And this hypothesis is entirely in harmony with the 
phenomena of allotropy. Yarious substances, convention- 
ally distinguished as simple, have several forms under 
which they present quite different properties. The semi- 
transparent, colorless, extremely active substance common- 
ly called phosphorus may be so changed as to become 
opaque, dark red, and inert. Like changes are known to 
occur in some gaseous, non-metallic elements, as oxygen ; 
and also in metallic elements, as antimony. These total 
changes of properties, brought about without any changes 
to be called chemical, are interpretable only as due to 
molecular rearrangements ; and, by showing that differ- 
ence of property is producible by difference of arrange- 
ment, they support the inference otherwise to be drawn, 



334 MK. MAKTINEAU ON EVOLUTION. 

that the properties of different elements result from differ- 
ences of arrangement arising by the compounding and re- 
compounding of ultimate homogeneous units. 

Thus Mr. Martineau's objection, which at best would 
imply a turning of our ignorance of the nature of elements 
into positive knowledge that they are simple, is, in fact, to 
be met by two sets of evidences, which distinctly imply 
that they are compound. 

Mr. Martineau next alleges that a fatal difficulty is put 
in the way of the General Doctrine of Evolution by the 
existence of a chasm between the living and the not-living. 
He says : " But with all your enlargement of data, turn 
them as you will, at the end of every passage which they 
explore, the door of life is closed against them still." 
Here again our ignorance is employed to play the part of 
knowledge : the fact that we do not know distinctly how 
an alleged transition has taken place is transformed into 
the fact that no transition has taken place. We have, in a 
more general shape, the argument which nntil lately was 
thought conclusive — the argument that because the gene- 
sis of each species of creature had not been explained, 
therefore each species must have been separately created. 

Merely noting this, however, I go on to remark that 
scientific discovery is day by day narrowing the chasm, or, 
to vary Mr. Martineau's metaphor, " opening the door." 
Not many years since, it was held as certain that the 
chemical compounds distinguished as organic could not 
be formed artificially. Now, more than a thousand organic 
compounds have been formed artificially. Chemists have 
discovered the art of building them up, from the simpler 
to the more complex, and do not doubt that they will 
eventually produce the most complex. Moreover, the phe- 
nomena attending isomeric change give a clew to those 



THE OEIGIN OF LIFE. 335 

movements which are the only indications we have of life 
in its lowest forms. In various colloidal substances, in- 
cluding the albuminoid, isomeric change is accompanied 
by contraction or expansion, and consequent motion ; and, 
in such primordial types as the Protogenes of Haeckel, 
which do not differ in appearance from minute portions of 
albumen, the observed motions are comprehensible as ac- 
companying isomeric changes caused by variations in sur- 
rounding physical actions. The probability of this inter- 
pretation will be seen on remembering the evidence we 
have that, in the higher organisms, many functions are 
essentially effected by isomeric changes from one to an- 
other of the multitudinous forms which protein assumes. 

Thus the reply to this objection is, first, that there is 
going on from both sides a rapid narrowing of the chasm 
supposed to be impassable ; and, second, that, even were 
the chasm not in course of being filled up, we should no 
more be justified in therefore assuming a supernatural 
commencement of life than Kepler was justified in assum- 
ing that there were guiding-spirits to keep the planets in 
their orbits, because he could not see how else they were 
to be kept in their orbits. 

The third definite objection made by Mr. Martineau is 
of kindred nature. The Hypothesis of Evolution is, he 
thinks, met by the insurmountable difficulty that plant 
life and animal life are absolutely distinct. " You can 
not," he says, " take a single step toward the deduction 
of sensation and thought : neither at the upper limit do 
the highest plants (the exogens) transcend themselves and 
overbalance into animal existence ; nor at the lower, grope 
as you may among the sea-weeds and sponges, can you 
persuade the sporules of the one to develop into the other." 

This is an extremely unfortunate objection to raise. 



33G ME. MAETTNEAU OX EVOLUTION. 

For, though there are no transitions from vegetal to animal 
life at the places Mr. Martineau names, where, indeed, no 
biologist would look for them, yet the connection between 
the two great kingdoms of living things is so complete 
that separation is now regarded as impossible. For a long 
time naturalists endeavored to frame definitions such as 
would, the one include all plants and exclude all animals, 
and the other include all animals and exclude all plants. 
But they have been so repeatedly foiled in the attempt 
that they have given it up. There is no chemical distinc- 
tion that holds ; there is no structural distinction that 
holds ; there is no functional distinction that holds ; there 
is no distinction as to mode of existence that holds. Large 
groups of the simpler animals contain chlorophyll, and de- 
compose carbonic acid under the influence of light as 
plants do. Large groups of the simpler plants, as you 
may observe in the diatoms from any stagnant pool, are 
no less actively locomotive than the minute creatures 
classed as animals seen along with them ; nay, among 
these lowest types of living things it is common for the 
life to be now predominantly animal and presently to be- 
come predominantly vegetal. The very name zoospores, 
given to germs of algce, which for a while swim about ac- 
tively by means of cilia, and presently settling down grow 
into plant-forms, is given because of this conspicuous com- 
munity of nature. So complete is this community of na- 
ture that for some time past many naturalists have wished 
to establish for these lowest types a sub-kingdom inter- 
mediate between the animal and the vegetal : the reason 
against this course being, however, that the difficulty 
crops up afresh at any assumed places where this inter- 
mediate sub-kingdom may be supposed to join the other 
two. 

Thus the assumption on which Mr, Martineau proceeds 



THE OEIGIN OF MIND. 337 

is diametrically opposed to the conviction of naturalists in 
general. 

Though I do not perceive that it is specifically stated, 
there appears to be tacitly implied a fourth difficulty of 
allied kind — the difficulty that there is no possibility of 
transition from life of the simplest kind to mind. Mr. 
Martineau says, indeed, that there can be " with only vital 
resources, as in the vegetable world, no beginning of 
mind : " apparently leaving it to be inferred that in the 
animal world the resources are such as to make the " be- 
ginning of mind" comprehensible. If, however, instead 
of leaving it a latent inference, he had distinctly asserted 
a chasm between mind and bodily life, for which there is 
certainly quite as much reason as for asserting a chasm 
between animal life and vegetal life, the difficulties in his 
way would have been no less insuperable. 

For those lowest forms of irritability in the animal 
kingdom, which, I suppose, Mr. Martineau refers to as the 
" beginning of mind," are not distinguishable from the ir- 
ritability which plants display : they in no greater degree 
imply consciousness. If the sudden folding of a sensitive- 
plant's leaf when touched, or the spreading out of the sta- 
mens in a wild-cistus when gently brushed, is to be con- 
sidered a vital action of a purely physical kind, then so 
too must be considered the equally slow contraction of a 
polype's tentacles. And yet, from this simple motion of 
an animal having no nervous system, we may pass by in- 
sensible stages through ever-complicating forms of actions, 
with their accompanying signs of feeling and intelligence, 
until we reach the highest. 

Even apart from the evidence derived from the ascend- 
ing grades of animals up from zoophytes, as they are sig- 
nificantly named, it needs only to observe the evolution 
15 



338 ME. MAETLXEAU OX EVOLUTION. 

of a single animal to see that there does not exist any 
break or chasm between the life which shows no mind and 
the life which shows mind. The yolk of an egg which the 
cook has just broken not only yields no sign of mind, but 
yields no sign of life. It does not respond to a stimulus 
as much even as many plants do. Had the egg, instead 
of being broken by the cook, been left under the hen for 
a certain time, the yolk would have passed by infinitesimal 
gradations through a series of forms ending in the chick, 
and by similarly infinitesimal gradations would have arisen 
those functions which end in the chick breaking its shell ; 
and which, when it gets out, show themselves in running 
about, distinguishing and picking up food, and squeaking 
if hurt. When did the feeling begin, and how did there 
come into existence that power of perception which the 
chick's actions show ? Should it be objected that the 
chick's actions are mainly automatic, I will not dwell on 
the fact that, though they are largely so, the chick mani- 
festly has feeling and therefore consciousness, but I will 
accept the objection, and propose that instead we take the 
human being. The course of development before birth is 
just of the same general kind ; and similarly, at a certain 
stage, begins to be accompanied by reflex movements. At 
birth there is displayed an amount of mind certainly not 
greater than that of the chick — there is no power of run- 
ning from danger, no power of distinguishing and pick 
ing up food. If we say the chick is unintelligent, we 
must certainly say the infant is unintelligent. And yet 
from the unintelligence of the infant to the intelligence 
of the adult, there is an advance by steps so small that 
on no day is the amount of mind shown appreciably dif- 
ferent from that shown on preceding and succeeding 
days. 

Thus the tacit assumption, that there exists a break, is 



MISCONCEPTION OF A PEINCIPLE. 339 

not simply gratuitous, but is negatived by the most ob- 
vious facts. 

Certain of the words and phrases, used in explaining 
that particular part of the Doctrine of Evolution which 
deals with the origin of species, are commented upon by 
Mr. Martineau as having implications justifying his view. 
Let us consider his comments. 

He says that competition is not an " original power, 
which can of itself do any thing ; " further, that " it can- 
not act except in the presence of some possibility of a bet- 
ter or worse;" and that this "possibility of a better or 
worse " implies a " world prearranged for progress," " a di- 
recting "Will intent upon the good." Had Mr. Martineau 
looked more closely into the matter, he would have found 
that, though the words and phrases he quotes are used for 
convenience, the conceptions they imply are not at all es- 
sential to the doctrine. Under its rigorously-scientific 
form, the doctrine is expressible in purely-physical terms, 
which neither imply competition nor imply better and 
worse.* 

Beyond this indirect mistake there is a direct mistake. 
Mr. Martineau speaks of the " survivorship of the better," 
as though that were the statement of the law, and then 
adds that the alleged result cannot be inferred " except on 
the assumption that whatever is better is stronger too." 
But the words he here uses are his own words, not the 
words of those he opposes. The law is the survival of the 
fittest. Probably, in substituting " better " for " fittest," 
Mr. Martineau did not suppose that he was changing the 
meaning ; though I dare say he perceived that the mean- 
ing of the word " fittest " did not suit his argument so 
well. Had he examined the facts, he would have found 

*" Principles of Biology," §§ 159-168. 



340 



ME. MAETIXEATT ON EVOLUTION. 



that the law is not the survival of the " better " or the 
" stronger," if we give to those words any thing like their 
ordinary meanings. It is the survival of those which are 
constitutionally fittest to thrive under the conditions in 
which they are placed ; and very often that which, hu- 
manly speaking, is inferiority, causes the survival. Su- 
periority, whether in size, strength, activity, or sagacity, 
is, other things equal, at the cost of diminished fertility ; 
and where the life led by a species does not demand these 
higher attributes, the species profits by decrease of them, 
and accompanying increase of fertility. This is the reason 
why there occur so many cases of retrograde metamor- 
phosis — this is the reason why parasites, internal and ex- 
ternal, are so commonly degraded forms of higher types. 
Survival of the "better" does not cover these cases, 
though survival of the "fittest" does. When it is re- 
membered that these cases outnumber all others — that 
there are more species of parasites than there are species 
of all other animals put together — it will be seen that the 
expression " survivorship of the better " is wholly inap- 
propriate, and the argument Mr. Martin can bases upon it 
quite untenable. Indeed, if, in place of those adjustments 
of the human sense-organs, which he so eloquently de- 
scribes as implying prearrangement, Mr. Martineau had 
described the countless elaborate appliances which enable 
parasites to torture animals immeasurably superior to 
them, and which, from his point of view, no less imply 
prearrangement, I think the notes of admiration which 
end his descriptions would not have seemed to him or his 
readers so appropriate. 

One more word there is from the intrinsic mean- 
ing of which Mr. Martineau deduces what appears a 
powerful argument — the word Evolution itself. He 
savs : 



IMPLICATIONS OF "EVOLUTION." 341 

" It means, to unfold from within ; and it is taken from the his- 
tory of the seed or embryo of living natures. And what is the seed 
but a casket of prearranged futurities, with its whole contents pros- 
pective, settled to be what they are by reference to ends still in the 
distance ? " 

Now, this criticism would have been very much to the 
point did the word Evolution truly express the process it 
names. If this process, as scientifically defined, really in- 
volved that conception which the word evolution was 
originally designed to convey, the implications would be 
those Mr. Martineau alleges. But, unfortunately for him, 
the word, having been in possession of the field before the 
process was understood, has been adopted merely because 
displacing it by another word seemed impracticable. And 
this adoption of it has been joined with a caution against 
misunderstandings arising from its unfitness. Here is a 
part of the caution : " Evolution has other meanings, some 
of which are incongruous with, and some even directly 
opposed to, the meaning here given to it. . . . The anti- 
thetical word, Involution, would much more truly express 
the nature of the process ; and would, indeed, describe 
better the secondary characters of the process which we 
shall have to deal with presently." * So that the mean- 
ings which the word involves, and which Mr. Martineau 
regards as fatal to the hypothesis, are already repudiated 
as not belonging to the hypothesis. 

And now, having dealt with the essential objections 
raised by Mr. Martineau to the Hypothesis of Evolution 
as it is presented under that purely scientific form which 
generalizes the process of things, firstly as observed, and 
secondly as inferred from certain ultimate principles, let 
me go on to examine that form of the Hypothesis which 

* " First Principles," second edition, § 97. 



342 ME. MARTIXEAU ON EVOLUTION. 

he propounds — Evolution as determined by Mind and "Will 
— Evolution as prearranged by a Divine Actor. For Mr. 
Martineau apparently abandons the primitive theory of 
creation by " fiat of Almighty Will " and also the theory 
of creation by manufacture — by " a contriving and adapt- 
ing power," and seems to believe in Evolution ; requiring 
only that " an originating Mind " shall be taken as its 
antecedent. Let us ask, first, in what relation Mr. Mar- 
tineau conceives the " originating Mind n to stand to the 
evolving universe. Erom some passages it is inferable 
that he considers the " presence of mind " to be every- 
where needful. He says : 

" It is impossible to work the theory of Evolution upward from 
the bottom. If all force is to be conceived as one, its type must be 
looked for in the highest and all-comprehending term ; and Mind 
must be conceived as there, and as divesting itself of some specialty 
at each step of its descent to a lower stratum of law, till represented 
at the base under the guise of simple Dynamics." 

This seems to be an unmistakable assertion that, wherever 
Evolution is going on, Mind is then and there behind it. 
At the close of the argument, however, a quite different 
conception is implied. Mr. Martineau says : 

" If the Divine Idea will not retire at the bidding of our specula- 
tive science, but retains its place, it is natural to ask, What is its re- 
lation to the series of so-called Forces in the world? But the ques- 
tion is too large and deep to be answered here. Let it suffice to 
say, that there need not be any overruling of these forces by the 
"Will of God, so that the supernatural should disturb the natural : or 
any supplementing of them, so that He should fill up their deficien- 
cies. Rather is His thought related to them as, in man, the mental 
force is related to all below it." 

It would take too much space to deal fully with the 
various questions which this last passage raises. There is 
the question, Whence come these " Forces/' spoken of as 



MIND IN RELATION TO FOECES. 343 

separate from the " Will of God " — did they preexist ? 
Then what becomes of the divine power % Do they exist 
by the divine Will % Then what kind of nature is that by 
which they act apart from the divine Will % Again, there 
is the question, How do these deputy-forces cooperate in 
each particular phenomenon, if the presiding Will is not 
there present to control them % Either an organ, which 
develops into fitness for its function, develops by the co- 
operation of these forces under the direction of Mind 
then present, or it so develops in the absence of Mind. 
If it develops in the absence of Mind, the hypothesis is 
given up ; and if the " originating Mind " is required to 
be then and there present, we must suppose a particular 
providence to be present in each particular organ of each 
particular creature throughout the univere. Once more 
there is the question, If " His thought is related to 
them [these Forces] as, in Man, the mental force is related 
to all below it," how can " His thought " be regarded as 
the cause of Evolution ? In man the mental force is re- 
lated to the forces below it neither as a creator of them, 
nor as a regulator of them, save in a very limited way : 
the greater part of the forces present in man, both struct- 
ural and functional, defy the mental force absolutely. Nay, 
more, it needs but to injure a nerve to see that the power 
of the mental force over the physical forces is dependent 
on conditions that are themselves physical, and one who 
takes morphia, in mistake for magnesia, discovers that the 
power of the physical forces over the mental is ^^con- 
ditioned by any thing mental. 

Not dwelling on these questions, however, I will mere- 
ly draw attention to the entire incongruity of this concep- 
tion with the previous conception which I have quoted. 
Assuming that, when the choice is pressed on him, Mr. 
Martineau will choose the first, which alone has any thing 



B4A ME. MAETEsEAU ON EVOLUTION. 

like defensibility, let us go on to ask how far Evolution is 
made more comprehensible by postulating Mind, univer- 
sally immanent, as its cause. 

In metaphysical controversy, many of the propositions 
propounded and accepted as quite believable are absolute- 
ly inconceivable. There is a perpetual confusing of actual 
ideas with what are nothing but pseud-ideas. 2so distinc- 
tion is made between propositions that contain real 
thoughts, and propositions that are only the forms of 
thoughts. A thinkable proposition is one of which the 
two terms can be. brought together in consciousness under 
the relation said to exist between them. But very often, 
when the subject of a proposition has been thought of as 
something known, and when the predicate has been 
thought of as something known, and when the relation 
alleged between them has been thought of as a known 
relation, it is supposed that the proposition itself has been 
thought. The thinking separately of the elements of a 
proposition is mistaken for the thinking of them in the 
combination which the proposition affirms. And hence it 
continually happens that propositions which cannot be 
rendered into thought at all are supposed to be not only 
thought but believed. The proposition that Evolution is 
caused by Mind is one of this nature. The two terms 
are separately intelligible ; but they can be regarded in 
the relation of effect and cause only so long as no at- 
tempt is made to put them together in this relation. 

The only thing which any one knows as Mind is the 
series of his own states of consciousness : and if he thinks 
of any mind other than his own, he can think of it only 
in terms derived from his own. If I am asked to frame a 
notion of Mind, divested of all those structural traits under 
which alone I am conscious of mind in myself. I cannot do 
it. I know nothing of thought save as carried on in 



WHAT THE IDEA OF MIND IMPLIES. 345 

ideas originally traceable to the effects wrought by objects 
on me. A mental act is an unintelligible phrase if I am 
not to regard it as an act in which states of consciousness 
are severally known as like other states in the series that 
has gone by, and in which the relations between them are 
severally known as like past relations in the series. If, 
then, I have to conceive Evolution as caused by an " origi- 
nating Mind," I must conceive this Mind as having attri- 
butes akin to those of the only mind I know, and without 
which I cannot conceive mind at all. 

I will not dwell on the many incongruities hence re- 
sulting, by asking how the " originating Mind " is to be 
thought of as having states produced by things objective 
to it ; as discriminating among these states, and classing 
them as like and unlike ; and as preferring one objective 
result to another. I will simply ask, What happens if we 
ascribe to the " originating Mind " the character absolutely 
essential to the conception of mind, that it consists of a 
series of states of consciousness ? Put a series of states 
of consciousness as cause, and the evolving universe as 
effect, and then endeavor to see the last as flowing from 
the first. I find it possible to imagine in some dim way a 
series of states of consciousness serving as antecedent to any 
one of the movements I see going on ; for my own states 
of consciousness are often indirectly the antecedents to 
such movements. But how if I attempt to think of such a 
series as antecedent to all actions throughout the universe 
— to the motions of the multitudinous stars through space, 
to the revolutions of all their planets round them, to the 
gyrations of all these planets on their axes, to the infi- 
nitely-multiplied physical processes going on in each of 
these suns and planets ? I cannot think of a single series 
of states of consciousness as causing even the relatively 
small group of actions going on over the earth's surface. 



346 MR. MARTLNEAU ON EVOLUTION. 

I cannot think of it even as antecedent to all the various 
winds and the dissolving clouds they bear, to the currents 
of all the rivers, and the grinding actions of all the glaciers ; 
still less can I think of it as antecedent to the infinity of 
processes simultaneously going on in all the plants that 
cover the globe, from scattered polar lichens to crowded 
tropical palms, and in all the millions of quadrupeds that 
roam among them, and the millions of millions of insects 
that buzz about them. Even to a single small set of these 
multitudinous terrestrial changes, I cannot conceive as 
antecedent a single series of states of consciousness — can- 
not, for instance, think of it as causing the hundred thou- 
sand breakers that are at this instant curling over on the 
shores of England. How, then, is it possible for me to 
conceive an " originating Mind," which I must represent 
to myself as a single series of states of consciousness, work- 
ing the infinitely-multiplied sets of changes simultaneously 
going on in worlds too numerous to count, dispersed 
throughout a space that baffles imagination ? 

If, to account for this infinitude of physical changes 
everywhere going on, " Mind must be conceived as there M 
" under the guise of simple Dynamics," then the reply is 
that, to be so conceived, Mind must be divested of all attri- 
butes by which it is distinguished ; and that, when thus di- 
vested of its distinguishing attributes, the conception dis- 
appears — the word Mind stands for a blank. If Mr. Mar- 
tineau takes refuge in the entirely different and, as it 
seems to me, incongruous hypothesis of something like a 
plurality of minds — if he accepts, as he seems to do, the 
doctrine that you cannot explain Evolution " unless among 
your primordial elements you scatter already the germs of 
Mind as well as the inferior elements " — if the insuperable 
difficulties I have just pointed out are to be met by assum- 
ing a local series of states of consciousness for each phenom- 



A EETUKN TO FET1CHISM. 347 

enon, then we are obviously carried back to something 
like the old fetichistic notion, with the difference only, 
that the assumed spiritual agencies are indefinitely multi- 
plied. 

Clearly, therefore, the proposition that an " originating 
Mind " is the cause of Evolution is a proposition that can 
be entertained so long only as no attempt is made to unite 
in thought its two terms in the alleged relation. That it 
should be accepted as a matter of faith, may be a defen- 
sible position, provided good cause is shown why it should 
be so accepted ; but that it should be accepted as a matter 
of understanding — as a statement making the order of the 
universe comprehensible — is a quite indefensible position. 

Here let me guard myself against a misinterpretation 
very likely to be put upon the foregoing arguments — 
especially by those who have read the Essay to which 
they reply. The statements of that Essay carry the im- 
plication that all who adhere to the hypothesis it combats 
imagine they have solved the mystery of things when they 
have shown the processes of Evolution to be naturally 
caused. Mr. Martineau tacitly represents them as believ- 
ing that, when every thing has been interpreted in terms 
of Matter and Motion, nothing remains to be explained. 
This, however, is by no means the fact. The Doctrine of 
Evolution, under its purely scientific form, does not in- 
volve Materialism, though its opponents persistently rep- 
resent it as doing so. Indeed, among adherents of it who 
are friends of mine, there are those who speak of the Ma- 
terialism of Buchner and his school, with a contempt cer- 
tainly not less than that felt by Mr. Martineau. To show 
how anti-materialistic my own view is, I may, perhaps, 
without impropriety, quote some out of many passages 
which I have written on the question elsewhere : 



34:8 ME. MAETIXEAU OX EYOIXTIOiX. 

" Hence, though of the two it seems easier to translate so-called 
Matter into so-called Spirit, than to translate so-called Spirit into 
so-called Matter (which latter is, indeed, wholly impossible), vet no 
translation can carry us beyond our symbols.'' * 

And again : 

" See, then, our predicament. TVe can think of Matter only in 
terms of Mind. TTe can think of Mind only in terms of Matter. 
When we have pushed our explorations of the first to the uttermost 
limit, we are referred to the second for a final answer ; and, when 
we have got the final answer of the second, we are referred back to 
the first for an interpretation of it. TTe find the value of x in term? 
of y ; then we find the value of y in terms of x ; and so on we may 
continue forever, without coming nearer to a solution. The antithe- 
sis of subject and object, never to be transcended while cons; 
ness lasts, renders impossible all knowledge of that Ultimate Realitv 
in which subject and object are united." t 

It is thus, I think, manifest that the difference between 
Mr. Martineau's view and the view lie opposes is by no 
means so wide as be makes it appear ; and further, it 
seems to me that sneb difference as e.v her tbe 

reverse of that indicated by bis exposition. Briefly ex- 
pressed, tbe difference is tbat, where be thinks there ie 
mystery, tbe doctrine be combats recognizes a mystery. 
Speaking for myself only, I may say tbat, agreeing entirely 
with Mr. Martineau in repudiating tbe materialistic inter- 
pretation as utterly futile, I differ from bim simply in this, 
tbat while be says be has found another interpretation. I 
confess tbat I cannot find any interpretation ; wbile be 
holds that be can understand tbe Power wbicb is mani- 
fested in things, I feel obliged to admit, after many fail- 
ures, tbat I cannot understand it. So that, in presence 
of tbe transcendent problem wbicb tbe universe ] 
Mr. Martineau regards tbe human intellect as capable, and 

*" Principles of Psycholog - I edition, vol. L, § 

flbid,£272. 



SCIENCE HUMBLER THAN THEOLOGY. 34:9 

I as incapable. This contrast does not appear to me of 
the kind which his Essay tacitly asserts. If there is snch 
a thing as the " pride of Science," it is obviously exceeded 
by the pride of Theology. I fail to perceive humility in 
the belief that the human mind is able to comprehend that 
which is behind appearances ; and I do not see how piety 
is especially exemplified in the assertion that the Universe 
contains no mode of existence higher in Nature than that 
which is present to us in consciousness. On the contrary, 
I think it quite a defensible proposition that humility is 
better shown by a confession of incompetence to grasp in 
thought the Cause of all things ; and that the religious 
sentiment may find its highest sphere in the belief that the 
Ultimate Power is no more representable in terms of hu- 
man consciousness than human consciousness is represent- 
able in terms of a plant's functions. 

Other parts of Mr. Martineau's argument I pass over 
as being met by implication in the above replies. I will 
now add only that, should any further explanation be re- 
quired, I must postpone it until I am free from present 
special engagements. 



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